

Other Books By
EUGENE WILLIAM LYMAN

MEANING OF SELFHOOD AND FAITH IN
IMMORTALITY

EXPERIENCE OF GOD IN MODERN LIFE

THEROLOGY AND HUMAN PROBLEMS

THE MEANING AND
TRUTH OF RELIGION

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By

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A



TO

M. E. L.

C. E. L.

L. F. L.

PREFACE

In this study I have attempted to give a fresh interpretation of religion according to its own intrinsic nature and in terms of its typical forms. The great prophets and the movements which flow from them best manifest religion's intrinsic nature. In these great figures and movements religion reveals its inherent creative power. The heart of creative religion is ethical mysticism. But religion comes to its fullest development when it effects a synthesis of its mystical, ethical, æsthetic, and philosophical types. Accordingly religion in its full nature unites communion with Divine Reality, the creation and conservation of value, the appreciation and expression of Beauty, and the integration of thought and experience.

I also have sought to show how religion can contribute to the solving of the urgent social problems of our post-war world. The task of reconstructing our whole social order is upon us, and there is imperative need for such an interpretation of religion as will make clear its relevance to that task. The thought of the book culminates in setting forth the meaning of religion for building the Beloved Community.

The creative power of religion depends upon its truth. The second part of this study shows how religious faith and intuition are sources of truth. They are irreplaceable means of insight into the nature of Reality. They cannot, however, be regarded as infallible, but must be integrated with tested knowledge gained through other avenues of experience. The method which brings reason, intuition, and faith into most fruitful relation is the method of creative synthesis.

I find that our human experience can best be integrated

PREFACE

by theism, rather than by naturalism or pantheism, provided that the theism is an ethical theism and makes creativity an ultimate characteristic of the cosmos. Thus God can be conceived as a Cosmic Creative Spirit manifesting himself through the creating and conserving of value. I have sought to bring out the grounds for this conception, partly by examining the new cosmology which views the universe as an organism rather than as a mechanism; partly by reviewing the doctrines of emergent and creative evolution; partly through a philosophy of history which sees there, not unity, but a unifying process; and most basically by the appeal to moral and religious experience.

The spiritualistic philosophy to which, as I hold, we are thus led sees in man, not a physiological organism occasionally acting in an intelligent and moral way, but an emerging spiritual personality, at once a part of Nature and having kinship with the Cosmic Creative Spirit and with the realm of intrinsic values. Man's kinship with the rest of Nature can be understood if we conceive Nature after the fashion of panpsychism. His kinship with God is best expressed by the thought that in mankind God is creating creators and seeking to bring them into a community of love.

Such an interpretation does justice to the order, organization, and creative purpose in the world, and forms the right approach to the problem of evil. That problem cannot be met by a mere evolutionary optimism, nor by the radical supernaturalism of the Crisis-Theology. Intellectually one must accept the possibility of evil in a world in which contingency and freedom are real. But the only true solution must come through the conquest of evil when men become co-workers with God and sharers in his redemptive and creative love. On the basis of such an interpretation one can gain a genuine conception of God as both transcendent and immanent,

PREFACE

and can understand our human struggles and aspirations as a part of the achieving of a spiritual universe.

I am deeply indebted to my wife for the invaluable co-operation and criticism which she has given me in the preparation of this work.

EUGENE W. LYMAN.

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY

| CHAPTER | PAGE |
|--|------|
| I. A POINT OF VIEW | 3 |
| II. RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF PRESENT SOCIAL PROBLEMS | 27 |

PART ONE. RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

| | |
|--|-----|
| III. VITAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RELIGION | 51 |
| IV. RELIGION AND ETHICS | 77 |
| V. RELIGION AND MYSTICISM | 100 |
| VI. CREATIVE RELIGION | 126 |

PART TWO. RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE

| | |
|---|-----|
| VII. RELIGIOUS FAITH AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY | 151 |
| VIII. VALUE AND VALIDITY | 175 |
| IX. INTUITION AND REASON | 203 |

PART THREE. RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND THEIR RATIONAL GROUNDS

| | |
|--------------|-----|
| INTRODUCTORY | 229 |
|--------------|-----|

A. BELIEF IN GOD

| | |
|--|-----|
| X. NATURALISM. PANTHEISM. THE MEANING OF THEISM | 233 |
| XI. THE NEW COSMOLOGY AND THEISM | 256 |

CONTENTS

| CHAPTER | PAGE |
|--|------|
| XII. REINTERPRETATIONS OF EVOLUTION AND THEISM | 288 |
| XIII. THEISM AND HUMAN HISTORY | 317 |
| B. MAN AND HIS IDEALS | |
| XIV. THE HUMAN SOUL, ITS FREEDOM AND IMMORTALITY | 347 |
| XV. ULTIMATE VALUES AND ULTIMATE REALITY | 380 |
| XVI. THE PROBLEM OF EVIL | 399 |
| C. A SPIRITUAL UNIVERSE | |
| XVII. GOD, IMMANENT AND TRANSCENDENT | 415 |
| XVIII. BUILDING THE BELOVED COMMUNITY | 438 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | |
| | 457 |
| INDEX | 465 |

INTRODUCTORY

I.

A POINT OF VIEW

RELIGION, in one of its chief aspects, is the enhancement of life. It is enthusiasm, the heightening of the vital energies. It is vision, in which larger realities swing into view and new and abiding truths are discovered. It is freedom, through which dormant powers are awakened, deadlocked energies are released, and mind and heart expand to a fuller functioning. It is community-building, making men members one of another or lifting a merely natural solidarity upward toward a more articulate and spiritual community life.

For every one of these traits of religion abundant instances can be given in the beginnings of Christianity. They are unmistakable in Jesus, "the people's prophet," who came as the awakener of faith, the proclaimer of good news, the messenger of hope to the disinherited classes, and who opened to all men the way to become sons of God. They are central in Paul's interpretation of the gospel as a principle of liberty and as mystical union with Christ in the life of love. They are the meaning of Pentecost and the whole early Christian movement. They are exemplified in the Fourth Gospel's identification of the spirit of Jesus with the creative cosmic reason, the eternal Logos, and in its teaching that eternal life is possessed as a present experience by those who lay hold of the knowledge of God through its supreme expression in Jesus Christ.

But essentially similar traits can be discerned in varying degrees in the beginnings of most of the great religions, so far as those beginnings have taken place within recorded his-

tory, and also in the great reforms of religion. This is evident from the rôle of the prophet in these beginnings and reforms. The prophet is the creative religious personality who challenges his world from a higher point of view, and who has the energy, the vision and the depth of human sympathy to lift and win a group of his fellowmen to this higher point of view, so that ultimately he initiates a new movement in spiritual and social life. Thus we find Confucius, notwithstanding the conservatism of his stress on propriety and filial piety, really remaking the religion of the ancient classics by his selections, omissions, and emphases. And Socrates and Plato are religious personalities through whom Greek religion gets purged of its cruder naturalism and its provincialism and lifted to the level of an ethical and philosophical world-view—which later fuses with the mystical movements and with Christianity. Buddha, notwithstanding his disillusionment and renunciation of the world, appears as a recoverer and liberator of life, when his work is viewed in contrast to the sterile Brahminism of his day. Likewise Mohammed, in contrast to the decadent tribal religion in the midst of which he appears, is the originator of great spiritual forces and the builder of a new social system.

Later prophetic figures also furnish illustrations of these traits in religion. One need only think of St. Francis, imitating Jesus in a new and profound way, and of his Japanese contemporary, Nichiren,¹ summoning his people back to "the Lotus of Truth," to the purer following of Buddha, and to the ideal of the Bodhisattva, who perfects himself in saving others—from each of whom sprang movements of new spiritual and social life. And in our own day one may find further illustrations in such characters as Gandhi, Kagawa, and Rauschenbusch—each with his characteristic blending of mysticism and social passion, and each initiating new currents of life among his fellowmen.

¹ Cf. Masaharu Anesaki, *Nichiren, the Buddhist Prophet*.

RELIGION AND DEVELOPMENT

It is here proposed that this aspect of religion, in which it appears as the enhancer of life, as a creative spiritual and social energy, furnish the point of view from which the present study of religion be made. But this can be done rightly only as it is frankly recognized from the outset that religion, historically considered, has many other aspects as well—aspects very diverse from each other, some of which are, to all appearances, contradictory to the one just pointed out. The manifoldness of religious phenomena is the omnipresent, baffling problem for the student of religion. If he offers any clear-cut differentia of religion he is sure to be met with the criticism that he is ruling out some things which always have been regarded as religion; and if he tries for the greatest inclusiveness he is equally sure to be told that he has not discriminated his subject matter from certain other large fields of human interest which have rights of their own.

Perhaps the best way to meet this problem is to recognize both of its extreme limits. Let us say that, historically considered, nothing is to be excluded from the field of religion which anybody has seriously called religion. And at the same time let us recognize that, beyond the mere task of description, no ground is gained except as some definite point of view is deliberately and frankly adopted from which the described data are to be examined.

For the purposes of this study, then, we may choose the aspect of religion in which it is an enhancer of life, a creative energy, as furnishing the point of view from which we seek to gain a fresh understanding of the nature and workings of religion, to comprehend more fully its meaning for life and the universe, and to discover some of its larger possibilities for human destiny. This choice has its preliminary justification in the fact that religion unmistakably has this quality at times, namely, in prophets and prophetic movements. Why then should not this quality be taken as a hopeful clue to the nature and possibilities of religion? An interesting passage

A POINT OF VIEW

from William James conveys the suggestion that such a clue be followed up. In a footnote in his *Varieties of Religious Experience* he characterizes the "faith-state" as "that sense of the exceedingness of the possible over the real," and says: "This readiness for great things, and this sense that the world by its importance, wonderfulness, etc., is apt for their production, would seem to be the undifferentiated germ of all the higher faiths."² The adoption of this point of view, in the experimental spirit, should have both a philosophic and a practical value in making us alert to note the conditions under which this quality is manifest, in contrast to the conditions under which it is suppressed or absent, and in turning our attention to the possible remaking of religion in the direction of a fuller realization of some of its higher fruits.

But when we think of religion in this aspect of manifesting creative energy we should have something more specific in mind than the general facts of the development of religion and of the influence of religion upon human evolution as a whole. Some care is needed in discriminating between such terms as evolution and development and such terms as growth, "creative evolution," and progress, which are often used as almost or quite interchangeable with each other. The term evolution is applicable wherever a specific structure or state of things comes about by a fairly continuous process of change. The mere drifting of fog, as such, can hardly be called evolution, but one can speak of the evolution of the moon, in the sense that it has passed through definite stages, though the terms growth and progress are hardly applicable there. Development is a term which seems to require a process of change that results in greater articulateness and complexity of structure. For example, one may speak of the development of the earth's crust. The term growth we use loosely wherever there is any increment of being, as for instance one might speak of the growth of sand dunes; but

² See p. 505, f.n. 6.

RELIGION AND DEVELOPMENT

more specifically we mean a development of structure and function by means of internal assimilation of material from an environment, such as occurs in the case of organisms. "Creative evolution" would seem inapplicable where there is no growth, but beyond just growth it denotes the coming to pass of new structures primarily through the operation of internal directive factors. Progress means proceeding toward a goal, advance toward an end, approach to the realization of value.

The importance of making these distinctions here is to keep it clearly before us that religion may be evolving and developing without necessarily growing or making progress. Historically considered, religion is always evolving, and influencing and being influenced by the course of human evolution in general. In this evolution there have been, and are, both developments and stagnations or disintegrations, and from the standpoint of ends and values, both progress and arrests or retrogressions. At the same time, when these distinctions have been made there remains a constructive significance in the facts of evolution and development in religion, for though they are not to be identified with growth and progress, they offer the opportunity for them. Evolving things are to that extent plastic to directive forces and favorable material for the embodiment of ideals and values. An inorganic structure can be changed only by being broken up from without. One can change a hill into a house only by breaking up the rocks and shovelling the sand into the cement mixer. But in the case of growing things one has something more or less responsive to his touch. There is something in them to co-operate with. The plant wizard does not have to put his materials into shape solely by external force. He simply exercises a discriminative selection upon the internal forces of his plants. The same is true in increasing degree of the breeder of animals and of the trainer of animals. Finally, the educator of human beings can have the fullest co-opera-

A POINT OF VIEW

tion with the subjects of his endeavor—in fact co-operation is the very essence of his enterprise. Now religion is one of the most pervasive things in this most plastic of realms, the realm of human life. It has, indeed, its formidable rigidities but it also has great internal forces, potencies of change, of growth, of progress. To assume that the changes are sure to be progress is to ignore the dangers to which religion is subject and at the same time to miss some of its richest possibilities; while to assume that the rigidities can be changed only from without is to ignore some of the most dynamic possibilities of social change and human advancement.

It is an important fact, then, for the student of religion, whatever his point of view, that religion not only has evolved but is evolving, that it not only has undergone impressive developments but that it presumably is undergoing, or will undergo, further developments. A professor of philosophy in a Christian university in China, referring to the current reaction against the requirement of courses in the Bible and Christianity in mission schools, writes me as follows: "It is interesting that the teaching of Comparative Religion and Philosophy of Religion is favored for colleges, the idea being that they should be taught with utter impartiality, so that college students, being of mature enough judgment, may decide for themselves which set of religious ideas they wish to embrace." Here is obviously a plastic situation, so far as those who take this attitude are concerned, which may lead to most significant new developments in religion.

From the point of view of the present study the fact that religion is evolving now, and the presumptive fact that significant new developments will take place, are matters of the greatest moment for the discovery of the meaning of religion. For these facts bring it home to us that one of the chief meanings of religion is its capacity to take on new meanings, and even to engender new meanings. But they also make it evident that the realization of this capacity is a contingent

RELIGION AND DEVELOPMENT

matter—contingent probably upon the kinds of contact and alliance which religion effects with other sides of life; contingent quite possibly upon adjustments interior to religion itself—adjustments in the way in which individual personalities and groups live their religious life.

If religion is sure to be evolving always, and if ours is a time when significant new developments in religion are likely to be taking place, why should not religion be looked upon as a sphere for the exercise of “creative intelligence”? Indeed, why should not the exercise of creative intelligence toward human life and the universe be recognized as itself one of the manifestations of religion?—or, if one prefers, as something to be taken up into religion, and fused with other creative forces already within it?

I have heard a contemporary leader of prophetic quality protest, with fine moderation, that if it be too much to expect Christian churches as institutions themselves to play a prophetic rôle, why should they not be at least seed-plots for the growth of prophetic personalities? Why indeed? This in fact is what they have been, in a limited but most significant measure, in both ancient and modern times. Why may they not become such in the future on a far greater scale? Is it not quite within the range of possibility that a wiser and more resourceful religious education, a philosophy of religion more vital and inclusive and more widely shared, and a realignment of religion's social adjustments might bring this about? At all events since few things are better grounded in experience than the belief that prophetic religion will not die out on this planet while humanity lasts, it would seem that the problem of its maximum prevalence is one, not only for practical reform, but for philosophic thought.

An illustration of the importance of bringing the fact of development in religion and the ideal of creativity into effective union is furnished by the contact of Western Christianity and Oriental religions in its present phases. Here the fact of

A POINT OF VIEW

change on both sides is inevitable. One may look upon these changes as an unfolding of what always has been latent in the religions in question, or one may regard them as instances of epigenesis, in which something genuinely new is being created; in either case it is important to recognize that forces in religion different in part from those with which we have been familiar are coming into operation. Only on this basis, for example, can one treat with sufficient seriousness either the tendencies toward autonomy in the Christian churches of the Orient or the efforts for revival among the Oriental faiths.

But here again, though the fact of change is inevitable, *what* the changes shall be is not. Shall these changes be allowed to come about through merely blind attractions and repulsions, such as so largely control the contact of nationalistic groups and the great groupings of economic force? Or shall they be molded by creative intelligence—based even on the conviction that the exercise of creative intelligence is one of the most religious things that men can do? This is a genuinely crucial question for religion. It is difficult to think of one more important. But in this matter one thing at least is evident. In proportion as creative intelligence is applied to such issues within religion itself, to that extent will religion in turn become a stimulator of creative intelligence in the realms of national and economic contact and conflict.

We are now in a position to demark in a preliminary way the boundaries of our present study. We are undertaking a study in the philosophy of religion and so are concerned fundamentally with the nature and meaning of religion and with the problems of truth in the realm of religion. We are adopting more particularly as our field of inquiry the further development of religion and of life through religion. And we are choosing as furnishing our special point of view that aspect of religion in which it appears as an enlarger and quickener of life, as a source both of insight and of energy.

RELIGION AND DEVELOPMENT

We wish to explore so far as may be this creative energy in religion, especially in its bearing on making the further development of religion as rich and significant as possible. And we undertake this exploration with the thought that thereby we may grasp more fully the nature and meaning of religion and its possibilities as a source of truth.

Our guiding conceptions, thus, will be seen to stand in partial contrast to certain conceptions which have been very influential in the philosophy of religion. It has been, for instance, a ruling thought in much philosophy of religion and in much theology that religion reaches its fulfilment when it becomes adequately redemptive. And in accordance with this thought we find religions often classified in a broadly ascending scale as natural religions, legal religions, redemptive religions.⁸ The great examples of the last class are then shown to be Buddhism and Christianity, and these are discriminated according to the kind of redemption they provide, Buddhism sometimes being characterized as the religion of æsthetic redemption and Christianity as the religion of ethical redemption.

Very many facts fall into line from such a point of view as this. In a period of history when civilization has so nearly suffered collapse the meaning of religion as a source of redemption is bound to be strongly emphasized. Indeed, whenever in the concrete situations of life men stand in need of redemption, religion must respond to meet that need if it is to have any meaning and power. But it ought to be recognized also that, from the point of view just mentioned, certain other facts fall out of line. The religion of childhood and youth cannot be wholly, or even mainly, comprehended under the head of redemption, though as is well known the effort to do so has been made extensively, and with disastrous results. The religions of times of renascence and of rapid so-

⁸ See, for example, H. Siebeck's *Lehrbuch der Religionsphilosophie*, pp. 43-161.

A POINT OF VIEW

cial growth, religions of enlightenment, the religion of nature mystics—all these fall mainly outside of the category of redemptive religion; nor does the conception of the “religion of the future” readily come under this category. To treat all such types of religion as merely naturalistic or rationalistic, and so as being religion only in a very superficial sense, is greatly to restrict the meaning of religion for human life. On the other hand to regard redemptive religion as the only really vital kind of religion results in forcing more pliable natures artificially into an unnatural mold and in repelling stronger natures whose dominant need may not be redemption. Thus in the end an injustice is done to redemptive religion itself. If the danger of the more expansive types of religion is superficiality, the danger of redemptive religion is morbidness. But these dangers should not blind the student of the subject to the rightfulness and indispensableness of both kinds of religion.

James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* has been often criticized for dealing too exclusively with extreme expressions of religion, and this has led to some overlooking of the great service which James rendered in stressing religion's more expansive types alongside of its more introspective ones. When one is engaged in the descriptive work of the psychologist, it is enough to have restored equilibrium by ranging the two alongside each other.⁴ But when one is seeking a point of view for a unified interpretation of religion the creative functioning of religion offers more promise than its redemptive functioning. For when creative religion confronts definite evils it inevitably becomes redemptive, whereas the transition from the redemptive functioning to the creative is not so inevitable. There is a strong tendency for arrest

⁴ James after all seems to have had a certain partiality for the redemptive phase of experience—though this, too, he conceived in rich variety—as being religion in its more intensive form; but when the more expansive phases become genuinely creative they may be as intensive as redemption experiences.

RELIGION AND DEVELOPMENT

to ensue after the work of redemption has been measurably successful.

And if one has before the mind primarily the problem of integration—integration of the vital forces within Christianity, integration of Christianity and the religions which now are exclusively Oriental, and integration of all religion with other constructive social forces—the superiority of taking the creative aspect of religion as the point of departure seems evident.

Another way in which the guiding conceptions we have chosen stand in contrast to certain prevalent ideas has to do with the relation of the philosophy of religion to religion itself. Nothing is more common in religious circles of a liberal temper of mind than to set religion as "life" in sharp contrast to theology. This is felt to be an emancipation of religion and is an indication of the extent to which theology has been found to work oppressively upon the religious life. But this oppressive work has been due, not to theology as such, but to the use of particular systems of theology by ecclesiastical institutions as instruments of authoritative control. Theology as such is simply reflective thinking about religion—or some particular historical religion—together with the organized results of such thinking so far as it has positive value for life. It need not be distinguished from the philosophy of religion, except as it starts with some particular historical religion as presumptively a source of objective truth.

Now reflective thinking about religion, together with the effort to organize its results, should be recognized as an essential part of all religion that would have any far-reaching effect upon "life." It has been well said that a religion without theology is a religion without theory, and a religion without theory is a religion without intellect.

But not only have religious people, especially those of liberal temper from whom it is least to be expected, often

A POINT OF VIEW

relegated theology to an external place in their religion. Philosophers of religion also have too frequently regarded themselves as able to come on the scene only after religion has done its work. They have thought of themselves as merely "unofficial observers," without any real responsibility or power for actual developments. They have treated the philosophy of religion as a kind of seedless fruit, barren of power to be a productive part of religion itself. Of course, so far as this attitude of being an unofficial observer has been adopted for the sake of avoiding an undue bias from practical interests, it has been wisely taken, but carried beyond that point it has tended to pervert the conception of religion and of its development.

But if the study of religion be approached from the standpoint of its creativity, attention will need to be given to its intellectual elements. The part played by mythologies and theologies in religious development, and by the intuitions of the sage, the criticisms of the reformer, and the constructive imagination of the speculative thinker, has been something inherent in religion itself, and a genuine source of human advancement. The philosophy of religion is by no means external to religion itself. On the contrary it may be, and rightfully is, a vital constituent of religion.

Again, our guiding conceptions stand in contrast to certain ideas about the meaning of religion for society and civilization which are frequently held by sociologists and social psychologists. Thinkers in these fields are apt to assume that the function of religion in society is inherently conservative. A quotation from Professor Dewey will be in point. In his book *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* he writes: "Intellectually, religious emotions are not creative but conservative. They attach themselves readily to the current view of the world and consecrate it. They steep and dye intellectual fabrics in the seething vat of the emotions; they do not form their warp and woof. There is not, I think, an instance

RELIGION AND DEVELOPMENT

of any large idea about the world being generated independently by religion."⁵

Now this would seem to be a quite too sweeping generalization. There is, to be sure, abundant evidence that religious emotions have worked often and widely as here described; but that they always do so or that such is their inherent nature is too large an assumption. And while large ideas about the world may not have been *independently* generated by religion, why should this be asked for? It is one of the chief teachings of Professor Dewey that the ideas of philosophy itself are not generated by it independently, but are profoundly influenced by the social conditions of the times in which they arise. Large ideas are not generated independently by any single phase of human experience. But the implication that religion, including religious emotion, possesses no creative achievements or possibilities in the intellectual realm can be accepted only where there is an overlooking of the part played by prophetic religion in human history.

The whole development of historical criticism and interpretation in the field of Hebrew religion, and of the beginnings of Christianity has resulted in showing prophetism to be the vital core of both. This is a clue which should be used much more than it has been for the understanding of later developments in Christianity. The deification of Jesus, while exalting to the supreme place the qualities of life which he embodied, has tended to obscure his prophetic religious consciousness and its effect upon his followers. But it is important to ask whether the supreme influence of Jesus down through the centuries has not been through his power to evoke the prophetic life in individuals and social groups.

The same clue might well be applied much more searchingly to the other great faiths of the world. This will be done when they are no longer looked upon simply from the struc-

A POINT OF VIEW

tural point of view—as finished systems whose total meaning has been given in the deposits of the past—but also from the functional and dynamic point of view—as ways of life discovered by prophetic personalities and their disciples, which retain important meanings for all seekers of the way of life through all generations. No great prophet is really superseded and rendered meaningless by other prophets. Amos and Isaiah retain important meanings for Christians even though Jesus occupies the central place as compared with them. So it would be well if the founders of all the great faiths gained real meanings for the followers of each.

But when prophetic religion has assumed its rightful place in the historical understanding of religion, the conservative aspects of religion will be seen to be less significant than the creative aspects for the understanding of what religion is and what it can become.

There are three qualities of life which often enough have been produced by religion, but which are produced only when religion is creative. They are Courage, Reason, and Love. The recognition of these qualities as fruits of religion will help to justify our choice of point of view for this study.

There is no lack of evidence for the capacity of religion to produce courage. One has only to think of the initiation ceremonies in tribal religion by which the youth is tested and nerved till he proves himself able to take the full part of a man in the life of his tribe. Or one need only remember the part of religion in social protest, from Isaiah to John Hus and John Wyclif, or from George Fox to Tolstoi and the conscientious objectors and non-co-operators of today. "We ought to obey God rather than men" has been one of the characteristic utterances of religion and one of the explosive forces that political states always have feared. Or one may recall the part of religion in pioneering, exemplified by Xavier, or Livingstone, or the Buddhist missionaries cross-

COURAGE, REASON, AND LOVE

ing the Himalayas, or by any of the forerunners in the missionary enterprises of religion.

This same trait of religion is in the mind of Mr. H. G. Wells when he affirms that "God is courage,"⁶ and in the mind of Sir James Barrie when, in his rectorial address at the University of St. Andrews, he says to the students: "I know that your God is watching to see whether you are adventurous."⁷ It is to this trait of religion that William James points when he writes: "Taking creeds and faith-state together, as forming 'religions,' . . . we are obliged, on account of their extraordinary influence upon action and endurance, to class them among the most important biological functions of mankind."⁸ A leading sociologist has said that the chief function of religion is to give men *courage* in the French sense of the term—heart, gallantry of spirit, the ability to carry on. Religion is able also to produce courage of intellect. Many of the free thinkers of the world have been genuinely religious men. Indeed, wherever "free thought" is not mere revolt and scorn, or merely a cheap pose, but is an expression of humaneness and of an ardent belief in the power of the human mind to get truth and of the universe to yield it, such thought is of the essence of religion.

That Reason is one of the things which religion is capable of producing may seem less obvious, but only to the short-ranged and one-sided view. It is not strange that intense opposition has developed at times between religion and reason, for religion involves so much else besides reason and strikes its roots deeper into human life. Reason, on the other hand, as it develops, necessarily becomes very exacting and far-reaching in its demands. Hence we naturally find religion often in passionate revolt against reason, and reason in turn imperious and arrogant toward religion—each treating the

⁶ *God the Invisible King*, p. 55.

⁷ *Courage*.

⁸ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 506.

A POINT OF VIEW

other as though it were an alien enemy. But a more historical and inclusive view shows a kinship between the two which is deeper than the opposition, and which may be the basis of the fullest co-operation.

Professor Hocking has clearly brought out—what anthropology and the study of social origins show—that religion is the “mother of the arts”; from the beginning of history it has been the fertile source of human culture, and has stood in the relation of “parenthood” to the development of human power and skill.⁹ This applies no less to the work of the reason in the more special sense than to the development of arts in general. Astronomy and geometry, earliest of sciences, are bound up in their origins with religion. Men found in their worship of the heavens a motive for studying them, and when they discovered that the movements of the heavenly bodies were intelligible they did not regard those bodies as less worshipful. As men came to revere the earth for its productivity they were prompted to orderly sowing and reaping, and the development of the art of mensuration only enhanced the significance of the god of metes and bounds. In due time temples became the first libraries and priests the first cultivators and guardians of learning.

But not only are the special arts and sciences the offspring of religion; reason also owes to religion many of its large guiding ideas. Just as the atoms of Democritus are the prototypes, and in a real sense the progenitors, of modern theories of atoms and electrons, so religious ideas of order, necessity, fate—*Ανάγκη*, *Μοῖρα*, Rita, Asha, Tao—have been prototypes and progenitors of the conceptions of an orderly nature and of a justice higher than that of tribes and nations, which carried to their limits give the severe canons of physical law and of impartial right. Such a line of development may serve as a single illustration of religion functioning to create large guiding ideas for human thought. But one has

⁹ Cf. *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, Chap. II.

COURAGE, REASON, AND LOVE

only to remember how congenial to religion logos ideas have been, and how fruitful has been their religious use, to realize the significant extent to which religion has promoted the ends of reason. It is Santayana who, though eliminating so much that religion is wont to regard as rational, says that religion "aims at the life of reason." And while his metaphysics leads him to add that it "largely fails to attain it," he yet affirms that, instead of blaming religion, "we must rather thank it for the sensibility, the reverence, the speculative insight which it has introduced into the world."¹⁰

Nor is this function of religion in which it is creative of reason something limited to the early stages of culture or the beginnings of theologies. It is really present wherever new philosophies arise and new conceptions of moral life are brought to birth. Spinoza and Fichte were called atheists in their times, but who today would deny that they were religious personalities? Socrates, with his unique moral elevation, and Rousseau, with his grave moral defects, each brought new ethical ideas into being. And what is true of individual thinkers is true also of larger movements. The broad connection between philosophy and mysticism, even in the West, should never be forgotten. While all the philosophies of India, of China and Japan, and of the Islamic world have an obviously religious origin. After all, the essence of a great philosophy is its vision more than its argumentation; and large ethical ideas are hardly brought forth except by personalities in whom ethical thinking and a philosophy of the universe are so blended as to make those personalities essentially religious.¹¹

This capacity of religion to be creative of reason is significant for the further development of religion. Such a

¹⁰ *Reason in Religion*, pp. 9, 13.

¹¹ If it be objected that we here are blurring the distinction between religion and philosophy, the rejoinder must be made that too sharp a distinction between them is unreal and misleading. And if, in the interest of inclusiveness and to avoid arbitrariness, almost every superstition is in-

A POINT OF VIEW

further development of the highest importance would come about if this capacity were to become actualized as a stable and persistent function. That a development of this kind may be expected is the judgment of one of our ablest psychologists of religion. Professor Stratton writes: "Indeed, the course of events clearly points to a time when disregard of common knowledge and intelligence will seem as repugnant to the religious mind as disregard of common morals. . . . Science, we may expect, will in this gradual way become part of religion, and then it will be required of us to repent of our ignorance and fallacious thought as now of theft and slander."¹² Only we never should conceive this process as working one-sidedly, as though science were to be stimulative for religion but religion never stimulative of science. In the living organism every kind of tissue is now conceived to be important for every other kind. So in our spiritual natures the hormones of science make for the health of religion, and the hormones of religion make for the vigor of science.

The third quality of life which we chose as manifesting the creative in religion is Love. Here the evidence is obvious and correspondingly impressive. To be sure, religion, historically considered, has by no means always produced love. Religion as men commonly have understood it has often enough produced schism, strife, and hatred. What needs to be sought out is the conditions under which religion produces love, as well as the conditions under which it produces reason and courage. But, also historically considered, religion has been greatly productive of love. Evidence of this is to be found in any of the world's great religions, especially in the work of their founders or of later prophetic minds.

cluded under religion, why should not more rational attitudes and functions, when they are largely significant for life, be included as well? In the course of this study we shall seek to determine, as best we may, the distinctive characteristics of religion, by which the degree of its presence in different aspects of life may be measured.

¹² G. M. Stratton, *The Psychology of the Religious Life*, p. 356.

COURAGE, REASON, AND LOVE

Confucius makes reciprocity one of the basic virtues of his teaching, and his life was one of unsurpassed devotion to serving the social order. Moh-Ti presents a form of Confucianism in which love is the cardinal principle. Buddha, inconsistently with his central doctrine, instead of remaining absorbed in the Nirvana into which the saint may enter even in this earthly life, gives himself in compassionate endeavor to save the world.¹³ In northern Buddhism the highest religious ideal is for each devotee to become an incarnation of the principle of saviorhood. In Hebrew religion Hosea stands forth as the first great embodiment of redemptive love, this being conceived to be the very character of God; while in second Isaiah we find as central teachings both the compassionate love of God and the great ideal of the Servant Nation. Stoicism achieves the ideals of universal human brotherhood and citizenship of the world. Christianity in the teaching of Jesus rises to the height of love for enemies, again on the basis of the character of God and his impartial love for men; and in the teaching of Paul love is presented as the fulfilling of the law.

It is true that the meanings for which the word love stands in these several religions differ more or less widely, and that these differences are of much importance for our social and practical life, and should not be blurred. But it also is true that ethical quality runs through all the ideas and embodiments of love just cited; and so far as we may seek to correlate the further development of religion and the unification of mankind this fruitage of humaneness in any of the world's religions should be kept clearly in mind.

It is noteworthy, for example, that several of the greater faiths teach the Golden Rule, in its negative, if not its positive, form. The liberal rabbi Hillel, contemporary of Jesus, when asked by a young disciple how the Law could be summarized "while standing on one foot," answered: "What is

¹³ See *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XLIX, p 168.

A POINT OF VIEW

hateful unto thee do not do unto thy fellow. This is the great foundation; the rest is commentary."¹⁴ Confucius likewise was asked by a disciple: "Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practice for all one's life?" To which he replied: "Is not Reciprocity such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others."¹⁵ It is of the utmost importance for the further development of religion that these several religions have brought forth golden rules which can be ranged alongside that of Jesus: "All things therefore whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them: for this is the law and the prophets."

It is love in its fully ethical meaning that we have primarily in mind in emphasizing love as one of the most characteristic manifestations of the creativity of religion. If the term love be extended to include mystical love, the evidence that religion is productive of love becomes greatly increased in volume. It is perhaps in its mystical form that love appears most clearly in the history of Islam. Thus the Sufi poet Jalal al-din Rumi finds love of a mystical nature to be the essence of all religions:

Soul of mine, thou dawning Light, be not far, O be not far!
Love of mine, thou Vision bright: be not far, O be not far!

.
See how well my Turban fitteth, yet the Parsee Girdle binds
me;

Cord and Wallet I bear light: be not far, O be not far!
In all Mosques, Pagodas, Churches, I do find one Shrine
alone;

Thy Face is there my sole delight: be not far, O be not far!¹⁶

In mediæval Christianity mystical love is religion's most

¹⁴ Hastings, *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, art. "Hillel."

¹⁵ *Confucian Analects*, Bk. XV, xxiii. See *The Chinese Classics*, translated by James Legge.

¹⁶ Quoted in the article "Sufis," by R. A. Nicholson, in Hastings's *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*.

COURAGE, REASON, AND LOVE

characteristic fruit. Of the many great examples of this it may suffice to call to mind Bernard of Clairvaux, whom Dante selected "as the exponent of the blessed vision which is salvation's crown in the paradise of God." "Through all its stages," says Taylor of Bernard's central motive, "as it flows from self to fellow, as it rises from man to God, love still is love, and forms the unifying principle among men and between them and God." Perhaps no better description of this mystical love can be found than that given in the following passage from Bernard's *De diligendo Deo*:

Yet Scripture says that God made all things for His own sake; that will come to pass when the creation is in full accord with its Author. Therefore we must sometime pass into that state wherein we do not wish to be ourselves or anything else, except for His sake and by reason of His will, not ours. O holy love and chaste! O sweet affection! O pure and purged intention of the will, in which nothing of its own is mingled! This is it to be made God (*deificari*). As the drop of water is diffused in the jar of wine, taking its taste and color, and as molten iron becomes like to fire and casts off its form, and as the air transfused with sunlight is transformed into that same brightness of light, so that it seems not illumined, but itself to be the light, thus in the saints every human affection must in some ineffable mode be liquefied of itself and transfused into the will of God. How could God be all in all if in man anything of man remained? A certain substance will remain, but in another form, another glory, another power.¹⁷

Mystical love and ethical love are often considered to be quite opposite to each other in their nature and fruits. Whether or not this is true must be discussed in subsequent chapters. But here we may take as our working hypothesis the view that under the right conditions they are complementary to each other. As a preliminary justification of this view a notable passage in the *Imitation of Christ* may be cited, in

¹⁷ Quoted in *The Mediæval Mind*, by Henry Osborn Taylor, Vol. I, p. 425. See the entire Chap. XVIII on "The Quality of Love in St. Bernard."

A POINT OF VIEW

which mystical love issues in a disposition of unmistakable value for the ethical life:

Love is a great thing, on all sides a great good; it alone can make the heavy burden light, and bears with evenness all inequalities. For it bears a burden without a sense of its weight, and makes every bitter thing sweet and pleasant.

Nothing is sweeter than love, nothing stronger, nothing higher, nothing broader, nothing more pleasant, nothing better either in Heaven or earth, because love is born of God; and rising above all created things can find its rest in Him alone.

One who loves—flies, runs, rejoices, and is free and unrestrained.

Love gives all for all, and has all in all, for it rests in Him who is Sovereign and above all, and from whom every good flows and proceeds.

Love looks not at the gift, but has its eyes upon the Giver more than upon all goods.

Love often knows no limits, but is fervent beyond all bounds.

Love never feels a burden, never thinks things tasks, willingly attempts what is above its strength, never argues that things are impossible; because all things seem to it possible and lawful to be undertaken.

It seems able to do all things, and it does effect much, and takes in hand that which he who loves not would faint under and lie down.

Love watches, and slumbering does not sleep; if weary, it wearies not; if restrained, it is not straitened; if fearful, it is not dismayed; but as a living flame and glowing torch it bursts upward, and under all circumstances securely keeps its ground.

If any man loves, he will know what is the utterance of love.¹⁸

Finally, wherever personality is conceived to be of supreme value, there religion, as being some form of experi-

¹⁸ *The Imitation of Christ*, Bk. III, Chap. V, "Of the Wonderful Effects of Divine Love."

COURAGE, REASON, AND LOVE

ence of divine reality, is bound to issue in love. Reverence, worship, communion with God, dedication to the service of the ideal—all the characteristic attitudes of religion—lead on to that discovery and evoking of the “spiritual uniqueness” in others, and that striving for the purifying and perfecting of all human relationships which is the life of love. And in turn every deep and growing experience of human love, between husband and wife, parent and child, friend and friend—with its sharing of joy and of sorrow, of striving and of vision—and every passionate devotion to ethical causes becomes a religious experience, in which one finds oneself participating in the deeper meanings and forces of the universe.

In the work of religion in producing Courage, Reason, and Love, therefore, we find unmistakable evidence of the capacity of religion to function as a creative energy in human life. This evidence, together with the significance of prophetic religion on which we already have laid stress, must serve as our preliminary justification for the point of view which we have selected for this study. We are directing our attention to the further development of religion because religion, together with all other branches of human culture, is evolving, and because it is possible—even probable—that significant new developments of religion are coming to pass at this juncture in human history. We have chosen the aspects of religion in which it shows capacity to function as a creative social and spiritual energy as furnishing the special point of view for our study, both because these aspects give promise of revealing more deeply the meaning of religion, and because the exploring of these aspects may contribute to a fuller functioning of religion as creative intelligence, or to a completer fusion of religion with creative intelligence from whatever source. Thereby, it may be hoped, religion, which has done so much to reveal the possibilities

A POINT OF VIEW

of human nature and to create the ideal of a divine destiny for man, will be aided in realizing these possibilities and this ideal with clearer vision and a purer and more persistent passion.

II

RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF PRESENT SOCIAL PROBLEMS

IF we are to consider religion as a creative social and spiritual energy we shall need to think not only of its past creative manifestations but also of its possible meanings for present social problems. May religion, we are bound to ask, have genuine constructive significance for men in their efforts to deal with our major social issues? And if so, what are some of the more important conditions that must be fulfilled for the obtaining of this result? What qualities does religion need especially to manifest for such social functioning, and what are some of these major social issues to which it should be addressing itself?

Obviously it is not with detailed social programs that we should be concerned here, though if religion is to function as a stimulator of creative intelligence, social programs down to their last detail will become, upon occasion, matters for personal religious experience. Rather we should look for certain underlying dispositions and attitudes in religion which may render it a permanent spring of social insight and energy. At the same time we should seek to envisage social problems with some concreteness, for it is to these problems in their actuality and concreteness that religion in the end should apply itself. In the first place, then, what dispositions and attitudes in religion are most favorable for its contributing to the solution of present social problems? And how far may religion itself need to develop new dispositions and attitudes if it is to function in this way?

We are helped somewhat in approaching these questions by the feeling so widespread today that religion must somehow

RELIGION AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

play an important part in solving those urgent problems with which mankind is now confronted. But this feeling is apt to take shape in the notion that the part of religion will be played chiefly by the coming of some great ground swell of new emotion, which will move masses of the people and lift us off the mud-flats where we now are stranded. Thus Mr. H. G. Wells writes, in the closing chapter of his *Outline of History*:

Religious emotion . . . may presently blow through life again like a great wind, bursting the doors and flinging open the shutters of the individual life, and making many things seem possible and easy that in these present days of exhaustion seem almost too difficult to desire.¹

Or else it is assumed that the part which religion can play must await the coming of some new Messiah. Hence when Gandhi arises and wins a great following in India, he is looked to by some as though he were to do vicariously for us the creative social work of religion. Or, again, it sometimes is assumed that we need a radically new religion for the solution of problems so urgent and baffling as ours, and that, until this new religion has arrived, the new order can hardly be hoped for.

None of these forms of religious expectation should be discounted as without real potency. The apocalyptic imagination has played too important a rôle in history to justify so doing. Great tides of religious emotion, messiahs with stirring evangels, and new forms of religious life have arisen before in human history and they well may recur again. But by themselves, or taken exclusively, these notions of the relation of religion to the present problems of humanity are far from being adequate. And this is chiefly because they take so little account of the conditions of their own fulfilment. What we need to be doing is not so much scanning the

¹ *Outline of History*, Vol. II, pp. 582-3.

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

horizon for some sign of approaching religious renewal, coming to us from afar. What we need is rather to be discerning and creating the conditions under which religion here and now may begin to renew itself and to revitalize our human world. We need to make the transition from the mood of those who were "looking for the redemption of Israel" to the mind of him who initiated a world-changing movement of faith with the message: "The Kingdom of Heaven is at hand . . . is among you"—present as the loaf is present in the leaven, as the mightiest of herbs is present in the tiniest of seeds. What took place then in one unique mind needs now to be taking place in many minds and groups of minds. For is it not quite possible that the new messiah of our time will be a spiritual group—that spiritual group which best fulfils the conditions required for leavening the world's life?

At all events religion can never thrive greatly, and be qualified to do its part in solving world-problems, by feeding on expectation alone. If religion is to have strong vitality it must add to high expectation in spiritual matters a warm, vivid sense of present possession. It must not only yearn and strive for the distant good that will mean the redemption of human society and the fulfilment of the capacities of every personality; it must also possess the secret of redemption and fulfilment in an inward and practical experience. It must not only long for the perfect good, but it must know the indwelling God. The Psalmist found at least a practical solution for the problem of evil when he was able to say: "My flesh and my heart faileth: but God is the strength of my heart, and my portion forever." Corruption, oppression, and affliction were round about him and a part of his own lot, yet he could say: "Nevertheless I am continually with thee: thou has holden me by my right hand. . . . Whom have I in heaven but thee? and there is none upon earth that I desire besides thee." Religion in its great creative periods

RELIGION AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

has always rooted in some such vivid sense of possession as this. Witness the overflowing sense of the possession of the Spirit in the early Christian church, which could rise to the glowing consciousness of the words, "Old things are passed away; behold, they are become new!"

There are, indeed, signs that this condition of religious fruitfulness is being met to a considerable degree today. The revived interest in mysticism is at least evidence that the importance of this condition is being realized. But the question must be at once raised as to how far a recovery of the sense of present possession in the religious life is correlated with other conditions of creative religion and how far it may be detached from them—with the result that its value will be largely negative.

Now there are two broad, comprehensive conditions, in addition to that of a vivid sense of spiritual possession, which must be fulfilled if religion is to make an effective contribution to the solution of our world-problems. These are an active, quickening recovery of the great memories of historic religion, and a high expectation of religion's power to conquer human evils and to foster human development.

It is noteworthy that every period of discovery of new moral and religious truth is also a period of recovery of the more vital truths of the past. Hebrew prophetism of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C.—one of the greatest creative movements of the world's life—was to an important degree a recovering and maintaining of simple ethical elements in Mosaic religion in the midst of the corruptions and decadence of Canaanitish worship. The most adequate point of view for the historical understanding of the work of Jesus Christ is the recognition of it as the recovery of the essential spirit of Hebrew prophetism in the midst of the excessive legalism of his time. St. Francis, by recovering certain fundamental traits of the religion of Jesus, infused new vitality into Roman Christianity. The Reformers

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

brought forth Protestant Christianity by aid of a fresh recovery of the Bible. And a like process takes place in other departments of human experience at the times of significant renewal. Philosophy has often renewed itself by going back to Plato and Aristotle or some other creative thinker of the past. Literature, music, and other forms of art have been frequently rejuvenated through inspiration from classics of an older time. We seem to be dealing here with a law of human experience which religion never can afford to ignore. Hence if our present religious faith would make itself adequate for the task of securing a new unification of humanity it must again make recoveries from the creative periods of religion in the past.

But the quickening recovery of great religious memories, and the vivid sense of present spiritual possession, must in turn be kept in union with a lively faith in the possibility of social redemption, if our religion is to play a truly creative part in the present world crisis. For it is very easy to cherish the great memories of faith in the merely traditional spirit, and to cultivate a mystical feeling of present spiritual possession in a purely æsthetic way, without recognizing the profound moral possibilities of these essentials of religion—just as it is also not difficult to adopt a reforming program without taking pains to root it in sacred memories and a present experience of divine reality. Religion lives by memory, possession, and expectation in regard to the great values of life, and it does its full work only as these three aspects of its nature are actively reinforcing each other.

The question thus arises: How may this union between the aspects of memory, possession, and expectation, which is so vital to the full power of religion, be most effectually realized in these times of overwhelming spiritual need? In particular, if we begin with some kind of faith in the redemptive power of religion and some real expectancy of a better human world, how can this faith and expectancy best

RELIGION AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

be grounded in a strong sense of present spiritual possession, and in the great, sacred memories of our religion?

An adequate grounding of religious expectancy in a religious experience of present divine realities is doubtless the point at which difficulty will be most acutely felt by many, in view of the fact that realities which are undivine seem so thoroughly dominant in our world today. But it is a characteristic of religion that it is able to turn defeat into opportunity. And it is important for us to ask whether even now the way for again turning defeat into opportunity is not open before us—whether even now we may not realize that the kingdom of heaven is at hand and that God is working in our world. We thus are prompted to look for a mode of religious consciousness which is not simply a yearning for a better world through some new manifestation of religion coming to us from afar, nor yet a detached mysticism, a refuge from our disordered time; but which is a finding of divine reality in the actual process of discovering and fulfilling the conditions through which the better world may begin to come.

It has been wisely said that the genuine prayer is the beginning of its own answer—that is, in the very seeking of God there is a finding of him. So now it should be realized that in the effort to take our urgent human problems religiously there is the emergence of new religious power and a new finding of God. What we need is not a return of past religion unmodified, nor a totally new religion, coming like Melchizedek without father or mother or descent. What we need is to find certain new things sacred, to gain certain new objects of reverence, to enter into companionship with God through certain new relations. And if we are right in saying that the vivid sense of present spiritual possession which we need should be kept in living relation with our great spiritual expectancies and social tasks, then is it not precisely in the discovering and fulfilling of the conditions of a better world

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

that a new sense of sacredness, a new experience of reverence, a new consciousness of fellowship with God should appear?

Thus we are led to the thought that we need not postpone a warm, satisfying sense of spiritual possession till some better day arrives, nor cultivate such a sense as an escape-reaction at the expense of our moral tasks, if we can discern in the very effort to comprehend our present problems and cope with them a living relation to that which is most Divine. And indeed, if we take the idea of the immanence of God in earnest, why should we not perceive a real incarnation of the Eternal Creative Mind in the human enterprise of creative intelligence? If human life, so far as it is intelligent, fraternal, and beautiful, is a fitting fruitage of the Divine Will, is not creative thought and work toward such an end a genuine partnership with that Will? Or can we believe with full sincerity in a God of love who responds to human suffering and sin with healing, forgiveness, and redemptive power without finding an experience of sonship to God in all human efforts and sacrifices for relief, reconciliation, and recovery in our social and world order today?

But not only in creative intelligence applied to personal development and social ends do we find a new field for the sense of sacredness, of reverence, of divine companionship. More richly still is this field of religious experience open to us when such a spirit comes to animate a social group. For when creative intelligence animates a social group, the objects of reverence take on a new concreteness and variety, and the experience of divine companionship takes on a new intimacy. At the same time the stimulus to effective spiritual living is intensified and there is a great increase of objective spiritual results. Can we, indeed, on any other terms, give full meaning to the idea of the immanence of God in human life? If the Eternal Creative Good Will is really immanent in man as well as in the rest of the universe, then is not that

Will immanent to the supreme degree wherever the lives of men are integrated into a group for mutual spiritual action? This being true, *creative social intelligence*—social both in objective and in method—becomes the field for a peculiarly warm, intensive experience of present divine reality. And in so far as religious experience takes on this form it becomes a powerful new force for the solving of our urgent human problems.

In western Colorado there are mountain torrents which for uncounted centuries have come tumbling down through gorges that they have worn for themselves and have made their way to the sea, leaving dry and barren the naturally fertile steppes through which they flow. But in recent years men have directed these torrents out upon the steppes, through channels that subdivide endlessly, like the arteries of the human body, till every square foot of soil over wide areas has the requisite moisture, and all the land has become wonderfully fruitful. Nor have the mountains and the glaciers lost any of their grandeur through the fact that now they nourish a new abundance of life.

Similarly, there is much religious passion in the world which is simply following the channels worn long ago, leaving great tracts of human society barren and desolate for lack of the fructification it might impart. If creative social intelligence were recognized as affording suitable channels for this religious passion, it might be flowing out over these desolate tracts of human life and, penetrating to every part of them, redeem them to great fruitfulness and beauty. Nor need the ancient sublimities of faith be in the least diminished thereby.

But it may be said that the finding of that which is sacred in new aspects and enterprises of our life is psychologically impossible, for we can venerate only that which has become venerable by being deeply rooted in our life through a long past. The new, it is averred, cannot be revered till it has be-

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

come old, hence to seek communion with God in new aspects and activities of life is to propose something foredoomed to failure.

A half-truth underlies this objection, but it is only a half-truth, for the reason that religion has always thriven upon new revelation and upon miracle as well as upon ancient sanctities. Joan of Arc was a religious personality for the people long before she was canonized. George Fox had spiritual "openings" which made him despise the hireling priesthood and the "steeplehouses." In our own day we have seen an abundant up-springing of new cults. And we ourselves are witnesses of how prophetic personalities, such as Tolstoi, Gandhi, or Sadhu Sundar Singh, win a religious reverence as genuine as that accorded to the Roman Catholic Church and the Papal See. It evidently is a one-sided view of religion which holds that it never can advance spontaneously to new fields of experience or through its intrinsic nature play a creative part in human life.

Still the half-truth, too, should be recognized. Present religious experience and active social devotion, if they are not rooted in great sacred memories, are apt to be like the seed sown in the thin stony soil, which springs up quickly but as quickly withers away. Individual persons, indeed, like separate stalks of grain, may thrive seemingly without fulfilling this condition. They doubtless find some special hidden rootage of their own. But large social results in religion do not come without nourishment from a fertile soil of historic religious experience and literature.

We already have emphasized that religion lives by memory as well as by possession and expectation. And we have noted, too, that the most important periods of religious creativity are also periods of recovery of religious resources out of the past. But the connecting bond between sacred memories and a religion of present creative power appears when the memories held most sacred are those which have to do with past

RELIGION AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

religious creativity. We cannot really and intelligently revere the Hebrew prophets who brought forth ethical monotheism without being kindled to devotion to the unifying of human life in our own time as being the deepest form of experience of God. We cannot cherish the New Testament teaching of the Spirit in living faith without perceiving that it should mean a spirit of freedom for us as it did for Paul, and that it should lead us to fresh insight as it did the author of the Fourth Gospel. Nor can we truly honor the prophets of later times unless we discover that they summon us to an independence of thought and deed like their own. John Milton wrote: "A man may be an heretic in the truth, and if he believes things only because his pastor says so . . . the very truth he holds becomes his heresy." (*Areopagitica*, ii, 431.)

Often enough, as this passage from Milton warns us, religious tradition has been deadening, just as mysticism often has been self-centred and religious hope has been fanatical. But this does not diminish the fact that there is a religious tradition of freedom, which shows that religion is capable of acting as a quickener and a ferment in times of social need. And if we today are feeling acutely the need of religion in solving our urgent human problems, we should make the most of this religious tradition of freedom as an indispensable nourishment for religious experience and hope. Thus we may complete the synthesis of sacred memories, a present experience of divine reality, and an active expectancy of a better world on which the most vital religious life depends.

But we must go on to consider what problems present themselves as so urgent and persistent that they call for new developments in religion? Unmistakably the most overshadowing problem is that of war and its positive counterpart, the creation of world friendship and world co-operation. Creative evolution has suffered arrest on this planet through war. It is fatuous to cling to a blind faith that it automati-

cally will go forward again "somehow." In fact such a blind faith may be one of the most serious obstacles to the resumption of creative evolution. It would be well if this blind faith could be disciplined by the thought that *homo sapiens*, although possessing many unrealized potentialities, yet may have reached the limit of his development as a whole through inability to solve the problem of war. The truth may be that only some more richly endowed type, arising on some other planet and better able to manage the social conditions of growth, will be capable of carrying creative evolution further. If then we are rightfully to cherish the faith that mankind can rise to higher levels than the present, it must be because our faith itself is opening up to us new insights and new powers.

But even a positive and enlightened religious faith, grounded in the personal experience of God and of the power of love, may be inadequate for the part that religion should play in the resumption of creative evolution, if it does not grapple directly with the problem of war. For though mankind has advanced thus far in spite of war, it is possible that further advancement cannot be made on these terms. In view of the colossal proportions that the institution of war has taken on, and of the increasingly terrible havoc which it works, materially and spiritually, as civilization becomes more highly organized, it seems indeed highly probable that the human race as a whole cannot advance further unless long strides can be taken toward the abolition of war. Hence if religion would do its characteristic work of recovering men from evil, imparting to them fresh vision, and releasing in them greater energies, it must address itself to the new conditions which the problem of war presents. In so doing, also, it must effect a new fusion with other aspects of experience—with intelligence and social-mindedness—on which the solution of the war problem depends. Thus religion itself will enter upon a further development and be

RELIGION AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

renewed in its power to impart a sense of present spiritual possession and of co-working with the immanent God.

The part which religious memory may have in developing a present religious experience which shall be fruitful for dealing with the problem of war is supremely illustrated in the instances of Christianity and of Buddhism, for the principle of non-resistance belongs to the classic forms of each. In the case of Christianity, not only did Jesus teach non-resistance and exemplify it in his life, but also, if this teaching is recognized to be central in his whole gospel—the counterpart of his humility and his love—a fuller historical understanding of his gospel becomes possible. Professor Simkhovitch, in his little book, *Toward the Understanding of Jesus*, shows how the entire life of the Jews in Jesus' day centred about the question of resistance to Rome, what social strain and nervous crisis this question produced, and how such situations of strain and crisis tend to produce both fanaticisms and destructive follies and also heroic personalities that are able to rise to creative insights and to embody them in life. And Professor McGiffert has shown that the attitude of Christianity toward war for the first two centuries was prevailingly that of its repudiation.² In these characteristics of Christianity in its beginnings, notwithstanding their reversal later, there is spiritual nourishment for those who find the problem of the abolition of war of prime importance for their religious experience.

In Buddhism the principle of non-resistance has had a much longer and wider prevalence, though in this faith, too, it has suffered reversals, as when in Japanese Buddhism loyalty came to replace meekness and the following of Buddha was deemed compatible with the warlike spirit. But of the original teaching W. L. Hare affirms, "There is not in Buddhism a trace of esoteric doctrine about war; it is every-

² See the article "Christianity and War," *American Journal of Theology*, Vol. XIX, pp 323 ff.

NEW STANDARDS

where implicitly, and in many passages explicitly, condemned. The fifth step in the Eightfold Path, 'Right means of livelihood,' authoritatively excludes the profession of soldiering, along with that of the huntsman and the slave-owner." And the same author goes on to say, "We are probably warranted in saying that Buddhism went far toward forming that non-combatant temperament which is so often exemplified by Oriental nations, such as the Indian, Chinese, Siamese, and Burmese peoples."⁸

But intimately bound up with the problem of substituting world co-operation for war is another problem which also opens the way to new developments in religion. This is the problem of social justice, particularly in economic relations. The intimate connection between these two problems is perfectly expressed by a passage in Plato's *Republic*. Socrates has been pointing out to Glaucon how, in the early state, a country may become too small to support its inhabitants on account of their increasing demands for luxuries. He goes on:

Socrates Then a slice of our neighbors' land will be wanted by us for pasture and tillage, and they will want a slice of ours, if, like ourselves, they exceed the limit of necessity, and give themselves up to the unlimited accumulation of wealth?

Glaucon. That, Socrates will be inevitable.

Socrates. And so we shall go to war, Glaucon. Shall we not?

Glaucon. Most certainly.

Socrates. Then, without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, thus much we may affirm, that now we have discovered war to be derived from causes which are also the causes of almost all the evils in States, private as well as public.

Glaucon. Undoubtedly

The common roots of war and of the economic social ✓ problem in luxury, in appropriating "a slice of our neigh-

⁸ *Mysticism of East and West*

RELIGION AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

bors' land" or the control of natural resources, and in the unlimited accumulation of wealth make it clear that there can be no real solving of either problem apart from the other. But the two problems have different aspects which present differing tasks to religion.

In the case of the abolition of war it is very difficult for men to have faith. Hence the creative task of religion is to engender faith of such a sort as will stimulate and fuse with psychological and social intelligence in respect to the problem. In the case of the economic social problem it is altogether too easy for men to have faith that essential social justice is a present fact. And this is due not simply to the complacency of a privileged upper class and a comfortable middle class. It is due also to the doctrine, which is deeply ingrained in our modern life, that social justice is simply a matter of certain "natural rights" which can be secured by the unhindered operation of "natural" economic laws.⁴ If social justice is something that "nature" can be relied upon to work out, then, except as men unwarrantably interfere, it is really always at hand. The uprooting of this complacent doctrine is a task in which religion must bear its part. For the accomplishment of the task requires not only scientific criticism of the doctrine but new valuations of human life and fresh insights into human powers and relationships. In other words, the task calls for the exercise of that creative faith which is religion at its highest.

Instances of this creative faith, working at least after the fashion of the mustard seed and the leaven, are not wholly wanting in our time. A noteworthy one is to be seen in the instrumentalities for greater social justice that have been worked out in Chicago between a large body of employees and their employers, consisting of a trade agreement and

⁴ For the contribution to ethical progress made by the idea of a moral law of nature see the article "Moral Philosophy," by John Dewey in Johnson's *Universal Cyclopaedia*, 1899.

NEW STANDARDS

courts for its interpretation and for dealing with grievances—a lower and a higher court presided over by impartial chairmen. In the devising and successful administration of these instrumentalities there have co-operated a talented labor leader, a religious social worker, and a professor of philosophy at the university. And on a greater scale, one can find in the British Labor Party, especially in its early stages, a movement for social justice in which specifically religious influences and social science have alike been most significant factors.

Such instances, in which social justice is recognized to be not something that can be left chiefly to the operation of “natural” economic laws, but something that calls for the best creative powers and intelligence of men and women, indicate the way to a new present experience of the creative God. Here is a way to a partnership with God which can widen and enrich the meaning of communion with him. New objects of reverence are opened up. A deeper dedication becomes possible, and also the sustained enthusiasm which makes unselfish, sacrificial service natural and welcome. Personal inward unity, work for unity and co-operation among men, and oneness with the immanent and cosmic God all become realizable as parts of a continuous experience. And in turn the creative social enterprise, when it definitely takes on religious quality and meaning, receives a needed purifying and enrichment. It is guarded from the materialism and the preoccupation with institution, method and technique, which can so easily deaden it and is placed in its true setting as a part of the eternal divine creativity.

Moreover, in proportion as creative effort for social justice is undertaken by groups and apprehended religiously by them, to that degree the experience of present possession of the divine is strengthened and justified. For then there is realized in a microcosm what is being striven for in the macrocosm. And in times of world unrest and change the

RELIGION AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

bringing to pass of such microcosms is of large significance, both because of their power in sustaining the spiritual life of their members and because of their capacity for supplying the enzymes on which larger social growth depends.

In physical science co-operative work is increasingly fruitful and in social effort it is an obvious necessity, but only slight beginnings have been made toward the interpenetration of social science, constructive social effort, and the religious spirit.

Our thought thus far has led us to perceive that a present experience of divine reality is possible for us in the enterprise of creative social intelligence directed toward the abolition of war and the development of world friendship, and toward the realization of social justice in economic life. But a multitude of other problems crowd in upon us in this restless time and by their very number tend to destroy the peace and purposefulness which a present divine experience should give. How then, in the face of this confusion of problems, may a consciousness of present communion and co-working with the divine be preserved? "For God is not a God of confusion but of peace."

The difficulties presented by our present confusion of thought and our social distress have driven the dominant theology in Germany to abandon the ideal of a present divine experience and to deny its value. This Theology of Crisis finds the social order, and human nature as such, so radically evil that it rejects faith in God's immanence and in a present experience of him, and places all its emphasis upon the transcendence of God and upon the acknowledgment of his incarnation solely in Jesus Christ. The salvation of the human soul and of the world must be the work of the transcendent God in such a sense as to invalidate the consciousness of a present communion and co-working with God.

It is true that a theology which conceives of God in terms of immanence only will fail to meet the needs of men today

NEW STANDARDS

and will fall short of the power of Christian faith. But it is also true that a theology which rejects the immanence of God cannot bring religion into vital connection with man's struggle with the major evils of our time. The relation between the ideas of divine immanence and divine transcendence will be discussed in a later chapter, but here it must be affirmed that religion fulfils its mission peculiarly when it makes possible the experience of communion and co-working with God in the midst of a distressed and evil time.

But as we already have seen, an adequate experience of communion with the divine requires the interpenetration of the religious spirit with social science and social constructive effort. This means that intellectual work must play a part in our experience of divine communion, and that this experience must not be confined to periods of detachment but must expand itself so as to transfuse with its meanings the affairs of human life.

A first step toward understanding this more adequate conception of divine communion will be taken if we can realize that underlying our present confusion of problems lies one fundamental problem—the problem of a fresh discovery of moral and spiritual standards. In regard to sex and the family, the nature of education, the claims of the state, the sphere of art and recreation, the value of religious worship and religious institutions, and many other questions a fresh discovery of standards is most urgently needed. Too many today, in such matters, either are depending on standards that they do not intelligently and heartily believe in, or are abandoning their former standards and taking unreasoning impulse and selfish desire as their guide, or else are making a weak compromise between these two attitudes. Parents want their children to accept standards that they themselves are discarding. Schools continue forms of teaching known to be barren and perfunctory. Capital preaches law and order, and places itself above the law. Labor demands greater eco-

RELIGION AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

nomic justice and disregards the ethics of good workmanship. Religious forms and institutions which are not believed in are maintained for the good of society. For lack of a fresh discovery of standards men are having to choose between unintelligent custom and irrational impulse.

Here is an instance where religion may turn difficulty into opportunity. For the discovery of standards for moral and spiritual living is a creative task in which one may have fellowship with the creative God. The task is creative because we can possess no standards that are fully moral and spiritual unless they come as matters of personal insight. And even the re-discovery of old truths, if made with personal insight, is a new discovery—whence the perennial charm of teaching. The truths re-discovered acquire new shadings of meaning and new possibilities of spiritual fruitfulness are developed, as when a good singer renders an old song.

The task of discovering spiritual standards is creative for the further reason that our moral and social life is continually advancing into new situations, and these new situations require that our past experience be given a new form in order that it may be applied to them fruitfully. When men began to deal with electrical energy they found that they needed new standards, such as ohms, amperes, and volts. So when new social forces emerge, new standards for judgment and action are called for. To use old standards unmodified is inept and barren of results. To abandon all standards because the situations are new is to abandon the funded experience of the past, which alone can make us resourceful in dealing with the new. What is needed is creative thought and effort, transmuting old standards so that they become like nicely adjusted instruments for dealing with new conditions.⁵

And if God is working to develop sons of God who can bear a creative part, however small in range, in world build-

⁵ Cf. J. H. Tufts, "The Moral Life and the Construction of Values and Standards," in *Creative Intelligence*, by J. Dewey and others.

ing and in achieving a spiritual universe, then the discovery of new moral and spiritual standards for a new time becomes one of the pre-eminent forms of fellowship with him.

Says Grisel, in Sir James Barrie's *Tommy and Grisel*: "I don't think God has done it all. I don't even think that He told you to do it. I think He just said to you, 'There is a painted lady's child at your door; you can save her if you like.'" "No . . .," she went on, "I am sure He did not want to do it all; He even left a little bit of it for me to do myself." If a true insight is here expressed about the part that we ourselves and our fellows have in the saving of lives, is it not equally true to the inmost nature of religious experience that we have a part with God in creative thought and endeavor? And from this viewpoint discoveries of new standards for moral and spiritual living become focal points in man's life with God.

The discovery of new standards is a problem which comprehends a wide array of more special social problems, and many of these more special problems cannot be solved except as a discovery of new standards takes place, either as a prior condition for handling their more detailed aspects or concurrently. Take, for example, the familiar phrase of "a standard of living" in the economic field. Any just dealing with wage questions is bound up with the employment of such a standard, but neither the wages nor the social conditions of the past furnish such a standard ready-made. The finding of such a standard is conditioned upon our valuations of personality, and where these in turn are changing, obviously "the standard of living" must be new. But the valuation of personality is at once a moral and a religious matter. And the mental and social dispositions favorable to a fresh application of such valuation, and a fresh discovery of standards in consequence, are religious matters, or may be made such. Thus we can see how there is really none of

RELIGION AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

the important social problems of the present which does not have its religious aspect, and how, for the solution of each of them, there is a contribution needed from religion.

And in turn we see how, in perceiving and grappling with these problems, religion may renew itself, and in so doing may re-incarnate the creative quality of its classic times. It is often objected to a consideration like this that nothing was further from the classic periods of religion than concern with social questions, and that hence one misses the spirit of those classic periods if one accords to social questions a primary place in religion. But while the concept "social" may not have been a part of the intellectual equipment of prophets and their followers, religion often was actually more closely bound up with social and political life in those times than it is in ours.

Moreover, one cannot be loyal to the spirit of the classic periods in religion, while keeping to the same forms and applications of religion which they employed. It is of the essence of those classic periods that in them religion found for itself new forms and applications. Socrates was really a conserver of the moral life of the Greeks precisely because through inquiry he became an innovator. Jesus aimed not to destroy but to fulfil Jewish religion, but he knew that his teaching was new wine, which must be put into new wine-skins.

The prophet Habakkuk met a spiritual crisis arising out of military conquest by the insight that "the righteous shall live in his faithfulness." Paul found his way to the gospel of freedom from legal religion by rediscovering that "the righteous shall live by faith." Luther made justification by faith the central teaching in his work for religious inwardness and liberty. Tolstoi resolved the discords within himself and between himself and the social order by rediscovering that faith is "that by which men live." Thus the same truth passes down through the centuries, but does so only because

NEW STANDARDS

it clothes itself with new forms and meanings and so becomes, in important respects, a new and different truth.

The recognition, then, that in evoking creative intelligence for urgent social problems of the present, in making it the animating spirit of groups of minds, and in engendering the sustained enthusiasm for its effective application there is the opportunity for a present religious experience of new vitality—this recognition discloses the way to a further development of religion itself. For it makes possible a synthesis of those experiences of kindling loyalty to the great memories of religion, of expectant vision for the high destiny of mankind, and of warm and intimate possession of divine reality, which is what religion requires for its fullest life and its greatest power with men. Thus we see that religion can be today what in its times of greatness it always has been, a creative spiritual energy. Miss May Sinclair writes: "Every fresh discovery of truth, every creation of new beauty, every victory of goodness is, while it lasts, an experience, here and now, of God." Men of the present as truly as those of any age may find God in experience and be lifted thereby to a new life of courage, reason, and love. They may gain new visions of truth which shall be able to illuminate all of life. Men of the present may be inspired with such creative faith as will enable them to deal victoriously with the problems of war, of social justice, of race relations, and as will give them open-mindedness and resourcefulness for each of the social problems with which they are confronted. It is indeed an unphilosophic view of religion which assumes that it has reached the limit of its development and that it can make no more contributions to human progress.

PART ONE

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

III

VITAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RELIGION

OUR introductory study has brought out already what well may be regarded as the most significant thing about religion: its capacity to function creatively in personal and social life. But now we must seek to characterize more fully what it is which can thus function and which, even when it does not thus function, remains so inalienably a part of the life of man. What then is religion? Or, since our interest is primarily in the vital operations from which religion's funded results are derived, what is religious experience?

If we approach this question with an effort to avoid one-sided answers and to keep an objective attitude of mind, we find ourselves confronted by a twofold paradox. On the one hand there is the infinite variety of religious phenomena, Religion appears as pervading the entire life of a social group and hardly distinguishable from it, and at the same time it appears as a sacred institution and ritual holding itself apart from all that is profane. It takes the form of a priestly caste which stones all prophets, and the form of prophetic leaders who harass the priests and cause their downfall. It worships fecundity, and exacts celibacy. It is now an affair of the state, and again it is utterly supernatural and other-worldly. It may smile upon all the arts, or it may sternly break images and whitewash frescoed walls. It consists now in the punctilious observance of rituals, now in a prudential and urbane philosophy, and now in fervent apocalyptic hopes. It may be bound up with all the idiosyncrasy of a racial culture, or it may expand itself to include in its ideal the whole of humanity.

VITAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RELIGION

But in contrast to this great variability of religion, it also appears as integrative of human life. It is religion which holds the Jewish people together when exiled among the Babylonians and brings them back to a national life in their own land. It is religion which, in the person of Confucius, reacts against the disorder of the state of Loo and becomes the basis of a vast cultural unity. Roman Catholic Christianity was for centuries almost the sole principle of unity in western Europe. America owed such coherence of life as it had at the outset largely to religion; for America sprang, not only from thirteen political colonies, but from at least five great religious colonies—the Pilgrims and Puritans in New England, the Covenanters in New Jersey, the Quakers in Pennsylvania, the Roman Catholics in Maryland, and the Huguenots in the Carolinas. Unfriendly toward each other as these religious colonies sometimes were, they yet helped to create the regional unities out of which the wider federation was built. And in individual life no less than in society religion shows itself to be integrative. Faith makes men whole, bodily and spiritually. It reunites the divided self. It relaxes tensions and gives peace. It supplies a supreme allegiance under which more limited loyalties can be harmonized. It sets a far-off goal toward which all of man's spiritual energies can be marshalled.

Thus religion manifests itself both as a principle of variability and as a principle of integration. It now shows itself to be spontaneous, liberating, eccentric—even to the point of being disruptive of the social order—and again it shows itself to be a regulator, a powerful bond, a lover of the orderly and normal. It seems as though the paradox here indicated must lie very close to religion's heart and constitute an element of contingency there which gives rise both to the tragedy and the glory of religion. Religion, a bringer of peace and a breeder of strife, a stimulator of fanaticism and a shedder of light—how can this dualism, which aggravates

VARIATION AND INTEGRATION

our problems, be turned into a healthful duality by which these problems may be effectively met?

Having taken some account of the complexity of our problem, let us ask whether it can be simplified at all through the pointing out of certain vital and comprehensive characteristics of religion. Here as always we shall have in the forefront of our interest the question why and how religion is able to function creatively; but also we shall be seeking for traits which will give us some real grasp of religion's inner nature and uniqueness, so that its development in any direction may become more intelligible. As to the difficult question whether any traits can be found which are universal, all that we need seek for is traits which are persistently recurrent, for such traits, though not always in evidence, are essentially universal. In biological heredity the various traits are sometimes "dominant" and sometimes "recessive"; and the reason for recognizing them to be present in a recessive form when they cease to be dominant is that in later generations they recur in a dominant form. If, then, we can find certain traits which recur widely and persistently in religion we shall have good reason for accepting them as expressive of religion's uniqueness and as able to tell us something of its creative capacity.

First of all, religion is characterized by being an experience of *kinship*. Religion is an experience of kinship with a human group and with its more mysterious inner bond and principle of unity. Or it is the group experiencing unity with all its members and with its own mysterious inner bond. Religion in its broadest aspects is communal, and in its most intensive aspects it is communion and union. Into it enter to a peculiar degree the impulses of sex, of parenthood, of filial dependence, of gregariousness, of tribal solidarity. Through religious ceremonies tribal communities express their common life and rejuvenate themselves.

Religion unfolds into a worship of ancestors. Its first gods

VITAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RELIGION

are limited to the lands where their worshippers dwell. It sings the songs of heroes, tells the story of migrations and of great deliverances, and becomes the first vehicle of history. Thus it fosters that sense of continuity of life on which large societies so much depend for their vigor. A characteristic quality of Jewish religion appears when God is called upon as "the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob." And Christian congregations never fail to respond with kindled feeling to the hymn,

Faith of our fathers, holy faith,
We will be true to thee till death.

Religion, thus, is not only communal, it is community-building. Inter-tribal relations depend upon religion for their fostering. Oracles and religious festivals help to bring rival Greek cities into a certain unity of cultural life. Ancient kingdoms and empires found it needful to get their monarchs worshipped, and the modern nationalistic spirit seeks to identify religion as closely as possible with patriotism.

Even when new religions or religious movements begin, though they may involve a break with the established order, this experience of kinship and of a mysterious bond of unity with one's fellows is not wanting. These new movements begin with a Master and his disciples. They flourish first in little conventicles, in ecclesiolæ, in groups of monks, in class meetings. They increase because in these groups the Spirit is poured out upon the brethren. And in the end they in turn take on organic character and make their contribution to society at large.

Two authoritative witnesses from the field of the history of religion may be cited in substantiation of the point that an experience of kinship is basic in religion. Robertson Smith, in his classic work, *The Religion of the Semites*, found kinship to be the principle of the religion studied. He

KINSHIP, POWER, AND INSIGHT

showed that the primary meaning of blood in sacrifices is that it is a kinship bond, and that sacrificial meals are for the sake of maintaining and strengthening kinship in a group of worshippers and between the worshippers and their god. Thus he wrote:

There is then a great variety of evidence to show that the type of religion which is founded on kinship, and in which the deity and his worshippers make up a society united by the bond of blood, was widely prevalent, and that at an early date, among all Semitic peoples. But the force of the evidence goes further, and leaves no reasonable doubt that among the Semites this was the original type of religion, out of which all other types grew.

And still more generally he affirmed:

From the earliest times, religion, as distinct from magic and sorcery, addresses itself to kindred and friendly beings. . . . It is not with a vague fear of unknown powers, but a loving reverence for known gods who are knit to their worshippers by strong bonds of kinship, that religion in the only true sense of the word begins.

Religion is not an arbitrary relation of the individual man to a supernatural power, it is a relation of all the members of a community to a power that has the good of the community at heart and protects its law and moral order.¹

Similarly E. Durkheim sums up his elaborate study of religion, based upon its manifestations among the Australian tribes, as follows:

Nearly all the great social institutions have been born in religion. Now in order that these principal aspects of the collective life may have commenced by being only varied aspects of the religious life, it is obviously necessary that the religious life be the eminent form and, as it were, the concentrated expression of the whole collective life. If religion has

¹ See pp. 50, 51, 54, 55.

VITAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RELIGION

given birth to all that is essential in society, it is because the idea of society is the soul of religion.²

Durkheim's studies, then, give strong support to the view that in religion an experience of kinship is basic.

But Durkheim gives this religious experience of kinship too narrow a range when he limits it entirely to social relations. For by conceiving the mysterious inner bond of community life as a god, religion opens the way to a widening of the experience of kinship until it becomes cosmic in its scope.³ And here the paradoxical character of religion appears, since the experience of kinship with a cosmic power may become the basis of criticising social morality, or of an asceticism and individualistic mysticism that are largely anti-social. In such developments the historian naturally takes note of the wide divergencies and sharp antitheses; but the psychologist will point out that the impulses and drives of the kinship experience are still at work, only in new combinations with other elements of experience. We shall best comprehend even these antithetical manifestations if we regard an experience of kinship—social, or cosmic, or including both meanings—as being at the basis of religion.

But along with religion as an experience of kinship must be ranged another characteristic, which often leads in an opposite direction, and which appears when religion is an experience of *power*. Religion is an experience of inward power, whether felt to be born within us or to come from beyond us, by which we are lifted above routine living and achieve more than we can achieve by sheer effort. Over and over again in history religion has meant pre-eminently inspiration, enthusiasm, newness of life. This is true whether we think of the Dionysiac experience among the Greeks, or of

² *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, pp. 418-419.

³ Durkheim assumes that the cosmic meanings of deity can be only symbolical of its social meanings, but this is a question not for social psychology but for philosophy.

KINSHIP, POWER, AND INSIGHT

the Hebrew prophet, with the hand of the Lord upon him, pronouncing moral judgment on king and people; whether we think of the early Christian community speaking with tongues, or of its principle of abiding love which meant the fulfilling of the law; whether we think of St. Francis wedding his Lady Poverty, or of Luther breaking down the barrier between the sacred and the secular; whether we think of the periodic revivals among the evangelicals, or of the sustained devotion of the moral reformer. The higher manifestations of human power always have been felt to have a religious meaning, both by those who witnessed them and those who experienced them.

In advanced stages of religion this experience of inner power often takes the form of personal, moral freedom as itself possessing divine meaning. In Kant the moral law, as a principle of autonomy, aroused an awe like that awakened by the starry heavens. Schleiermacher apostrophizes the experience of freedom as follows:

Welcome to me, at those moments when I see the enslaved in spirit tremble, twice welcome to me, beloved consciousness of Freedom! beautiful serenity of the clear mind with which I cheerfully greet the future, knowing well what she is and what she brings, and that she is my free possession, not my tyrant. Fate rules only the gods who have nothing in themselves that they would accomplish, and the worst of mortals who seek to accomplish nothing in themselves, but not the man who directs his action to the shaping of his own life, as befits his nature.⁴

This consciousness of freedom Schleiermacher shows to be far diviner than blind trust in the higher foresight of an alien Sovereign Will and timorous hope for its mercy.

But it is not only in exceptional periods of enthusiasm and in pre-eminent personalities that religion shows this trait of being an experience of inner power. The same trait

⁴ See the *Monologen*, opening paragraphs of the first monologue.

appears in the peculiar concern that religion always has shown for the unfolding powers of youth and the religious meaning which those unfolding powers have for youths themselves. This concern extends from the deep interest of evangelical churches in the religious awakenings of adolescents, and the concentration of liturgical churches on confirmation, all the way back to the religious instruction of youth by sages and to the initiation of youths into full participation in the life of the tribe. In fact, while religion from the first has had a primary interest in kinship, it has had a correlative, though often secondary, interest in individuality.

Thus we see that religion is bound up with the original nature of man in a second aspect. It has to do in a fundamental way not only with the impulses and drives which express kinship, but also with those which consist in self-assertiveness and make for individuality. Concerning self-assertiveness Woodworth writes, in his chapter "Inventory of Instincts and Emotions," "Of all the native tendencies, this is the one most frequently aroused, since there is scarcely a moment of waking (or dreaming) life when it is not more or less in action."⁵ Inevitably, then, religion has as an important part of its functioning the meaning and scope which it can give to this elementary drive of our nature.

Nor should this interest in individuality be too much subordinated to the interest in kinship in our view of primitive religion. What Woodworth writes of a group of children must have been to an important degree characteristic of tribal life:

Get a number of children together, and you will see more than one of them attempt to be the leader in their play. Some must necessarily be followers just now, but they will attempt to take the lead on another occasion. The "born leader" is perhaps one who has an exceptionally strong dose of masterfulness in his make-up, but he is, still more, one who has

⁵ *Psychology*, p. 161.

KINSHIP, POWER, AND INSIGHT

abilities, physical or mental, that give him the advantage in *the universal struggle for leadership*.⁶

Recognition of the solidarity of tribal life should not blind us to the struggle for leadership which must also have been present, and which means so much for the development of individuality. And in this struggle religion certainly played its part. Prayer for prowess is one of the most frequent forms of prayer in primitive religion.⁷

But in this characteristic of religion, too, the aspect of paradox is not wanting. For the experience of power includes not only inward resourcefulness but also actual mastery of objective conditions; and this latter aspect calls for submission. The primitive prayer for prowess already contains both elements of this paradox, and in the advanced stages of religion humility and exaltation, surrender and self-fulfilment go together. The Stoic renounces all that he cannot control in order that above all things he may have self-control. Christianity teaches that the meek shall inherit the earth, that he that humbleth himself shall be exalted, that humility must be one of the chief attributes of the sons of God. And modern reflection upon the way of life shows that discovering and conforming to laws and the controlling of events toward freely chosen ends must go together. Perhaps this paradox points to the presence of both order and contingency at the heart of reality and tells us why a full spiritual life must needs be not only intellectual understanding and æsthetic appreciation but also a moral task.

But religion possesses a third vital characteristic, which serves both to correlate its experience of kinship and its experience of inner spontaneous power and also to widen their

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 165; italics mine.

⁷ Professor George Foot Moore finds in the struggle for self-preservation the primary root of religion in primitive life, and emphasizes the continuity between this primitive impulse and the experience of self-realization in the most advanced religions. See his *Birth and Growth of Religion*, Chap. I.

VITAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RELIGION

meaning and practical application. This third characteristic is *insight*. To religious experience belongs an experience of insight into truth and value. Religion has never advanced very far without producing the seer. The astute and canny person evokes awe in his fellow tribesmen as truly as does the man of valor. Early communities consult oracles as eagerly as they visit shrines. Kings do not like to go into battle if the man of God is against it. This function of insight in religion becomes a means of developing its kinship aspect. Tribal customs now and again require interpretation, and where tribes meet there must be either wisdom or war. But the priestly personage knows how sacrifices should be made; the sage, sitting in the market-place or at the gate, can supply the reconciling wisdom and instruct youth; and each possesses sanctity by reason of his insight. Thus the bonds of kinship are made more coherent and given an extended application.

But insight is also a vital factor in developing religion's individualistic aspect. The great prophet has first of all his vision, in which he apprehends a higher righteousness; his experience of illumination, through which he discovers a better way of salvation. And on the basis of such insights he becomes the challenger of the *mores* of his time and the originator of a better type of life. The greatness of any prophet is proportionate to the freshness of his insight. In the course of time religious fellowships arise in which insight is the recognized prerogative of all their members. An indwelling spirit of truth, an inner light, is accessible to each. Thus this characteristic of religion makes for the development of individuals and for democracy.

The idea of revelation in religion, in its experiential form, denotes insight. But insights that operate entirely *de novo* do not reach very far. Significant insight must always be to a considerable extent a fresh *comprehension* of experience and of truths already known. Thus the funded results of past

KINSHIP, POWER, AND INSIGHT

insights become very important for religion and grow into a body of revelation. And as the idea of God enlarges and human life becomes more complex the worth of such a body of revelation is more and more appreciated. But then the myth of Kronos eating his own children becomes applicable, for the accumulated body of revelation becomes the means of smothering further insight. It is in contrast to this development that the inherent religious strength of liberalism appears. Liberalism, to be sure, develops its own weaknesses, but so far as it maintains the function of present religious insight it is fostering one of the vital characteristics of religion.

The place of insight in religion appears in another fashion when wisdom, the fruit of insight, comes to be regarded by the religious mind as an eternal principle, having a cosmic, creative rôle. In this manner Wisdom is portrayed in Proverbs: "Jehovah possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. . . . When he established the heavens, I was there: when he set a circle upon the face of the deep. . . . When he marked out the foundations of the earth; then I was by him, as a master workman; and I was daily his delight." To the Stoic the Logos or Reason was a divine principle immanent in the mind of man and pervading all nature as well. In the first synthesis of Christian thought, the Fourth Gospel, the Word "was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him; and without him was not anything made that hath been made." This eternal Word is linked, through Jesus, with the Spirit of truth who "shall guide you into all the truth."

But the experience of insight develops its own inner tension and paradox. Insight comes not only by vision but also by reflection. It now is vouchsafed in swift flashes of intuition, but again it is achieved by processes of patient reasoning. Moreover, as a body of revelation grows it accumulates a varied content, and this content is not always harmonious

VITAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RELIGION

within itself. It develops discrepancies within itself and discrepancies with fact and further experience. "Immanuel" in some parts of Old Testament prophecy means "God with us" for protection, and in other parts "God with us" for judgment.⁸ When the question, "Why do the righteous suffer?" once has been raised it is bound to be answered in different ways, and none of the answers will satisfy. Reflection inevitably comes in; for insights, if they are to be the basis of a unified life, must be coherent. And the reflection which arrives at coherence of insight has gained further insight.⁹ The teachings of Jesus are all the product of intuitive insight, and some of his "hard sayings" never can be brought into complete harmony with each other except by the recognition that they came from a marvellously unified personality. But in the Fourth Gospel the knowledge of God has become a matter of intellectual reflection as well as mystical apprehension, and Jesus' way of life is commended, among other grounds, by reason of its philosophical validity.¹⁰

But these two modes of religious insight do not always function together. The sage may be a decidedly prudential person, whose teaching as to the way of life may contain much worldly wisdom; while the prophet's vision may make him the radical reformer, who is reckless of his own fate and ruthless toward the existing social order. The theologian and the man of mystical vision often have little appreciation of each other. One of the problems of the further development of religion is to secure a fuller mutual appreciation at this point for the sake of a more complete synthesis of the forces of religion. That a more complete synthesis is possible is evidenced by the fact that the greatest theologians—men like Augustine, Aquinas, and Schleiermacher—have also been mystics.

⁸ See Julius A. Bewer, *The Literature of the Old Testament*, p. 105.

⁹ On the relation of reason to insight see J. Royce, *Sources of Religious Insight*, Chap. III.

¹⁰ See Mary Redington Ely, *Knowledge of God in Johannine Thought*.

WAYS OF SALVATION

there are certain other traits no less vital to religious life than kinship, power, and insight. And one of them may be called *integrity*. Religion is an experience of spiritual integrity, whether arrived at by growth, defended against disruptive forces, or regained by human and divine grace. This experience of integrity achieved and maintained is no less vital to social groups than to individuals; in fact the social and the individual form of it are in a close correlation. Religion is a way of securing integrity and therefore includes the aspiration for it, the sense of its absence, and the stages by which it is brought to pass. Religion is peculiarly concerned for wholeness in human life. The English word "holy" derives from the Anglo-Saxon *hale*"—whole.

Religion is always profoundly occupied with the problem of human salvation. It is this preoccupation of religion which comes before us, but not this exclusively. As was pointed out in the first chapter, the redemptive aspect of religion often has obscured its creative aspect, but the latter is more inclusive. The word "integrity" has been chosen because it connotes both aspects.

The yearning for spiritual integrity appears far back in the history of religion. It is to be found in Egyptian religion in the *Book of the Dead*, especially in the famous "Chapter of going Into the Hall of Truth (or Righteousness)." On the day of the deceased says:

... to thee, great god, lord of Truth. I have come to thee, my lord, and I am led (thither) in order to see thy face. . . . Behold, I come to thee, I bring to thee my righteousness and I expel for thee sin. I have committed no sin against people. . . . I have not done evil in the place of which I knew no wrong. I did no evil thing. . . . I did not do anything which the god abominates. I did not report evil of a man to his master. I allowed no one to hunger. I caused no one to weep. . . . I did not diminish the grain measure. I did not diminish the span. I did not diminish the land

VITAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RELIGION

measure. I did not load the weight of the balances. I did not deflect the index of the scales. I did not take milk from the mouth of the child. . . . I did not hold back the water in its time. I did not dam the running water.¹¹

Evidently integrity of conscience has here become an active spiritual ideal—an ideal, too, which has the most important social meanings. It would make for a valuable further development of religion if spiritual integrity could be universally recognized as involving such direct social meanings today.

Centuries later we find Job cherishing this same ideal of integrity, but with more emphasis on purity of motive.

If I have walked with falsehood, and my foot hath hasted to deceit (Let me be weighed in an even balance, that God may know mine integrity); If my step hath turned out of the way, And my heart walked after mine eyes, And if any spot hath cleaved to my hands: Then let me sow, and let another eat; Yea, let the produce of my field be rooted out.

On the basis of his unshakable consciousness of inner integrity Job, with superb courage, challenges the moral government of the world. Yet the whole drama of his inner life is religious, for Job maintains his integrity in the end through his vision of God.¹²

Aspiration for integrity is central in the religion of Jesus. What he calls for is that higher righteousness which consists, not in deeds done to be seen of men, but in rightness of heart. He asks that prayer, almsgiving, and fasting be done in secret that they may be wholly sincere. For him there was no greater sin than hypocrisy, and he deemed no really spiritual life to be possible without single-mindedness. It is to the pure in heart—that is to those who possess complete sincerity and inner integrity—that he says the blessedness of

¹¹ See J. H. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, pp. 299-300.

¹² Job 31:5-8; 42:1-6.

WAYS OF SALVATION

the vision of God will come. And, he dares to summon men on toward the ideal of perfection—such perfection as is to be seen in the impartial, universal, and active love of the heavenly Father.

The significance of this trait of religion which consists in the securing of integrity is increased by our new sciences of human nature. These sciences—psychology, anthropology, sociology—emphasize the complexity of the factors which go to make up our life; and the further these sciences proceed with their analyses the more important becomes the problem of integration. Thus the ideal of modern religious education becomes the integrated life—the life personally integrated, yet dynamic; the life socially integrated, yet free.

Religion's concern for wholeness of life involves concern for the healing of life whenever it is harmed. In the earliest phases of religion the harm to be healed is chiefly some physical calamity befalling the tribe or some taint of impurity due to a transgression of the tribal *mores*. In these phases religion provides salvation through ceremonials which work magically and through processes of physical purification. In its higher stages religion develops different ways of salvation, according to the ideal of the wholeness of life which is sought and the nature of the disruptive or corrupting forces which are found to be defeating that ideal.

Four ways of salvation are outstanding in the historic religions. Where the ideal is primarily an objective social one, and the evils are chiefly those things which make for a disorderly state, religion has found the way of salvation to be *the way of loyalty and obedience*. Confucius is the great prophet of this way. To Confucius Heaven and earth and man belong to one great order, Tao, "the Way." The goal of human existence is the well-ordered state. The supreme virtues are propriety and filial piety. The Confucian maxim is to "stand in one's lot," to fill one's place as prince or subject, son or father. A Chinese proverb runs: "The morning

VITAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RELIGION

glory of an hour envies not the pine of a thousand years." It is enough that each fulfils his appointed station in life. Confucius incarnated this way of salvation and "stood firm."

When, however, the ideal of wholeness is completely metaphysical, and the evils are conceived to be the temporal illusions which hide the metaphysical reality, then the way of salvation becomes *the way of realization*. Thus Tagore writes: "The supreme soul has himself chosen this soul of ours as his bride and the marriage has been completed." So long, indeed, as the soul-bride "remains obstinately in the dark, lifts not her veil, does not recognize her lover, and only knows the world dissociated from him, she serves as a handmaid here, where by right she might reign as a queen." But in truth "the marriage of supreme love has been accomplished in timeless time. . . . When the soul-bride understands this well, her heart is blissful and at rest."¹⁸

But the ideal of integrity cherished may be mainly or wholly psychological. The integrity sought above all other things may be composure, inner repose; and the great evils may be the great disturbers of the inner life—disappointment, defeat, pain. For such needs religion has developed *the way of renunciation*. It is Buddha who follows this way to the end. For Buddha taught that one must renounce, not only all outward things, but every desire of the soul. Does not all desire mean suffering, and is not the satisfaction of desires like drinking from a salt spring? Hence Buddha taught men how to cut the thread that holds together, like a bundle of fagots, the bundle of desires that make up the soul, and so to find Nirvana. He taught his disciples to renounce property, family, and civic station, and donning a yellow robe and taking a razor, a needle, a girdle, a sieve, and a beggar's bowl, to set out on the Noble Eightfold Path that leads to the extinction of desire. This path leads by a moral discipline to a right ordering of speech and deed, by

¹⁸ See *Sādhana*, pp. 160–162.

WAYS OF SALVATION

an intellectual discipline to freedom from lust and grief, and by a mystical discipline on beyond happiness and misery to the ultimate peace and bliss of Nirvana.

But the ideal of wholeness which religion cherishes may be at one and the same time psychological, social, and metaphysical in its implications, and the evils to be escaped from may be sinfulness, sickness, and fear, pride and unbrotherliness, and estrangement from God. For this richer ideal, and for meeting the manifold evils which endanger it, religion has developed *the way of transformation*. From the point of view of this way human nature is neither doomed by the law of its existence nor good in a ready-made fashion; and the objective order of society and the physical environment are neither divine in themselves nor a veil of illusion which hides the divine Absolute. On the contrary, human nature is something to be transformed into divineness, and the objective order is a sphere in which divine transforming forces are at work. For the fullest portrayal of the way of transformation we must turn to Jesus. And from him we learn that this way saves men from evil by repentance and forgiveness, faith and sacrificial service. These experiences restore wholeness because they are in themselves integral. Repentance is the recovery of singleness of mind. Forgiveness, whether given or received, relaxes the tensions and breaks down the antagonisms due to past wrongs. Faith releases inward powers and allies the soul with higher forces. Sacrificial service repairs the havoc of unreason and lovelessness.

✓ These different ways of recovering integrity when it has been lost are not simply parallel lines. They often diverge sharply, but they also converge and intersect. Most of the great religions have developed each in varying degrees. Doubtless the highest spiritual life will make some use of each of these ways, but just what use an individual should make of each is dependent on his place in history, on the

VITAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RELIGION

society in which he finds himself and on his own particular lot and endowment. We do not escape the element of paradox here. But has not the paradox which most perplexes modern religion—that between integrity by growth and integrity through redemption—been solved in principle by the prophet who combined in his own religious experience the ideal of sonship and the ideal of saviorhood?

Still another trait of religion must be named in bringing to a conclusion our effort to characterize the sources of its vitality. This trait is *wonder*. Religion is an experience of wonder in the presence of the beautiful and the meaningful. Religion is hardly religion in the full sense of the term unless it is both lyrical and metaphysical. Along with its nourishing of the communal life, its stimulation of individual power, its love of insight, and its aspiration for integrity, religion also has found expression in adoration. It has been responsive to beauty and to mystery. It has used the language of song and of symbol. It has loved miracle, not through any perverse fondness for the anti-natural, but through joy in the wonderful. It has dramatized the past, given momentousness to present commonplace, and portrayed the future, whether in heaven or on earth, as an attainment of ideality.

In the literature of religion songs come before legal codes, and myths and epic histories come before theologies. The Vedic hymns are themselves preceded by a long religious development, but they are also the fountain head of the Brahmanic codes and of the Upanishad philosophy.¹⁴ These hymns, in which myth and song are made the accompaniments of sacrifice, express at times a direct responsiveness to beauty, as one can perceive in the following passage from one of the Dawn-hymns:

She comes like a fair maiden, awakening all to labor, with a hundred chariots comes she, and brings the shining light;

¹⁴ E. W. Hopkins, *The Religions of India*, p. 216.

WONDER

gleam forth, O Dawn, and give us thy blessing this day; for in thee is the life of every living creature. Even as thou hast rewarded the singers of old, so now reward our song.¹⁵

An ancient instance of religious wonder finding both lyrical and metaphysical expression is afforded by the following Zoroastrian hymn:

This I ask thee, tell me truly, O Lord. Who is by generation the father of Right* at the first? Who determined the path of sun and stars? Who is it by whom the moon waxes and wanes? This, O Wise One, and yet more am I fain to know.

This I ask thee, tell me truly, O Lord. Who upheld the earth beneath and the firmament from falling? Who the waters and the plants? Who yoked swiftness to winds and clouds? Who is, O Wise One, creator of Good Thought?

This I ask thee, tell me truly O Lord. What artist made light and darkness? What artist made sleep and waking? Who made the morning, the noon, and the night, that call the understanding to their duties?

*(Right, i.e., the Divine Order, or perhaps collectively, the ordered Kosmos.)¹⁶

One of the most characteristic traits of religion is that functioning in which it is creative of beauty, and this religious creation of beauty springs from wonder in the presence of the mysteriously meaningful. Those things which excited the Hebrew mind most to wonder were the great events in their tribal and national life. Jehovah was always the one who "brought up Israel out of Egypt," and the songs in which their literature began were celebrations of his saving deeds. The ethical monotheism in which Hebrew religion culminated meant for the worshipper, not abject, blind submission, but wonder and hope:

Hast thou not known? hast thou not heard? The ever-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 75. Professor Hopkins says: "Nothing in religious poetry more graceful or delicate than the Vedic Dawn-hymns has ever been written."

¹⁶ See J. H. Moulton, *Early Religious Poetry of Persia*, p. 86.

VITAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RELIGION

lasting God, the Lord, the Creator of the ends of the earth, fainteth not, neither is weary; there is no searching of his understanding. He giveth power to the faint; and to him that hath no might he increaseth strength.

And with this marvel of the Creator re-creating the worshipper was coupled, at the summit of Israel's faith, that other marvel concerning the nation's destiny expressed in the poems of the Suffering Servant: "Who hath believed our report? and to whom hath the arm of the Lord been revealed?" "The chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed."

Jesus found sources for wonder in unwonted places, that is, in the commonplace. He saw in the lilies a more than royal beauty. He perceived in children the secret of the kingdom of heaven. The capacity for faith in the ordinary man and woman was to him a wonder-working force. His parables give abundant testimony to the meaningfulness which he found in the common events of life. God was to him one who made all things possible.

Christianity was cradled in wonder. The *Magnificat* and the *Benedictus* convey to us the atmosphere of its beginnings, as do the miracles of the synoptic gospels. The fact that these miracles are so largely stumbling-blocks to faith in our day should not blind us to the fact that they bear witness to something on which the vitality of religion depends—the capacity for wonder.

The religions from which Christianity was able to assimilate elements for its own growth—notwithstanding its inevitable resistance to being assimilated by them—were the religions in which wonder was most alive. It is a long development from the earliest sun-myths to the mystery-religions with their teachings concerning the dying and rising god, which left their mark on the theology of Christ's death and on the Christian sacraments, but throughout we see the work of man's wondering imagination. Very diverse in value

WONDER

are the results of this development, but the central impulse of it all belongs to the essence of religion.

But the chief source from which Christianity drew, in addition to its origin in Jesus and in Judaism, was the religious philosophy of the Greeks, which was the product of the marvellous capacity of the Greek mind for speculative wonder. Out of ponderings upon the elements of nature, the meaning of number, the problems of permanence and change, the truths underlying myths, the nature of justice, the strangeness of human destiny, came that body of Greek religious speculation which, when blended with the spiritual insights of the Hebrew prophets and of Jesus, has resulted in the full development of ethical monotheism.¹⁷

But this religious trait of wonder in the presence of the beautiful and meaningful is rooted not only in our social inheritance, but also in man's original nature.

Those who have difficulty in identifying religion in children should watch a child when he is wondering, when he is in the presence of something that charms and fascinates, when his attention is held by something that to him is mysteriously meaningful. If, as Santayana says, "the feeling of reverence should itself be treated with reverence," so should the wonderings and questionings of a child. Nothing is more rudimentary in the behavior of a child than his "exploratory reactions," with their accompanying feeling of curiosity. By such reactions he becomes acquainted with his world. But the stimulus to exploratory reactions is not from the things with which he already is acquainted but from the novel and

¹⁷ "The higher religion of the Greeks is represented by the poets and the philosophers. It was they, not the priests, who conceived and set forth purer and loftier ideas of the gods and their dealings with men; they who affirmed the essentially moral character of true religion and the nature of true piety; they who, from different sides, advanced towards monotheism." George Foot Moore, *History of Religions*, Vol. I, p. 477.

Of Plato Professor Moore says: "He is the founder of theistic philosophy, or, we may as well say, of philosophical theology; and all the theologies of the Western world, Jewish and Moslem as well as Christian, derive in the end from him," p. 499.

VITAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RELIGION

strange. These things he is impelled to examine, they rivet his attention, promise new meanings, and cause him to wonder.¹⁸

Similarly a child responds with wonder to things that give delight, especially to sudden beauty. A child a year old will be fascinated by a Christmas tree with its candle flames. An older child, stepping unexpectedly into a heavily shaded bower, stretches out her arms and exclaims, "Wonderful!" Again to a younger child the one that is more mature, possessing graces and skills which he longs to acquire, is an object of admiration. Hero-worship directs itself toward one who is adept and masterful in some sphere of activity in which the worshipper can imagine himself with delight.

This wonder of the child in the presence of mysterious meaning and sudden beauty is altogether of a piece with the awe of the adult in the great cathedral or when contemplating the sublimities of nature or the larger movements of the spirit of man. The child's capacity for wonder, then, is a native endowment which makes for religion. If children as they grow up are to have a religion that retains the quality of spontaneity and is not wholly a matter of habit, "the shades of the prison house" must be kept from closing in upon them; and those who find that, with all their correct living, they have missed the entrance to the kingdom of heaven must repent and become as little children in respect to the capacity for wonder.

This trait of religion, then, which consists of wonder in the presence of the beautiful and the mysteriously meaningful, is deeply rooted both in our social and our psychological inheritance. And it gives to religion a most vital function in human life. Bertrand Russell, commenting on the finiteness of the physical universe, says: "Physical science is thus approaching the stage when it will be complete, and therefore uninteresting. Given the laws governing the motions of elec-

¹⁸ See on this topic, R. S. Woodworth, *Psychology*, pp. 154-157.

trons and protons, the rest is merely geography—a collection of particular facts telling their distribution throughout some portion of the world's history."¹⁹ If this be true, it will remain for religion and art to preserve that sense of the wonderfulness of the universe which thus far has been so stimulating to the human mind.

Professor Rudolf Otto goes so far as to find in feelings akin to wonder the basic datum of religion and the source of its uniqueness. He examines the idea of "the holy" to see what it is apart from its ethical and rational elements and he discovers it to be "*the numinous*," a "*mysterium tremendum*"; and the feeling of awe, the shudder, the sense of the uncanny in the presence of whatever possesses holiness in this primitive meaning he considers to be the original datum of religion.²⁰ But while Professor Otto thus points out an essential trait in religion, that trait should not be regarded as religion's original datum. If the results of the inquiry of this chapter are sound the quest for such an original datum is a mistake. Religion, in the earliest and simplest manifestations of it which are thinkable, is yet too composite an experience to be contained in a single datum. Religion, rather, is always a characteristic synthesis and fusion of elements which appear in other than religious contexts, and which to some extent man shares with the animals. Religion, even in its most primitive forms, is too advanced an achievement of creative evolution to occur as an entirely unique datum. Like reasoning and morality its nature lies in a characteristic integration of what otherwise is discrepant and discordant in human experience. In its highest manifestations it is faith, hope, and love, and in its most primitive manifestations its tendency is toward dissolving tensions and releasing and co-ordinating psychic energies.

If now we seek a conception of religion which will gather up what we have found to be its most vital characteristics,

¹⁹ *What I Believe*, pp. 2-3.

²⁰ Cf. *Das Heilige*, Chaps. I-IV.

VITAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RELIGION

we may say that *religion is an experience of kinship with the Deepest Reality in the Universe and hence of membership in an infinitely meaningful world and of sharing in an ever unfolding life.*

In religion one finds oneself a member of a world with whose deepest nature he is akin and of an enlarging world—
‘a world which possesses infinitude in its possibilities and its range; and in this world one is a participator, both active and receptive, by reason of the insights which he gains, the integrity which he attains, and the inner spiritual power evoked in him which he contributes. One’s meaningful world may be simply a tribal group, or it may be mankind only—everything else being merely an environmental background for humanity—but if so the religious man feels that his tribe, or mankind, possesses a certain illimitable life, in which he may participate and to which he may make his contribution. One’s meaningful world may be the Absolute in which all finiteness is believed to be swallowed up, but the experience of participation does not disappear—“That art thou,” say the teachers of the Upanishads to their disciples.

The opposite of the religious experience, then, is the state of alienation from what is meaningful in one’s world—
‘whether through complete moral and intellectual frustration, or through callousness and cold pride, or through being reduced to futility and utterly broken by fate. *These opposites, indeed, may themselves enter into religious experience when they are not complete, and provided they are transcended.* A peculiar depth and poignancy are given to membership and participation in one’s world when it comes as reconciliation after estrangement. Persecution may stimulate the spiritual independence without which one cannot be a real participator in any higher order of things. Nevertheless the wise religious educator recognizes estrangement as a spiritual danger and will not evoke it simply for the sake of overcoming it.

WHAT RELIGION IS

Estrangement in its tendency toward enmity and perverseness, or toward sheer desolateness or numbness of spirit is the antithesis of religion.

If the world of outward and social experience loses its meaning for an individual or a group, religion requires that it be renounced and that another world be found which possesses such significance as makes membership and participation possible. Religion then becomes other-worldly—either in the dualistic fashion of dwelling by anticipation in a heaven beyond this earth, or in the monistic fashion of reducing the outer world to an illusion and of identifying the human spirit with the All-One. Or the natural order of things as a whole may be believed to possess so much meaning that one may simply “accept the universe” and thus gain a religious experience of participation. Or again one may find that the world of present experience is in some of its aspects meaningful and in other aspects meaningless and may be led, by alliance with the meaningful and by undertaking to transform the meaningless, to become a participator in a world of ever enlarging meaning.

Thus religion is more than a single mood, or a simple reaction, or an attitude controlled by a single idea. It is, rather, a fusion of certain persistent traits of human experience. It is blended out of experiences of kinship, of inner power, of gaining insight and integrity, and of wonder. This blending is itself variable, different traits being at different times either dominant or recessive. Hence the paradoxical character of religion’s manifestations which we noted at the outset of this chapter. Religion is by no means bound to result in a single world-view, or a single attitude toward man’s inner experience or social life. But the fusion or blending is real nevertheless, for it yields a distinctive form of human experience—that of kinship with Ultimate Reality and hence of membership and participation in an infinitely meaningful world. And in this form of experience all the traits which

VITAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RELIGION

have been pointed out are, explicitly or implicitly, present. Without inner power, insight, and integrity no real participation in a meaningful world is possible, and without kinship and a vista of meaning stimulative of wonder the traits which make for individual participation will not be developed.

IV

RELIGION AND ETHICS

IN arriving at the conception of religion set forth in the last chapter we were guided by the desire to apprehend religion in its inner vitality. We were seeking for those qualities in religion itself which would help us to understand the development of religion, both in its diversity and in its continuity; and especially we were seeking for the qualities which might give us clues to religion's further development. / But, more specifically still, we were stimulated in our inquiry by the evidence which religion has given of its capacity to function creatively in human life and by the urgent need for a renewal of such functioning. We must go on, then, to consider how far the conception of religion which we have gained can throw light upon religion's power for creative functioning and upon the conditions under which this power may be expected to manifest itself.

We cannot advance far in such a consideration without examining the relation between religion and ethics. Prophetic religion, which is so clearly creative, is predominantly ethical religion. In what relation do ethics and religion stand in such manifestations? Our urgent social problems, we have found, have important religious aspects; but how are these aspects related to the ethical side of those problems? We have been led to the thought that religion, as a sense of present possession of the divine, might be deepened by expressing itself in creative social intelligence. But in what, one may ask, does the religiousness of exercising creative social intelligence consist? Our next step, then, should be to seek to clarify our thought upon this underlying problem.

Religion and ethics may be compared profitably from the

RELIGION AND ETHICS

standpoint of the field with which each deals, the inner principle by which each is determined, and the most characteristic function by which each is manifested. Accordingly let us consider, first, the respective fields of religion and ethics.

The field of ethics is the field of human values. Ethics is concerned with the right, the good, the desirable, the ideal, and their meanings for human relationships and human conduct. Its field is thus very wide, for the things that men find ideal or valuable are most various. In the sphere of manners what is manly straightforwardness to the Anglo-Saxon may be offensive impoliteness to the Oriental. The Hindustani may prize as indispensable culture what is mere Oriental subtlety to the Western mind. In the structure of society one portion of the human race will regard as inviolate and the basis of morality some body of custom, such as a system of caste or aristocracy, which to another portion of the human race is anathema—the very negation of morality. In the economic realm ethics plays an important but contradictory part. The Chinese business man lives fully up to his ethical code if he begins to pay an obligation on the day when it falls due, but his American creditor considers him in default and takes peremptory measures, to the damage of his Chinese trade. The demand for a standard of living, in the name of justice, by workmen in industry is denounced by employers as an unjust taking away of property without due process of law. To many patriots and some philosophers there is no obligation higher than that to the state; but to the conscientious objector morality breaks down if the state be not subordinated to conscience, or to the will of God, or to the welfare of humanity.

But not only is the field of ethics very wide, varied, and full of inconsistencies; it also emerges but slowly from the general background of human life and shifts in its range and application through the ages. Tribal customs in their most primitive form operate like natural laws, and enforce them-

THE FIELD OF ETHICS

selves upon individuals indiscriminately, without regard to distinctions which ethical reflection would make. Even today, frequently the only reason we succeed in giving our children for avoiding certain actions is that "it is not done" in our circle or among our people. When in tribal life ethical ideas do begin to appear they have a quasi-physical character. It has been pointed out that the most primitive idea of sin in the Bible "includes any act that puts a man in the wrong with those who have power to make him rue it."¹ But gradually a recognition of what is approved or disapproved develops and becomes able to determine conduct, and then morality has clearly emerged. And when men of independent spirit gain a consciousness of what is inherently valuable and ought to be, and make this consciousness the basis for criticizing customs, religious sanctities, princes, and the gods themselves, the stage of an ethics which functions autonomously has been reached. Ethics thus appears both as a product of growth and as a source of growth.)

Just because ethics comes to function autonomously, its field changes also in respect to its range. Ceremonial laws once deemed in the highest degree binding become challenged as having no value, while new value is discovered in the personalities of men. Jesus made "all meats clean" and laid supreme stress on purity of motive and humaneness of deed. A recent instance in which the ceremonial was put above the human is given by Hobhouse. "In the most inhuman period of our early factory system," he writes, "employers who insisted on the justice and necessity of working little children twelve hours daily resented the suggestion that they keep the mills running on Sunday."² Probably few employers today would chart their moral responsibilities in precisely this fashion.

But changes take place not only in what men regard as

¹ See Robertson Smith, *Prophets of Israel*, pp. 102-104.

² *Social Development*, p. 206.

RELIGION AND ETHICS

coming within the purview of ethics but also in objective values. Wage systems which once were the means of releasing men from serfdom have to be re-examined as to whether, under modern industrial conditions, they have not become the means of reducing men to serfdom. It may once have been well that daughters who remained unmarried should defer to their parents' wishes as to what they should do; but with equal education for the sexes and a wide range of callings open to women it is difficult to see why they should give up choosing a calling, at the behest of their parents, as sons do not. Thus do ethical issues shift, things which once were matters of ethical concern ceasing to be such and new things becoming matters of vital ethical moment.

Yet, though the field of ethics is diverse in its contents and shifting in its boundaries, it does differentiate itself broadly from certain other major fields of human experience. (We shall be helped in determining how far the field of ethics differs from that of religion by considering for a moment the difference between the field of ethics and the field of science. Science deals with facts, just as ethics deals with values. The primary concern of science is with the real, that of ethics is with the ideal. Science seeks the laws of how things do take place, ethics the laws of how things ought to take place. Science is supremely interested in the existent, whether it is good or not; ethics is supremely interested in the good, whether it exists or not.)

Now these two fields of experience are related, but they should not be confused. They are related because science may study values, and it is most important that it should do so. But when science studies values it is studying what men have valued or do value, how men have come to the valuations they make, or how they have secured or may secure valuable results—taking for granted that the results in question are valuable. But science as such cannot tell us what men should value. Psychology, for example, may determine cer-

THE FIELD OF ETHICS

tain laws of the mind and apply them to education, and education may establish certain procedures as being scientifically necessary for the realization of the democratic ideal. But neither psychology nor the science of education can establish the validity of the democratic ideal. It may be sufficient for limited practical purposes simply to point to fact and say that we, the people of a given nation, are embarked on a democratic enterprise. But such an attitude is not sufficient for a real philosophy of life. If one never does more than *assume* a certain ideal, one is helpless before those who *assert* another ideal. In other words, democracy as an ideal must be established by the methods of ethics.

Ethics, in turn, has the strongest interest in science, for it wants to see the ideal made real. To cherish an ideal for human personality, for instance, and not to use the sciences of psychology and physiology, and seek their development, is folly, or rather, it is unethical. One may say then that men ought to be scientific—using the results of science even if they are not scientists—but ethics may not settle questions of science. Neither religion nor ethics can settle the question of the truth of biological evolution. The population question cannot be rightly settled solely from an ethical standpoint without regard to scientific knowledge.

Oddly enough one frequently hears today the declaration that there is knowledge enough now for the saving of human society, if only there were sufficient good will; and also the opposite declaration that there is good will enough abroad to save society, if only there were also the requisite knowledge. What these two opposite statements really bear witness to is the autonomy of both science and ethics and the consequent
✓ need for their correlation. Each is autonomous with respect to the other. The complete subjection of ethics to science would be as injurious as was its subjection to theology or metaphysics. And where science is dictated to from some ethical or political standpoint—as not infrequently happens

in the case of the social sciences—it must still fight for its freedom.

But now, just as ethics and science have characteristic fields of experience in which they are autonomous, so has religion. As the parent of all culture religion once had science and ethics in subjection to herself, but in the course of time she has had to grant them independence. Now, in turn, it has become needful that science and ethics should recognize that religion has a field of experience in which it, too, is autonomous. This field is our experience of the underlying relations between reality and value.

(To this field belongs the idea of God in all its diverse forms. In the idea of God are blended in some fashion a more than human power and a more than human goodness. The distinctiveness of the idea is precisely that it denotes a deep union of reality and ideality, a genuine fusion of being and meaning which conditions the life of man, some inner connection between the Ground of life and the Goal of life. The twilight of the gods comes, for the naïve experience of man, when the chill of winter has reduced the sun to a pale abstraction of its former warmth and glory, enfeebling the source of human goods and joys; and it comes for the modern man when the cosmic chill of a meaningless universe creeps upon him, benumbing his own energies for achieving goodness and beauty. Whenever the universe becomes to men an iron-toothed machine, blind to all values and wantonly destroying such as may happen to arise, the meaning of God has been blotted out for them. And on the other hand, the notion that man makes his own gods—that the gods are *Wunschwesen*—while it may express a judgment about religion, can never serve the religious man himself. Religion has an equal interest in the ultimate truths about reality and in the supreme values that the mind and heart of man can conceive; it is concerned alike for the dignity and for the destiny of spiritual life. And the idea of God stands

THE FIELD OF RELIGION


primarily for man's experience and belief that the supreme values are in some manner grounded in the deepest reality.

But further, that the field of religion concerns the underlying relations of reality and value may be seen, on religion's more subjective side, in the instance of the experience of religious faith. It is not one's *duty* to have faith, nor can one have faith simply because it is good to have it; rather must we say that one ought not to have faith if he finds nothing in his experience of reality to justify it. Faith is, on one side of it, a response to what one honestly finds to be reality. But faith, nevertheless, is not simply assent to facts. Facts need to be faced; but many of the facts of life, taken simply as facts, evoke the opposite of faith. Faith, then, on its other side, is a response, not simply to the actual, but to the potencies of the ideal within the actual. We can have faith in persons, in social groups, in a way of life as something that has been and can be lived, and in any realities which have manifested values and give promise of continuing to do so. Faith is response to reality in its capacity to produce value.

Moreover, what is true of the idea of God and of the experience of faith is true of religion as a whole. All those most characteristic traits of religion which we already have found—the experiences of kinship, power, insight, integrity, and wonder—have to do with the underlying relations between reality and value. They all are experiences which come, or may come, to men when they face both their duty and their destiny, when they both wrestle with reality and dream of truth, beauty, and goodness, when in communion with the sources of their being they find themselves entering into a more abundant life. And the uniqueness of this field of experience which belongs to religion, notwithstanding its close correlation with other fields, is shown by the fact that, where any or all of the positive contents of religion are absent, the *problems* of religion remain. Whether or not men find themselves able to believe in God, or to exercise faith, or to par-

ticipate in any manner in an infinitely meaningful world, they can hardly fail to recognize the problems of the underlying relations between reality and value; and except as they become frivolous, or benumbed, or mechanized by life's routine, these problems will become vital for their personal and group life.

Religion, then, as compared with ethics, and with science as well, has a field of experience which is its own. These three fields overlap, as operations in agriculture, in mining, and in the air may overlap with respect to the earth's surface; but they concern life at different levels, and hence, while capable of close correlation, they need also to be conceived in their distinctness. It is, indeed, precisely because religion has a distinctive, unique place in human experience that it can enter into creative connection with the rest of life. But to this point we shall need to return after comparing religion and ethics in respect, also, to their principle.

In approaching this aspect of our topic we shall do well to follow the line of direction which our study thus far points out. If we do so we shall not expect to find a complete identity of principle, such that religion has only the distinctiveness of being a dim penumbra for ethics; nor shall we expect to find a sharp antithesis—as when religion regards ethics as a subtle form of worldliness, and ethics regards religion as a futile form of spirituality. Data for each of these views can be found in history, but the difficulty with both is that they give no real understanding of the creativity of religion. Rather, we shall expect to find a relation of polarity—a contrast like that of two poles which start currents of energy and preserve their balance; or like that of the two foci by which a single curve may be determined; or like that of the germ and the sperm cells from which a new organism springs. 

The field of ethics, we have said, is the field of human values. Now in this field of human values human personality

THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF ETHICS

as such has a clear primacy. That is, the being which can feel values, reflect upon them, choose among them, and direct his action according to his reflection and choice has a unique and supereminent value. In contrast to valuable objects or institutions, or to valuable aspects of human experience which may be taken abstractly, quantitatively, and collectively, such as pleasure or health, human personality stands out as being the supreme value to which all other values are relative. For example, a society never can be made good by a maximum production of goods, even though the goods be cultural as well as physical and even though they be quite fairly distributed, if personalities are enslaved in the process of production. Personalities are instrument users by reason of their power to select ends and to fashion instruments for their achievement, and instrument users cannot rightly be made into instruments. Sooner or later, indeed, the effort to do so will actually fail, and the instrument users that have been made into instruments will declare and win their independence. Only as persons make themselves instrumental to other persons—recognizing the unique worth of others and finding their own fulfilment in serving them—can persons rightly play an instrumental rôle.

But the correlative of this unique worth of individual persons is the corresponding worth of a society of persons. The correlation here is both natural and ethical. It is natural because there can be no persons without society, and it is ethical because there can be no complete fulfillment of persons without dedication to other persons, and because this dedication itself is not fully right unless it is reciprocal. In moral living freedom and service mutually condition each other. Freedom is maintained and developed when it is used in service, and service is fruitful when it fosters freedom.

Now from the unique worth of personality, and of society as fostering personality, follows the supreme principle of ethics. It may be expressed as being *the fullest develop-*

RELIGION AND ETHICS

ment of every human personality through the co-operative creation of a world-wide community of persons. In this principle are involved several constituents, each of which is indispensable. They are: the unique worth of each person and the corresponding worth of a community of persons; the significance of growth; the conditioning of growth on the creative action of all the individuals concerned; and the conditioning of individual creativity on the community and on co-operation. A neglect of any one of these constituents will lead to some of the well-known one-sidednesses in ethics—sheer individualism, or state socialism, or relativism, or freedom without love, or love without freedom. But taken together they form a harmonious principle which is fundamental for the guidance of ethical thought and action.

Such being the supreme principle of ethics, what supreme principle, standing in a relation of polarity to the ethical principle, has religion? We found the field of religion to be that of the underlying relations between reality and value. Religion, that is, discovers values to be resident not only in the human realm but in reality beyond the human, and it dreams of goodness and beauty not only as goals of human striving on this planet but as goals for a cosmic creative Spirit. In other words, religion gains satisfaction and inspiration from a range of values wider than those of ethics, though properly inclusive of the latter; and religion experiences vital connection with a value-producing Power far transcending man—which, however, may be found to penetrate deeply all human life.

Now in the experience that there are vital connections between reality and value which are wider and deeper than those established by man is contained the principle of religion. It may be expressed as follows: For religion the supreme principle is the *maximum of harmonious interaction between the personalities of men and the Deepest Reality of the universe.* Religion, thus, is metaphysical and æsthetic as

THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF RELIGION

well as ethical. Religion is æsthetic; it discovers harmony and responds to beauty; as is shown by the fact that, in proportion as æsthetic faculty is present, religion is sensitive to cosmic beauty and harmony. "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handiwork," is the language of religion. To be "in tune with the universe" is a religious value, and one may even become so absorbed in this value as to grow insensitive to the discords and evils of human society. But the maximum of harmonious interaction is not so attained. A higher experience of harmony comes to those who "worship the Lord in the beauty of holiness," and who share in the building of the City of God.

Religion is metaphysical as well. It considers values not only in relation to the activities of men and the structure of human society, but also in relation to the processes and structure of the universe; and it finds the processes and structure of the universe to be positively significant for the value-producing enterprise. Religion brings into unity two moods equally characteristic of modern life but often left unreconciled—man's proud consciousness of his control over nature, and his baffling sense of his insignificance in the presence of nature. Religion says:

When I consider Thy heavens, the work of Thy fingers, the
moon and the stars which Thou hast established;
What is man that Thou art mindful of him? and the son
of man that Thou visitest him?
Thou hast made him but a little lower than God, and crown-
est him with glory and honor:
Thou makest him to rule over the works of Thy hands,
Thou hast put all things under his feet.

Religion is metaphysical not only to the philosopher but also to the man of simple religious nature. It takes him out to the frontiers of experience and speaks of life and death, of the infinite and the eternal, and it yields an answer to the question, "What will become of man?" It penetrates also to the

RELIGION AND ETHICS

innermost centre of human existence, finds in man's nature an infinite part, and evokes there the hunger for perfection and a capacity for super-human courage. It puts its own interpretation upon human society and conceives of it as the sphere for a kingdom of God, a microcosm of a spiritual universe.

It is not to be assumed that, because religion is metaphysical as well as ethical and æsthetic, its metaphysics is self-guaranteeing. Religious metaphysics, even in its higher forms, has been too diverse, and at points too contradictory, for that conception to be justifiable. The harmonious interaction which religion seeks with what produces value in the universe is intensive as well as extensive, and sometimes men have been able to gain the maximum of such harmony only through adopting asceticism and a sharp metaphysical dualism; at other times they have found the whole of reality to be valuable and harmonious, and have taught that the production of value for man need consist only in the dispelling of the illusion of man's finiteness and the imparting of metaphysical insight. Again, some phases of religion have been satisfied by a mundane and political harmony, while other phases have deemed this earthly life to be devoid of essential values and have conceived the life harmonious and abundant to be altogether other-worldly and something to be gained through a wholly supernatural redemption.

The metaphysical teachings of religion, then, are too much at variance to be accepted on the basis of religious experience alone; rather, they must be tested in the light of the sum-total of human experience. And more particularly, history shows that religion can override the autonomy of ethics and of science only at its peril. Some measure of ethical dualism in human life must be accepted—to be dealt with practically and not simply theoretically—and candid recognition must be given to those processes of nature established by science whether they appear as promoting values, or as destroying them, or

THE FUNCTION OF ETHICS

as resulting in values only when subjected to human control. But it is also fair to urge that religion, too, has its autonomy, and that, since its field and its principle are in part metaphysical, its testimony should be fully weighed when life presses upon us its ultimate metaphysical questions.

(But now, having compared religion and ethics in respect to field and principle, let us also compare them in respect to their most characteristic function. The most characteristic function of ethics will be found to be congruous with its field and its principle. We have seen that the field of ethics is that of value—value as it relates to human life. Now ethics is loyal to the values which it perceives, however little they may be found to be embodied in reality. To grow indifferent to what one knows to be good—not to love it and work for it—because the world is so far from its realization, is to take the unethical attitude. But the principle for the guidance of ethical judgment and conduct—a world-wide society of creative personalities—sets a distant and a flying goal: a goal so distant that men keep turning aside from it as impracticable, and one that enlarges its demands with the increase of man's powers and the growing complexity of human life. Now the function which corresponds to the field and principle of ethics is that of effortful work. Ethics centres in action under the guidance of the ideal. It "stretches forward to the things which are before," and "presses on toward the goal." It also "girds up the loins of the mind" that one may see clearly the good that one is to do. Ethics makes the faculties of man taut so as to deliver the maximum of energy in the most effective way and get a bit of good really done.

✓The dignity of man as a psycho-physical and social being is thus bound up with ethics. As a psycho-physical being man, to be man, must improve the planet upon which he finds himself, and must improve his own habits of life, and as a social being he must exercise influence upon his fellows, in the direction of what he deems to be his insight. But this

function of effortful work in which ethics centres has inherent limitations. It creates tensions beyond need and wastes energy in anxiety. In order to be ready for instant action it keeps the motor running at the curb. Persistence in effortful work, as Professor Hocking says, "turns self-defeating." Of course, when this result occurs, it is possible for ethics to say that one ought to relax the tensions and dispel the anxieties, but the ethical mood is precisely what prevents one from so doing. This is true whether one speaks from the standpoint of duty, or of the good, or of self-interest. The highest good and enlightened self-interest are also imperatives and the command which they shout is "At attention!"

Other limitations of the ethical function appear in the well-known defects of moralism—its severity toward pure contemplation and its restlessness over the simple enjoyment of beauty, its inability to call out the free play of the human spirit. Hence the "social uplifter" becomes the object of satire, and the strenuous reformer needs to be reminded of the maxim, *memento vivere*. Moral exhortation as a means of influencing conduct is effective only within narrow bounds. Whether it be children, or adult citizens, or social and national groups which need to lay hold of a new and loftier ideal, moral "challenges" prove to be feeble stimuli apart from active interests. The creation of new interests is requisite, in all such instances, along with moral appeal.

From one point of view the amount of effort that an individual can make is the measure of his individual worth; the maxim, "The only good thing in the world is the good will," emphasizes a real truth. But for the attainment of objective goods for human life resilience of mind and spontaneous interests are of no less moment. Moreover, the capacity for effort itself requires nurture. It may be made to grow, or it may become so depleted that the line of least resistance will always be taken. While, then, the characteristic ethical function, that of effortful work, is of indis-

THE FUNCTION OF RELIGION

pensable importance if men are to be loyal to values however far they may be from realization, and are to shape life steadily by the supreme value of a world-wide society of creative personalities, it needs alliance with other functions, which are determined by other great fields of experience.

Now the most characteristic function of religion is different from that of ethics, though akin to it, and for that very reason it can make religion an effective ally of ethics. Religion's most characteristic function follows from the fact that its field is that of the underlying relations between reality and value and its principle the maximum of harmonious interaction between man and the Deepest Reality of the universe. Religion, accordingly, functions primarily by worshipful response to that Reality and to its manifestations in goodness and beauty. Worshipful response is clearly the only appropriate attitude whenever a more than human power is found to be bringing forth a more than human goodness. In the presence of such reality it is natural to react, as Jesus would have us, with the eager docility of a child. Thereby one becomes a member and participator in an infinitely meaningful world. "Of such is the Kingdom of Heaven."

Thus we see that, while both ethics and religion are concerned for values and their realization, yet by reason of the difference in their range and principle ethics functions with tension and effort and religion with devotion and joy. In one aspect this contrast between the two functions is like that between the nutrition and the exercise of the human body; Worshipful response is nutritive; it replenishes the stores of personal energy after they have been expended and builds up and maintains reserves. Through worshipful response one receives "the bread of life," and "the water of life," and finds the deep hunger and thirst of his spirit becoming satisfied. The effortful activity of ethics, on the other hand, transmutes personal energies into objective work accomplished, but leaves the stores of energy depleted. Ethics emphasizes

RELIGION AND ETHICS

the momentousness of life, and says, "Watch," "Let your loins be girded and your lamps burning," "Strike while the iron is hot."

But we must not be misled by this figure of nutrition and exercise into supposing that it fully illustrates the contrast between the two functions, for in another aspect they are contrasted in an opposite fashion. Worshipful response manifests itself not simply in moods of relaxation, receptivity, and peace; it also appears as a higher excitement and an intense activity. When "the hand of the Lord" was upon Elijah he outstripped the chariot of Ahab on the road to Jezreel. The word of the Lord is to Jeremiah as a burning fire shut up in his bones, which he cannot contain and which compels him to defy king and nation. George Fox, regardless of consequences to himself, rebukes the judges who have put him in jail because of their injustice to the poor and weak. From the beginning of the Christian era till now men and women have endured hardships similar to those that Paul underwent because they were constrained by the love of Christ.

The essential connection between these two opposite aspects of worshipful response, which explains their common contrast to the function of effortful work, appears if we recognize the characteristic of the former to be that it is evoked by wider ranges of reality and value than those with which the latter is properly concerned, and that it is able to bring the whole self more fully into play. The religious function may take the form either of the receptive attitudes of humility, peace, joyful adoration, or of the active experiences of lofty excitement and sustained enthusiasm in which the human rises to superhuman achievement; but in either case man attains in the religious function more unity in himself, discovers more coherence and meaning in his world, and establishes more harmonious interaction between himself and his world in its meaningful character than

THE FUNCTION OF RELIGION

the ethical function of effortful work is adapted to yield. For ethics in its functioning is by nature selective. It seeks, in the light of its values, to grasp particular situations, to define moral tasks, and to summon the appropriate powers of the person for accomplishing the task. But this selection and concentration tend to produce wasteful tensions, staleness of spirit, and exhaustion, and to detach one from the wider ranges of experience with their larger import. But religion can restore the spirit of man, in his very quest of value, to kinship with reality wider than human, and can thereby dissolve tensions, refresh the heart, and bring the whole self into play. Religion says, "Be not anxious," "Behold the birds of the heaven," "Consider the lilies of the field." "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness."

Thus in the end religion can carry men, even while they stand in the midst of the stress of life and the affairs of human history, beyond the level of effortful work to that of joyous freedom in creative living. Of this power in religion Jesus is the supreme demonstration. No one can understand Jesus by making his originality either primarily ethical or exclusively religious. It is precisely in his unique fusion of the two interests that his pre-eminence among the prophets of the world consists. As Johannes Weiss wrote:

In his personification of the ideal he welded the love of God and the love of man in an indissoluble union, in which they might foster and strengthen each other. He expressed the ideal in a perfect form and stamped it upon the soul of the race. Since his day it has become obvious that the highest form of *religion* is that from which there radiates the soothing, genial, meek, and helpful *love of mankind*; obvious also, that that *love of man* is the deepest, the truest, the most enduring, the most exacting, which has its roots in the depths of a soul pledged to the Most High, a soul which is permeated by his truth, and has been apprehended by his holy and gracious will.⁸

⁸ See Hastings, *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*, art. "Ethics."

RELIGION AND ETHICS

No one has written so illuminatingly of the contrast between the function of effortful work and that of worshipful response as Professor Hocking, particularly in his chapter on "The Principle of Alternation." He there shows how "the soul over-steeped in actual work loses capacity to believe in the *presence* of the good worked for," and needs to turn to worship for the recovery of sincerity, poise and a sense of participation in real values. But, in turn, "worship cannot last; it also has its type of self-defeat and death," for worship which is too prolonged becomes automatic and mechanical. Hence Hocking urges the need of alternation between work and worship. He cites the Egyptian proverb, "The archer hitteth the target, partly by pulling, partly by letting go; the boatman reacheth the landing, partly by pulling, partly by letting go"; and he maintains that "the whole of human existence falls into two phases, work and worship; the domain of duty and the domain of love."⁴ And while Hocking dwells primarily on the contemplative side of worshipful response, he does not fail to carry it on to the level of sustained devotion and enthusiasm in living. He undertakes to define the channels through which religion manifests itself as "creating men, conferring on them the power to create"; and he finds the highest result of the alternation between work and worship to be the prophetic personality, "the mystic in historic action."⁵

But for the full understanding of how the "Principle of Alternation" can lead on to such results as the production of the prophetic personality, that principle needs to be supplemented by another. This supplemental principle we may designate as the *Principle of Interpenetration*. All through this discussion of religion and ethics we have been concerned to understand both their difference and their correlation. It is their difference which we first have emphasized; but their

⁴ See *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, Chap. XXVIII.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Chaps. XXXI, XXXII.

PRINCIPLE OF INTERPENETRATION

correlation is implied in their common, undifferentiated origin, and also in the ideal of creative action between them. Now while there is a real difference, there clearly is also an overlapping and interpenetration between the field of human values and the field of the underlying relations between reality and value. Likewise is it evident that there is overlapping and interpenetration between the principle of a world-wide society of creative personalities and the principle of the maximum of harmonious interaction with the Deepest Reality of the universe. It is in respect to the functions of effortful work and worshipful response that the contrast is apt to be so sharp as to leave the relation between them unfruitful; hence there is need at this point for a conscious recognition of the principle of interpenetration.

The legitimacy of this principle appears as soon as one considers religion in its historical aspects. When, for example, worshipful response is directed toward the message of prophets whose greatness is at once religious and ethical, one's effortful work cannot but be determined thereby. Can one meditate upon Amos's interpretation of the kind of worship God wants—"Let justice roll down as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream"—and not be impelled to effortful work? When, in turn, one's effort is directed toward realizing the ideal of "the ever-coming kingdom of God," one receives at the same time the quickening which comes from worshipful response. In the historical development of ethical religion one sees religion and ethics becoming differentiated so as to stand in at least partial opposition to each other; and then one sees them fuse again, thus bringing man's spiritual experience to a new level. Who can mistake the fusion of worshipful response with the strenuous ethical note in the words by which the Fourth Gospel expresses the consciousness of Jesus: "My meat is to do the will of him that sent me, and accomplish his work"; "We must work the works of him that sent me while it is day: the night

RELIGION AND ETHICS

cometh, when no man can work." The very idea of an ethical God, in its vital practical meaning, denotes a fusion of work and worship and promotes their interpenetration in all life into which it really enters.

I find what is essentially this principle of interpenetration in what Professor George Plimpton Adams has written upon the interpretation of religion. Professor Adams is concerned, as we have been, to bring out the autonomy of religion. He writes :

Whoever tries to study with any patience and sympathy the life of religion must agree that it is utterly impossible to sweep into the categories of moralism those traits of the religious attitude which are most central and characteristic; he will agree that religion possesses a certain autonomy of its own, that it is no mere enforcement of morality.

And he goes on :

He who has not discerned the way in which possession and activity, contemplation and mastery, knowledge and will, may be and are fused together without contradiction, in the life of religion, is blind to its most central and persistent nature.⁶

Professor Adams applies the idea of interpenetration not only to the relations between religion and ethics and between cognition and volition, but also to the relation between the individual and the community. We shall be endeavoring to give this idea still further application, in the sphere of religious knowledge itself, in the second part of our study.

What we especially should note at this point is that the principle of interpenetration is needed to give effect to ideas to which our previous study of the creative capacities of religion has led us. It already has been brought out that religion functions most effectively for the solution of social problems when it is able to blend its most sacred memories

⁶ See *Idealism and the Modern Age*, p. 241, and Chaps. III and X.

THE PRINCIPLE OF INTERPENETRATION

and its most imperative ideals with a living sense of possession of divine reality; and also it has been brought out that a new sense of possessing divine reality may be found through the exercise of creative social intelligence. But this finding of divine reality in creative social intelligence calls for a creative act in religion itself. It requires a further development of religion, in which the unity of spiritual experience already achieved in ethical religion shall bring forth a new form of interpenetration between religion and ethics to meet our changed world-view and our new social situations. But one great condition for such a further development may be fulfilled through the recognition that, as has been shown, the principle for ethics is a world-wide society of creative personalities, and that the principle of religion is the maximum of harmonious interaction between man and the Deepest Reality of the universe. If, for example, we can believe that God himself is working to bring to pass such a world-wide society, then the more we work intelligently for that same end the more we have *rapport* with him and find him working through us. Thus, through the principle of interpenetration, religion may be at one and the same time *the creating and conserving of the highest personal and social values, and communion with Divine Reality.*

The principle of interpenetration is of vital importance for those major social questions of our time already considered—war, social justice, and the task of discovering new standards for new social situations. We already have taken note of the fact that for dealing with these questions we need not only imperative ideals but new interests, and interests are conditioned as much by the character of the realities in the midst of which we live as by distant goods. Now religion, operating as it does in the field of the underlying relations between reality and value, is powerful for the creation of new moral and social interests. It can bring men into

RELIGION AND ETHICS

warm, living relation with a cosmic creative Spirit and so can infuse with poetry and passion the pursuit of the most distant ideals and can inspire men with unswerving purpose for their achievement. Patriotism, aristocratic privilege, the codes and rituals of ancient institutions—these have the glamor and romance about them which tradition so easily imparts. Hence the more men are called upon to swing out, without the support of their fellows, in pursuit of world-friendship, social co-operation, and new and more intelligent ways of living, the more they need the consciousness of being in vital relation with Divine Reality which religion gives. In other words, our most urgent problems find solution, and mankind progresses, in proportion as religion and ethics interpenetrate.

A concluding instance of the importance of the principle of interpenetration may be taken from the field of Comparative Religion. At the World's Parliament of Religions in Chicago P. C. Mozoomdar, speaking on "The World's Religious Debt to Asia," sketched in broad outlines the contrast between religion in the East and in the West. He said:

In the West you observe, watch, and act. In the East we contemplate and commune, and suffer ourselves to be carried away by the spirit of the universe. In the West you wrest from nature her secrets, you conquer her, she makes you wealthy and prosperous, you look upon her as your slave, and sometimes fail to realize her sacredness. In the East nature is our eternal sanctuary, the soul is our everlasting temple, and the sacredness of God's creation is only next to the sacredness of God himself. In the West you love equality, you respect man, you seek justice. In the East love is the fulfillment of the law, we have hero worship, we behold God in humanity. In the West you establish the moral law, you insist upon propriety of conduct, you are governed by public opinion. In the East we aspire, perhaps vainly aspire, after absolute self-conquest, and the holiness which makes God its model. In the West you work incessantly, and your work is your worship. In the East we meditate and worship for long

THE PRINCIPLE OF INTERPENETRATION

hours, and worship is our work. Perhaps one day, after this Parliament has achieved its success, the Western and the Eastern man will combine to support each other's strength and supply each other's deficiencies. And then that blessed synthesis of human nature shall be established which all prophets have foretold, and all the devout souls have sighed for.⁷

Those who have at heart the ethical and social ideal of the unification of the human race and the religious principle of the maximum of harmonious interaction between man and the Deepest Reality of the universe, and who therefore recognize the autonomy both of ethics and of religion, cannot but feel the authoritativeness of this summons to the creative task of bringing about between these two autonomous sides of experience the fullest interpenetration.

⁷ *World's Parliament of Religions*, Vol. II, pp. 1090-1092.

V

RELIGION AND MYSTICISM

OUR study of religious experience has led us to conceive of it as an experience of kinship with the Deepest Reality in the universe and hence of membership in an infinitely meaningful world and of participation in the realizing of its potentialities. Such being its nature, religious experience is interested equally, as we have seen, in reality and in value, and has as its own field the underlying relations between the two. Consequently we found the principle of religion—which both differentiates it from other sides of experience and correlates it with them—to be the bringing to pass of the maximum of harmonious interaction between the personalities of men and the Deepest Reality of the universe. But we also have been compelled to note how different are the ways in which men have found what they deemed to be the maximum of such harmonious interaction—ways differing according to the conception of the universe held and according to the way of life discovered or learned from tradition. Here it has been a dualistic asceticism, there a pantheistic optimism, here a mundane polity, there an other-worldly supernatural redemption, which has afforded men what they believed to be the maximum harmonious interaction attainable. Now, prominent among the differing ways in which religion has sought to realize itself and fulfil its function is the way of mysticism. Thus the significance of mysticism is of much interest for any philosophical study of religion.

But from the point of view of our present inquiry—that of religion's further development and its creative possibili-

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MYSTICISM

ties—the question of the significance of mysticism is of special importance. In the post-war period there has been a tendency toward a revival of mysticism. What does such a revival portend? What possibilities of good or of danger does it open up? Has mysticism any positive value for creative religion, or is it inimical to it?

The nature of the problem which a revival of mysticism presents may be seen from two quite opposite appraisals of mysticism which one finds among the philosophically minded. Some would regard any reviving of mysticism as a sign of neurosis in our time—as another instance of a widespread “failure of nerve,” such as Professor Gilbert Murray finds to have been characteristic of the Græco-Roman world at the beginning of the Christian era. They would point to the great social discouragement that followed the war, and to the still more general tendency of a complex and ill-harmonized civilization to become a burden upon the human spirit. They would cite the flaring up of interest in spiritistic phenomena and other occult matters. And they would regard the turning to mysticism in religion as something closely correlated with these tendencies. It is, they think, a refuge, a defensive reaction toward too burdensome and sad a world.¹

Professor Santayana, for example, writes of mysticism as follows: “Mysticism is the most primitive of feelings and only visits formed minds in moments of intellectual arrest and

¹ A fuller citation of Gilbert Murray's characterization of the world at the time of Christianity's beginning will be of interest here. Comparing the great classical writers of Athens with those of the Christian era Professor Murray finds a new quality appearing. “It is,” he says, “a rise of asceticism, of mysticism, in a sense, of pessimism; a loss of self-confidence, of hope in this life and of faith in normal human effort; a despair of patient inquiry, a cry for infallible revelation; an indifference to the welfare of the state, a conversion of the soul to God. It is an atmosphere in which the aim of the good man is not so much to live justly, to help the society to which he belongs and enjoy the esteem of his fellow creatures; but rather, by means of a burning faith, by contempt of the world and its standards, by ecstasy, suffering, and martyrdom, to be granted pardon for his unspeakable unworthiness, his immeasurable sins. There is an intensifying of certain spiritual emotions; an increase of sensitiveness, a failure of nerve.” *Four Stages of Greek Religion*, p. 103.

RELIGION AND MYSTICISM

dissolution. It can exist in a child, very likely in an animal; indeed, to parody a phrase of Hegel's, the only pure mystics are the brutes." And he adds: "In the Life of Reason it (mysticism) is, if I may say so, a normal disease, a recurrent manifestation of lost equilibrium and interrupted growth."²

But in contrast to such a depreciatory judgment other important thinkers would regard a revival of mysticism, if it took place under the right conditions, as a return to sanity. Mysticism, they would say, if it is rightly related to the rest of life, is a token not of equilibrium lost but of equilibrium regained, not of interrupted growth but of escape from atrophy. Thus Bertrand Russell seeks to combine "mysticism and logic," holding that mysticism is "the inspirer of whatever is best in man"; and he speaks of "the true union of the mystic and the man of science" as being "the highest eminence . . . that it is possible to achieve in the world of thought."³

Similarly Havelock Ellis, writing on "Science and Mysticism," has said: "When we look broadly at the matter . . . not only is there no opposition between science and mysticism, but . . . they are essentially related." True, he says, "if the natural impulses which normally work best together are separated and specialized in different persons, we may expect to find a concomitant state of atrophy and hypertrophy, both alike morbid. The scientific person will become atrophied on the mystical side, the mystical person will become atrophied on the scientific side. Each will become morbidly hypertrophied on his own side."⁴ But he holds that in the more normal spiritual life the scientific and the mystical impulses are fused—a view for which he finds abundant evidence in history, and in support of which he narrates his own spiritual experience.

² *Reason in Religion*, pp. 277, 278.

³ *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 4.

⁴ *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. CXI, pp. 771 ff.

WHAT IS MYSTICISM?

Now such sharply contrasted judgments as to mysticism are indicative of the complex character of mysticism's historical manifestations—in view of which the most reasonable hypothesis is that mysticism involves possibilities of danger and also possibilities of creative value for man's spiritual life. In this respect, however, mysticism is in a position no different from that of religion in general. No one, looking impartially at the phenomena of religion, can maintain that religion always makes for human well-being. Only by reasoning in a circle—by saying that none but the phenomena which make for human well-being are genuine religion—can the dangers of religion be ignored. If one would have the philosophic attitude toward religion, one must recognize both its dangers and its creative possibilities, and seek to grasp the conditions to which such opposite results are due. Similarly with respect to the aspects of religion termed mysticism—they presumably are of such a nature as to contain possibilities both of danger and of creative value. Any study of the further development of religion is bound to reckon with both kinds of possibility and to try to gain an understanding of the conditions involved. From this point of view a revival of mysticism is neither to be looked at askance, nor welcomed wholesale, but to be estimated according to the extent to which it proves itself able to fuse with creative intelligence.

But what is mysticism? In actual usage the term has acquired a wide and varied range of meanings. It sometimes denotes simply a heightening of emotional tone in experience, as when Russell says: "Mysticism is, in essence, little more than a certain intensity and depth of feeling in regard to what is believed about the universe";⁵ but again it signifies experience of the maximum intensity which, like a powerful gravitational force, deflects from its customary path every other item in life and compels them all to swing in orbits

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

about itself. It is conceived to be applicable only to the feeling life of the individual in his solitude; and it is employed of the spirit of a group, of a ritual, of an age. It is used in disapproval, as though it necessarily meant something pathological; and it is used in eulogy, as denoting the climax of existence. Without assuming that all such uses of the term are justifiable, we are yet bound to ask: Is there a characteristic mode of experience, best described as mysticism, which can appear in manifold and diverse ways, according to the elements of life with which it combines and the conditions under which it manifests itself?

Let us seek to gain an answer to this question on the basis of concrete instances which unmistakably are mysticism and which at the same time exemplify to some extent its range. *The Journal of John Woolman* is a classic of mysticism of the practical type and illustrates admirably the ethical sensitiveness which marks the religion of the Society of Friends at its best. Woolman's mysticism pervades all of his life and expresses itself in the practice of the presence of God and in unreserved obedience to the Inner Light. A few passages from the earlier stages of Woolman's religious experience will serve to bring out these traits. Woolman's religious development in youth was healthful, but was not without its inward struggles—which were concerned chiefly with the problem of securing an undivided heart. Thus he writes of his sorrow and confusion because "There was a secret reserve in my heart"; and again he says: "For some months I had great troubles; there remaining in me an unsubjected will, which rendered my labors fruitless, till at length, through the merciful continuance of heavenly visitations, I was made to bow down in spirit before the Lord."

But such struggles are soon superseded for Woolman by a settled experience of divine communion. "As I lived under the Cross, and simply followed the openings of Truth, my mind, from day to day, was more enlightened." And this

WHAT IS MYSTICISM?

steady communion is marked by the ineffable quality so characteristic of mysticism:

While I silently ponder on that change wrought in me, I find no language equal to it, nor any means to convey to another a clear idea of it. I looked on the works of God in this visible creation, and an awfulness covered me; my heart was tender and often contrite, and universal love to my fellow-creatures increased in me. This will be understood by such as have trodden the same path. Some glances of real beauty may be seen in their faces, who dwell in true meekness. There is a harmony in the sound of that voice to which divine Love gives utterance, and some appearance of right order in their temper and conduct, whose passions are regulated; yet all these do not fully show forth that inward life to such as have not felt it.

In the experience of the "great mystics" of mediæval times there were three stages which were well-nigh universally present—purification, illumination, union. Woolman has much to say of purification; it is an important phase of his mysticism and conditions the other phases. But with him purification means securing purity and singleness of motive, whereas with the mediæval mystics it commonly means also emptying the mind of sense objects and images. So Woolman writes: "As I was thus humbled and disciplined under the Cross, my understanding became the more strengthened to distinguish the pure Spirit which moves inwardly upon the heart"; and "From an inward purifying, and steadfast abiding under it, springs a lively operative desire for the good of others." And again he says: "There was a care on my mind so to pass my time that nothing might hinder me from the most steady attention to the voice of the true Shepherd."⁶

A mysticism of the practical type—mild rather than extreme, ethical, pervasive of daily living, into which purification and discipline enter, not as a means adopted to secure

⁶ *Journal of John Woolman* (Everyman's Library), pp. 21-29.

the ecstatic experience, but as an underlying condition of the practice of the presence of God—such is evidently the mysticism of Friend John Woolman.

But there is mysticism which centres in æsthetic feeling no less definitely than the foregoing is centred in practical living. A striking instance of such æsthetic mysticism, in the form of a single experience—swift and spontaneous in occurrence and expressed freshly, in language uninfluenced by traditional forms—is to be found in *Twenty Minutes of Reality*, by Margaret Prescott Montague. The experience here recorded—the author's own—is all the more significant for our study because it was led up to by no discipline, because it does not appear to be bound up with any particular philosophy or theory of religion, and because, as the narrator plainly implies, it was not a recurring one but stood detached from utility and practice. It was an experience of illumination, of swift vision, in which Reality stood disclosed primarily as Beauty.

The "twenty minutes" took place during the author's convalescence in a hospital following upon a slight operation. The patient had for the first time been wheeled out to the porch. For the sake of brevity let me fuse together a number of sentences scattered through her report. She writes :

I cannot now recall whether the revelation came suddenly or gradually; I only remember finding myself in the very midst of those wonderful moments, beholding life for the first time in all its young intoxication of loveliness, in its unspeakable joy, beauty, and importance. I cannot say exactly what the mysterious change was. I saw no new thing, but I saw all the usual things in a miraculous new light—in what I believe is their true light. Whatever it is, the importance seemed to me nearer to beauty and joy than to an anxious morality. Certainly that unspeakable importance had to do with our relationship with the great Whole. For those fleeting, lovely moments I did indeed, and in truth, love my neighbor as myself. Nay, more: Of myself I was hardly conscious. Is it likely that I could have experienced such love

WHAT IS MYSTICISM?

if there had not been some such emotion at the heart of Reality? In what I saw there was nothing seemingly of an ethical nature. Indeed, it seemed as though beauty and joy were more at the heart of Reality than an over-anxious morality. It was a little as though (to transpose the quotation),

I had slept to dream that life was duty,
But waked to find that life was beauty.

Some may object that I preach a dangerous doctrine; others, that I am trying to whip a mad moment of Pagan beauty into line with Christian thought. Possibly I am; yet I am not trying to do the one thing or the other. I merely am wondering, and endeavoring to get at the truth of something that I saw.

This experience stands by itself—"Once out of all the gray days of my life I have looked into the heart of reality," writes the author; and it shows that mysticism may be a matter of unsought vision as well as of deliberate cultivation and that it may be bound up with the realization of beauty no less than with the attainment of goodness. The practice of the presence of God and the swift vision of reality as beauty are alike mysticism.

But one of the most remarkable things about mysticism is the extent to which it has been bound up with philosophy. Along with the mysticism of practical living and the mysticism of æsthetic feeling must be ranged the mysticism of the philosophic thinker. A peculiarly instructive manifestation of this third type of mysticism is to be found in the writings of Pascal.

Pascal is especially significant for our study, as compared with earlier philosophical mystics in the West or those of the Orient, because he is one of the geniuses who made "the century of genius" which gave us modern scientific thinking in its definite character; and also because he stood out boldly for the freedom of scientific thought from religious author-

ity.⁷ Now Pascal, the originator in mathematics, the experimenter and discoverer in physics, the philosopher, is also a great religious personality in whose experience mysticism plays an important rôle; and furthermore, his mysticism furnishes the central principle for his philosophy. He builds his philosophy, like Kant, upon the antitheses which reason inevitably develops, and he finds the solution of these antitheses, not in a further use of reason, nor in sheer postulates of the will, but in the immediate intuition of truth and of God.⁸ For him the highest principle of knowledge is the heart, not the reason—"The heart has its reasons, which the reason cannot know." The ultimate truths are supernatural, religious, and religion is the direct experience of God in the heart. It is the heart, too, that knows the ultimate principles of physical science. Both in physical science and in religion it is the highest act of reason to know its own limitations, and to recognize its dependence, for its own operations, upon the instincts, the sentiments, the intuitions which spring from the heart. Thus for Pascal experience of an immediate, mystical character lies at the centre alike of practical religion and of philosophic thought.

The mysticism of Pascal could rise to the greatest intensity. In addition to the mystical experiences of purification and illumination, of which we already have seen examples, Pascal had experience of ecstasy, of blissful union with God. The following is the fragmentary record of such an experience; it was found, after his death, written upon parchment and sewed into his doublet:

Year of Grace 1654
Monday, November 23, Day of St. Clement,
Pope and Martyr,
and of others in the martyrology.
Eve of St. Chrysogonus, Martyr, and others.

⁷ *Pensées et opuscules*, edited by Leon Brunschvigg, 9th ed., pp. 74 ff.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 451-463.

WHAT IS MYSTICISM?

From about half-past ten o'clock in the evening to about
half-past twelve.

Fire.

God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob,
not of Philosophers and Scholars.

Certitude. Certitude. Sentiment. Joy. Peace.

God of Jesus Christ,
My God and your God.

Thy God will be my God.

Forgetfulness of the world and of all save God.

He is found only by the ways taught in the Gospel.

Greatness of the human soul.

Righteous Father, the world hath not known Thee;
but I have known Thee.

Joy, Joy, Joy, tears of joy.

I separated myself from him.

They have forsaken Me the fountain of living water,
My God, wilt Thou forsake me?

May I not be separated from Him eternally.

This is life eternal, that they might know Thee, the only
true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent.

Jesus Christ.

Jesus Christ.

I separated myself from Him; I fled from Him, renounced,
crucified.

He is retained only by the ways taught in the Gospel,
Renunciation complete and sweet, etc.

Unquestionably this is a record of a mystical experience that had a profound and far-reaching influence upon all his religious life and philosophy. And its traits are those which are wont to be called "typical" of mysticism—though in truth they are no more typical than the inner light, and the practice of the presence of God, of John Woolman. But here is a most intense emotional experience, of brief duration, accompanied by a hallucination of great light, giving certainty of truth and God, and a blissful merging of the human self with the Divine.

Yet, though Pascal's mysticism includes an intensity of

RELIGION AND MYSTICISM

emotional experience which does not appear in the practical mysticism of Woolman nor the æsthetic mysticism of the *Twenty Minutes*, it deserves to be classed as philosophic mysticism, because with Pascal the dominant interest was always truth rather than moral achievement and reform, or beauty, and because it forms the creative centre of a characteristic philosophy.

We have been seeking to bring before ourselves in the concrete something of the range of mystical phenomena; and we have taken account of contrasting types—the types of practical, æsthetic, and philosophic mysticism—and of differing degrees—the practice of the presence of God based on purification and discipline, the unpremeditated swift illumination, and the ecstatic union. Of course, numberless other lines of description could be followed out; indeed the data already presented contain many other sequences and contrasts than those which we have stopped to trace. But the nature of the problem which a definition of mysticism involves is to be seen in the material just surveyed. Are there traits common to the tranquil, pervasive communion of the Friend, with its ethical fineness and urgency; to the sudden fresh vision of Reality which discovers its beauty; to the ecstatic experience with its tendency to the pathological; and to the philosophy founded on the intuitions of the heart? And if there are such common traits, do they discriminate the modes of experience in which they appear from other modes of experience? We return, then, to the question, what is mysticism?

Let me point out three characteristics, evident in the material before us, with the thought that they do serve to discriminate it, and similar bodies of data, from other modes of experience. These characteristics are *immediacy*, *objectivity*, and *luminousness*. To Woolman the Spirit is immediately present, giving him the moral insights on which he so conscientiously acts; in the *Twenty Minutes* new

WHAT IS MYSTICISM?

beauty is discovered by direct vision into the heart of Reality; to Pascal an ecstatic union with God gives certitude of the Gospel, and direct intuitions of the heart give basic truths for the philosophy of the universe. The experiences cited, whether mild or intense, whether pervasive and abiding or brief, present themselves as not of the step-by-step, trial-and-error type, but direct and immediate; as not subjective imaginings, but contact with the Real; and as not the application of familiar truth to life, but as insights of far-reaching significance.

Now if we take the foregoing characteristics as being the essentials of mystical experience we shall not be narrowing our conception of mysticism to something of which we are bound to disapprove, as being inherently pathological or as belonging to a pre-scientific world, but can take a catholic attitude toward the very wide ranges and varieties of experience that men have been wont to call mystical; and at the same time mysticism will remain something distinctive in our experience. Let us say, then, that mystic experience is a direct awareness rather than an inference or a taking things at second hand; it also is felt to be an apprehension of reality, and not a merely subjective experience; and in addition it has the quality of newness, of insight, of being a perception of something inherently meaningful. So conceived mysticism may appear in secular as well as in religious forms, as psychologists of the subjective have affirmed.⁹ Mysticism is religious when there is present the further characteristic that the objective reality is experienced as Divine. But for the term "Divine," in turn, a wide range of meaning should be preserved. Let us think of it as denoting, on the level of primitive life, whatever evokes the response of awe, and by processes of growth as coming to denote, on the higher

⁹ Cf. W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 382 ff; J. H. Leuba, *Belief in God and Immortality*, pp. 47-48, and *Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, pp. 286-288; J. B. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 350

RELIGION AND MYSTICISM

levels, reality more than human which is instinct with truth, beauty, and goodness.¹⁰

On the basis of the characteristics thus brought out we may undertake to define what religious mysticism should be conceived to be. Religious mysticism, as our study shows, is a sense of a presence that is immediately felt to be Divine, or an apprehension of truth that is immediately felt to be valid and momentous. Concerning this definition it should be at once added that its two parts signify simply two different aspects which the one type of experience may show—the momentous truth being metaphysical and the Divine Presence being luminous. Thus the mystic experience is wont to be, to the person who has it, an immediate consciousness of Deity in which new insight comes and from which fresh life flows. So conceived, mystic experience may be conditioned on an elaborate, severe, exacting discipline, as is “the mystic way” described by the mediæval mystics, or on a more simple but methodical practice of the presence of God, or it may just happen, as did the instance of æsthetic mysticism already given. It may be very sporadic—occurring only once or twice in a life-time—or it may be a fairly persistent or recurrent phase of experience. It may be a mode of experience that some people—including religious people—have comparatively little of, and that others have a great deal of. But it is always direct and immediate—that is, an experience in which reasoning and moral effort are not active at the time; it is always felt to be a contact with Reality, not a mere change in one’s self; and it is always luminous.

Now with respect to the sense of divine presence and the immediate apprehensions of truth of which religious mysticism essentially consists there are two questions of major importance to be asked, namely, Have they value? and, Are

¹⁰ The more than human reality may indeed be called “Humanity,” as is done by Comte and his present-day counterparts, but then “Humanity” denotes something deeper and higher than the aggregate of facts assembled by anthropology, psychology, and sociology.

WHAT IS MYSTICISM?

they valid? These two questions, from the standpoint of one's total philosophy, are of course closely bound up together. For processes in experience which are not valid cannot in the long run have value; and processes which prove to have genuine value have a strong presumptive claim to some kind of validity. Nevertheless, the criteria of validity and those of value are to a large degree distinct from each other, and it is dangerous to confuse them; since so doing sacrifices the relative autonomy which belongs to science and logic to ethics, to æsthetics, and to religion. Hence our two major questions concerning mysticism require separate treatment. In the second and third parts of our study we shall be led to the question of what may be valid in mysticism. The question, accordingly, to which we now should proceed is that of mysticism's value. This question, when stated from the special point of view of our present inquiry, is, as was indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the question as to the creative possibilities of mysticism in religion's further development. Have immediate apprehensions of truth and a sense of divine presence an important part to play in the further development of religion and of life through religion?

We may best approach this question from the point of view of what we have found to be the highest principle of ethics, namely, the achievement of a world-wide society of creative personalities. Has mysticism a contribution to make toward rendering this principle controlling in life and conduct?

There is much to indicate that, under the right conditions, mysticism may work creatively toward extending the sway of the ethical principle by *producing social solidarity*. Let us return to our concrete data for a moment. As we have seen, Woolman, by simply following the "openings of truth" day by day, came into a truly ineffable experience of God and therewith found that, as he expressed it, "Universal love to my fellow-creatures increased in me." In other words, a

strong sense of social solidarity is a direct consequence of his sense of the presence of God and of his intuitions of truth. So entirely are his religious mysticism and his social feeling bound up together that he writes: "To say we love God, and at the same time to exercise cruelty toward the least creature, is a contradiction in itself."

Now this fusion of mysticism and social consciousness, which appears with the first ripening of Woolman's religious experience, continues throughout his life. Evidently these two aspects of his life mutually reinforce each other. To an astonishing degree he feels the social issues of his time and with prophetic eye discerns those that are to come. As Miss Vida Scudder writes: "Of him as of Shelley it might well be said, 'He was as a nerve o'er which do creep the else unfelt oppressions of the earth.'"¹¹ He says of slavery, "It appeared to me as a gloom over the land," and he foresees that "the consequence will be grievous to posterity." He observes "that too much labor not only makes the understanding dull," but makes it difficult "to enjoy the sweetness of rest." Writing "On Merchandising" he appeals, in advance of the Higher Critics, to the whole social message of the Hebrew prophets and shows that, to Isaiah, the truly holy are "persons superior to all the arts of getting money which have not righteousness as their foundation; they despise the gain of oppressions." In his *Considerations on the True Harmony of Mankind* he describes the complex social conditions which lead to the exploitation of labor:

I have here beheld how the desire to provide wealth, and to uphold a delicate life, hath grievously entangled many, and been like snares to their offspring; and though some have been affected with a sense of their difficulties, and appeared desirous, at times, to be helped out of them; yet for want of abiding under the humbling power of Truth, they

¹¹ See *The Journal of John Woolman* (Everyman's Library), Introduction, p. ix.

WHAT IS MYSTICISM?

have continued in these entanglements; for in remaining conformable to this world, and giving way to a delicate life, this expensive way of living, in parents, and in children, hath called for a large supply, and in answering this call the faces of the poor have been ground away, and made thin through hard dealing.

The ramifications of these motives in economic and political life have the result that "the harmony of society is broken, and from hence commotions and wars do frequently arise in the world."¹²

The value of Woolman's intuitions of truth may be seen from the soundness of the social feeling which results. His criticism of worldliness is never ascetic. It never arises from detachment from mankind or a despising of nature; on the contrary, it springs from his feeling of solidarity with all his fellowmen, and from the desire that the goods of nature and the products of industry shall be more widely shared.

Moreover, Woolman's mysticism, with its ethical sensitiveness and discernment, is in the completest fashion carried over into social action. After having once complied with his employer's request that he write a bill of sale of a Negro woman whom the latter had sold—doing so because "the thing was sudden" and the purchaser was waiting, but with great uneasiness of conscience—he thereafter gives much of the energy of his life to combating slavery and its evils, with good success. He is "fully convinced that the proceedings of wars are inconsistent with the purity of the Christian religion," and will not accept pay for the entertainment of soldiers. Having learned that working with dyes is a dangerous occupation, he begins to wear undyed clothes. He takes every possible means to avoid benefiting by unjust profits. For this reason he crosses the Atlantic in the steerage, in the days when steerage conditions were unspeakable, and is constrained to publish a protest against the

¹² Pp. 32, 33, 167, 184, 185, 194.

lot of sailors and their apprentices. Gentle, refined, and possessed of rare humility, he yet remonstrates courageously and effectively wherever he finds social customs or conditions of industry which are a source of oppression to the toiler. And when one observes the part which pure contemplation, silent worship, and "openings of truth" also have in Woolman's experience, one cannot but conclude that his mysticism is a prime source of his self-identification with the oppressed and of his power to labor and suffer through a life-time for social reform.

There is, then, a type of mysticism, of which Woolman and many others of the Society of Friends are pre-eminent embodiments, which is a powerful force for removing the causes of enmity among men and producing social solidarity. Here, as always in the case of religion, it must be recognized that the type and its functions are conditioned. Mysticism appears in other types, which have other and even quite opposite functions. The sense of the presence of God has often turned the mystically minded away from society. Mystical apprehensions of truth have often been such as to obscure personal and social values. The idea of God cherished by a given person or group inevitably affects the sense of his presence; and no less inevitably do one's sentiments and practical attitudes condition one's intuitions of truth—especially in the moral and spiritual realm. The Principle of Interpenetration, at which we arrived in the preceding chapter, has its application here. Mystical experience must interpenetrate with the ideas and the practice of ethical and social religion, if it is to be productive of social solidarity. But the point for special emphasis now is that the interpenetration is really and fully mutual. The immediacy of mystical communion and of intuitive vision fructifies thought and practice at the same time that it is molded and directed by them. Immediacy can make its contribution to life's development just as can any other char-

WHAT IS MYSTICISM?

acteristic mode of experience. That such is the fact social mystics like John Woolman furnish important proof.

But if mysticism can extend the sway of the ethical principle by being productive of social solidarity, what of mysticism's relation to the exercise of intelligence in our moral and spiritual life? Can intuition and the practice of the presence of God promote the exercise of intelligence in this realm, or do they naturally and necessarily inhibit such exercise? This question—if we are keeping definitely in mind the problem of what further developments of religion will be truly creative—may be stated more specifically as follows: *Can mysticism sustain and foster the spirit of inquiry?*

The importance of persistently cultivating the spirit of inquiry as a part of the religious life is being increasingly recognized in our day. "Exploratory reactions" are seen to be fundamental in human nature and therefore should not be smothered in life's higher ranges. The curiosity of childhood must not be quenched in the religious realm if our religion is to retain the quality of childlikeness which Jesus praised. Criticism and doubt are indispensable for independence in religion. Healthful, vigorous faith is forward-looking and is not only loyal to known truth, but always ready to re-test it and always in quest of new truth.¹³ Thus the spirit of inquiry appears as of vital significance for creative religion.

Now unquestionably mysticism has been, at times, indifferent to inquiry—even unfriendly to it—but it would be a mistake to suppose that such is mysticism's inherent nature. Evidence to the contrary, indeed, we have already

¹³ Professor Gerald Birney Smith conceives Christian ethics "as a never-ceasing quest of the good," and writes of it: "Christian ethics, in so far as it embodies the spirit of Jesus, will be a creative attitude of moral eagerness rather than a complacent conformity to a system. If duty be portrayed as that of moral exploration, we may uncover many an opportunity which never would have presented itself to us without the creative insight due to the spirit of moral quest." *The Principles of Christian Living*, p. 67.

before us in the philosophical mysticism of Pascal. We have noted how vigorously Pascal championed the independence of physical science. In this realm experiment and reason are for him supreme. In the realm of history and theology, it is true, Pascal thinks that he can mark out a sphere for authority. But when physical science and ecclesiastical authority are at odds, he takes the verdict of the former to be decisive. In the eighteenth of the *Provincial Letters* Pascal wrote to the Jesuit Father Annat:

It was equally to little purpose that you obtained against Galileo a decree from Rome, condemning his opinion respecting the motion of the earth. It will never be proven by such an argument as this that the earth remains stationary; and if it can be demonstrated by sûre observation that it is the earth and not the sun that revolves, the efforts and arguments of all mankind put together will not hinder our planet from revolving, nor hinder themselves from revolving along with her.

But even in the sphere which Pascal assigned to authority he recognizes a higher principle. Thus he declares: "If my letters are condemned by Rome, that which I condemn is condemned in Heaven. Lord Jesus, I appeal to thy tribunal."¹⁴ And in a fragment which treats of authority he says: "It is your assent to your own self, and the steady voice of your own reason, and not that of others, which should cause you to believe."¹⁵ Pascal remained a good Catholic, but, considered in the large, his influence must be reckoned on the side of freedom of thought and inquiry. Of the Jansenist movement to which he belonged M. Villemain wrote: "The recluses of Port-Royal, while appearing to discuss only scholastic subtilties, represented the liberty of conscience, the spirit of examination, the love of justice and truth."¹⁶ And pre-eminent in these respects was Pascal; as

¹⁴ *Pensées*, *op. cit.*, p. 745.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 453.

¹⁶ *Études sur B. Pascal*. 3^e édit., p. 274.

WHAT IS MYSTICISM?

A. Vinet has said: "The spirit of inquiry is one of the things of which Pascal, in the *Provincial Letters*, made himself the representative."¹⁷ Similarly E. Lefebvre, in a recent study, declares: "Pascal is a liberator of the intelligence."¹⁸ We have only to think ourselves back into the ideas and issues of the seventeenth century to see how significant was this work of liberation. Whether it was the current physical dogma that nature abhors a vacuum, or the official theological dogma as to human works and divine grace, with which he was confronted, Pascal stood for fresh inquiry and the realities of experience.

Mysticism and the spirit of inquiry, then, are united in Pascal. In him the intuitive habit of mind goes along with invention in mathematics and experimental discovery in physics, and the sense of God's presence in the heart supplies a higher authority than the Papal See.

But Pascal, though a genius, is not an isolated instance of the union of mysticism with the spirit of inquiry. Mysticism in general, at least in the West, has proven to be a powerful ferment, whose workings have contributed toward freedom of thought, toward the formation of new philosophies, and toward far-reaching social changes. To note such workings one has only to recall the sequence from Pseudo-Dionysius through Scotus Erigena and Eckhart to German philosophy; or to think of the part of Neo-Platonism in producing the Renaissance; or to remember how mysticism prepared the soil for the Reformation. Of this last line of influence Windelband has said: "Luther's work of liberation owed its origin and its success not least to Mysticism—not indeed to that sublime, spiritualized form of viewing the world to which the genius of Master Eckhart had given expression, but to the movement of deepest piety, which as 'practical Mysticism,' had spread from the Rhine in the

¹⁷ *Provincial Letters*, tr. by Thomas M'Crie, p. 69.

¹⁸ *Pascal: l'homme, l'œuvre, l'influence*, p. 178.

'League of the Friends of God,' and in the 'Brothers of the Common Life.'"¹⁹ Orthodox mystics there have been, to be sure, as well as heterodox mystics, but it remains true that established authority, whether ecclesiastical or political, for the most part has regarded mystical movements with suspicion and fear and has sought to stifle them. Thus it seems evident that the mystic's inner experience tends to give him an independence of conventional ideas and standards, and affords him a basis both for moral protest and for intellectual inquiry.

But not only does mysticism prove its creative quality through its capacity to produce social solidarity, and to fuse with intelligence in the work of inquiry. It also is creative by reason of its *capacity for heightening personal energy*. This effect of mysticism is one of the chief things established by James through the great amount of data which he assembles in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*. He concludes concerning the "faith-state"—which term he regards as practically synonymous with "mystical state"²⁰—that it is "what Kant calls a 'sthenic' affection, an excitement of the cheerful, expansive, 'dynamogenic' order, which, like any tonic, freshens our vital powers."²¹ Again he sums up his inductions by saying: "Mystical conditions may, therefore, render the soul more energetic in the lines which their inspiration favors."²² And in his famous essay on "The Energies of Men" he has shown how mysticism enables men to tap reservoirs of energy of whose presence they re-

¹⁹ Windelband goes on to say: "For this mysticism, the disposition, purity of heart, and the imitation of Christ were the sole content of religion; assent to dogmas, the external works of holiness, the whole worldly organization of Church life, appeared to be matters of indifference and even hindrances: the believing soul demands only the freedom of its own religious life—a demand that transcends all these outer works. This was the inner source of the Reformation. Luther himself had not only searched Augustine, he had also edited the 'German Theology': and his word let loose the storm of this religious longing." *A History of Philosophy*, tr. by J. H. Tufts, p. 365. See also pp. 271, 334-5, 353, 367, 409; and H. Hoffding, *History of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 83 ff., 117 ff., 130 ff.

²⁰ P. 424.

²¹ P. 505

²² P. 415.

WHAT IS MYSTICISM?

main entirely unaware in their ordinary work-a-day lives. The data which we have surveyed in the present chapter point to the same conclusion. The mysticism of each of the types considered—practical, philosophical, æsthetic—has had a clearly tonic effect upon its exemplar. Woolman, Pascal, and the author of the *Twenty Minutes of Reality* alike experienced from their mysticism a heightening of personal powers.

It will be instructive, in this connection, if we return particularly to our instance of æsthetic mysticism. The experience of the union of reality and beauty which æsthetic mysticism gives is peculiarly releasing and quickening in its effect upon the human spirit. From an instance of this type we should be able to gain some understanding of how and why mysticism heightens personal energy.

In the experience recorded in *Twenty Minutes of Reality* Beauty is, as we have noted, the central element; but there plainly is a general heightening of faculties as well—first of all, in the vivid perception of beauty in things familiar; and then in being lifted beyond the motive of duty into a quickening sense of joy in living, and into the consciousness of truly loving one's neighbor as one's self. What were the conditions of this heightening of faculties?

The little volume containing this record presents also an analysis of it by Doctor Richard Cabot—under the title, "Was it Reality?"—which helps to answer this question. He tells us that no anæsthetic, or drug, or fasting, or fever was a condition of the experience. Instead of finding in it anything of a morbid nature he says: "There are signs of unusual health in the type of perception which this convalescent reports." What he means he explains by an illustration from our physical vision. He points out that the half of the retina which is continuously stimulated by the bright sky gets stale, and when we bring the fresh half of the retina into use we get a keener perception. In looking

at a sunset, for example, "by stooping or lying down one partly inverts the eye, reverses the retinal segments and brings the fresh, unsated part of the eye-ground against the bright sunset colors. The familiar but fascinating result is that the sky colors appear brighter, more varied, and more beautiful."

Doctor Cabot goes on to say: "No one questions that the greater beauty appreciated by the fresh half of the retina is reality and not delusion or morbidness. The unsated tissues give us true sight of the colors. . . . Ordinary perception is untrue, because it has become blind by overuse. It is calloused and numb." And again, he compares the keener perceptions of children, which correspond to their greater health—their greater output of energy, their superior muscular control and co-ordination, the soundness of their sleep, etc.—with the prosaic perceptions of the adult. And he suggests "that our ordinary prosaic perceptions show strong evidence of morbidity. The familiar pictures on our walls are all but invisible to most of us. Shall we pride ourselves on this sort of blindness? It means falsity, not fact. . . . Satiety is our average or 'normal' state about much of our experience in adult life, and satiety is demonstrably untrue, unscientific, maimed—in short, diseased." What we need, he thinks, is something to "crack the crust of habit and show us reality." And this was done, for the author of the *Twenty Minutes*, after ten days of hospital atmosphere, "by the return to the sky and the moving winds."

✓ The sequence of events in such an experience appears to be: an escape from fatigue, tensions and the mechanisms of habit; an exposure of the mind to beauty and reality, and a consequent fresh perception of them; and then a heightening of vital powers through bringing the whole self into more harmonious interaction with wider ranges of reality. The moralist summons always to greater strength and more efficient service, and we cannot deny the rightfulness of his

WHAT IS MYSTICISM?

summons. But our surface storage of energy gets drained; and our schemes for efficient service shut us away from much that is human—just as our subways whirl us along in the dark past so much that is interesting in our cities. Then we need the help of the mystic, who knows the way of direct connection with the eternal springs of energy from which our little storages came, and who can lead us up out of our tunnels to the upper levels where we can have a fresher, humaner vision of the world that we have been rushing around to serve.

Thus we see how mysticism of the æsthetic type may enhance our moral living. Fresh intuitions of beauty in reality make our activity more spontaneous and creative; they release us from satiety and from mechanism and enable us to live again with joy. A passage from Tagore well expresses this synthesis of æsthetic mysticism and moral endeavor: "Just as the joy of the poet in his poem, of the artist in his art, of the brave man in the output of his courage, of the wise man in his discernment of truths, ever seeks expression in their several activities, so the joy of the knower of Brahma, in the whole of his everyday work, little and big, in truth, in beauty, in orderliness, and in beneficence, seeks to give expression to the infinite."²³ And what the æsthetic type of mysticism can do can result from the other types as well. The practical mystic pursues the goal of life the more ardently when he intuitively perceives that it is potentially present in the Ground of life. The philosophical mystic will be quickened in the production of value as he has vision of cosmic value-producing Power. In any of these leading types, mysticism can enable us to experience with peculiar intensiveness the long-established truth that "they that wait on the Lord shall renew their strength."

That religious mysticism in general may contribute powerfully to the heightening of personal energy is the con-

²³ *Sādhanā*, p. 131.

clusion of the latest psychological study of the subject—that by Professor Leuba. His final estimate of religious mysticism finds expression in such passages as the following:

The development of the mystical technique for the realization of a quasi-physical presence of the Perfect One constitutes the most remarkable achievement of religion in man's struggle to overcome adverse external circumstances, his own imperfections, and those of his fellowmen. It is one of the outstanding expressions of the creative power working in humanity. It is paralleled in the realm of reason by the development of science. Both lead, if in different ways, to the physical and spiritual realization of man.²⁴

Professor Leuba is drastic in his criticism of the traditional belief in "a God-Providence," which he rejects; but he says:

Whoever wants to know the deepest that is in man, the hidden forces that drive him onward, should become a student of mysticism. And if knowing man is not knowing God, it is nevertheless only when in possession of an adequate knowledge of man that metaphysics may expect to fashion an acceptable conception of the Ultimate.²⁵

And at the same time Leuba's conclusions confirm the argument of this chapter, namely, that mysticism is creative in proportion as it interpenetrates with ethics and with social intelligence. For he writes:

It has seemed to us that, for the philosopher, the fact of greatest significance in religious mysticism is perhaps not the accession of energy but the direction it takes, *i.e.*, the manifestation of the will to actualize an ideal, thought of as divine and involving the socialization of humanity. We have seen how the great Christian mystics strove to establish the Kingdom of God on earth. Without regarding their social ideal as perfectly conceived, the Divine in them might be seen, if anywhere, in the unrelenting effort with which they endeavored to realize in themselves and in others a lofty

✓ ²⁴ *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, p. 299.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 318.

WHAT IS MYSTICISM?

social ideal. In this effort they were not attempting to adapt themselves to the demands of actual society: they strove instead, with unconquerable tenacity, to create something to which the World opposes a stubborn and cruel resistance.²⁶

Mysticism then, we conclude, has a vital part to play in religion's great enterprise of attaining the maximum of harmonious interaction between the personalities of men and the Deepest Reality of the universe. A revival of mysticism need not be a reaction to individualism nor need it be alien to scientific inquiry or to the co-operative exercise of intelligence in social life; instead, it may draw men together in the life of reason and in creative social endeavor. Hence the more candidly and resolutely we face those major social problems arising from the decay of the old social order and the tensions and divisions in human society, the more we shall prize those fresh visions of ideal social values, that intuitive faith in the practicability of a unification of mankind, and the immediate sense of a co-operative Divine Energy which it is in the province of mysticism to give.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 317.

VI

CREATIVE RELIGION

OUR study of religious experience has been guided by the desire to ascertain in some measure what qualities in religion make it creative, and under what conditions its creativity manifests itself. We have felt that since religion is always undergoing development—and particularly so in our time—it is to a certain degree plastic to our intelligence; and that hence the philosophy of religion should address itself to the problem of the further development of religion. We have been guided by the conviction that the philosophy of religion has a part to play in rendering religious development a real progress. Philosophic reflection, we have assumed, may help to deepen religion's intrinsic significance and its capacity to strengthen and enrich human life as a whole. It is desirable, then, before proceeding to the other main subdivisions of our study, to gather up the chief results of our inquiry thus far in their bearing on the question as to what are the requirements for a creative religion. But as we do so it also will be well for us to seek to define the particular kinds of problems which the idea of a creative religion sets in the fields of religious knowledge and religious metaphysics, with which the later parts of our study will be concerned.

Stating in outline the main results of our study of religious experience, we may say that religion realizes itself most fully, and is most fruitful for personal life and for society, in proportion as it effects a vital synthesis of four leading types, namely: religion as the creation and conservation of values; religion as communion with Divine Reality; religion as an imaginative achievement of the human spirit; and religion as an integration of thought and ex-

REQUIREMENTS FOR CREATIVE RELIGION

perience. It might be supposed, indeed, that since such types of religion come about by a more or less natural process of variation, a really vital synthesis is not to be hoped for, and that an effort for it would be artificial and against nature. But none of these types acquires its typical character through the exclusion of the other types, but rather through a preponderating emphasis upon its own leading characteristics. There is a tendency, to be sure, for these leading characteristics to receive such development as to suppress and stifle the corresponding characteristics of the other types, but this tendency makes for sterility in religion rather than for fertility. Just as Galton found that human genius appeared most frequently where there was a crossing of diverse stocks—Celtic, Anglo-Saxon, Norman—so it is through the synthesis of the types mentioned, rather than through their over-specialization, that the highest creativity in religion is to be looked for. Let us consider briefly these four types in some of their historic differentiations and inter-dependences, in order that we may be aided in estimating their significance for creative religion.

When we conceive of religion as the creation and conservation of values we are expressing a present-day accentuation of what historically is known as ethical religion. Religion evolved into what was predominantly ethical religion in the case of the Hebrew people, especially under the leadership of their great prophets. From the beginning it was the events of history rather than the processes of nature which stirred the Hebrew religious consciousness. It was in their migrations, their wars of conquest, their struggles to maintain their basic virtues while assimilating a people more civilized but more corrupt, and in the disasters and deliverances of their conflicts with great empires, that they experienced the nature and power of Jehovah. It was not the order of physical nature but the order of righteousness which they first

perceived; and when they attained to ethical monotheism, it was the conviction of the absolute and impartial righteousness of God which led to the belief in his universal sway.

Now while this Hebrew religion at its highest is primarily ethical religion, it also contains within itself, at least in implicit fashion, the elements of mystical fellowship, lofty imagination, and an integrated view of the world.

The psychology of Hebrew prophetism can hardly be understood without recognizing its mystical character. The great prophets record the visions in which they were called to their work; they are carried forward in their careers by an inward divine urgency; they manifest a superhuman courage; they feel themselves to be the spokesmen of Jehovah. Their uniqueness—distinguishing them from the “false” prophets, and giving them meaning for all time—consists, it is true, in the ethical truthfulness and penetration of their messages; but in respect to the psychological form of their inner life they belong to the general phenomenon of Semitic prophetism and share in its experiences of vision and of ecstasy. They have—to mention a modern analogue—much more nearly the psychology of George Fox than that of the reflective moralist or the merely practical reformer. If we ask under what psychological conditions the profound ethical insights of the great Hebrew prophets came to pass, the answer is that they were mystically conditioned. Hebrew ethical religion, then, developed, not by turning aside from mystical religion, but by infusing it with a new and higher content.

But this ethical religion ranks also as an imaginative achievement. The writings of the Hebrew prophets inevitably took the form of poetry, because poetry is, as Wordsworth defined it, “truth carried alive into the heart by passion.” They dramatize the destiny of nations, they portray the workings of eternal righteousness, they delineate the struggles of the human spirit with the problems of sin and of

CREATING AND CONSERVING VALUES

suffering, they sing of a divine compassion for human sorrow. They are unrivalled for their bitter satire upon luxury and oppression, and for the pathos with which they depict the lot of the oppressed. They body forth in symbol and parable the inmost meetings of the soul with God, and paint the portrait of the Suffering Servant "who was wounded for our transgressions." Their imagery brings before our vision the artificers of peace, beating swords into plowshares and spears into pruning-hooks. And in later generations this ethical religion gives us the book of Job—the world's supreme poem on the mystery of pain—and the Psalter, in which "the whole range of human life, its joy and its woe, its light and its shadow, and its daily routine,"¹ find poetic expression. Thus Hebrew ethical religion, while not sympathetic with the pictorial arts, had the poetic imagination as a powerful ally.

But Hebrew religion at its best, though centring in ethical insight, develops a genuinely integrated view of the world in the conception of ethical monotheism. This integration includes both physical nature and human life, but its centre remains in the human realm. Thus Deutero-Isaiah, by whom it is most fully expounded, teaches that God is "the Creator of the ends of the earth," but the problem of the world's physical structure is left with the words, "There is no searching of his understanding." When any aspect of nature is referred to we find no speculation such as occupied early Greek thought—about earth, air, fire, and water being the elements of all things, or about a universal flux of things, or about all motion being an illusion. Nature's aspects are depicted by Hebrew writers always from an intensely human point of view. The attitude taken may be pessimistic, as in the following passage from Job:

But the mountain falling cometh to naught;
And the rock is removed out of its place;

¹ J. A. Bewer, *The Literature of the Old Testament*, p. 340. For poetry in the prophets one should read the relevant sections of this book.

CREATIVE RELIGION

The waters wear the stones ;
The overflowings thereof wash away the dust of the earth :
So thou destroyest the hope of man.

Or the attitude may be profoundly optimistic, as when the author of the 139th Psalm writes :

If I take the wings of the morning,
And dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea ;
Even there shall thy hand lead me,
And thy right hand shall hold me.

But whatever the attitude, the several aspects of nature are considered only from the point of view of interpreting the destiny of man. Nevertheless, Hebrew ethical monotheism became cosmic in its scope, and the integrated view of the world which thus was secured contributed powerfully to the preservation of Jewish piety after the Exile and throughout the far-flung Jewish communities of the Diaspora.

Thus ethical religion in one of its most creative historical embodiments developed, not by elimination of the mystical, æsthetic and rational phases of religion, but by a characteristic inclusion of them in subordination to its central interest.

But the synthesis achieved in Hebrew ethical religion gradually broke down under the disintegrating influences of external history. Ethical insight became legalistic piety ; the prophet's mystical intuitions of God's righteous and universal will became the apocalypticist's vision of his miraculous deliverance of the Jewish nation ; the spirit of poetry retired before the interest in elaborate symbolism which prefigured the national deliverance ; the genuinely integrated view of the world contained in pure ethical monotheism gave place to a particularistic philosophy of history, centred in a single nation's destiny. A new synthesis—wider and profounder than could come through a single nation's life—

COMMUNION WITH DIVINE REALITY

was needed, if the original creative energy of Hebrew ethical religion was to be preserved to humanity. Such a synthesis took place in the beginning of Christianity. But before turning our attention to this early Christian synthesis, which has most vital significance for our problem of synthesis today, we need to take note of historical instances of the other leading types already mentioned.

Religion as communion with Divine Reality receives typical historical embodiment in the Upanishads. In these writings of the eighth to the sixth centuries classical expression is given to mystical religion, as in the writings of the Hebrew prophets of the same centuries classical expression is given to ethical religion.¹ The Upanishads are the culmination of a long religious development, but they also are a fountain head for all the following centuries of Indian religious thought and experience. Their central interest is neither physical nature nor the course of human history, but rather the ultimate grounds of the spiritual life. They express a reaction against ceremonial and priestly religion, as do the Hebrew prophecies, but this reaction is not in the direction of a higher social righteousness, but in the direction of the oneness of the human soul with the Divine. They teach a new way of salvation. As Professor George F. Moore has written:

Men had long thought of the highest blessedness as an endless life hereafter in the abode and company of the gods. For this external conception of blessedness the Upanishads substitute oneness with God in the fullest meaning of the word, not a union to be realized after death, but a present and eternal reality.²

The discovery of this new way of salvation is exemplified in two passages from one of the most original of the Upani-

² *History of Religions*, Vol. I, p. 274.

CREATIVE RELIGION

shads. The following verse expresses the underlying religious longing:

From the unreal lead me to the real!
From darkness lead me to light!
From death lead me to immortality!

Then, further on, the teacher, Yajnavalkya, is questioned by Maitreyi, his beloved wife, as follows:

Then said Maitreyi: "If now, Sir, this whole earth filled with wealth were mine, would I be immortal thereby?"

"No," said Yajnavalkya. "As the life of the rich, even so would your life be. Of immortality, however, there is no hope through wealth."

Then said Maitreyi: "What should I do with that through which I may not be immortal? What you know, Sir—that, indeed, tell me!"

Then said Yajnavalkya: "Ah! Lo, dear as you are to us, dear is what you say! Come, sit down. I will explain to you. But while I am expounding, do you seek to ponder thereon."

In what follows the term "Soul" denotes the Universal Soul.

Then said he: "Lo, verily, not for love of the husband is a husband dear, but for love of the Soul a husband is dear.

"Lo, verily, not for love of the wife is a wife dear, but for love of the Soul a wife is dear.

"Lo, verily, not for love of the sons are sons dear, but for love of the Soul sons are dear.

✓ "Lo, verily, not for love of the wealth is wealth dear, but for love of the Soul wealth is dear.

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Lo, verily, not for love of the worlds are the worlds dear, but for love of the Soul the worlds are dear.

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"Lo, verily, not for love of the beings are beings dear, but for love of the Soul beings are dear.

COMMUNION WITH DIVINE REALITY

"Lo, verily, not for love of all is all dear, but for love of the Soul all is dear.

"Lo, verily, it is the Soul that should be seen, that should be hearkened to, that should be thought on, that should be pondered on, O Maitreyi. Lo, verily, with the seeing of, with the hearkening to, with the thinking of, and with the understanding of the Soul, this world-all is known."³

Now plainly, this oneness of all finite beings with the Infinite Soul is something intuitively apprehended, something realized in mystical experience. From this point of view religion, whatever else it is, is union with Divine Reality. Indeed, nothing ever can debar us from such union except ignorance of our essential identity with that Reality. Such, then, is the most characteristic teaching of the Upanishads, which have had so much to do with all the subsequent development of Indian religion.

But the Upanishads by no means represent a religion which is mystical to the exclusion of æsthetic, cosmological, or ethical interests. Their mysticism does not take the worshipper away from the forms of the world and their beauty so much as it takes him within them. It kindles his æsthetic imagination because it infinitely enriches the meaning of all which his senses perceive. And so this literature, like the Hebrew prophecies, is not systematized teaching, but is essentially poetry. "The Upanishads, like the Bible, are not troubled with consistency and logic. Their aim is not to expound a system of philosophy, but to give poetic expression to religious intuitions."

But philosophy, nevertheless, is in the Upanishads, in a free, unorganized form. They are the "mountain tarns," as the translator of Deussen's *System of the Vedanta* expresses it, from which the great reservoirs of Indian philosophic thought are filled. And that which is most characteristic of this free, intuitive philosophy has been reduced to ordered

³ Robert E. Hume, *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, pp. 80, 98-100

thought in the Vedanta system, India's great system of idealistic monism.⁴ The basic principle of this idealistic monism is the identity of the finite soul and the Universal Soul, the Atman and the Brahman, already referred to. In the Upanishads this principle is given by a father to his son, Svetaketu, in parables: As honey is the distilled essence of many flowers, as the ocean is the merging of all rivers, as a tree has one indivisible life, as within every seed there is an invisible essence, as salt when dissolved in water can be no longer seen but can be tasted in every particle of water, so, says the father, there is but the one invisible Reality appearing in every soul and in all the universe. Each of these parables closes with the refrain: "That which is the subtle essence, of its being is the universe, that is the Real, that is the Soul, that art thou, O Svetaketu." In the pregnant expression "That art thou," indeed, are contained both the mystical way of salvation taught in the Upanishads and the world-view to which it gave birth.

The preponderating emphasis of the Upanishads is upon the mystical way of salvation—salvation through the realization of the soul's eternal oneness with God—and their poetry and philosophy are tributary to the teaching of this way. Similarly the ethical interest is present in them only in a subordinate and tributary sense. But though subordinate and receiving little development, the ethical element is none the less indispensable to the Upanishad way of salvation. One does not, according to this teaching, attain to that state beyond good and evil which is union with the Absolute without a radical disciplining of desires, a thorough-going unworldliness, and an utter truthfulness. The essential vir-

⁴ Six great philosophical systems—in part widely divergent—derive from the Vedas and Upanishads. For descriptions see Moore, *op. cit.*, or de la Saussaye, *Manual of the Science of Religion*. But the Vedanta is the system which develops most fully the new way of salvation—that of a present and eternal union with God—and "as Vedanta (*i.e.*, end or object of the Veda) it is most closely connected with the Upanishads, whose teaching it systematizes." (de la Saussaye, *op. cit.*, p. 548.)

COMMUNION WITH DIVINE REALITY

tues, it is true, are not active but contemplative; we are not saved by works, but by insight. But with the insight come serenity, a spiritual poise which knows no fear, and the spiritual wealth which neither moth nor rust can consume. The following passage is fundamental for understanding the way of salvation in the Upanishads on its ethical side:

"This eternal greatness of the Brahmana⁵ does not grow larger by work, nor does it grow smaller. Let man try to find its trace, for having found it, he is not sullied by any evil deed.⁶

"He therefore that knows it, after having become quiet, subdued, satisfied, patient, and collected, sees self in Self, sees all in Self.⁷ Evil does not overcome him, he overcomes all evil. Free from evil, free from spots, free from doubt, he becomes a true Brahmnāna; this is the Brahman-world, O King," thus spoke Yajnavalkya.

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This is indeed the great, the unborn Self, the Strong, the giver of wealth. He who knows this obtains wealth.

This great, unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman. Fearless is Brahman, and he who knows this becomes verily the fearless Brahman.⁸

Thus it is not by an elimination of the ethical interest—any more than by an elimination of the philosophical and æsthetic interests—that the Upanishads become a classical embodiment of mystical religion. Rather, the ethical interest enters, like these other two interests, as a real constituent of Upanishad religion, yet one which is radically subordinated to the dominant ambition for the deepest and fullest communion with Divine Reality.

In later centuries great epics draw inspiration from the Upanishads, systems of philosophy elaborate their thought,

⁵ *I.e.*, the saint, who is at one with Brahman, the Universal Soul.

⁶ This, as the context shows, must not be understood in the antinomian sense, any more than should Augustine's saying: "Love, and you may do what you will."

⁷ *I.e.*, in Brahman.

⁸ *Sacred Books of the East*, ed. by Max Muller, Vol. XV, pp. 180-181.

new legalisms seek to fence in and protect their way of life, and in the end the creative energy of the earlier mysticism becomes dissipated and spent. For the recovery of this creative energy there is needed a new synthesis of Indian mysticism with the ethical and social passion achieved in Hebrew prophetic religion and with that clarity of thought and artistic expression which the Greek spirit attained. But the ethical, æsthetic, and philosophical types of religion in turn may receive a needed quickening through becoming fused with that intimate communion with Divine Reality which this early historical embodiment of the mystical type learned so well.

The æsthetic type of religion receives unique literary embodiment in the Greek tragedies. In these tragedies, composed for presentation at the Dionysiac festivals, great problems of life and destiny are portrayed in such a way as to impress the popular imagination. The æsthetic, dramatic motive is controlling as to form, but as to content the controlling motive is religious. The materials for the tragedies are drawn from the popular faith, from tradition and mythology, from the older religious poetry, but they are refined by dramatic art or bold criticism so as to become the vehicle for expressing the profound insights of poet-prophets into universal issues of human life.

Mysticism plays its part in the production of the Greek tragedies. Æschylus was deeply influenced by the religious mysteries; Sophocles had been initiated into their rites;⁹ and the sceptical Euripides, in his last play, the *Bacchæ*, found a union of knowledge with a wisdom that is beyond knowledge—springing from mystical insight:

Knowledge, we are not foes!
I seek thee diligently;
But the world with a great wind blows,
Shining, and not from thee;

⁹ C. H. Moore, *The Religious Thought of the Greeks*, Chap. III.

THE ÆSTHETIC MOTIVE

Blowing to beautiful things,
On amid dark and light,
Till Life through the trammellings
Of Laws that are not the Right,
Breaks, clean and pure, and sings
Glorying to God in the height!¹⁰

The union of religion with a higher morality is a dominant motive with each of the great tragedians—Sophocles effecting it upon the principle that

Nothing to which the gods lead men is base,
and Euripides upon the opposite principle:

If the gods do aught that is base, then they are not gods.¹¹

And the central problem of religious philosophy, the problem of evil, runs through all the tragedies. Thus all the chief aspects of creative religion—the mystical, the ethical, the philosophical, the æsthetic—are present in this great religious poetry. Nevertheless the æsthetic motive is the one that presides in bringing Greek religion to this unique and universally significant expression. In the Greek tragedies religion ministers to the human spirit, not primarily through forming new ethical ideals, nor through producing a sense of mystical union with divine reality, nor through reasoned solutions of life's problems, but by bringing the inevitably conflicting elements of human destiny into a dramatic harmony and so adumbrating a harmony beyond the power of human thought to compass. The final chorus of Euripides's final play may serve to suggest the deeper spirit of this religion:

There may be many shapes of mystery,
And many things God makes to be,
Past hope or fear.

¹⁰ Euripides, tr. by Gilbert Murray. ¹¹ C. H. Moore, *ibid.*, p. 135.

CREATIVE RELIGION

And the end men looked for cometh not,
And a path is there where no man thought.
So hath it fallen here.¹²

Whenever we would know the power of religion to elevate human life by imaginative achievement it is, first of all, to the Greek tragedies that we should turn.

Philosophical religion—religion as an integration of thought and experience—receives its first developed and universally significant expression in Plato. Plato was profoundly interested, as were the Orphic and Pythagorean religions which he had so closely studied, in finding the true way of life and salvation, and the mysticism of these religions persists, refined and transmuted, as an essential element in his teaching.¹³ But for him the way of life could not be a matter of ritual and ceremonial; it must be through and through ethical. And to him as a disciple of Socrates ethical living was primarily a matter of knowledge. Thus his quest for the way of life led him to undertake the unification of all knowledge. And herein lies his unique contribution to the development of religion—that he brought it to full rational interpretation and metaphysical grounding. Yet the form which he imparted to his thought—not systematic but artistic—bears witness to the potency of æsthetic religion in his teaching. "The serene beauty of his compositions and the perfect purity of his diction reveal the artist who from the heights of the culture of his time gives to the thought of that time a form that transcends the time."¹⁴

The union of philosophy and religion which Plato achieved appears in his fundamental teaching, the doctrine of Ideas. For the Ideas are the things "by the contemplation of which

¹² Gilbert Murray's translation in *Nine Greek Dramas*, in *The Harvard Classics*.

¹³ C. H. Moore. *Ibid.*, pp. 47 ff., 52 ff., 161 ff.

¹⁴ W. Windelband, *History of Ancient Philosophy*, tr. by H. E.ushman, p. 179.

THE INTEGRATION OF EXPERIENCE

even deity is divine,"¹⁵ and it is by the Ideas that he builds up his conceptions of immaterial reality and of the true being and immortality of the soul. The Ideas also prove to be the true causes of nature and its processes; "For it appears to me," says Socrates in the *Phædo*, when discussing causes, "that if there be anything else beautiful, besides beauty itself, it is not beautiful for any other reason than because it partakes of that abstract beauty; and I say the same of everything."¹⁶ And since for Plato the Ideas form a hierarchy under the control of one supreme Idea, he is led to a conception of nature which is essentially teleological.

But this teleological conception of nature receives further definition from the ethical character of Plato's thinking. The Idea to which he subordinates all other ideas is the Idea of the Good. Thus he arrives at a thoroughly ethical metaphysics, as the following passages from the *Republic* suffice to show: Socrates says,

Now, this power, which supplies the objects of real knowledge with the truth that is in them, and which renders to him who knows them the faculty of knowing them, you must consider to be the essential Form of Good, and you must regard it as the origin of science, and of truth, so far as the latter comes within the range of knowledge; and though knowledge and truth are both very beautiful things, you will be right in looking upon good as something distinct from them, and even more beautiful.

And again:

In the world of knowledge the essential Form of Good is the limit of our inquiries, and can barely be perceived; but, when perceived, we cannot help concluding that it is in every case the source of all that is bright and beautiful—in the visible world giving birth to light and its master, and in the intellectual world dispensing, immediately and with full authority, truth and reason;—and that whosoever would act

¹⁵ *Phædrus*, *Plato's Works*, tr. by H. Cary, Vol. I, p. 325, sec. 62.

¹⁶ *Phædo*, *Ibid.*, pp. 106-7, sec. 112.

wisely, either in private or in public, must set this Form of Good before his eyes.¹⁷

In Plato's philosophy of religion, then, the ethical motive is central. But with this ethical motive the æsthetic motive is marvellously blended. The Good is practically identified with the Beautiful, and at the end of the discourses on Beauty in the *Phædrus* Socrates prays:

O beloved Pan, and all ye other gods of this place, grant me to become beautiful in the inner man, and that whatsoever outward things I have may be at peace with those within. May I deem the wise man rich, and may I have such a portion of gold as none but a prudent man can either bear or employ.¹⁸

Furthermore, in the contemplation of the Beautiful and the Good and the other divine Ideas Plato rises to the level of mystical religion. For these Ideas are intuitively perceived, and of their contemplation Socrates says in the *Phædrus*:

But a man who makes right use of such memorials as these, by constantly perfecting himself in perfect mysteries, alone becomes truly perfect. And by keeping aloof from human pursuits, and dwelling on that which is divine, he is found fault with by the multitude as out of his senses, but it escapes the notice of the multitude that he is inspired.¹⁹

Thus all the great aspects of religious experience are integrated by Plato and placed in the framework of a unified philosophy. From this time on no religion can influence profoundly the life of mankind which does not achieve for itself articulate philosophical expression.

We have been studying four great types of religion—the ethical, the mystical, the æsthetic, and the philosophical types—in those historical embodiments in which they first re-

¹⁷ *The Republic of Plato*, tr. by Davies, and Vaughan, Bk. VI, secs. 505, 517.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 630, sec. 147.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 325, sec. 62.

THE CHRISTIAN SYNTHESIS

ceived classic expression. Their differentiation is due, in each instance, to special historical and social needs and to the activity of a sequence of gifted minds possessing a common genius. But it seems evident that something native to religion and necessary for its full creative functioning is revealed in each type. For, as we have seen, each type develops, not by excluding the leading traits of the other types, but by including them and subordinating them to its own controlling emphasis. But after each type has received its classic expression a decadence sets in, and the recovery of religion's vitality takes place when new social needs are met by great creative personalities, who are able to initiate a new and higher synthesis of the great essentials of religious experience.

Such a higher synthesis came to pass in early Christianity. This conception of early Christianity does not require that Jesus be portrayed at one and the same time as the fulfiller of Hebrew religion, as the typical mystic, and as transcending the Greeks in the fields of philosophy and æsthetic culture. Such portrayals have been made in the spirit of eulogy, but they are not historically grounded, and they really obscure the vividness and creativeness of Jesus. What is needed for grasping the higher synthesis of religion achieved in early Christianity is to perceive that already in the New Testament the four leading types of religion of which we have been speaking have come to some characteristic expression.

Jesus himself embodies ethical religion uniquely and supremely. That which made him spiritually possible—without which he could not have transcended the legalism and apocalypticism of his day—was the ethical religion of the Old Testament prophets. Though he “came not to destroy,” he did destroy much of the religion of his day. If he had not, he would not have been put to death; for it was the religious leaders of his people who demanded his death—the Pharisees

because he rejected the ceremonialism of the synagogue teaching, and the Sadducees because he condemned the prevailing temple worship. He had what Harnack, referring to him, has called *die Kraft des Negativen*—the power to eliminate the trappings and impedimenta of religion through energetic concentration on its great principles. It was the prophetic ethical religion which Jesus *fulfilled*—making it a new ferment destined to break the old religious forms. The Old Testament prophets had placed human values foremost in the service of God, and, drawing his inspiration from them, Jesus created a universal religion by effecting a complete interpenetration of love for God and love for man. The psychology of the prophet always involves a measure of mysticism, and Jesus is no exception in this respect—witness the “Johannine passage” in Matthew (11: 25–27). And that integrated view of the world in ethical monotheism which the Old Testament prophets achieved was carried further by Jesus through a fresh penetration into its meaning and through its thorough-going application to every aspect of life.²⁰ But Jesus’ supreme creative work was in his profound discovery of human values, in his embodiment of those values in life and deed, and in his interpretation of God in light of them.²¹ Hence it is that so long as Christianity remains Christian it will be, first of all, ethical religion.

Paul, carrying the religion of Jesus into the Gentile world, and confronting there the ardent quest for redemption through Oriental and Greek mysteries, developed Christianity on its mystical side. “We speak God’s wisdom in a mystery,” he writes—a wisdom once hidden, now revealed to “the full-grown,” and intuitively apprehended. Baptism

²⁰ The universalization of religion which comes to pass through the thorough-going application of its principles to every situation and to all sides of life is as important as that which consists in the extension of its theoretical application.

²¹ Cf. the valuable article, “Ethics,” by Johannes Weiss, in Hastings, *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*

he interprets as an initiatory rite by which one participates in Christ's dying and rising, and the bread and wine of the Lord's supper become, in his teaching to the Corinthians, the means of mystically partaking in the body and blood of Christ. Conversion, for Paul, while ethically conditioned and ethical in its fruitage, was in its psychological form a mystical experience. Again, there is nothing more characteristic of Pauline teaching than his doctrine of the Spirit, by which he elevated and purified the ecstatic speaking with tongues, and by which he explained the springs of the Christlike character. And all these mystical elements of his teaching have their unifying source in the Christ-mysticism of his own experience: "It is no longer I that live, but Christ liveth in me." The core of Paul's thought is, indeed, always ethical. He had learned unselfishness from Jesus, and, little as he quotes Jesus' words, the essential traits of the Master's teaching and life are the formative forces in his great disciple.²² But Paul had a task and an environment different from those of Jesus, and his own creative genius was bound to have its effect. Thus under the influence of Paul the ethical religion of Jesus becomes ethico-mystical religion.²³

Philosophical religion first comes definitely into New Testament Christianity through the influence of Alexandrian thought. Hebrews, which gives "the first philosophy of the Christian religion," develops its theory by means of a doctrine of heavenly patterns and imperfect earthly copies, which comes down from Plato through the Alexandrians. And the Fourth Gospel derives its conception of the Logos, which influences its whole interpretation of Jesus, from Philo.²⁴ Moreover, the knowledge of God of which the

²² Cf. Johannes Weiss, *Paul and Jesus*; and Frank C. Porter, *The Mind of Christ in Paul*.

²³ Percy Gardner, *Paul the Mystic*.

²⁴ Cf. E. F. Scott, *The Fourth Gospel*, pp. 61 ff., and B. H. Streeter, *The Four Gospels*, pp. 374 ff.

Fourth Gospel speaks is the fruit, not only of laying hold of the meaning of the historical Jesus—the Word made flesh—and of mystical illumination from the Spirit of truth, but also of the employment of the intellectual nature in reflective thought.²⁵ Indeed, while the philosophical motive in this gospel is subordinated to the mystical and the historical-ethical motives, yet these three great motives in religion are here marvellously blended, to the permanent enrichment of Christianity.²⁶

The motive of æsthetic religion obviously is not consciously active in early Christianity, but one has only to compare the New Testament with, let us say, the Koran to perceive how real and important in the shaping of the former is the influence of spontaneous æsthetic feeling, and what it has meant to Christianity that the New Testament belongs to the great literature of the race. The parables, the sententious sayings, the poetic stanzas, the skillful narrative of the Synoptics, the mystical meditations of the Fourth Gospel, the story of the Acts, the eloquence of the letters and the strange pictures of the Apocalypse have woven themselves together into that "Christian epic" which forms an unsurpassed achievement of the religious imagination.

The higher synthesis of the four great types of religion which early Christianity effected is weighty evidence that these types must needs be present in some fashion if religion on its higher levels is to be creative. For only a narrow and one-sided philosophy of history will deny that Christian ideas and Christian experience have been powerfully creative of progress in the subsequent development of mankind. Checked and overborne, indeed, they often have been by dogma, ecclesiastical authority, political power, and unassimilable pagan

²⁵ Cf. Mary Redington Ely, *The Knowledge of God in Johannine Thought*, especially Chap IV.

²⁶ Cf. Mary Ely Lyman, *The Fourth Gospel and the Life of Today*, especially Chaps IV-IX.

SYNTHESIS OUR PRESENT TASK

culture, but always at some point they have reasserted themselves—as in St. Francis, Wyclif, Luther, or Wesley—with fresh creative energy. And our thesis is that the creativity is proportionate to the vital union effected between the four typical religious motives—the ethical, the mystical, the æsthetic, and the philosophic. Mysticism failed in Quietism through lack of ethical motive. Puritanism limited itself by the suppression of æsthetic religion. Comtean Humanitarianism, lacking a spiritual metaphysics, could not nourish the religious life. Deistic rationalism was wanting kindling power. If religion, then, is to meet man's inner needs and be effective toward solving urgent social problems it must stimulate man's ethical nature to the creation and conservation of human values, open to him a vital communion with Divine Reality, nourish his imagination with spiritual Beauty, and achieve a philosophy which makes for the integration of thought and experience.

There are certain antitheses in present religious thought and feeling which must be transcended if religion is to be fully creative. The antithesis between ideal social living and mystical communion, which is very real in religious thought today, never can be overcome by insisting upon either one of them as sufficing for the essence of religion. Ideal social living done with enthusiasm takes on a feeling tone which some prefer to call religious rather than simply ethical. They choose to define religion, with Matthew Arnold, as "morality touched with emotion." But it seems clear that religion so conceived loses its distinctiveness. It becomes an adjective instead of a substantive. And for that reason it ceases to be something that can fructify ethical and social living. Similarly a mystical experience may have such satisfyingness that it seems to represent the ultimate end for the sake of which all other experience should be merely means. But

religion thus understood fails to yield that integration of experience and that abundant life which we rightly seek from it. As we learn from our study of the place of ethics and of mysticism in religion, it is only when mystical communion and ideal social living interpenetrate that religion manifests the full integrative and creative power which makes known its deeper nature.

Again, the antithesis between a religion of æsthetic feeling and religion as a response to Divine Reality, which exists today as it has in various periods in the past, puts asunder what religion in its normal functioning joins together. Since the field and function of religion have to do with the profounder relations between the Real and the Ideal religion languishes when men identify it with æsthetic feeling—having judged Reality to be alien to their higher aspirations. And ere long artistic creation languishes in its turn. The irony of the cosmic situation tends to chill the expansive mood and to inhibit the free exercise of powers. On the whole the creative ages are ages of faith, and creativeness in art is no exception. Concerning the late Francis Grierson, artist in music and letters, a critic writes: "Grierson's mysticism consisted in believing in the human soul and the things of the soul, eternity and the things of eternity, as simply and implicitly as a child believes in its mother or a chemist in his formulæ."²⁷ And when, on the other hand, Man's response to Divine Reality is not also a response to Beauty his religion becomes warped through insensitiveness to one of the things essential to Divinity. God cannot be thought of as a cosmic value-creating Spirit without thereby being thought of as a creator of Beauty; and from this point of view man's appreciation and creation of Beauty are a mode of realizing kinship and communion with God.

From the study thus far made there emerge certain basic affirmations of religion which must be subjects of our fur-

²⁷ Shaemas O'Sheel, in *The New Republic*, Vol. II, No. 657, p. 171.

SYNTHESIS OUR PRESENT TASK

ther inquiries. Both the philosophical and the mystical types of religion imply that there is a knowing of reality which is religiously conditioned, and so important are these types for creative religion that such an implication gains initial probability. No philosophical treatment of religion should assume that religion has nothing to do with knowing the cosmos unless critical investigation shows that this initial probability is unsubstantiated. The basic affirmation therefore which we next should examine is that religion can make a genuine contribution to the knowledge of metaphysical reality.

But religion, particularly ethical and æsthetic religion, implies that Goodness and Beauty have meaning for the cosmos as well as for man. The distinctive principle of religion we found to be the maximum of harmonious interaction between the personalities of men and the Deepest Reality of the universe. It is of the nature of religion, we have said, to make man a member of an infinitely meaningful world and a sharer in realizing its potentialities. The basic affirmation which emerges from these interpretations of religion is that Goodness and Beauty reveal that which is deepest in cosmic reality. But the rightfulness of this affirmation turns to an important degree upon the answers to metaphysical questions. Are there rational grounds for believing in God as a Cosmic Purposeful Spirit that is conserving and creating value? Or is the only rational object of worship a pantheistic God in whose being distinctions of value ultimately have no place? Or again, as our new naturalism affirms, is the only existential reality the system of nature, including man, as described by the natural sciences? And if so, can values have anything more than an accidental and transient place in the universe? What, indeed, is the metaphysical meaning of the natural sciences? Is it materialistic mechanism? Or is it creative or purposive evolution? Has human personality, with its thinking, purposing, and ideals any metaphysical significance? What is the ultimate destiny of

CREATIVE RELIGION

humanity? To questions like these we must press on, after our examination of the problem of religious knowledge, and upon the kind of answers gained to these questions turn, to an important degree, the creativity of religion and its power to deal with our urgent human problems.

PART TWO

RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE

VII

RELIGIOUS FAITH AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY

RELIGION is interested in truth no less than in salvation and the abundant life. It seeks to penetrate beneath appearance to reality, to lay hold of values that are intrinsic, and to find valid principles of union between reality and value. To this end it desires truth in the inward parts of man's soul, and sincerity in his life with his neighbor, and it demands of the worshiper that he worship in spirit and in truth. It strives to lead men away from folly and to make them to know wisdom. And in its speculative moods—as in the Hebrew Wisdom Literature, in Stoicism, in Philo, and in the Fourth Gospel—it rises to the thought of a Creative Cosmic Reason as being the meaning of the Eternal and the pervading principle of the world.

It is sometimes assumed that superstition and dogma are characteristic products of religion, except as it is disciplined by secular thought. But this assumption springs from an error and an oversight. The error consists in supposing that religion is to be traced to a single datum or a single un-analyzable motion of the human spirit, which involves only the non-rational side of man's nature; whereas we have seen religion to be a synthesis and integration of human life and experience. The oversight consists in forgetting that superstition and dogma are general human failings. They have played, and still do play, an extensive part in religion; but in the field of medicine there is much superstition which has no connection with religion, and our most dangerous dogmas today belong to the economic, political, and social realms. In these realms, indeed, propagandists of dogma increasingly prefer to place themselves under the ægis of science rather than of religion.

RELIGIOUS FAITH AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY

But granted that religion, inherently, is interested in truth, the question inevitably arises, what is its relation, in this respect, to science and philosophy? Does religion possess truth which must remain forever withdrawn from science and philosophy—not being subject to review and examination by them? Or should it be simply a borrower of truth from science and philosophy, and confine its own function to truth's emotional assimilation and practical application? Or is there a concordat between religion and science and philosophy to be arrived at, which can be permanent and by which the cause of truth itself can best be served?

The underlying issues involved in these questions appear most definitely when science and religion are compared; for we have seen in our study of types of religion¹ that philosophy and religion have been often and fruitfully united, and we have shown reasons for thinking that such a union is necessary if religion is to be steadily creative. Similarly a real union or co-operation between science and religion is to be postulated in the interests of religion's creativity; but such a postulate should not be made without recognizing that its success depends upon facing and resolving certain real issues between science and religion today.

The first of these issues is: Has religion a contribution to make to our total knowledge? That is, Do we gain knowledge through religious experience itself—more particularly, through organized religious experience—so that religion and science should be regarded as supplementing each other in our knowledge of the world? Or is science, together with the philosophy of science, the sole source of knowledge? Now our study of religious experience showed that it reports itself to have a cognitive aspect. One of its basic traits is an experience of insight. And one of the net results of our study was the working hypothesis that religion can make a genuine contribution to the knowledge of metaphysical

¹ See Chap. VI.

RELIGION'S DESIRE FOR TRUTH

reality. The implication of this hypothesis is that religion and science should supplement each other, rather than seek to displace each other as they often tend to do. The merits of this hypothesis and its implication we should now proceed to test.

But a second issue between science and religion has to do with the type of object known by each, as the first issue has to do more with the method of knowing. Adjustments between science and religion in the past have been largely on the basis that what is known in science consists simply of appearances to our senses and not of things as they are. To Plato sense perception gives only an imperfect confused knowing, the chief value of which is that it furnishes an occasion for discovering the immaterial Ideas, which are the true reals; and while Plato was not interested in physical science, his theory has enabled later Platonists to reserve the true reals for philosophy and religion and to relegate science, no matter how exact, to the realm of appearances. Kant, in turn, limited scientific knowing to phenomena, and denied to it the noumena, the things-in-themselves. And since Kant religious philosophy for the most part has been bound up with a phenomenalist view of nature.

But in the twentieth century the phenomenalist view of nature has been rapidly giving way to realism. The more convinced men become that their spiritual life is conditioned on their physiological organisms and that, in our mundane sphere at least, the whole drama of life was preceded by eons in which inorganic matter held sway, the more difficult it becomes to regard physical objects and processes as just appearances and to maintain that the immaterial alone is truly real. This difficulty is reinforced by the success of physical science in discovering laws of nature and in enabling man to predict and control events in nature. Such success is unintelligible unless it be granted that physical science is laying hold of genuine reality. Accordingly, the

RELIGIOUS FAITH AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY

claims of realism must be faced in any serious effort to bring science and religion into harmonious working connection, and it must be recognized that an acceptance of realism alters greatly the problem of the relation between the types of object known, respectively, in science and in religion.

Turning, now, to the first of the two issues just defined, namely, Do we gain knowledge through religious experience itself? we may well begin by examining that attitude which ethical religion emphasizes as indispensable for gaining religious truth—the attitude of faith.

I

What, then, is religious faith? In its full nature religious faith is the response of the soul to the Divine Reality when that Reality is apprehended as a Cosmic Moral Will. Divine Reality always denotes “being” transfused with “value.” In the idea of God, as we have said earlier,² are blended a more than human power and a more than human goodness. Without the element of value, present at least implicitly, being or power could not evoke worship. But as religion develops into its higher types the apprehension of the Divine Reality develops with it, and it is characteristic of ethical religion that the Divine Reality is understood to be a Cosmic Moral Will. That is, in ethical religion God is a Cosmic Energy that makes for righteousness. Such is the thought of the chief Hebrew exponent of monotheism, the second Isaiah:

“Distil, ye heavens, from above, and let the skies pour down righteousness; let the earth open that it may bring forth salvation, and let it cause righteousness to spring up together; I the Lord have created it.”³

Now the response of the soul which answers to the conception of Divine Reality as a Moral Will is termed faith. And the congruity between faith and the conception that

² Cf Chap. IV, p 82

³ Isa 45:8.

THE MEANING OF FAITH

moral will is the essence of the Divine nature appears from the special Hebrew meaning of faith, which is faithfulness. In Habakkuk's great teaching, "The righteous shall live by his faith," the primary meaning of the term is faithfulness, a steadfast loyalty to God; and in the thought of the first Isaiah, who "put faith into the centre of religion,"⁴ the special emphasis falls on steadfastness, fidelity.

Another connotation of the term faith as it appears in ethical religion is trust. This aspect of faith is particularly evident in the teaching of Jesus as given in the Synoptic Gospels. The opposite of faith as Jesus means it is not so much doubt or unfaithfulness as fear. He sought to deliver his fellowmen from the fear of demons, and from whatever held them in spiritual bondage, by awakening in them faith—a trust that they were always in the hands of the Heavenly Father. The childlike spirit, to which he said the kingdom of heaven belonged, is a spirit of teachableness, of fresh openness of mind, of trustfulness. The filial spirit, which summed up life for Jesus, includes confidence in a living bond between man and God.

But further, faith, as it developed in ethical religion, always included belief. Faithfulness to, and trust in, a Cosmic Moral Will imply a clear conviction of the reality of that Will. In early Christianity the element of belief which resides in faith emerges into special distinctness when interest in the philosophical aspect of religion begins to stir. Corresponding to the traces of Alexandrian philosophy in the epistle to the Hebrews is the interpretation of faith as "assurance of things hoped for, a conviction of things not seen." And in the Fourth Gospel, whose basic teaching is that the Logos, the Creative Cosmic Reason, has become incarnate in Christ, the element of belief is continually stressed, without being in any sense divorced from the ethical and mystical aspects of religious experience. To the

⁴ Cf. Julius A. Bewer, *The Literature of the Old Testament*, p. 105.

RELIGIOUS FAITH AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY

Fourth Evangelist, believing in the truth, doing the truth, and receptivity to the Spirit of truth are indissolubly bound up together.

But it is in the thought of Paul that faith received its richest interpretation. Paul, not only teaches that we are justified by faith because it makes us receptive to God's infinite grace, but also expresses the principle of the Christian life as "faith working through love"; and through faith he finds himself in mystical union with the living Christ. Faith is here the total response of the soul to the Eternal Love. It includes belief in the cosmic reality of that Love, for Paul holds to the mystical paradox that our faith itself is wrought by God. It includes the completest trust and surrender of will to that Love. And it includes entire fidelity to that Love in heart and life—through faith in Christ we become "rooted and grounded in love."

We have taken our data in regard to religious faith from Hebrew and Christian religion, for it is there that historic religion conforms most fully to the ethical type, and it is in ethical religion that faith manifests itself most distinctly and fully. But when religion has developed according to the ethical type elsewhere in history faith has taken a central place. In Hinduism, for example, when Indian pantheism is replaced by theism and the ethical interest achieves especial prominence, *bhakti*, faith, becomes the attitude of the soul which conditions religious experience—as contrasted with the mystical and speculative knowledge of the Upanishads and of Vedantism.

Religious faith, then, being a total response of the soul which receives its peculiar quality from an apprehension of the Divine Reality as a Cosmic Moral Will, and being an experience of sharing in the life of that Divine Will, is of high importance for the realization of creative religion. The urgent social problems of our time can hardly be met with full energy and originality without what is essentially re-

ligious faith. "Wanted a faith for a task!" wrote Rauschenbusch, as he analyzed the problem of Christianizing the social order.⁵ Religious faith at its best is of great worth for the maximum development of personal and social life.

But now, what is the significance of religious faith as a way of knowing? As we have seen, religious faith in its developed form includes faithfulness, which may be called its ethical aspect; trust—an aspect akin to mysticism; and belief, which involves an intellectual aspect, since belief implies a judgment. Our question, then, really concerns, in part at least, the relation between the ethical and mystical aspects of faith and its intellectual aspect. What, we need to ask, is the effect of ethical and mystical attitudes upon the judgments implied in religious belief? Do they condition judgment favorably or unfavorably when one is in quest of truth in the field of religion? The relation of the mystical aspect of faith to judgment we shall be discussing in the chapter entitled "Intuition and Reason." Accordingly the theme for our present consideration is the relation of the ethical aspect of faith to judgments in religion.

When we take up the relation of ethical attitudes to religious judgments—or, in other words, the relation between moral faithfulness and religious belief—we find the problem of "the will to believe" lying across our pathway. Faithfulness denotes an exercise of the active volitional side of man's nature, and it has been the part of voluntarism and pragmatism to urge the importance and rightfulness of this side of our nature in the process of knowing. Pre-eminently, William James developed the doctrine of "the will to believe," not indeed for application in our dealings with objective nature, but as being significant for knowing in the moral and religious realms. "Throughout the breadth of physical nature," wrote James in his famous essay, "facts are what they are quite independently of us." Here "we ob-

⁵ *Christianizing the Social Order*, p. 40.

viously are recorders, not makers, of the truth." But in regard to moral questions he maintained that the will to believe was justifiable. "A moral question is a question not of what sensibly exists, but of what is good, or would be good if it did exist. Science can tell us what exists; but to compare *worths*, both of what exists and what does not exist, we must consult not science, but what Pascal calls our heart."

Again, said James, "in truths dependent on our personal action faith based upon desire is certainly a lawful and possibly an indispensable thing." For here "faith in a fact can help to create the fact." "Whenever a desired result is achieved by the co-operation of many independent persons, its existence as a fact is a pure consequence of the precursive faith in one another of those immediately concerned. A government, an army, a commercial system, a ship, a college, an athletic team, all exist on this condition, without which not only is nothing achieved, but nothing is even attempted."

Finally, in the religious realm—in regard to "the radical question of life, the question whether this be at bottom a moral or an unmoral universe"—James justifies the will to believe as a means of gaining truth. Starting with the religious hypothesis that this is a moral universe James reasons thus: "Although in one sense we are passive portions of the universe, in another we show a curious autonomy, as if we were small active centres on our own account. We feel, too, as if the appeal of religion to us were made to our own active good-will, as if evidence might be forever withheld from us unless we met the hypothesis half-way. . . . I, therefore, for one, cannot see my way to accepting the agnostic rules for truth-seeking, or wilfully agree to keep my willing nature out of the game."⁶

Recently F. C. S. Schiller, in his *Problems of Belief*, has reaffirmed James's teaching. His conclusion is "that the will

⁶ *The Will to Believe*, pp. 20, 22, 24-27.

VALUE OF FAITH FOR KNOWLEDGE

to believe cannot be argued out of existence. It is an all-pervasive psychic fact in all minds, whether they know it or not, whether they like it or not." Hence he maintains that it should be accepted as an asset in gaining truth, if it be properly correlated with a testing of beliefs. He says: "The forces inclining us in the direction we desire stimulate us to activity, to experimentation, to discovery, and are so far good. It is, of course, desirable that they should be aided and steadied by a keen *will to know*—that is a will to believe only 'truths' which have been tested and can be trusted, which will predict correctly the course of events, and by a will to learn from experience."⁷

Now this recent doctrine of the will to believe—akin to the ancient *credo ut intelligam* and to Kant's doctrine of the postulates of the practical reason—derived its force from modern psychology and from the Darwinian theory of evolution. Modern psychology, with its emphasis on the instincts and the vaguer phases and fringes of consciousness, and with its theory of ideo-motor action, led to the view that "our passional nature" is bound to play a great part in our thought; and the Darwinian theory of evolution taught that practical utility determined the survival of organisms and hence controlled the structure of the human mind itself. But certain tendencies in recent psychology, especially those of the Freudian school, represent our passional nature as belonging mainly to a realm of the "unconscious," whence, unbeknownst, it controls our conscious life. From this point of view a large portion of our thinking is regarded as "wishful thinking," and much of our reasoning is treated as "rationalization"—a finding of commendable reasons for acts and thoughts which really occur because of subconscious animal wants within us.

Thus psychology, in its stressing the place of our volitional and passional nature in our conscious thought, lands us in a

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 115-17.

dilemma in respect to the process of knowing—a dilemma, oddly enough, often unperceived by many who choose to be pragmatists and Freudians at the same time. On the one hand, the doctrine of the will to believe points toward a pragmatic theory of *truth*, and on the other it is the characteristic rôle of desire, wish, will, to produce *fiction*.

Now it is not for us to assess this desire-psychology, in its diverse tendencies, as psychology; but we are bound to consider its implications for the theory of knowledge. And these implications may best be estimated if we reflect on the nature of belief in its bearing on knowledge. The gist of belief is such an assent of our natures to a judgment, expressed or implied, as prompts to action in accordance with the judgment. Belief is not always followed by action; certain inhibitive forces may be strong enough to prevent it. But in real belief there is such an inward assent to what is regarded as a truth as will lead to action, in the absence of rather strong inhibitive forces. Even when we believe “against our will,” as we say—being perhaps convinced of the need of a surgical operation or of the guilt of a friend—the prompting to some appropriate action is still there.

But if an expressed or implied judgment is prerequisite for that assent which is belief—if the assent is assent to what is regarded as a truth—then the notion of “a will to believe” turns out to be a contradictory one. That is, if one has to *will* to believe, he is not really believing. “My country, right or wrong!” is an expression of will, but it is not an expression of belief. There may be, indeed, a will to make-believe, but that is as far as will can go in the matter of belief. The whole meaning of propaganda is that, while one may get allegiance by command or exhortation, if one would secure belief one must supply “truth.” The propagandist wills to make others believe, but he either has his own independent grounds for belief or else is a cynical unbeliever in the matter. Desire and will may, indeed, de-

VALUE OF FAITH FOR KNOWLEDGE

termine belief indirectly. The volition, "My country, right or wrong!" undoubtedly tends in due time to produce the belief that one's country is always right. The extent to which such indirect determination of belief takes place has been made more patent by Freudian psycho-analysis. Nevertheless the *intent* of a belief is to be an assent to *truth*, and a belief can be dispelled by being shown to have no other basis than unreflective or suppressed desire. It is upon this distinction between the intent of belief and the force of unrecognized desire that certain of the therapeutic methods employed by psycho-analysts rest.

"The will to believe," then, is a misleading expression, which fails to define any reliable element in the process of knowing. James himself, in later writing, changed the expression into "the right to believe,"⁸ ~~thereby radically altering the problem~~—though whenever he passes from the word "belief" to the word "faith" he clearly is stressing the volitional and mystical aspects of faith rather than its intellectual aspect. And Schiller after all establishes only the indirect influence of volition on belief, thus leaving as belief's most essential quality its intent to be assent to truth.⁹

But if the relation between moral faithfulness and religious belief is not that of a willing to believe, how should it be understood? It may be defined thus: Granted an initial experience of apprehending moral value in cosmic Reality, the response of faithfulness is the indispensable condition of testing that experience and of its possible growth. That is, faithfulness presupposes insight, but in turn tests and increases insight. The initial insight, since we are social beings, will come most often through the sharing of what others have gained. But it is a mistake to

⁸ Cf. *Some Problems in Philosophy*, pp. 221ff.

⁹ In his chapter on "The Will to Believe," Schiller writes: "Of the ordinary man it is truer to say, with Professor Ward, that he 'may wish to believe; he cannot, strictly speaking, will to believe,' adding only that the wish may in due course become father to the thought." Cf. the rest of the paragraph. *Problems of Belief*, p. 111.

RELIGIOUS FAITH AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY

suppose that there is a complete antithesis between tradition and personal insight. One who masters geometry in any other way than learning it by rote must *see into* it—that is, master it by personal insight. And if so be that tradition is at times the conveyer of truth, unless one has personally appropriated its truth in a given field of experience, one's fresh insights are likely to be of little significance. But whether the insight be one received mainly by sharing or whether it be a more nearly original experience, its full appreciation and testing call for moral faithfulness, and such faithfulness lifts one to a vantage point for gaining further insights. Thus a volitional element can enter right-fully into the development of religious belief without being its prime conscious source or its surreptitious cause; indeed, without this volitional element an important factor in gaining religious truth is wanting.

The positive significance of moral faithfulness in gaining religious truth is the more evident the more clearly we keep in mind the conclusions already arrived at concerning the field and principle of religion. The field of religion, we have said, is the underlying relations between reality and value; and the principle of religion is the securing of the maximum of harmony between the personalities of men and the Deepest Reality of the universe.¹⁰ Now moral faithfulness to tested values, and to tested insights concerning cosmic spiritual reality is vital for attaining the harmony which religion seeks, and results in a new *rapprochement* with the springs of value in the cosmos which is most important for the enlargement of insight.

The various aspects in the process of religious knowing of which we are speaking can be verified in the case of a great judgment of belief such as that of Paul: "We know that all things work together for good to them that love God." Here are present an initial insight concerning the

¹⁰ See pp. 82, 86.

reality of God, a value-judgment as to the supreme worth of love, a response of moral faithfulness through loving God, and a concluding insight as to the triumph of the good. Thus value and reality are found to be deeply united in actuality and in a creative process, and there is attained that full experience of faith which we have described as the response of the entire soul to a Cosmic Moral Will. The intellectual aspect of this experience is the belief that there is a Cosmic Moral Will who is achieving the good, and with whom man has kinship. This belief offers itself as a trustworthy interpretation of the universe—in other words, as knowledge. It deserves acceptance as knowledge in so far as the steps in the process by which it is arrived at are able to meet their appropriate tests. In the immediately following chapters we are to discuss tests of value and their relation to tests of reality, the testing of intuition by reason which yields true insight, and the comprehensive testing of religious belief in philosophical criticism and synthesis.

What we have here to point out is a twofoldness in the testing which faithfulness makes possible. On the one hand faithfulness can commend itself only as it is moral faithfulness. There is much faithfulness to customs and institutions and habitual conscience which is only secondarily moral, and which may be even immoral. But moral faithfulness meets the highest religious test because it is a positive incorporation of value into reality. It brings into existence that quality of being which it is of the very essence of religion to discover, possess, and create. As Masfield has written the poems of the sea, and Conrad the tales of the sea, because each was bred to the sea-faring life, so man is able to apprehend the fidelities of the Infinite in proportion as he has attained fidelity in his own soul.

But, on the other hand, faithfulness is the experimental side of religious faith. It puts religious beliefs to the acid test of wholeheartedly living them out, and such testing is

bound to contribute to the growth or correction of the beliefs. Of course there are types of faithfulness, apparently religious, which are decidedly unexperimental—faithfulness to creeds, for example. But such faithfulness is only formally religious. Religious faithfulness in the deeper sense of the term is faithfulness to truth and reality in the conviction that thereby the greater values will be possessed or achieved. It holds, with the Gospel of John, that through the coming of the Spirit of Truth we shall be guided into all the truth. Hence it is bold in putting beliefs to the test of reality and of life.

The following may serve as an illustration of the point under consideration. One reads in the press that Germans "firmly believe" that by synthetic chemistry they can produce on a large scale indispensable commodities which now they must import, and that, in consequence, they are building extensive plants and liberally financing their project. Now this "firm belief" carried out in action illustrates, in the realm of material affairs, the experimental faithfulness of which we are speaking. It is not a blind faithfulness, but one based on abundant knowledge; but it is experimental faithfulness because it fulfils conditions essential to further knowledge. Without the "firm belief" carried out into action the fuller possibilities of synthetic chemistry cannot be known. Much more is there something truly experimental about moral faithfulness in religion. It is not, when rightly exercised, blind faithfulness, but has abundant experience behind it. But it fulfils conditions indispensable for the most adequate knowing of the springs of value in underlying cosmic reality.

Religious faith, therefore, when its various elements are rightly adjusted to each other, has a genuine kinship to scientific inquiry. It is not a blind trust, nor an arbitrary will to believe, but presupposes experience and judgments based on experience—judgments which have their own test-

REALISM AND RELIGION

ing, as the following chapters will bring out. And it has its own experimental quality, namely, the moral faithfulness which puts conviction to the test of action, and which thereby establishes a *rapport* with all cosmic value-producing energy. Thus religious faith apprehends and explores the cosmos from the standpoint of its capacity to produce value, as scientific inquiry apprehends and explores the cosmos from the standpoint of uniformity and continuity in its processes. And just as scientific inquiry develops the presupposition of the general uniformity of nature, so religious faith functions most freely when it attains the belief in a Cosmic Moral Will. But, as the concluding chapter of this part of our study will maintain, both the presupposition of the uniformity of nature and the belief in a Cosmic Moral Will must be subjected to the testing and criticism involved in comprehensive philosophical synthesis.

II

We turn now to the second issue between science and religion—the issue which concerns the type of object known by each. Are the objects known in science unqualifiedly real? If so, what kind of relation can there be between these reals of science and the objectivities of religious belief—an Infinite Spirit, finite spirits, objectively valid principles of spiritual living? Or is the truth about the objects of science that they are only qualifiedly real—existing by virtue of being presentations to mind, finite or Infinite, or of being manifestations of things-in-themselves which science cannot know? In other words, are the claims of realism, as over against phenomenalism, to be accepted? And if so, what consequences for religious belief are entailed?

One of the chief motives which led to the development of phenomenalism was a new faith in the constructive powers of the human mind. Over against the view that nature writes

RELIGIOUS FAITH AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY

its teachings upon man's mind as upon a wax tablet or a sheet of white paper, and that all our knowledge comes from such experience, it was boldly asserted that the human mind possesses an equipment by which it constructs or creates nature in the very process of knowing. For, it was urged, what is impressed on the mind from without is nothing but a miscellany of sensations; from this miscellany the mind builds the objects of common sense by locating and dating its various sensations in space and time—space and time being characteristic forms of experience for finite minds; from these objects of common sense, in turn, the mind, by mathematical analysis and by the use of its own categories such as cause and effect, builds the scientifically known world. Thus nature as science knows it is throughout a construct of the human mind. This view fits in well with the modern faith in human nature and its powers, as contrasted with the mediæval despair of human nature; and it is a view which answers to the world of mathematical physics as Newton describes it—a world which never could be known by passive experience without constructive thought. Hence it is that Kant and his followers glory in the creative power of the human mind: man creates nature in the very act of knowing nature.

But the question is bound to arise whether, granting capacity for creativity to man's mind, this creativity is not misconceived when it is identified so largely with knowing. Theorizing is, indeed, essential to scientific knowing, and theorizing is a constructive activity of the mind. But the theorizing of science is not simply for the sake of systematizing the contents of minds but for the sake of *discovering* reality. Now phenomenalism emphasizes the power of the mind to create at the expense of its power to discover. It teaches that, because our knowing consists of experiences and of the constructing of a coherent, orderly system of experiences, it gives us experiences only. To be sure, experi-

REALISM AND RELIGION

ences somehow bear witness to the existence of things-in-themselves, but they never tell us anything about these things as they are in themselves. They only give us appearances of these things—that is, phenomena. And even if an idealistic metaphysics assures us that the things-in-themselves are experiences of an Infinite Mind¹¹, our knowing of things by common sense or science is not thereby given a fuller reality. Idealistic metaphysics cannot tell us whether Mt. Erebus in the Antarctic is real, or whether atoms and electrons are real. But when we arrive at these objects by exploration and science we are, according to the doctrine of phenomenalism, really creating rather than discovering—because these objects are the product of the mind's construction of the mind's contents.

Now over against this interpreting of knowing as creating, realism interprets knowing as discovering. As Professor John Laird has expressed it:

The assumptions of realism . . . are that knowledge is always the discovery of something; that anything discovered is distinct from and independent of the process of recognizing it; that nothing which is known is *therefore* mental except in the way of being selected by a mind; and that if any selected thing is mental or mentally tinged *de facto*, this circumstance does not affect the kind or validity of our knowing of it.¹¹

In other words, realism affirms that sense perception, when sufficiently tested, gives us things as they are, and that scientific analysis and experiment give us things as they are. According to the realist there is a radical difference between knowing the physiology of a bird and devising an airplane. To call the former a creative action of the mind is a misconception, even though it requires no less mental originality to be a good physiologist than to be an inventor of mechanisms. The essence of the physiologist's task, the realist would point

¹¹ *A Study in Realism*, p. 181.

RELIGIOUS FAITH AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY

out, is to discover structures and processes as they are; and a like discovery of things as they are must be the basis of the inventor's work.

What, now, should be our estimate of this issue between realism and phenomenalism? Phenomenalism, because it holds that mind is creative in all scientific knowing, affords an opportunity for maintaining the ascendancy of mind in the universe as a whole. Realism, on the other hand, takes the creative action of the mind more seriously by undertaking to establish that power of the mind to discover reality without which creativity is impossible. The issue is one with which religion is vitally concerned. For religion, in its ethical and prophetic developments, moves out to creative effort and at the same time is convinced of having *rapport* with a higher Mind in the universe. Faith, as we have just seen, has its aspect of trust and belief in Divine Reality and its venturing and experimental aspect. But questions of knowledge must be determined by the examination of knowledge itself. We accordingly need to consider some authentic type of knowing which is capable of shedding light on this issue between phenomenalism and realism.

A type of knowing which is revelant to any inquiry into the nature of religion, and whose authenticity it is almost impossible to discredit, is our knowledge of the reality of human selves. Solipsism—which would make other selves figments of the imagination of the self that is thinking—is not a philosophy; it is only an instrument for refuting an opponent's philosophy. Any philosophy which can be shown logically to lead to solipsism is thereby effectually disposed of. Likewise extreme monism, which reduces finite selves to illusions, while it has a clear religious motivation in that it satisfies the desire for complete identification with Divine Reality, is epistemologically self-refuting. For if finite selves are illusions, the knowledge which they think they attain is also illusory. From the standpoint of epistemology those

REALISM AND RELIGION

who maintain the illusoriness of all finite selves are in scarcely better case than the intoxicated sailors who asked themselves :

Could the grog we dreamt we swallowed
Make us dream of all that followed?¹²

A social realism, then, underlies a very large part of our knowledge. It need not, indeed, be concluded that there is no such thing as private knowledge, nor that a completely solitary individual can have no objects. But to suppose that there can be a developed system of knowledge without the recognition of other minds is fallacious. In particular, this recognition of other minds is involved in our scientific knowledge, notwithstanding the remoteness of the objects with which science often deals. Scientific knowledge is public knowledge. It is knowledge which can be verified by any one who will fulfil the requisite conditions. The individuality of the knower does not enter into scientific knowing as it does, for example, into artistic appreciation. It belongs to the very essence of science to be able to eliminate, or to reduce to the minimum, "the personal equation." And the obverse of this elimination of individual idiosyncrasy in science is the completely sharable character of its results. The recognition of other minds is presupposed in the very idea of scientific inquiry.

We should not be misled into denying social realism by the fact that it is difficult to know other selves, or our own, fully and that we can easily fall into error about them. The motives of our fellows may be much more complicated than we are apt to suppose, and our so-called "sub-conscious selves" may masquerade successfully behind the pictures of ourselves which we cherish. But complete and accurate knowledge is difficult to get in almost any given field, and yet in that same field we often have much well-tested partial

¹² Alfred Noyes, *Collected Poems*, p. 175.

RELIGIOUS FAITH AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY

knowledge. There is no reason to regard selves as exceptions in this respect. We may know the existence of selves and have trustworthy partial knowledge about them, even though the extension of our knowledge in this field be a peculiarly difficult and delicate task.

But if the nature of knowledge implies a social realism, does its realistic implication stop at that point? Should we proceed from social realism to a doctrine of the phenomenality of all of nature except human selves—as Hocking, and the American personalists of the school of Bowne, have done? Hocking affirms that “the only way to a realism of social experience is through a non-realism in regard to the surface of nature.”¹³ And Knudson, in his *Philosophy of Personalism*, says: “Thorough-going personalism is idealistic. It finds in personality the key to reality. Only the personal is metaphysically real. The material world is phenomenal.” Knudson’s conception of phenomenality, indeed, seems to cover the whole non-human order of nature; for he declares: “Only in finite spirits do we have a measure of independence mingled with dependence.”¹⁴

But so far as the character of knowledge goes, it is impossible to stop with a social realism. Our selves as we know them are psycho-physical beings. That is, they are not only centres of psychic experience and members of a social system having its characteristic laws, but they are also members of a system in which the laws of physics hold sway. And psycho-physical reality cannot be assumed to stop with man. It may, indeed, extend throughout the system of animate nature. That possibility involves metaphysical questions to which we must advert in Part III of our study. What selfhood is, in distinction from simpler forms of psychic life and from life in general, must also be considered later. But it is impossible to limit psycho-physical reality to man with-

¹³ *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 290.

¹⁴ Pp 76, 377

out arbitrarily setting aside the conceptions of continuity and evolution. Such reality must be at least widely extended in the system of animate nature. And psychically experiencing beings cannot be reduced to mere phenomena by any general considerations of knowledge. For they possess an inner, intrinsic, individual character without the recognition of which they cannot be really known.

But once more we must ask, Should realism be limited to psycho-physical reality, and should reality as described by physics be treated as phenomenal only? This is not the place for questions of the metaphysics of inanimate nature such as in the end we may feel bound to raise. But one consideration, growing out of the train of thought which we have been following, is of significance for the question immediately before us. It should not be assumed that, when we pass to the realm of physics, we no longer have need for the conception of individuality. It is, indeed, a part of the ideal of physical science to organize its data into a system of laws the basic principles of which shall be as few and simple, and as completely mathematical, as possible. But it is a no less essential part of physics, as of all science, to discriminate its data in order to apprehend them as they are and in order to be as sure as possible that its system of laws will hold good of the data in their actual relations. Now perhaps a system of laws taken by itself may dispense with the conception of individuality. But in any combination of a system of laws with data the conception of individuality is involved, provided it can be shown that *these* data require precisely *this* system of laws for their interpretation. Individuality should not be understood in the merely etymological sense of indivisibility—having no parts—for then human beings could not be said to possess individuality, and there might be nothing in the universe to which the term could be applied. Individuality, rather, should be understood as meaning such a uniqueness in the unity of parts as cannot be

RELIGIOUS FAITH AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY

derived from the parts themselves and the laws of their operation, and hence has its special empirical basis. In this sense the term "individuality" has its application to physics. The analysis of the molecule into atoms and of the atom into electrons and a proton does not render the terms "molecule" and "atom" meaningless, for they remain characteristic parts of higher combinations. Moreover, physics has occasion to speak of "each individual molecule or atom"—otherwise there would be no meaning in computing the precise number of molecules or atoms requisite for units of higher combinations. In short, while the idea of individuality is less important for understanding physics than for understanding human beings, it is no less truly applicable in the former case than in the latter.

But individuals, in whatever field, cannot be reduced to mere phenomena. Each is something in its own right and not simply an appearance to mind. What kinds of individuals enter into the make-up of the universe, how they may be related to each other, and how far they may constitute a coherent and significant whole—these are metaphysical questions and must be discussed as such. They cannot be answered simply on the basis of the implications of knowledge. But this much can be affirmed on the basis of our reflection upon some of those implications. Scientific knowledge, being public knowledge, implies social realism. A like realism is implied in the knowing of all psycho-physical individuals. Persons, and all psycho-physical individuals, have an intrinsic nature which cannot be expressed in terms of appearances to "other mind." They are reals which, even though we know them only approximately, yet must be there for us to approximate to, if knowing in such instances has any meaning. And further, wherever we find the idea of individuality indispensable, there are by implication reals to be known, and not simply appearances. When scientific analysis finds micro-organisms to be the cause of a particular disease, we cannot

REALISM AND RELIGION

regard these minute organisms simply as appearances to "other mind," but must think of them as individual reals. And when, by still more exact analysis science finds bodies to be constituted of molecules, and these of atoms, and these of electrons, in such a manner that it conceives "each individual" molecule, atom, and electron to have its part to play in the processes of nature, then these constituents of bodies must be regarded as reals and not merely as appearances to mind. If, indeed, the analysis by which these constituents have been arrived at should turn out to have been inaccurate, so that they prove not to be true individuals, then their status will have to be judged to be instrumental or phenomenal only. But subjecting these constituents to further analysis, or finding them to be caught up in some texture, system, or continuity does not reduce them to appearances. They are individuals, and therefore reals, if sufficiently careful analysis identifies them as characteristic unities having their special basis in experience and as indispensable constituents of higher unities. They are, then, not like the squares on plotting-paper—devices for our own convenience or something which has meaning solely with reference to some higher design—but like the fibre of the paper, without which there would be no paper.

We have entered into this discussion as to the status in philosophy which the results of scientific analysis should have, because we needed a fresh understanding of the relation between religious faith and scientific inquiry. Religious faith, we have found, has a vital part to play in exploring and apprehending the nature of Reality. It is capable of making a contribution to our total philosophy with which it cannot afford to dispense. But while this contribution is unique and indispensable, it should not be conceived in detachment from the contribution from scientific inquiry. It turns out that it is equally wrong for science to claim to give

RELIGIOUS FAITH AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY

a full account of reality, which religion may embroider with such emotional patterns as are to its taste; and for religion, in alliance with philosophy, to claim that science is irrelevant to the task of knowing reality as it is, because it deals with phenomena only. Rather should religion and science be thought of as genuinely complementary to each other in the enterprise of knowing reality. Thus a more comprehensive and riper philosophy may be gained. Thus, too, the creative functions of religion may be more fully realized. Religion needs to integrate the broader and more stable results of scientific research into itself, both in thought and in constructive activity. Scientific discovery is an indispensable basis for the fullest religious creativity. Religious faith and scientific inquiry are not antitheses nor antagonists, but stand in a relation of polarity to each other, so that each should further the other in the development of the human spirit.

VIII

VALUE AND VALIDITY

PRESENT-DAY philosophy is full of antinomies. This is doubtless a sign of growth, because it is an indication of abounding fertility, and because it calls for new philosophical syntheses. But to remain content with antinomies would be a sign of arrest of growth in philosophy, for the rise of philosophy is due very largely to the paradoxes and antinomies which occur in experience.

One of the major antinomies in the philosophy of the present is that which appears in the interpretation of ends, ideals, values. Bertrand Russell, for example, thinks that ethics does not really belong in philosophy, in spite of its traditional place there. "The asceticism of the intellect," he says, "requires that, while we are engaged in the pursuit of knowledge, we shall repress all other desires for the sake of the desire to know."¹ He believes that the inquiry concerning the real should be kept as distinct as possible from the inquiry concerning the good, and while he makes concessions at times to the desire to bring the good and the real into some sort of intelligible relation, it is clear that on the whole he regards the pursuit of the truth about reality and the pursuit of the good as essentially disparate interests.²

On the other hand, Professor Dewey holds that the chief concern of philosophy is with goods and their realization. Philosophy, he thinks, should turn from its old metaphysical and epistemological puzzles and devote itself to the projecting of ideals by which man's social life and his physical

¹ *Philosophy*, pp. 225, 300.

² "For Russell, as for Spinoza, philosophy is the austere vision of eternal truth, majestic in its isolation from man's paltry life." A. K. Rogers, *English and American Philosophy since 1800*, p. 429.

environment may be so remade as to deliver him from the serious ills from which he now suffers. Professor Dewey criticizes Greek philosophy and Christian theology for cherishing "the spectator conception of knowledge," and advocates instead an active conception of knowledge as being essentially "power to transform the world." Philosophy, accordingly, should be not contemplative but practical, which means that its central interest is in ends, aims, and the achievement of values.³ Again, taking another approach, Dewey says that "philosophy is inherently criticism," and has, as its stricter task, "to appraise values by taking cognizance of their causes and consequences." And he finds "the most far-reaching question of all criticism" to be: "the relationship between existence and value, or, as the problem is often put, between the real and the ideal."⁴ Thus the view that inquiry into reality and concern for values are disparate interests, which Russell holds, is contravened by Dewey's view that questions of truth and reality derive their whole meaning from their relation to values.

But what I am pointing out as an antinomy in the treatment of values by contemporary philosophy is something more than an incompatibility between the teachings of two individual philosophers who in certain respects are like-minded. It appears, rather, to be inherent in the doctrines of the new naturalism of the day. That such is the case is illustrated by an interesting controversy between Santayana and Dewey, both of whom announce themselves as exponents of naturalism in philosophy. Santayana, in reviewing Dewey's *Experience and Nature*, has pronounced Dewey's naturalism to be "half-hearted," for the reason that he seeks to bring the ends, aims, and values which man cherishes directly into nature. This results, in Santayana's view, in giving Dewey's philosophy a teleological and anthropomor-

³ *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, Chap. V.

⁴ *Experience and Nature*, pp. 398, 408, 415.

phic character quite inconsistent with naturalism. Santayana regards Dewey as an incurably ethical thinker, and hence finds his naturalism to be only a thin veneer.⁵

Dewey, on his part, in making rejoinder to this criticism has called Santayana's naturalism "broken-backed." He finds that Santayana does not make man truly a part of nature just because he makes no place in nature for man's values and ideals. In Santayana's philosophy, as Dewey points out, human values and ideals are somehow an efflorescence of existence which never can have any effect upon the course of existence. The discernment, appreciation, and fostering of ideals is the chief end of man, but the fulfilment of this end has no bearing upon the events of the actual world. Ideals give man "another world to live in," but this other world remains quite unrelated to the world of nature and of our practical life. But to Dewey, naturalism means chiefly the bringing of man's values and ideals into nature as efficacious determiners of the course of actual events. Hence the permanent gap which Santayana leaves between the realm of ideals and the on-goings of nature defeats the very interest which leads Dewey to espouse naturalism.⁶

There are reasons for suspecting that this controversy involves something more than the question as to what one should mean by the term "naturalism," or as to which thinker has the best right to the term. Rather do these reasons suggest that the controversy arises because of a deep-seated dilemma in the naturalistic way of thinking. The reasons in question are ultimately metaphysical, and as such they will come up for consideration in later chapters. But one of these reasons lies in the field of the theory of knowledge and concerns us now.

This reason is that naturalism appears to occupy an ambiguous position in regard to the question whether there are

⁵ Cf. *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXII, pp. 673-688.

⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, pp. 57-64.

VALUE AND VALIDITY

tests of *truth* in the realm of *value*. If truth about reality belongs to one realm and human value to another, so that the "asceticism of the intellect" required for the pursuit of knowledge demands the repression of all other desires for the sake of the desire to know, naturalism will tend to complete the system of nature as an empire in which man cannot have full citizenship but must remain always in a state of colonial dependency. The naturalistic thinker, accordingly, will tend to adopt the "spectator" conception of knowledge, with Santayana, and to protest against any ascendancy of ideals of activity and of progress in the shaping of philosophy, as Russell has done. But then will arise questions about the status of truths about *human* nature, in which ends, purposes, and values seem to play a formative part; and also questions will persist as to what are *true* values and as to how their truth is related to other truth.

If on the contrary, truth is nothing distinct from value, and for this reason man and his values are incorporated into the system of nature, man is immediately given a pontifical rôle with respect to the rest of nature. He becomes the measure of all things, and we have a new kind of anthropomorphism. Questions then press in upon us as to the status of truths about physical nature when it is considered apart from man or before man was; and the questions as to whether there are not truths with respect to values which have a characteristic and unique place have to be pushed aside.

Of the questions which we thus find pressed home to us by the dilemma of naturalism it is those that have to do with the testing of values themselves, and with the kind of validity they possess, which claim our immediate attention. These latter questions, indeed, grow out of much of our previous study. In our discussion of ethics and religion we were led to emphasize the importance of their interaction and interpenetration; and we have seen how ethical religion

ARE ALL VALUES RELATIVE?

implies a synthesis between reality and value, both in thought and in creative action. The field of religion, moreover, has seemed to be best definable as that of the underlying relations between reality and value. And each of these interpretations leads on to the question as to what we should mean by "truth" in the realm of value.

Before proceeding directly to this subject, however, it may be well to take up an objection sometimes raised to such a formulation of the subject as we have made. The objection referred to is directed against the division of philosophic subject-matter into a realm of reality and a realm of value, or into other realms in like fashion. To this objection I would reply that, in truth, no radical separation between reality and value should be made, and that none has been made in our foregoing discussions. In our actual world reality and value intermingle and blend in varying degrees. Values become realized and thus become determiners of events to a greater extent than when they are simply in an ideal form. Realities take on values and thereby become richer and acquire a new potency. Further, any form of a teleological view of the universe finds in the cosmic process a large measure of realized value. But, on the other hand, all ideas of progress imply also a large measure of unrealized value. In other words, some degree of separation between reality and value there must be, if progress is an intelligible and meaningful idea.

The contrast, accordingly, between a realm of fact or reality and a realm of value must be in part simply a contrast between two universes of discourse. Being has its value-aspect and its existent, factual aspect. Becoming may, or may not, consist in increase of valuable quality. There is abundant reason for giving these two aspects distinctness in our thought, even though at times they belong quite completely together. But this contrast cannot be treated solely as a matter of universes of discourse; it oftentimes denotes sharply separated fields of experience. The "realm of reality" and the "realm

of value," therefore, stand for fields of experience which only partly overlap; in part they are outlying with respect to each other. One might illustrate the matter by thinking of land which is unproductive without cultivation, of land which has been cultivated to a certain degree of productivity, and of the maximum degree of productivity which is possible but unrealized. These contrasts are of real importance to agriculture, and the analogous contrasts between reality and value are of genuine significance for philosophy and religion.

We took note at the beginning of our study of how ethical religion includes both the sense of present possession of Divine Reality and an active anticipation of the realization of Higher Good—the present possession being also "the substance of things hoped for." But this experience of present possession implies the possessing of some basis for discriminating between what should be hoped and striven for, and what not. It implies some real power to test Truth, Beauty, and Goodness.

Ideas of growth and creativity, on the other hand, are indefinitely expansive. They lead us to ask: Is there anything that is not subject to them? Do not our standards grow? Thus again we come up to our question as to whether there are tests of truth in the realm of value, and if so, of what nature are they? And when this question is expressed in the form of a query as to whether our standards themselves grow, it takes shape as the problem of relativity in judgments of value. Are our judgments of value wholly relative to our desires and interests, so that as desires and interests may vary, so our tests of value must vary? Or are there more objective principles of judgment in regard to value, which we need to discover and employ in order to lay hold of true values? In the words of Professor George Plimpton Adams: "Our problem—the common problem of all who face the future with hope rather than despair—is simply the problem as to whether man's life and his mind

INTUITION OF THE GOOD

may still be thought of as participating in objective, significant structures, or whether life and mind are but the expression and prolongation of interests. This is the radical question for any theory of value."⁷

This problem of relativity in our judgments of value is one with which the philosophy⁸ of pragmatism confronts us. Pragmatism builds its whole philosophy of truth and of reality around the impulsive, striving, purposive life of man. It takes man in the conative aspect of his life, and derives therefrom its cognitive aspect. Man as an active being, adapting himself to his environment and seeking to control it and make it serve his manifold interests, and as participating in a group life which is always evolving—such conceptions furnish for pragmatism a sufficient basis for the determining of truth and of value. Thus Dewey will recognize no highest good or supreme test of value except social growth.⁸ Now one may recognize important contributions from pragmatism and at the same time find that in solving some problems it has created others. One such problem, at least, now lies before us—the problem as to whether judgments of value are completely relative to human desires and interests. In this chapter, accordingly, we shall be dealing with certain aspects of pragmatism, as in the last chapter we dealt with an issue raised by realism.

Let us first take up that group of values which we naturally gather together under the head of the Good. We already have had occasion, in discussing the relation between ethics and religion, to formulate the supreme principle of ethics. This principle we found to be: "The fullest development of every human personality through the co-operative creation of a world-wide community of persons."⁹ What we need here to do is to consider the status of this principle as

⁷ *Idealism and the Modern Age*, pp. 11-12

⁸ *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, Chap. VII.

⁹ See pp. 85 f.

VALUE AND VALIDITY

knowledge, and its relation to certain other aspects of what we must judge to be the Good.

Reflection will show that the knowledge of this supreme principle of ethics is intuitive in character. It involves the direct appreciation of personality as having intrinsic worth, and it involves also a direct recognition of the equalitarian principle—namely, that *every* personality has intrinsic worth, and that hence no person can rightfully be made a mere means to other persons' ends. An example of the intuitive character of these two aspects of the ethical principle may be taken from Schleiermacher:

With proud joy I still recall the time when I discovered humanity and knew that henceforth I should never lose it. The sublime revelation came from within; it was not produced by any code of ethics or system of philosophy. My long quest which neither this nor that would satisfy was crowned in one moment of insight.

And with this passage should be coupled another occurring a few paragraphs later:

Thus there dawned upon me what is now my highest intuition. I saw clearly that each man is to represent humanity in his own way, combining its elements uniquely, so that it may reveal itself in every mode, and all that can issue from its womb be made actual in the fullness of unending space and time.¹⁰

These instances from the personal experience of Schleiermacher are indicative of the intuitive character which belongs, at least empirically, to the two chief aspects of the supreme ethical principle. Their discovery in history, and their re-discovery in later periods, come as prophetic inspirations. And probably most of us today who hold to the intrinsic worth of all persons on any other than a traditional

¹⁰ *Schleiermacher's Soliloquies*, tr. by H. L. Friess, pp. 28, 29, 31.

INTUITION OF THE GOOD

basis do so on the basis of an immediate appreciation of what personality means.

Now the recognition of the intuitive character of the supreme moral principle throws light upon the question whether judgments of value in the ethical field are relative solely to human desire and interest. For an intuition is not something merely instinctive, however much our instinctive nature may participate in it. It has a cognitive quality in a way that instinct and impulse do not. An intuition is, in its intent, an apprehension of something objective, being in this respect akin to perception. But an intuition also gives *understanding* of things objective; it goes beyond the new data or stubborn opaque facts which may be all that perception gives and grasps them in their intrinsic nature, in their meaning, in their connection with significant wholes. In this respect of giving us understanding of things, intuition resembles inference and reasoning. But it differs, in turn, from inference and reasoning in that it gains its understanding with that directness and immediacy which characterize perception. It is one thing to perceive the actions of a child and another thing to understand them. It is also one thing to assemble psychological knowledge about children and another thing to have a quick, intuitive insight into *this* child *at the right moment*, so as to interact with him as wisely as possible. But the point of special importance for us now is that intuition ranges itself with perception and with inference as one way of knowing objective reality.

When, therefore, we find the supreme moral principle to be something intuitive in character, this fact throws light upon the question whether moral values are relative solely to desires and interests. For desires and interests are subjective in their nature. They not only spring from the subject, but receive their decisive determination there. Bodily warmth remains an interest no matter how arctic may be the climate. But an intuition is objective in its purport and,

however it may be subjectively conditioned, receives its decisive determination from objective reality. An intuition which misleads us about objective reality must go into the discard.

Confusion arises in regard to the significance of intuition because, while objective in intent, it is also conditioned so largely by interest and feeling. It is plain that our feelings enter much more extensively into our intuitions than into our perceptions or our reasonings. An intuitive judgment bears a real resemblance to an instinctive action. Nevertheless the distinction between the cognitive and the conative, which characterizes human experience from infancy on, is present to differentiate intuition and instinct. The distinction between the cognitive and the conative should not, of course, be taken as though it meant a fundamental split in our natures. For creatures having cerebral hemispheres as largely developed as the human there can be hardly any conation which does not have its cognitive aspect; and no intellectual recluse can ever completely insulate his thought from the conative side of his nature. Yet to discriminate these two sides of our nature without imagining them to be separate is important for understanding our human capacities.

The view that the conditioning of intuition by instinct and feeling destroys its value as a way of knowing is an instance of "the fallacy of geneticism." The vogue of the doctrine of evolution has resulted in a widespread tendency to regard the tracing of the genesis of anything as being decisive for our estimate of it. When, for example, social idealism or religious devotion are thought to be traceable to impulses of sex there is a tendency to treat them as "nothing but" manifestations of an unsatisfied sex nature. Or if the socially idealistic or religiously devout individuals have experienced some early bafflements, their idealism and spirituality may be labelled as "escape reactions" and nothing more. But it is fallacious thus to suppose that origin determines

INTUITION OF THE GOOD

significance. However humble and obscure Shakespeare may have been, his plays have their place in the front rank of great literature. The fact that the biography of Thomas à Kempis seems to be that of an insignificant monk does not alter the worth of *The Imitation of Christ*. The origin of chemistry from alchemy, or of astronomy from astrology, does not vitiate the importance of the later sciences. So the fact that intuitions have their rootage in instinct and feeling cannot rightfully be taken as negating their significance for knowing objective reality.

On the contrary, the special conditioning of intuitions by instinct and feeling, seems to be one of the reasons why they can make a characteristic contribution to our objective knowledge. A passage from Professor Montague's chapter on mysticism as a way of knowing will illumine this point:

No interpretation of reality that neglects or violates the inner harmonies of feeling can gain a hold upon the heart. The mystic is one to whom these inner experiences appeal as vital and real. He pictures the world in terms of them, and the picture is precious in that it embodies and makes visible in objective form the hidden depths of the human spirit. Even ordinary perception and reasoning is largely based upon the subconscious stores of memory and instinct. They furnish the meaning with which our sensations are clothed, and the motives by which our reasonings are driven. The intuitions of creative imagination as expressed in the cosmic revelations of the philosophic and religious mystics, and even the less generic visions of the great poets, owe their grandeur and uniqueness to the fact that in them the subconscious functions more spontaneously, more nearly as a unified whole. In normal experience intuition is the servant of the specific, external situation, and there is evoked only that part of the subconscious which is relevant to the situation, while in the real mystic intuition the inner self in its entirety is the controlling factor.¹¹

Since, as the foregoing passage brings out, no perception

¹¹ *Ways of Knowing*, p. 57.

of the objective takes place without some contribution from within, there may well be profoundly significant apprehensions of objective reality resulting when a unified self with rich subconscious resources is brought into play.

It is unjustifiable, then, to treat intuition as relative solely to instinct, feeling, desire, interest. Intuition has a distinctive function as a way of knowing objective reality. And when intuition is concerned with the good, it is still not simply a registration of desire or interest, but is a cognizing of the good which may help in determining the goodness of desire or interest. It affords a way of laying hold of something deeper, more objective, and more universal about the good than desire or interest as such can discover. Intuition, indeed, may be in error and hence itself require to be tested. This aspect of our problem will come up for discussion in the following chapter. But intuition also yields objective truth which is indispensable for judging the goodness of our interests and desires. Such an objective truth I hold our supreme ethical principle to be. The intrinsic worth of persons, of their creative capacities, and of a world-wide community of creative personalities forms an objective principle of good by which ultimately all our interests and desires must be tested. Many desires and interests, as they actually occur, conflict with this principle, and so far as they do so they must be judged to be not good. Institutions which involve exploitation of persons, social pressure which smothers the creative in individuals, national or commercial policies which defeat a world-wide community must be judged to be bad unless they can be remade so as not to have these results. And for the same fundamental reason courses of action which in general are wisely planned for the well-being of persons and communities are better if they derive from self-determination and co-operation than if they are adopted by a benevolent external authority. In sum, there is basic objective truth concerning persons, their development, and

INTUITION OF THE GOOD

their inter-relations, embodied in our supreme ethical intuition which constitutes an indispensable test for desires, interests, and purposes.

A significant corroboration of this interpretation of ethical validity is to be found in the fact that those who seek to interpret ethical validity in other ways sooner or later introduce essentially the above principle, in intuitive fashion, into their argument. Thus Professor Dewey has much to say against the idea of a Highest Good and holds that the ultimate and supreme good is simply what "the specific situation" demands. He will have no universal test of the good except social growth. But the words "social" and "growth" have for Dewey implicit meanings which do not belong to them of necessity. For him they evidently do not mean, for example, change in the direction of a Mussolini regime. The meaning which he gives them comes out in such a passage as the following:

Government, business, art, religion, all social institutions have a meaning, a purpose. That purpose is to set free and to develop the capacities of human individuals without respect to race, sex, class or economic status. And this is all one with saying that the test of their value is the extent to which they *educate every individual into the full stature of his possibility*. Democracy has many meanings, but if it has a moral meaning, it is found in resolving that the supreme test of all political institutions and industrial arrangements shall be the contribution they make to the all-round growth of *every member* of society.¹²

The value of personality and of its possibilities, and the equalitarian principle, which Dewey here makes use of in normative fashion, are treated by him as self-evident. To all intents and purposes they are intuitions.

Another corroborative instance is afforded by the position of Professor R. B. Perry as developed in his work, *General*

¹² *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, Chap. VII, see p. 186. (Italics mine.)

Theory of Value. Perry, though taking a starting-point like Dewey's, namely, that value is "any object of any interest," works out a hierarchy of values and accepts the idea of a Highest Good. The content of this Highest Good he finds to be a co-operative system of integrated personalities, all persons being brought in—in other words, "harmony through universal love." The Highest Good thus conceived has for Perry a clearly objective character:

The highest good is not sheer satisfaction of maximum intensity, but, as Plato taught, an *order* of satisfaction, whose form is prescribed by reason. The highest happiness is not that which is most comfortable and easy of attainment, but, as Christianity has taught, that tragic happiness which is at once the privilege and penalty of love.¹⁸

And into this Highest Good "the independence of persons" and "the postulate of concurrence"—which demands that all be brought in—enter in a manner which seems essentially intuitive.

We therefore must reject the pragmatic doctrine that the Good is wholly relative to human desires and interests. It is true that the Good, in the full sense of the term, always relates to persons. But persons as they develop are something more than a group of interacting desires and interests. Persons have power to gain objective knowledge of physical nature, and the knowledge thus gained enters into the very structure of personal experience. They also have power to gain objective knowledge about themselves, both as to their actual nature and as to their ideal possibilities. The objectivity of knowledge of this type is revealed by the fact that it holds good whether it be welcome or unwelcome to our desires and active interests. The demand that we "face reality" instead of being dominated by our passionate or submissive desires, or our subconscious tendencies, implies the objective, non-relative quality in our knowledge about per-

¹⁸ Pp. 669ff., 677, 683, 687.

CRITIQUE OF PRAGMATISM

sons of which we are speaking. And this objectivity pertains to our knowledge of what is ideal for persons as well as to the knowledge of the facts of their existence. We miss objective truth, for example, as much if we build our social ideals without recognizing that we cannot in the end have the co-operation of persons apart from the independence of persons, or the independence of persons apart from the co-operation of persons, as we do if we carry on education without finding the intelligence-quotients of the pupils.

The intuitional nature of our basic ethical knowledge is also a witness to the objectivity of the Good. Our active desires and interests all too frequently run counter to the principle of the intrinsic worth of persons and of the non-subordination of persons, which principle we lay hold of by intuition. In such cases we cannot but recognize that it is the principle which possesses the greater objectivity. Of this fact the impartiality of the principle as compared with the countervailing desires is a clear sign. It may be said that reflection upon conflicts of desires, individual or social, and the effort to harmonize them is all that we need for moral guidance. But if reflection, as pragmatism holds, must make its final test simply the outcome "in the long run," and that "long run" is, let us say, no more than five hundred years, it would seem that some test supplied by reason or intuition would have to bear the actual responsibility in our more difficult moral decisions.

But while we gain through intuition a basis for decisions in regard to the Good which is more objective than our desires and interests and the effort for their compounding—and hence must reject the pragmatic doctrine that our moral judgments are wholly relative to our appetitive and conational life—there are important contributions to the interpretation of moral values to be derived from pragmatism.

Pragmatism, as an outgrowth both of the volitional trend in modern philosophy and of the evolutionary way of think-

ing due to the rise of modern biology, emphasizes active, intelligent control of human life and its environment in the interests of progress. This emphasis is the counterpart of mysticism's emphasis upon pregnant insight and upon the more intensive realization through feeling of our kinship with the deepest in reality,^f and also of rationalism's emphasis upon order and unity in nature, human society, and the ideal realm. This pragmatic emphasis is invaluable as against rationalism's tendency to accept some *status quo* in thought or life and justify it, refusing to experiment for the sake of advance to something better. It is also invaluable as against mysticism's tendency to indulge in mere romanticism or to escape into otherworldliness.

But pragmatism also has its danger. It may seek smooth adjustments or temporizing reforms when a more radical, uncompromising attitude is what is really called for, and it may foster a mere restlessness for change and a certain barbarism toward historic achievements. A visitor to America has suggested that the American recipe for life might be expressed by the conjugation, "I need a change, you need a change, he needs a change, we need a change, you need a change, they need a change." The corrective for such tendencies is to recognize that for the determining of the ultimate values by which our activity should be guided and for finding the direction of true progress we need the intuitions which spring from a deeply unified self and the perspective which the discovery of "objective significant structures" in thought and reality can give.

A certain ambiguity in the notion of the relativity of all truth and value may be pointed out as an aid in defining the strength and the limitations of the pragmatic doctrine concerning the Good. This notion of relativity may mean simply that all our ideas of truth and value have arrived by a process of growth and that none of them should be withheld from scrutiny as to its accuracy and adequacy. So far

CRITIQUE OF PRAGMATISM

the notion is merely a protest against dogmatism. It does not preclude the further notion that our ideas may become *closer and closer approximations* to objective truths and values which we do not make but discover.

Again, the notion of the relativity of all truth and value may mean that all reality is caught up in a process of change and that hence all our ideas of truth and value are changeable. With reference to this meaning of relativity it should be pointed out that *so far as* reality changes, ideas of truth and value must undergo some modification in order to be objectively valid. But the assumption that *all* reality changes must not be made dogmatically, but must be subjected to the critique of metaphysics. In both of these cases it should be noted that truth and value remain something more than the satisfaction of desires and interests. They are something to be discovered, not something to be made.

But ideas of truth and value may be held to be relative because their most essential meaning is that they guide us to the satisfaction of interests and desires. They are thus implements of our conative natures, and essentially instrumental. The boundaries of a field, for example, may not exist at all in nature. They are the product of our desire to own and they serve the property interest. If we should adopt communism they would cease to exist or acquire an altogether different meaning. Similarly, our systems of measurement are devised to serve practical interests. We may employ as our unit the yard, the meter, or the ell. These units do not represent divisions in nature. They are artifacts, tools invented to help us accomplish our purposes in nature. This conception of our ideas may be made to cover their entire range, from electrons and laws of gravitation and radio-activity to human characters and ideals of justice and wisdom. Professor Dewey, in discussing "Desire and Intelligence," has used the up-to-date illustration of the traveller, the signboard by the roadside, and the garage to which it

directs him. The signboard illustrates an idea in its instrumental function, the garage illustrates the object desired, which is instrumental in an ulterior sense, and the outcome sought is "a re-unification of activity and the restoration of its ongoing unity."¹⁴

Dewey naturally protests against the supposition that his theory would regulate judgments of truth and value by petty, inferior, or merely individual desires, and insists that intelligent desires and public interests should preponderate. But he does make relativity to desires decisive for all judgments of truth and value. In discussing the nature of truth he writes: "An idea or conception is a claim or injunction or plan to *act* in a certain way as the way to arrive at the clearing up of a specific situation. . . . Its active, dynamic function is the all-important thing about it, and in the quality of activity induced by it lies all its truth and falsity." Likewise in the ethical field he affirms: "*Moral* goods and ends exist only when something has to be done." And of our more general moral ideas he says: "They are tools of insight; their value is in promoting an individualized response in the individual situation."¹⁵

It is this making relativity to desire and interest the controlling thing in determining truth and value which constitutes the most serious weakness of pragmatic doctrine. For when this is done the fact is lost sight of that there are basic truths and values which are objectively valid, whether they are subjectively desired by individuals and communities or not. These basic truths and values have to be discovered. They are not made, and they cannot be ignored with impunity. There are, for example, inherent moral limitations both in competitive individualism and in highly centralized collectivism, even though a general prosperity under either system may produce a widespread apathy toward any

¹⁴ *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 249, 250.

¹⁵ *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, pp. 156, 169.

CRITIQUE OF PRAGMATISM

plan for betterment. A contented peasantry and a complacent aristocracy do not constitute a good social order; nor is a smoothly adjusted personality necessarily to be preferred to a onesided development in which some positive talent has fuller scope. There is an intrinsic worth in personality and its creative possibilities, and in the co-operative activity of persons, which is normative for all human desires and interests.

We have found occasion, to be sure, to point out that the discovery of new standards for our changing social conditions is one of the major problems for creative religion.¹⁶ But the recognition of this problem is not the same as adopting the doctrine that all standards must change as human interests and desires shift. As Professor Perry points out: "Superior principles do not annul the operation of subordinate principles: to a very considerable extent they permit them and endorse them as they stand. International goodwill leaves innumerable alternatives open to national aspiration, as the sentiment of humanity leaves to each man his choices of individual perfection." It is not, in fact, merely the change of social conditions which calls for new standards; they are called for in the light of the supreme ethical principle. They are called for when our proximate standards fail to enable us to meet the changed conditions in such a way as to be in harmony with our ultimate standard. Our proximate standards, therefore, should grow. But if there were no ultimate standard, we should have no means of telling what kind of changes in our proximate standards would constitute real growth.

We come, then, to a realistic conception of the Good. The ultimate nature of the Good is something that we intuitively discover, rather than pragmatically devise. And in the gaining of better proximate standards there is likewise a process of discovery involved. That is to say, there are in the moral

¹⁶ See Chap. II.

VALUE AND VALIDITY

realm "objective significant structures" upon which the validity of our value-judgments depends. While our moral life develops naturalistically from primitive social conditions and elementary desires, it proves to be an instance of emergent evolution, in which a new plane of being is reached having its own inherent principles. At the same time, the realism at which we have arrived is a pragmatic realism, because it shares in the pragmatic emphasis upon development, progress, reconstruction, and creative thought and action. From the standpoint of a pragmatic realism the dilemma of naturalism disappears, so far as the theory of knowledge is concerned. The realm of truth about natural existence and the realm of value need be neither merged together indiscriminately nor treated as alien to each other. Our judgments in each realm are subject to the test of objective principles which are characteristic of that realm. There are objective principles for determining the Good as well as for discovering the real events of nature. And yet there is no reason for putting values out of our minds in studying nature. In the science of medicine, for example, values would seem to be obviously indispensable guides. Similarly, moral values not only arise in history, but also are needed for the interpretation of history and help to remake history. A pragmatic realism, then, will make neither for the anthropomorphism which subsumes metaphysics under ethics, nor for the physiomorphism which excludes ethics from metaphysics. It will make, rather, for a philosophical synthesis into which all sides of experience enter and which seeks both to grasp reality in its wholeness, so far as the wholeness is there, and to contribute to the processes of integration by which a fuller wholeness may come to pass.

When we turn to the values in the realm of the Beautiful the question of the nature of their validity confronts us, for this question has much to do with the meaning of these

THE IDEA OF BEAUTY

values for religion. In the chapter entitled "Creative Religion" we saw reason to discriminate æsthetic religion as one of the types under which the creative possibilities of religion have been manifested. This fact implies the uniqueness of the experience of beauty and also the capacity of such experience to interact fruitfully with religion. According to this implication the beautiful will not be simply the pleasant or agreeable. An appetizing meal may be served in a beautiful or an unbeautiful way. Nor will the beautiful be merely something which our social group is wont to regard with satisfaction. It is sometimes said that the music or art in the Orient and Occident are so different that they can consist in nothing but what different races have grown accustomed to like. Nevertheless we find the art of one race being enriched by contact with the art of another, which implies some fundamental congruity between them and leads us to look for some basic qualities and relations in things which render them beautiful. Must we not say, then, that just as there is objective order in nature which we can discern as our minds become attentive and orderly, so there is objective beauty in things seen and unseen which we can appreciate when our minds have gained sufficient sensitiveness and intuitive power? And is it not also true that just as the discovery of objective order in nature enables man to create new types of order, so the intuition of essential beauty is the source of man's power to create things beautiful?

Let us consider the answer to these questions given by Robert Bridges in *The Testament of Beauty*.¹⁷ As to the unique place of the beautiful in man's spiritual life these lines may be quoted:

Spiritual life being thus imagin'd in the child
thru' conscient personality and love of beauty,
—which on so tender a plant budding hath power to bear

¹⁷ Published by The Clarendon Press, Oxford.

VALUE AND VALIDITY

the richest fruit of all creation, incomparable—
ther is nought in all his nurtur of more intrinsic need
than is the food of Beauty.

Another passage gives this poet's thought concerning beauty's inherent nature. He renames Plato's Ideas, calling them Influences, and treats them as

supreme efficient causes of the thought of men.

And then he writes :

Beauty is the highest of these occult influences,
the quality of appearances that thru' the sense
wakeneth spiritual emotion in the mind of man.
And Art, as it createth new forms of beauty,
'awakeneth new ideas that advance the spirit
in the life of Reason to the wisdom of God.

A great merit in Bridges' thought is that he brings into unity the intuition of Beauty as an eternal essence and the creation of things beautiful. In the earlier discussion of the æsthetic type of religion it was said that in this type religion stood forth as an imaginative achievement of the human spirit. But it also was shown that this type could never be divorced from religion as communion with Divine Reality. So in the specifically æsthetic realm the intuition of objective and eternal Beauty and the work of the creative imagination are brought together by Bridges :

Delicat and subtle are the dealings of nature,
whereby the emotionable sense secretly is touch'd
to awareness and by glimpse of heav'nly vision drawn
within the attraction of the creativ energy
that is the ultimate life of all being so'er.

In the last two lines, moreover, we see that the way in which the poet effects the union of the two great aspects of

THE IDEA OF BEAUTY

æsthetic experience is through that conception of God which finds man to be a sharer in God's creative life.

A similar unification of the intuition of objective, essential beauty and the creative imagination seems to have been effected by Coleridge, who in his thinking on æsthetics was primarily interested in working out a theory of poetic creation. In this effort Professor Muirhead tells us that:

Coleridge chiefly found help in his study of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, particularly in the recognition, in addition to the reproductive function of imagination, of another to which he attributes not only a productive activity of its own, but something of the fruitful and inexhaustible character of noumenal reality itself.¹⁸

Coleridge himself describes the poet as one

who brings the whole soul of man into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each other according to their relative worth and dignity. He diffuses a tone and spirit of unity that blends and (as it were), fuses each into each by that synthetic and magical power to which I would exclusively appropriate the name Imagination. This power . . . reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities: of sameness with difference; of the general with the concrete; the idea with the image; the individual with the representative; the sense of novelty and freshness with old and familiar objects; a more than usual state of emotion with more than usual order.¹⁹

If, then, one follows the thought of Bridges and of Coleridge, one will be led to perceive that the test of values in the æsthetic realm must be the intuition of essential and eternal Beauty, and also that this same intuition is an indispensable condition for the creation of the beautiful. It is not true that the recognition of eternal beauty condemns

¹⁸ J. H. Muirhead, *Coleridge as Philosopher*, pp. 200-201.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp 207-8.

art to the imitation of the pre-existent. Nor is it true that creativity in art implies a doctrine of universal flux. Whitehead has said, speaking of the world-process as such: " 'Change' is the description of the adventures of eternal objects in the evolving universe of actual things."²⁰ So one may say that artistic creation, from the drawings in the caves of Dordogne to the present, is the epic story of eternal Beauty incarnating itself in infinitely varied forms through awakening the intuitions and imaginations of men. One may recall in this connection lines from Shelley's *Hymn to Intellectual Beauty*.

v Spirit of Beauty, that dost consecrate
 With thine own hues all thou dost shine upon
 Of human thought or form—where art thou gone?

.

Thy light alone—like mist o'er mountains driven,
 Or music by the night wind sent,
 Thro' strings of some still instrument,
 Or moonlight on a midnight stream,
 Gives grace and truth to life's unquiet dream.

Doubtless there will always remain a certain tension—and a productive one—between the intuition of beauty in its essential, eternal character and the free play of the creative imagination and of fancy—as the perennial discussion between classicism and romanticism shows. Mr. Lawrence Hyde has written instructively on this point:

The life of the spirit has two great complementary aspects: that of inward realization and that of outward expression. If either that realization or that expression is defective, we are concerned with an imperfect adaptation to life. The man whose strength lies in the phase of expression is the romantic; he is endowed with a feminine sensitiveness to the richness and intricacy of the realm of sensuous experience. But,

²⁰ Cf. *Process and Reality*, p. 92.

THE IDEA OF BEAUTY

as we have seen, he is on that account peculiarly exposed to the danger of being overpowered by the matter which he is seeking to spiritualize. The man whose strength lies in inward realization, on the other hand, is the classicist and, on a higher plane, the man of religion. He may have a notably inferior capacity for relating the temporal to the eternal, but he is remarkable for his moral depth and stability of character. He is massive and consolidated where the artist is fragile and inconsequent. In fine, while one type is particularly sensitive to the Changing, the other is particularly sensitive to the Changeless. One possesses the capacity to spiritualize the fugitive, the other the capacity to reflect in his personality the stillness and peace which is to be found at the heart of reality. The strength of one finds expression in relation to the Not-self, the strength of the other in relation to the Self. Both are by themselves incomplete. Only when they are united in the person of the true mystic is perfection achieved. For just as the accomplished poet effects the union of the eternal and the temporal on the plane of art, so does the true mystic effect the same union on the plane of life.²¹

The resolving of the tension between the intuition of essential beauty and the free play of the creative imagination does indeed take place most fully at the level of religion. We have seen that religion in its supreme developments finds Goodness and Beauty to be revelations of that which is deepest in cosmic reality, and if it be true that the ultimate reality is also inexhaustibly creative, communion with that reality will foster both the vision of essential beauty and the creation of the beautiful.

The One remains, the many change and pass;
'Heaven's light forever shines, Earth's shadows fly;
Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,
Stains the white radiance of Eternity.²²

But when God is seen as Creator and active Lover of all, those who are creators of beauty and of love may be forever

²¹ *The Prospects of Humanism*, pp. 235, 236. ²² Shelley, *Adonais*.

revealers of the glory hidden in the white radiance of his thought.

We come, then, to the conclusion that judgments of value in the realm of the Good and the Beautiful are autonomous with respect to each other and also with respect to scientific judgments concerning existence, and that it is this very autonomy of the respective areas of judgment which makes possible fruitful interaction between the experiences of man in these several areas.²³ That fruitful interaction can and will take place is indeed first of all a matter of religious faith and intuition. Whether such interaction can have the support of reason, and if so, on what terms, will be discussed in the following chapter on "Intuition and Reason," and the full answer to these questions will require the discussion of the metaphysical topics in the third part of this book. Here we may simply note, in conclusion, that the intuitions of the artist often affirm the reality of such fruitful interaction.

Shelley writes in *A Defence of Poetry*:

Poetry lifts the veil from the hidden beauty of the world. . . . A man, to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must put himself in the place of another and of many others; the pains and pleasures of his species must become his own. The great instrument of moral good is the imagination; and poetry administers to the effect by acting upon the cause. . . . Poetry strengthens the faculty which is the organ of the moral nature of man, in the same manner as exercise strengthens a limb. A poet therefore would do ill to embody his own conceptions of right and wrong, which are usually those of his place and time, in his poetical creations, which participate in neither. By this assumption of the inferior office of interpreting the effect, in which perhaps after all he will acquit himself but imperfectly, he would resign a glory in the participation of the cause.²⁴

²³ Cf. W. M. Urban, "Value Theory and Æsthetics," p. 71, in *Philosophy Today*, edited by E. L. Schaub.

²⁴ Quoted in *Philosophies of Beauty*, selected and edited by E. F. Carr. ✓

THE IDEA OF BEAUTY

With this passage should be ranged a saying of Santayana:

Beauty is a pledge of the possible conformity between the soul and nature, and consequently a ground of faith in the supremacy of the good.²⁵

Professor Prescott has said in his *Poetry and Myth*:

In poetry beauty is inseparable from the other great ends of human desire—the true and the good. In the works of great poets—Dante, Shakespeare, or Shelley—the higher the poetry and the nobler the persons, the more we see beauty, truth, and goodness approaching one another and coalescing; and this is undoubtedly one of the highest pleasures poetry can give.

And he concludes his richly suggestive study with the following words:

In poetry, if at all, the imagination still survives. In poetry, more than elsewhere, our imaginative thought may still be active, free, and progressive. For our guides into the future it is perhaps upon the poets that we must more and more depend.²⁶

We cannot relinquish to poetry the place which we have affirmed can only be filled by creative intelligence and creative love. But neither should we be led by moralistic zeal or prepossession for the powers of science to ignore the capacity of the contemplation and creation of beauty to purify, elevate, and transform human life. And in times of intellectual and social confusion like the present there may be not a few to whom the quickening experience of the Divine will best come in forms like Edwin Arlington Robinson's "Credo":

I cannot find my way: there is no star
In all the shrouded heavens anywhere;
And there is not a whisper in the air

²⁵ Quoted by Carritt, *Ibid.*, p. 204.

²⁶ See F. C. Prescott, *Poetry and Myth*, pp. 76, 77, 188.

VALUE AND VALIDITY

Of any living voice but one so far
That I can hear it only as a bar
Of lost, imperial music, played when fair
And angel fingers wove, and unaware,
Dead leaves to garlands where no roses are.

No, there is not a glimmer, nor a call,
For one that welcomes, welcomes when he fears,
The black and awful chaos of the night;
For through it all—above, beyond it all—
I know the far-sent message of the years,
I feel the coming glory of the Light.²⁷

²⁷ *Children of the Night.*

IX

INTUITION AND REASON

THE threefold thesis of this chapter is: that religious experience affords intuitions which are an irreplaceable source of insight into truth and reality; that the test of intuitions is either their congruity with the rest of experience or their power to introduce unity into experience; that a dynamically integrated religious experience requires an interaction and interpenetration of intuition and reason.

To such a thesis various aspects of our previous discussions have been leading up. We found one of the vital characteristics of religion to be insight into truth and value.¹ Historically, religion has always meant illumination as well as salvation and moral quickening, and most religious personalities of the first order have advanced in some way the cause of truth. It is striking, also, to note how many of the makers of philosophy, from Plato and the Stoics to the present time, and from beginning to end in Oriental philosophy, have been eminent religious personalities whose religion bore fruit in their philosophy.

This same general thesis is that toward which our discussion of mysticism, in one of its aspects, pointed; for we saw how much there was to show that mysticism and the spirit of inquiry are not inherently uncongenial to each other, but can be fruitfully united.² Furthermore, the discussion of the preceding chapter concerning the kind of validity which attaches to our judgments of value has led us to recognize the intuitive character of our fundamental principles of value.

¹ See Chap. III, pp. 60 ff.

² See Chap. V, pp. 117 ff.

INTUITION AND REASON

But all our study has served to emphasize the fact that if religion is to function creatively, and in particular, if it is to contribute to the discovery of truth, certain conditions must be fulfilled; and the thesis which we have just formulated includes the conception that all intuitions must themselves be held subject to some testing process. Thus we find ourselves in need of discussing the relation between intuition and reason, especially so far as this question bears on the interpretation of our moral and religious experience. And here we must take account of certain aspects of philosophical idealism—just as the question of value and its relation to truth required the examination of some of the claims of pragmatism, and as the question of objective reality in science and in religion called for some consideration of present-day realism.

Let us begin by examining the view, embodied in the thesis of the chapter, that under certain conditions intuition can go beyond reason in the gaining of knowledge. And as material for our examination let us place alongside the experience of ethical and religious intuition cited in the previous chapter from Schleiermacher an instance of intuition in the field of scientific discovery. Robert Mayer, the physicist and physician who first enunciated the law of the conservation of energy, was making a voyage to the East Indies, in the capacity of ship's doctor, when the new idea flashed across his mind. Mayer in his boyhood had been fascinated by the idea of perpetual motion and had tried to devise mechanisms that would demonstrate its truth. He had brooded upon the reasons for his failure, and upon the meaning of cause and effect in physical science, throughout all his subsequent studies of physiology, chemistry, and physics. In particular, studies into the generation of organic heat, and pondering upon the fact that the motion of the waves of the sea produces heat, had preceded the flash of insight which proved to be the solution of his problems. His in-

THE RÔLE OF INTUITION

sight soon received the support of experimental proof and became the central guiding idea for scientific discovery for the next two generations.³

In this instance of momentous scientific discovery there is a real sense in which intuition went beyond reason because, although observation and reason preceded the discovery and experimental reasoning confirmed it, the central event in the discovery was a swift vision of new truth. Others also had amassed much pertinent scientific knowledge, but with them the solving intuition remained absent. The experiments for verifying the intuition were open to many, when once the guiding principle had been found. But the discovery itself, which interpreted previous knowledge and guided subsequent experiment, was intuitively gained.

At the same time the conditions under which intuition can go beyond reason seem fairly evident from the foregoing instance. These conditions appear to be: a mental quest whose general direction is defined, the gathering of an abundance of relevant data, the long and recurrent brooding, and the openness to subsequent verification.

But to this historic example of intuition supplementing reason there needs to be added some general definition of these two ways of knowing. By reason I mean the process of gaining organized knowledge of reality through the gathering and weighing of evidence and the making of inferences therefrom. The test of reasoning, from this point of view, is the coherence of the system of judgments to which it leads. Incongruity between judgments or groups of judgments is a token of irrationality—due either to the presence of error, or to the absence of an essential truth, or to both. Reasoning is the process of eliminating incongruities and substituting coherence. It thus has an analytic and critical task and a synthetic task.

✓ By intuition I mean a direct vision of truth. As was

³ H. Höfding, *History of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 494 ff.

INTUITION AND REASON

brought out in the previous chapter, intuition differs from reasoning in not being a step-by-step process, whether inductive or deductive, but in having the swiftness and directness of perception. And this remains true no matter how much in the way of inductive and deductive processes may lie behind the intuition. But intuition differs, on the other hand, from ordinary perception, and is akin to reasoning, because of its capacity to give genuine understanding of the reality with which it has to do. This distinction between perception and intuition is, to be sure, a relative one. There can hardly be a perception of anything unless there is merged with the mere presentation of the thing some slight measure of understanding of it. Yet the perception of something as being in congruity with a setting and the perception of something as having no such congruity are different events, and the difference is an important one. A slight tremor in the physique of another might betoken pent-up feelings of antagonism or pent-up feelings of sympathetic rapport. The mere perception of the tremor is likely to result in bewilderment and a clumsy reaction on the part of the perceiver, whereas an intuitive grasp of the situation which the tremor really indicates makes possible an intelligent and skillful response.

But for intuition as for reasoning the ultimate test must be congruity or coherence with the rest of experience. Intuitions are not infallible. There can be mistaken intuitions, just as there can be illusory perceptions and fallacious pieces of reasoning. The great error in estimating intuition is to suppose that it must be either infallible or valueless. A feeling of certainty is apt to accompany an intuition, but this must not be taken as a proof of certainty. At the same time the fact that intuition is not self-validating is no ground for denying that it is a significant way of knowing. An intuition may cohere with a relevant body of judgments; if so, it enriches knowledge. An intuition may introduce co-

SYNTHETIC INTUITIONS IN RELIGION

herence between conflicting bodies of judgments; in that case it solves a problem and advances knowledge by organizing it. An intuition may become the focus for a new body of judgments; then it pioneers into new territory which in the end must be annexed to the domains of knowledge. Such being the case, intuition presents itself as having the power to go beyond reason but never to dispense with reason. A relation of polarity holds between them, and knowledge grows best where this relation is active and unimpeded.

Turning now to specifically religious experience, let us go on to consider whether it is adapted to yield intuitions of truth and reality which go beyond reason and yet have significance for reason. There are three types of cognitive need to which religion seems adapted to minister. We need not simply an astronomical, but also an interpretive, knowledge of our universe. We need an ontological knowledge of human personality as well as a psychological knowledge. And we need a discovery—which in the last analysis should be a personal discovery—of truth concerning the way of life. In regard to each of these types of knowledge let us consider whether reason can be transcended and completed by such intuitions as religion makes possible.

An interpretive knowledge of the universe is plainly a synthetic task. Interpretation denotes the discovery of meaning in reality that is already known apart from its newly discovered meaning. It signifies the finding of value in reality which at first is cognized in deliberate disregard of questions of value. It involves examining processes and events which have shown to be real apart from any connection with intrinsically worthwhile ends and discovering that they are connected with such ends. Interpretation takes things known abstractly and quantitatively and restores to them their inherent qualitative richness. It supplements knowledge gained by calculation with knowledge gained by appreciation. We interpret things, too, when we consider them not only in

INTUITION AND REASON

their actual operation but also in their potentiality for ideal ends. For example, calculations of man-power may be all the better for military or economic purposes if they are in terms of abstract statistical averages; but a real interpretation of a human situation will include the imponderables—morale, cultural attainments, individual gifts, spiritual resources. The abstractness of our astronomical and physical knowledge of the universe is being admitted with increasing readiness by our philosophical scientists; and in consequence the need and rightfulness of an interpretive knowledge is becoming more and more evident. Now although the imponderables are not known in mathematical, statistical fashion, they are matters of experience and are subject to testing after their kind; and it is the function of interpretation to seek for a synthesis between such⁴ tested experience and the abstract knowledge of physics and astronomy. Only so can we hope to get beyond the knowledge of the physical sciences, which, though realistic, is abstract, to a knowledge of reality in its qualitative richness and meaning.

Now the nature of this task of interpretive synthesis is such that it can hardly be accomplished except as reason and intuition work together, and the intuitions called for are such as religion is adapted to produce. In other words, we should look to religion for *synthetic intuitions* which can guide and complete reason in the work of gaining an interpretive knowledge of the universe. Let us see why this is so.

In the first place, it belongs to religion to fulfil, in respect to the interpretation of the universe, those conditions on which, as we have seen, fruitful intuition depends.⁴ Religion supplies the supreme interests which give direction to the interpretive quest—the interests concerning the Ground, the Goal, and the Way of life. Religion affords a wealth of data relevant to these interests through its history, its great per-

⁴ See p. 183.

SYNTHETIC INTUITIONS IN RELIGION

sonalities, and its classic literatures. And religion, in its worship, its meditation, and its communion, secures the brooding upon the meaning of experience from which fresh and significant intuitions may come.

In the second place, religion fosters that functioning of the total self from which alone come synthetic intuitions that may prove to be genuine discernings of the deeper reality and meaning of the universe.⁵ Religion, as we have seen, is an experience which makes for inner integrity. It summons men to singleness of mind and of heart. It calls upon them to seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness.⁶ And as it grows, it gathers around the central thought, motive, and purpose already achieved all the other interests and experiences of a person's life. Thus religion makes for wholeness of life, for peace, and for power. And these fruits of religion condition also its capacity to gain insight. The more the whole self enters into the mental quest, so much the more are we able to transcend partial and specific knowings and valuing and find a deeper and more meaningful wholeness in cosmic reality.

In the third place, the synthetic intuitions of religion do not remain in sheer detachment from each other but tend to grow into a body of intuitive insight. There is no better instance of such a growth than the development of ethical monotheism by the Hebrew prophets. The visions of Amos give him the conception of a God of universal, impartial righteousness. The brooding of Hosea upon his personal tragedy results in enriching the conception of Amos through the insight of God's redemptive love. In Isaiah's visions we find God's holiness and man's moral faithfulness brought into vital relation with each other. With Jeremiah we see personal religion, involving a profoundly inward relation to God as ethically conceived, emerging into full distinctness from national religion. Second Isaiah sees all history and

⁵ See p. 185.

⁶ See p. 63.

INTUITION AND REASON

nature as being under the control of the God of righteousness and compassion, and at the same time gives religion new depth and power through the portrayal of the Suffering Servant. Thus ethical monotheism comes to full development in its cosmic range and in its inwardly transforming power.

In this development intuition is the form of knowing, as is always the case with the prophetic type of mind. The intuitions are synthetic in character, resulting from brooding upon experience in its wide ranges and its difficult, tragic aspects. And the intuitions are cumulative. There is a progressive enrichment of their content, the earlier intuitions being the basis for the later and fuller ones. Moreover, the principle of interpenetration⁷ is to be seen at work in this development. These Hebrew prophets are writing prophets, which means that they are not only men of religious intuition and moral action but also men in whom reflective thought is playing a significant, though subordinate, part. It is the interpenetration of insight, deed, and reflection that makes the visions of these prophets, even though they were often ecstatic in form, so different in their value and truthfulness from those of the shaman or the dervish. By this process of interpenetration, which is so characteristic of religion when it is creative, the Hebrew prophets achieve that coherent body of intuition which we call ethical monotheism.

Now the religious brooding upon the meaning of experience, and the consequent heightened functioning of the total self, by which we find the great prophets to have been characterized, must be actively present in us all if we are to gain a really interpretive knowledge of our universe. For though we later and lesser men may be lifted to a point of vantage by the body of insight from the prophets of the past, this point of vantage avails nothing if our own vision is clouded in. Those who take what was once fresh insight, quick with meaning, on mere external authority, and those who accept

⁷ See pp. 94 ff.

THE INTUITION OF PERSONALITY

the astronomical and physical view of the universe in its abstractness without seeking for its meaning, are in the end doing much the same thing. In neither case are a living religion and a living philosophy being brought to bear upon the great issues of life.

But in addition to the need for an interpretive knowledge of the universe we have pointed out the need for an ontological knowledge of human personality. And here, too, we shall do well to ask whether intuition has not a part to play which is complementary to that of reason. Most of our modern psychology of human personality has felt constrained to banish the ontological question. The reason for this attitude appears to have been that answers to the ontological question which men have cherished have interfered with the psychologist's descriptive and analytic work. Conceptions of the soul based on Descartes's absolute dualism between mind and body have interfered with physiological psychology. The notion that the human soul is endowed with reason and will according to some fairly fixed ratio has prejudged the problems of educational psychology. And metaphysical ideas of the soul have tended toward treating persons as detached individuals in disregard of the problems of social psychology.

But difficulties have arisen on the other side. The descriptive and analytic work of the psychologist, and the system of laws which he builds up, have often resulted in dissipating the conception of personality as a unique whole. If the purely psychological knowledge of persons be not supplemented by other knowing there arises a strong tendency to regard persons only as groups of processes—having no more real individuality than the interplay of physical forces in a certain room. But where such a view prevails the personality in which ethics finds intrinsic worth is lost. The unique individual that the biographer seeks to portray becomes a literary fiction. Education for personal insight and initiative ceases to have meaning. Evidently psychological

INTUITION AND REASON

knowledge, in order to retain its full significance, must be recognized as knowledge about persons as ontologically real individuals. Although the question as to how these real individuals called persons come into being must be raised, and although they must also be regarded as parts of society, their existence as unique wholes must not be denied. A psychological account of the process of becoming of persons misses the point if the process is not seen to issue in unique beings. A treatment of persons as parts of society is inadequate except as it leads up to an understanding of them as active participators in society.

How, then, do we come into possession of this knowledge of persons as ontologically real individuals, if psychological analysis of personal life into elementary processes and the recombining of these into a group of processes is insufficient? This knowledge becomes ours only through an intuitive apprehension of the unitary character of that to which our psychological analysis applies. The elements discovered by psychological analysis are elements which occur only in unique individuals, and in any given case the presence of a unique personal individual is something of which we are immediately aware. We need, then, to recognize a *perceptive type of intuition* as well as a synthetic type. A synthetic intuition gives us a synoptic vision of apparently diverse realities as having actually a coherent, organic unity. A perceptive intuition gives us a unique individual, which doubtless will be analyzable into parts but to which the parts must *belong* in order to have their proper meaning.

The perceptive intuition of persons as unique individual reals is a matter of the most practical importance if one would be fully alive to any human situation. This holds good even when it is the physiological aspect of persons which is in the foreground. In the address at the opening of New York's new Medical Center it was stated that adequate diagnosis and treatment demanded the consideration of each

THE INTUITION OF PERSONALITY

instance of illness in its individual, personal aspect, and that no advance of scientific knowledge could make this aspect negligible. Even more important is the intuition of personal uniqueness when persons are being considered on the mental and spiritual side. No amount of general experience with persons, or of psychological knowledge, will compensate for the absence of direct sympathetic responsiveness to the person with whom we are having to do. Moreover, it is being recognized increasingly that persons can be truly understood only on the basis that each has a unique personal history. In other words, the psychological view of persons and the biographical view must supplement each other. And in the biographical view both the synthetic intuition, which can discover the personality in its wholeness, and the perceptive intuition, which apprehends its living uniqueness, must play a part.

Now for the ontological intuition of human personality as an individual and unique real, which grows by preserving its wholeness through manifold experiences, the religious consciousness is of great importance. For the uniqueness of human individuality does not mean detachedness. Just as the intrinsic worth of a person as an end in itself is correlative to the intrinsic worth of a society of persons which is a realm of ends, so the ontological uniqueness of a person is correlative to membership in an order of being of like nature. The kind of individuality which persons possess is not illustrated by shot in a bag. It is illustrated better by cells in a living body. Human individuality involves both diversification and mutuality. It signifies both independence and interdependence. It is well known that individual thought and the communication of thought are closely bound up together. Without a language of some sort—of words or other signs—there can be little or no personal thought.

That profounder perception of personal uniqueness which sees it in infinite relationships is made possible by religion.

INTUITION AND REASON

A partly similar result, it is true, can be gained by seeing the individual person in his finite human relationships. An outstanding individual after all reflects in some manner the spirit of his age, and the spirit of the age receives some unique incarnation in the outstanding individual. Though even here that which most illuminates such a relationship is the realization that it manifests something deeper than itself—an indwelling divine Spirit or Logos. But for the perception of the personal uniqueness of *each* man the consciousness that he is a child of God is of great moment. For in the light of this consciousness the uniqueness which we ourselves perceive is seen to have a capacity for infinite unfolding. And this sense of the capacity in each person for infinite unfolding fosters that brooding upon the meaning of each personal life which is indispensable for all wise love.

It should be emphasized that the ontological intuition of personal uniqueness and the religious consciousness of the meaning of each person for the Infinite should be viewed as fully correlative. Neither should be regarded as merely a derivative from the other. Such a full correlation, for example, is involved in the two great commands of Jesus—love for God and love for one's neighbor. Real love for one's neighbor means loving him for his own sake and not simply for the sake of God—as a matter of religious duty. Any other view is incompatible with Jesus' idea of God, who on his part loves men for their own sakes. Likewise real love for God is something more than the sum of one's love for men; it is also the devout response of one's being to a Being of Infinite Wisdom and Love. Neither love for God nor love for man, then, is merely a derivative from its counterpart; yet each nourishes the other. When we love our fellow-man for his own sake the life of God flows through us, and when we are responsive to the God of Infinite Wisdom and Love we are better able to discover and foster the moral and spiritual capacities of our fellowmen.

CREATIVE INTUITION

But this knowing of personality in intuition is no substitute for the knowing of personality through reason in the science of psychology. Just as the elements and processes discovered by psychological analysis need to be seen as belonging to a unique individual whole—which can be known as a whole and as being more than the sum of the parts—so the intuitive knowledge of personal individuality needs to be made more and more articulate by an increasingly thorough psychological analysis. The physician's direct inspection of each person's illness as ultimately individual is, of course, only a supplement to the amassed generic knowledge of organized medical science, and is in no sense a substitute for such knowledge. In fact it seems plain that in medicine each way of knowing reinforces the other. And when we consider that in seeking to know personalities in their mental and spiritual natures we are dealing with the problem of individuality on a level still higher than that of the bodily organism, it seems no less evident that both intuition and reason should be brought into play in co-operative fashion.

But as has been already pointed out, there is a third type of cognitive need to which religion is adapted to minister. In addition to an interpretive knowledge of the universe and an ontological knowledge of personality we need the discovery of truth concerning the way of life. This field of knowledge is universally recognized as lying peculiarly in the province of religion. All great religions are first of all ways of salvation or ways of life, and it is in these ways of salvation and life that the great religious interpretations of reality and of the universe centre. Now knowledge concerning the way of life is palpably a matter of intuition. It comes as a personal discovery by a prophetic personality, and in the case of the followers who really receive his message the element of personal verification is essential. Each must make the discovery for himself, to which the prophet has pointed the way. So long as the spiritual community which the

INTUITION AND REASON

prophet initiates has full vitality he remains "the first-born among many brethren."

Intuition concerning the way of life, because of certain of its special characteristics, may be termed *creative intuition*. For any great way of life is both an insight and an art. It involves both a clearer vision of truth than we otherwise have and also freer and more skillful living. And the clearer seeing and the finer doing are most intimately bound up together. They somehow mutually quicken each other—as when love makes us wiser and wisdom makes us more loving.

A creative intuition is always, on the one side, a fresh penetration to basic truth and reality. That which is basic for life is continually getting buried by the detritus of living—which then becomes the insecure substratum for second-rate forms of life, as the mud-brick hamlets of an inferior people may conceal the ruins of the better built cities of a stronger race. There is an ever-recurrent need for minds that can cut through outworn opinion and custom to the truth and reality which are basic for all of life. The traditions of the elders must be set aside for the sake of a re-discovery of the truths of the prophets. But the energy of life and thought which says "no" to the outworn of ephemeral for the sake of clearly affirming the fundamental and eternal are bound to find new and higher forms of expression which will become permanent gifts to the race.

For the most significant manifestation of creative intuition in religion one must turn to Jesus. Jesus went back to the great basic insights of Hebrew religion embodied in the ethical monotheism of the Old Testament prophets, and in so doing he exhibited the power to deny a vast mass of deadening non-essentials for the sake of affirming with clarity and vigor the great living essentials. The casuistry of the scribes, the ceremonial piety of the officially religious, the worldly compromises of priest and prince, the reckless

CREATIVE INTUITION

fanaticism of the zealot, the superstitious fears of the common people—Jesus brushed all these aside for the sake of a clear, all-controlling faith in the one God of universal righteousness and impartial love.

This fresh apprehension on the part of Jesus of the great intuitions of earlier prophets was the basis of his creative intuition concerning the way of life. It gave him a clear perception of the unique worth of each human soul, not only as a matter of principle but also in every concrete situation. It enabled him to see the religious significance of all genuine human values. It made possible for him the gaining of his supreme insight—that love is the secret of the coming of the Kingdom of God on earth. It was this insight which enabled Jesus to give to men a way of life which transcends all the other great ways of religion. Jesus' Way is not simply the Way of Realization offered by purely mystical religion, according to which all problems are solved by realizing the illusoriness of finiteness and evil and the identity of the self with the Absolute. Nor is it the Way of Renunciation presented by ascetic religion in which the quenching of all desire is the road to salvation. Nor is it the Way of Conformity and Obedience pointed to by religion in which established institutions have supreme sacredness. Jesus' Way is the Way of Transformation, because it apprehends love as the eternal nature of God and as the fulfilment of the life of man. Love, as Jesus interprets it, transforms human desire from the will to dominate to the will to serve. It kindles the courage to challenge human institutions, even though they have become sacrosanct, when they conflict with human need, and inspires to their refashioning in the spirit of brotherhood. It brings the soul of man into a unity with God which is more than that of finite dependence because it is a filial sharing in his Fatherhood and in his will to achieve the reign of love on earth.

Creative intuition, when unfailingly expressed in active

INTUITION AND REASON

living, as it was with Jesus, changes the course of events and becomes the means for effecting a new organization of life and bringing to pass a higher unity than before. It is when religion fosters creative intuition that it becomes most significant as a resource in meeting our major social problems. If the solution of these problems calls for a unifying of history such as has never yet been, it seems obvious that creative intuition is indispensable. Differing national and racial cultures, which themselves are great syntheses of life, are now requiring synthesis with each other. In our economic life new conflicts have arisen, along vastly extended fronts, between social groups, and these conflicts can be resolved only by new forms of co-operation. In our general social life, concerning matters of education, the family, and the like, we have need of new standards and methods if basic values are to be maintained and to be made more controlling. None of these types of problem can be effectively met without creative intuition. All of them call urgently for that form of religion in which creative intuition is a vital principle.

✓Creative intuition does become a vital principle in the religion in which the Way of Transformation is the central insight. For such a religion lives in proportion as it kindles personality, enlists the resources of science and art, and faces new situations as fresh opportunities for spiritual life and achievement. It is no true loyalty to the creative intuitions of the past to suppose that they preclude the necessity of creative intuition now. One should not so understand, for example, the ideal of the imitation of Christ. For Christ himself dealt with his own religious heritage in the spirit of free selection and interpretation according to his own personal insight. Moreover, he sought to bring men directly to God in a truly filial relation. To imitate Christ is to read God's past manifestations and his present inward revealings in the light of each other. This is a part of what was meant for the early disciples of Christ by the continuing presence

THE TEST OF REASON

of the Spirit in the Christian community. In the thought of Paul the Spirit of the Lord was a spirit of liberty. Paul himself is the foremost demonstration of the fact that one who appropriates the great intuitions of Jesus concerning the way of life will in turn become an organ of creative intuition. Indeed, by its very nature creative intuition is a self-multiplying principle which forms a part of the very life of truly ethical religion.

But an intuition which is to prove really creative requires integration with a tested body of truth. If it is to introduce unity where none has existed before, it must cohere with the organized insights previously attained. In this process the new insight will be a means of criticizing past insights as they have become organized, but it will also be a completion of those insights in their basic meaning. Thus reason has its part to play in completing the work of creative intuition. In a dynamically integrated religion intuition and reason will interact and interpenetrate. The true prophet is always both a reformer and a fulfiller, and precisely because he has this double rôle there is need that his work be supplemented by that of the religious thinker. Luther needs his Melancthon and George Fox his William Penn. It is through such an interaction of intuition and reason that the meaning of a way of life is unfolded and a comprehensive religious view of the world is gained.⁸

It is philosophical idealism which, among the schools of philosophy, has been most concerned with the synthetic, integrative task. And in proportion as idealism has been able to present reality as a rational whole in which the supreme values are embodied, it has corroborated the basic insights of religion. Thus idealism has been the chief sponsor of reason, not only in the processes of knowing in general, but

⁸ See my Chapter, "Can Religious Intuition Give Knowledge of Reality?" in *Religious Realism*, by D. C. Macintosh and others.

INTUITION AND REASON

also as the basic factor in religion. John Caird, for example, has said: "God and divine things may touch our feelings, kindle our emotions, awaken in us desires and impulses, dominate our practical activities: but underneath and throughout all these there must be present the activity of that organ which alone can raise us above ourselves, which alone can bring us into relation to the things unseen and eternal, and that organ is thought."⁹

This idealistic emphasis upon reason as a vital constituent of fully developed religion, and upon the synthetic task in philosophy, furnishes the needed corrective for the tendency to rely solely on mysticism and its intuitions as the source of ultimate truth, and also for the irrationalism of extreme pragmatism. But idealism, on its part, has been prone to lay such stress upon reason as to override religious insight and to rob the volitional and pragmatic side of experience of its significance. Particularly is this true of Absolute Idealism, which Professor Hoernlé declares to be "the highest form which idealism has assumed."¹⁰ The Absolute Idealist is so convinced, by *a priori* reasoning, of the complete organic wholeness of all reality that he undermines the most important religious appreciations and ethical distinctions. Thus Hoernlé, expressing his own view as well as that of his school, writes:

God, as both Bradley and Bosanquet agree, is an "appearance," though ranking high in the order of appearances. . . . In other words, the concepts of person and personal intercourse . . . seem to the Absolutist untenable, if taken as ultimate truth. The Absolute, therefore, must be conceived as impersonal, or rather, as suprapersonal. What this means may, perhaps, best be appreciated by recalling that to many great thinkers, now as in the past, it has seemed that individual persons, as distinctive centres of consciousness, are evanescent and transitory compared with the spiritual achievements which they help to preserve and carry on.¹¹

⁹ *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, p. 154.

¹⁰ *Idealism as a Philosophy*, p. 74.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 313, 314.

THE TEST OF REASON

Such a position subordinates the values which, in our discussion of ethics, we have found to be highest, namely, persons and a community of persons. And likewise it subordinates that form of religious experience which has the greatest richness of meaning—communion with God in creative ethical living. Thus Absolute Idealism, though exalting the doctrine of the Whole, really fails in its synthetic task, so far as it finds wholeness through a scheme of abstract logical relation rather than through bringing into unity the basic principles of the chief forms of experience. Religion in its full nature is at once mystical, rational, æsthetic, and ethical, and its apprehension of God normally involves each of these forms of experience.

There are not wanting idealistic interpreters of religion, however, who are less committed to the Absolutist tradition, and who give more adequate recognition to the different aspects of religious experience. George Plimpton Adams, for example, writes thus of "the religious tradition":

We see illustrated throughout the contrast between participation and contemplation, feeling and idea, mysticism and rationalism. And yet, in spite of all this seeming diversity and conflict, both the motives of participation and of contemplation must be counted among the energies of religion and within the tradition of religion. . . . It is to be noted . . . that a third component in the life of religion, in all its higher forms, depends for its emergence and its existence upon this very tension between participation and contemplation, the immediate and the remote. I mean that which can only be called the knowledge of and devotion to the Good. This is that ethical and moral passion which claims its rightful place alongside of participation and contemplation within the religious tradition.¹²

Adams, it is true, is reluctant to accord intuition a distinctive place in the process of knowing; but his emphasis on the

¹² *Idealism and the Modern Age*, p. 59.

INTUITION AND REASON

importance for religion of a fusion of possession and contemplation, of mysticism and rationalism, really involves the acknowledgement that tested intuitions are vital to both religion and philosophy.

Hocking, likewise, although cherishing the doctrine that reality is an absolutely rational whole, yet combines mysticism with rationalism, and thus gains a more adequate interpretation of religion than the British absolute idealists. Through this fusion of mysticism with rationalism, religion for Hocking becomes creative, and the conception of the Absolute approximates to the God of theism. In consequence Hocking is able to grant to intuition a rôle which corresponds closely to its actual function in religion. "Intuition," he says, "should be regarded . . . not as a point of arrest, but as a bond *through which* veritable knowledge must pass, a node . . . a point of least mobility. But it is also more than that. It would be better to represent it as a vital node, a way of knowledge which concentrates conceptual knowing in itself rather than excluding it."¹³

Philosophical idealism, then, has its contribution to make to the theory of religious knowledge through its emphasis upon reason and its synthetic task. The most significant syntheses, indeed, often originate, as we have shown, in intuition, but all intuitions need to be tested and supplemented by reason. But if reason is truly to fulfil its synthetic function it must not be allowed to lead us into the rationalism to which Absolute Idealism has been prone, but must give to the intuitions of mysticism a structural place in its syntheses. Nor may we, in the name of reason, presuppose such a doctrine of the Whole as closes the door in advance to the conception of a dynamic universe, which pragmatism believes in. Nor, again, may we prejudge all the questions of cosmology by espousing, with idealism, a phenomenalistic doctrine of the objects in science; rather must we accept the

¹³ *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, Vol. XXIX, p. 447.

THE TEST OF REASON

verified results of science in a realistic spirit, and undertake the task of interpreting these results in relation to knowledge otherwise gained.

It is, indeed, certain writers of the realistic group who have most clearly recognized the intuitions and practical faiths of religion as sources of knowledge which make an indispensable contribution to philosophical synthesis. Mr. L. T. Hobhouse holds that philosophy requires a "synthesis of all methods" of knowing, and outlines, in addition to the abstract, analytical methods of science and logic, the more concrete methods of practice and imagination, and of faith—faith in reason itself, and faith in a moral order. And he writes:

No truth can be final or complete which is not in harmony with the whole of our nature so far as our nature is consistent with itself. It is on each and all of our impulses to think and believe that our knowledge logically rests. And of these none is before or after the other, none is greater or less than another. Only they must harmonize with one another. And that reality, and only that reality in which such a harmonious whole could find rest, is the only reality we can logically take as true. Feeling, imagination, emotion, the moral will, thought, all so far as self-consistent, claim a determining voice in the system of belief which we finally accept as the system of knowledge.¹⁴

Similarly, Professor W. P. Montague outlines six sources of knowing: "*testimony, intuition, reason, sense-perception, practice, and doubt,*" and argues for a "federation of the methods" which have been based upon them, on the ground that each way of knowing has an indispensable contribution to philosophical synthesis.¹⁵

We conclude, then, that intuition may not be set aside in favor of reason, as idealism on the whole has tended to do. Nor can reason be discarded in favor of intuition, as mys-

¹⁴ *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 620.

¹⁵ *Ways of Knowing*, p. 233.

INTUITION AND REASON

ticism so often has done. Rather must these two functions of the mind co-operate, if the fullest knowledge is to be gained. It is the primary rôle of intuition to discover truth, and it is the primary rôle of reason to test and establish truth. Most of all in the field of religion, which has to do with the fundamental problems of the relation between reality and value, is there need for an active union of intuition and reason. Where there is no fresh intuition of Divine Reality, religion ceases to be creative; and where intuition is withdrawn from the scrutiny of reason, religious experience and values become detached from those scientific, ethical, and social conditions upon which the realization of the fullest life depends. But where intuition and reason interpenetrate, those higher insights become possible which are needed for the guidance of religion, and of life as whole, in their further development.

But we must bring into relation with intuition and reason that element of moral faithfulness which we previously have found to be vital to religious knowledge. Religion, as we have said, is in its fully developed nature at once mystical, rational, æsthetic, and ethical, and each of these aspects of its nature enters into the gaining of religious knowledge. Intuitive apprehension, rational synthesis, imagination, and practical fidelity must all play their part in the knowledge of Divine Reality and of the way of life. And it is no less important that the truths gained by intuition and reflection should be lived out faithfully, if their meaning is to be fully apprehended, than that our practical efforts for the realization of truth should be revived by fresh intuition and imagination and criticized by reflection.

We have, then, verified the first of the two basic affirmations which were formulated at the conclusion of our discussion of Creative Religion, namely, that religion can make a genuine contribution to the knowledge of metaphysical

THE TEST OF REASON

reality. And at the same time we have brought out the essential aspects of the method to be employed in our metaphysical inquiry. We may characterize this method as that of *critical and creative synthesis*. This characterization of our method is simply meant to indicate such a synthesis or federation of the different ways of knowing as shall enable us to test the second of the basic affirmations which issued from our discussion of Creative Religion. That affirmation was that Goodness and Beauty reveal that which is deepest in cosmic reality. In examining this affirmation we shall come to grips with those aspects of the philosophical problems outlined at the beginning, which we have been obliged to defer until we took up the metaphysical questions reserved for the third part of our study. We must now go on to the issues between naturalism, pantheism, and theism, and to the questions—bound up with these issues—concerning the cosmic status of human personality and the achievability of spiritual values. For the answers which may be found to these issues and questions condition, in great measure, the creativity of religion and its power to contribute to the solution of the spiritual and social problems which press heavily upon our time.

PART THREE

RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND THEIR
RATIONAL GROUNDS

A. BELIEF IN GOD

B. MAN AND HIS IDEALS

C. A SPIRITUAL UNIVERSE

INTRODUCTORY

THERE are many reasons for holding ethical religion to be the greatest spiritual force in human history. Into it have been gathered insights and inspirations which are central for grasping the meaning of the universe and for the full unfolding of human life. Ethical religion has at its core the intuition that human personality, and that which is deepest in cosmic reality, are akin, and that this kinship consists in the vision and realization of value. Hence ethical religion fulfils itself through the union of love for God and love for man, as we see in the religion of Jesus. It brings mystical communion and ethical endeavor into fruitful relation with each other. Looking upon all men as potentially sons of God, it deepens the consciousness of the pathos of the actual lot of humanity and engenders a passion for human redemption. We see the ethical fruitage of Jesus' communion with God when we read that, beholding the multitudes "he was moved with compassion for them, because they were distressed and scattered, as sheep not having a shepherd"; and when we find him facing the crisis of his mission with the words, "The Son of Man also came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many." And we see how communion with God nourished his moral passion when we find him explaining his mission at the outset from the passage in Second Isaiah: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he anointed me to preach good tidings to the poor." Thus the ethical religion of the Hebrew prophets, as it was deepened and universalized by the spirit of Jesus, became a powerful leaven in human history in that it brought into vital unity communion with Divine Reality and the creation and conservation of the values of life.

THE GROUNDS FOR RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

But, as we have seen in an earlier chapter,¹ fully developed religion will not only nourish man's mystical nature and quicken his moral passion; it will also stimulate him to imaginative achievement and to philosophic thought. So it was with the ethical religion of Jesus. It brought forth, in the New Testament, a literature of supreme beauty, and it supplied the principles for a fresh integration of thought and experience. In these developments, as well as in its way of salvation and of life, ethical religion manifested its creative power and established the conditions for its enduring vitality.

It is with religious philosophy, as conditioning the creativity of ethical religion, that we are especially concerned now. The psychology, cosmology, and metaphysics through which ethical religion expressed its intellectual meaning in the first great Christian synthesis were largely the product of Greek thought. But this does not signify that matters of philosophic thought are extraneous to ethical religion. There was, in truth, a growing stream of ethical religion in Greek life. But the most important fact is that these forms of Greek thought were in large measure transmuted by the intuitions, valuations, and vital new experience which came from the religion of Jesus; while at the same time they were needed to bring out the meaning of that religion.² Just in so far, indeed, as ethical religion is animated by a spirit which should pervade all of life, will it always need a philosophy which shall interpret that spirit in relation to the universe in which men live.

✓ But man's conceptions of the universe have changed vastly since the synthesis of thought and life achieved by early Christianity was made. And these changed conceptions require that the philosophy which shall interpret the spirit of ethical religion be thought out afresh. Such a rethinking

¹ See Chap. VI.

² Cf. E. F. Scott, *The Gospel and Its Tributaries*, Chap. X.

THE RÔLE OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY

was effected in the mediæval synthesis, in which cosmic conceptions and religious faith were brought into vital unity. In a sense a corresponding synthesis—less complete and less widely shared, but no less far-reaching in its scope—came to pass in the period of the Enlightenment. And now in the twentieth century there is need for a new synthesis, the demand for which is heard on every hand. Doubtless no single generation will be able to fulfil this task, so vast are the bodies of knowledge and experience which require correlation, but it is in this direction that our thought must move.

But these changes do not signify that there is no continuity of life which needs to be understood and preserved. Nothing dries up the springs of spiritual life sooner than loss of historical perspective. Nor can the continuity be understood rightly as a mere matter of feeling and inarticulate life. In any significant development there is a continuity of thought, of principles and beliefs, which is of vital importance for the process as a whole. There is continuity in political thinking from Stoic conceptions of law, through Roman jurisprudence, to modern ideas of civic rights and duties. There is continuity of scientific thought from Democritus to Dalton and Planck. Similarly, there is continuity of a most vital sort in the principles and beliefs which express the meaning of ethical religion through the succeeding ages. It is the task of the present part of our study to examine these principles and beliefs in their more metaphysical aspects, and in the spirit of critical and creative synthesis.

As we undertake this task we should keep in mind some of the focal points in our previous study. We have found the field of religion to be that of the underlying relations between reality and value, and we have conceived the essence of religion to be an experience of kinship with the deepest reality in the universe and, consequently, an experience of membership in an infinitely meaningful world and of shar-

THE GROUNDS FOR RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

ing in an ever unfolding life. Our point of view throughout has been the quest of the conditions under which religion is able to function creatively in human life. Religion, we have said, is bound to undergo further development, and we should look to the philosophy of religion to bring guidance to that development, in order that religion may be brought to bear on our deepest human problems, and may fulfil its essentially prophetic function in relation to life as a whole.

We may group the principles and beliefs which have been bound up with ethical religion under the following general heads: *A. Belief in God; B. Man and His Ideals; C. A Spiritual Universe.* To what views, we have now to ask, does metaphysical inquiry lead us concerning these great themes of religious thought?

A. BELIEF IN GOD

X

NATURALISM. PANTHEISM. THE MEANING OF THEISM

THERE are three conceptions of the universe which press upon our attention when we take up the question whether belief in God is philosophically justified, namely, naturalism, pantheism, and theism.

Naturalism has appeared in many forms in the history of thought, but we here are concerned with that form of contemporary naturalism which seeks to maintain the values of ethical religion, so far as this can be done on naturalistic principles. This form of naturalism centres in the philosophy of Professor Dewey, and it has received its fullest development on its religious side by Professor E. S. Ames.¹

The term "naturalism" as applicable to these thinkers may be understood to mean that the sciences, physical and human, give us all that we know of reality and all that we need to know. These sciences, of course, are incomplete, but they are growing, and we are not justified in talking of any kinds or ranges of reality beyond their scope. Hence the objects of religion are the objects which science presents, and only these. Neither religion nor philosophy has any capacity of penetrating more deeply into reality, or of finding any other structure in the system of things as a whole, than do the sciences.

Thus we find Dewey affirming that neither morals nor religion can have any "direct revelatory worth." Religion

¹ Dewey's naturalism underlies the interpretations of religion by A. E. Haydon, cf. *The Quest of the Ages*; by M. C. Otto, cf. *Things and Ideals*; and by H. N. Wieman. Aspects of Professor Wieman's thought will be discussed in Chap. XV.

BELIEF IN GOD

should not have recourse to a "higher kind of knowledge, as intuition, immediate insight, mystical certainty of the truly real." That is to say, religious experience does not give evidence of the reality of its own objects. Nor can any process of reasoning justify for religion any objects other than those of physics, biology, and the social life of man. The objects that religion has believed in may be likened to "Helen of Troy" or "Hamlet of Denmark" in respect to their relation to reality. They are symbols of interests and processes in our biological-social life, and nothing more.²

Certain of Dewey's expressions concerning religion, it is true, might seem at first sight to transcend the limits of naturalism. While religion, to his thought, is primarily "a sense of community and one's place in it," it is also "a sense of the whole." Hence he writes:

The last word is not with obligation nor with the future. Infinite relationships of man with his fellows and with nature already exist. The ideal means . . . a sense of these encompassing continuities with their infinite reach. This meaning even now attaches to present activities because they are set in a whole to which they belong and which belongs to them. Even in the midst of the conflict, struggle and defeat a consciousness is possible of the enduring and comprehending whole.

And again:

Every act may carry within itself a consoling and supporting consciousness of the whole to which it belongs and which in some sense belongs to it.³

But "the whole," as used in these utterances, is to be understood in a naturalistic sense, as the following passage indicates:

Fidelity to the nature to which we belong, as parts how-

² *Experience and Nature*, first edition, p. 17.

³ *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 330, 331.

NATURALISM

ever weak, demands that we cherish our desires and ideals till we have converted them into intelligence, revised them in terms of the ways and means which nature makes possible. When we have used our thought to its utmost and have thrown into the moving unbalanced balance of things our puny strength, we know that though the universe slay us still we may trust, for our lot is one with whatever is good in existence.⁴

Here is a noble ethical and social idealism linked with a trust in the whole. But by "the whole" we should not understand anything more than the totality of the objects of the physical and human sciences, together with such continuities between them as these sciences may discover. In fact, so pluralistic is Dewey's thought⁵ that the use of the term "the whole" in his expressions concerning religion seems to rest rather upon optimistic feeling than upon anything structural to his philosophy. At all events, belief in God, in either the theistic or the pantheistic sense of the term, is not permissible on the basis of Dewey's naturalism.

But the implications for religion of Professor Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics have been given much fuller development by Professor Ames. "Radical empiricism," a title previously adopted by William James, is the name which Ames employs for his philosophy, but this does not mean that he shares the spiritualistic metaphysics of James. On the contrary, his thought seems to be consistently that of naturalism as expounded by Dewey. The true view, according to Ames, is "to regard science as the method of all possible knowledge."⁶ What we have to make sure of, in order to avoid onesidedness, is that the physical sciences be supplemented by the social sciences. The physical-science view of the world can be called "abstract" and "partial" by Ames, as by spiritualistic thinkers, but only because man with his purposes and ideals is to be conceived as a part of nature.⁷

⁴ *Experience and Nature*, p. 420.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Chap. II.

⁶ *Religion*, p. 74.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 59 ff., 169 ff.

BELIEF IN GOD

What Ames considers to be most important for the understanding of religion is that it be viewed naturalistically—that is, as a social process. To be sure, from this point of view the distinction between religion and morality is hard to make. "When," writes Ames, "both morals and religion are conceived in naturalistic ways the line of demarcation is not so clear as when morality is assigned to human reason and religion to the divine." The differences which he points out are two: "Religion emphasizes the wider perspectives in which all conduct lies"; and "religion employs ritual and symbols to dramatize and illuminate the meaning of life." But both the ritual and symbols and the wider perspectives remain within the naturalistic framework. For example, trust in the providence of God becomes "a certain commitment to the nature of the world."⁸

Naturalism, in the past, has sometimes been linked with pantheism, but never with theism. It is characteristic of the humanistic naturalism of Dewey and Ames that it excludes both. Since Ames, in contrast to Dewey, has much to say of the value of belief in God, it is important for the sake of clarity to note that his meaning in so doing is neither theistic nor pantheistic. Ames evidently sees no sufficient reason for believing that there is any Intelligent Will in the universe, higher than man's, with whom man stands in moral and spiritual relations, nor that there is any all-pervading impersonal Life. Hence he sets aside both beliefs, and uses the term "God" to mean the personification of our highest ideals and of the physical and social processes which realize them. "God is . . . the Spirit of a people, and in so far as there is a world of humanity, God is the Spirit of the world." His reality is of the same order as that of "Alma Mater and Uncle Sam."⁹ God is "idealized reality." He is the orderliness and beauty of physical nature, but he is not a purpose-

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 97-99.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 133, 176.

NATURALISM

ful Creative Mind bringing to pass orderliness and beauty in physical nature. He is intelligence and love so far as men show intelligence and love, but more than this we cannot say. "The world thinks, reasons, understands, in and through the rational beings which appear in it." "God is the world or life taken in certain of its aspects, in those aspects which are consonant with order, beauty, and expansion." We may, if we wish, say that God is personal, if we do not mean that there is a cosmic personal Spirit with whom we have to do, but only that the human parts of nature are personal. "Since man is a part of nature," Ames says, "nature is to that extent personal."¹⁰

Professor Ames maintains that there is a great gain in transferring the word "God" from the conception of a Cosmic Spirit of perfect righteousness and love to those processes in physical and human nature which are realizing ideals. This latter conception of the nature of God, he asserts, "involves no longer the old difficulty concerning his existence. His reality is as demonstrable as the world itself, indeed is given in the living experience of all socially minded people."¹¹ But what is it that so surely exists, according to Ames, as divine reality? Simply the fact that there is *some* love in the universe.

Love is present in animals and men and these belong to reality. It is manifest in lovers and families, in states and in world-societies, and these belong to the world and to the cosmos. Therefore reality, taken in its most inclusive and far-reaching significance, manifests love, and this empirical fact is the ground for the religious interpretation of reality as God. Any conception of the world without love is an inadequate and so far an empirically untrue representation of it. Even if love is regarded as merely the flickering flame of the candle, still it is there and its light and warmth may be more significant than any other factors.¹²

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 164

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 154-155.

BELIEF IN GOD

But the transition from the empirical fact that the order of nature contains some love to the conception of the friendliness of the universe, which Ames asserts we may make use of in our worship, is a very long one. "Reality," he says, "conceived as friendly, as furnishing support for man's existence and for the realization of ideal ends, is God."¹³

Now this transition from the observation that there is some love in the universe—namely, human love—to a rational conviction that the universe is "friendly" is the all-important step for religion. But Ames appears to offer no other basis for it than optimistic feeling. "Unless there is some degree of order," he writes, "it is impossible to set up ends and work for them; even the building of houses and the direction of the state would become illusory and self-defeating. But we do build houses and railroads and radio stations and empires and democracies." Unfortunately there are many thoughtful people today who do not find our present civilization to be a very satisfactory evidence of the rationality and friendliness of the universe. Ames, on his part, assumes that optimism is on the increase. By reason of the advancement of science and its application to human welfare "the sense of the friendliness of the world is increased for the masses of men, though pessimism is not without its prophets."¹⁴ But such an appeal to a trend toward optimism is slender ground for the affirmation that the universe is on the side of man's highest ideals.

There is, indeed, a too profound dilemma in modern life to permit the nourishing of a religious attitude toward the universe simply upon optimistic feeling. One horn of this dilemma is represented by our current emphasis on man's mastery over nature. Through scientific experiment, technique, and invention man has discovered how to exercise an

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 157-158

THE DILEMMA IN MODERN LIFE

extraordinary control over nature, and this control seems likely to continue to expand. Successes of this kind are frequently recounted, and one of the results has been the development of a kind of anthropocentric philosophy. For such a philosophy, with its emphasis on man's control over nature, there is no need for seeking to discover in the universe any spiritual reality greater than mankind. For this contemporary anthropocentric philosophy the thought of Dewey and of Ames affords classic expression.

But the other horn of the dilemma is presented by another emphasis which has characterized our modern life of late—especially since the Great War—namely, the emphasis on human insignificance. In this inconceivably vast universe of stars and galaxies, it is urged, human life can be regarded as nothing but a mere episode—"a rather sordid and disgraceful episode upon one of the minor planets." In other words, it is maintained that we should have a cosmocentric philosophy, not an anthropocentric one, and that from this point of view man's insignificance is patent. One of the consequences of such a philosophy, however, is the tendency to affirm the impotence of spiritual ideals and values. A professor of English literature has called attention recently to the extent to which human frustration is the theme of contemporary literature, pointing for evidence to the writings of Eugene O'Neill, Sinclair Lewis, Theodore Dreiser, and others. Such a tendency in literature has its ultimate background in the conception that this is a universe of blind forces.

A striking expression of the conviction that man's spiritual frustration is grounded in the nature of things is given in the recent volume by Joseph Wood Krutch, entitled *The Modern Temper*. Mr. Krutch writes of "the inevitable realization that living is a merely physiological process with only a physiological meaning, and that it is most satisfactorily conducted by creatures who never feel the need to give it

BELIEF IN GOD

any other.”¹⁵ He points to “those more fundamental maladjustments that subsist, not between man and society, but between the human spirit and the natural universe.”¹⁶ In the following passage he characterizes these maladjustments between nature and man:

Nature's purpose, if purpose she can be said to have, is no purpose of his and is not understandable in his terms. Her desire merely to live and to propagate in innumerable forms, her ruthless indifference to his values, and the blindness of her irresistible will strike terror to his soul, and he comes in the fulness of his experience to realize that the ends which he proposes to himself—happiness and order and reason—are ends which he must achieve, if he achieve them at all, in her despite. Formerly he had believed in even his darkest moments that the universe was rational if he could only grasp its rationality, but gradually he comes to suspect that rationality is an attribute of himself alone and that there is no reason to suppose that his own life has any more meaning than the life of the humblest insect that crawls from one annihilation to another. Nature, in her blind thirst for life, has filled every possible cranny of the rotting earth with some sort of fantastic creature, and among these man is but one—perhaps the most miserable of all, because he is the only one in whom the instinct of life falters long enough to enable it to ask the question “Why?”¹⁷

Hence Krutch finds that we must take a view “very different from that scientific optimism which, though it is being widely popularized at the present moment, really belongs to nineteenth century thought.”¹⁸ “This world in which an unresolvable discord is the fundamental fact,” he says, “is the world in which we must continue to live, and for us wisdom must consist, not in searching for means of escape which do not exist, but in making such peace with it as we may.” “If we no longer believe in either our infinite capacities or our importance to the universe, we know at least that

¹⁵ P. 235.

¹⁶ P. 242.

¹⁷ Pp. 8, 9.

¹⁸ P. xvi.

THE DILEMMA IN MODERN LIFE

we have discovered the trick which has been played upon us and that whatever else we may be we are no longer dupes." "Ours is a lost cause and there is no place for us in the natural universe, but we are not, for all that, sorry to be human. We should rather die as men than live as animals."¹⁹

Now it at least seems clear that a cosmocentric philosophy has too strong a claim upon our thought to be set aside simply by offering an anthropocentric philosophy in its stead. Nor can the pessimistic conclusions stated above be met by alleging that they are determined by the temperament of the author and that an optimistic view of the world is the "normal" one. But, as we have seen, naturalistic humanism, affirming the fact that some ideal ends have proven attainable and that some love prevails among men, rests the conception of "an enduring and comprehending whole" and the "friendliness of the universe" simply on optimistic feeling. More than this, indeed, cannot be expected of a "derivative philosophy" such as Dewey offers,²⁰ and with which Ames's "radical empiricism" seems to be at one. Such philosophy does not seek any structural character whatever in the universe as a whole. Thus its very point of view and method of procedure preclude the finding of any spiritual reality greater than that which appears in mankind, or the attaining of any genuine synthesis between ideal values and cosmic reality.

Naturalism, even when it zealously seeks to unite itself with humanism, fails in the synthetic task which philosophy aspires to perform. Humanistic naturalism proves to be in a position of very unstable equilibrium, oscillating between anthropocentric and the cosmocentric view of things. Hence

¹⁹ Pp. 247-49.

²⁰ *Experience and Nature*, Chap. I. By a "denotative" philosophy Professor Dewey means a philosophy which considers the reality denoted by the descriptive terms of common sense and of science to be the sum-total of reality. In other words, these terms do not connote a reality deeper or more nearly ultimate than that dealt with by common sense and science.

BELIEF IN GOD

we must go on to consider whether a theocentric view may not discover a unity in things which is hidden from humanistic naturalism.

Pantheism. A theocentric view of the universe always means something more than a personification of natural processes, even though one restricts the personification to processes which result in good. There is, moreover, no valid reason for such a restriction. Personification is just as applicable to processes which result in evil as to the processes which result in good. If a personal God is only a personification of natural processes, then a personal devil has the same reality as God has. One may still hold that the processes personified as God are greater than the processes personified as Satan, but the same kind of reality belongs to both. A theocentric view of the universe, however, means that a Cosmic Divine Life gives the universe its basic character and trend.

But the Cosmic Divine Life may be conceived pantheistically or theistically, and the contrast between these two conceptions is of much moment when one is considering the further development of religion. The theistic conception is the one that is fully congruous with ethical religion, but the pantheistic conception is often regarded as more valid metaphysically, if not more satisfying religiously.²¹

Pantheism is the conception that the basic reality of the universe is an all-pervading impersonal Divine Life. The conception is applicable to any form of mystical monism, whether cosmic or acosmic. Hindu doctrines of the All-One, according to which the order of nature is an illusion, are commonly called pantheistic, as well as Western doctrines which conceive nature to be indubitably real and at the same time to be filled everywhere by a single Divine Life—a Life impersonal but worshipful. Since, however, our previous study has led us not only to a social realism, but also to a

²¹ Cf. J. H. Leuba, *A Psychological Study of Religion*, pp. 290-91.

PANTHEISM

recognition that there is real individuality in both organic and inorganic nature,²² we need consider here only the cosmic form of pantheism.

Pantheism in its cosmic form affords much which nourishes the æsthetic and mystical sides of the religious consciousness. It conceives the sublime, awe-inspiring aspects of nature to be revelations of the mysterious Infinite Life to which the human soul also belongs, so that in man's worshipful responses to them he is realizing a oneness which is forever there. And it conceives nature's darker and more forbidding aspects to be only phases of the infinite Whole, which is essentially unified and at harmony with itself. Emerson's thought fluctuates between pantheistic and theistic modes of expression, but many passages in his writing are classic utterances of the pantheistic religious consciousness:

"The Supreme Critic on all the errors of the past and the present, and the only prophet of that which must be, is that great nature in which we rest as the earth lies in the soft arms of the atmosphere; that Unity, that Over-Soul, within which every man's particular being is contained and made one with all other. . . . We live in succession, in division, in parts, in particles. Meantime within man is the soul of the whole; the wise silence; the universal beauty, to which every part and particle is equally related; the eternal One."

"In youth we are mad for persons. Childhood and youth see all the world in them. But the larger experience of man discovers the identical nature appearing through them all. Persons themselves acquaint us with the impersonal. In all conversation between two persons tacit reference is made, as to a third party, to a common nature. That third party or common nature is not social; it is impersonal; is God."

"Ineffable is the union of man and God in every act of the soul. The simplest person who in his integrity worships God, becomes God; yet for ever and ever the influx of this better and universal self is new and unsearchable. Ever it inspires awe and astonishment."²³

²² Chap. VII.

²³ *Essays*, 1st series, "The Over-Soul."

An expression of pantheistic religious feeling which is closer to the realistic tendencies of our day, in that it does not ignore the sterner, harsher phases of Nature, is to be found in John Burroughs's *Accepting the Universe*: Concerning God Burroughs writes:

His the fact of the fact,²⁴ the life of the life, the soul of the soul, the incomprehensible, the sum of all contradictions, the unity of all diversity. . . . He is not a being, yet apart from him there is no being—there is no apart from Him.²⁴

But the pantheism which is most widely influential in our day is overwhelmingly optimistic, as may be seen in the writings of New Thought, the Unity movement, and Christian Science.²⁵ As examples a few passages may be cited from prominent New Thought writers. In Ralph Waldo Trine's book, *In Tune with the Infinite*, the dominant idea is set forth as follows:

"The central fact of the universe is that Spirit of Infinite Life that is back of all, that animates all, that manifests itself in and through all; that self-existent principle of life from which all has come and . . . from which all is continually coming." "This Spirit of Infinite Life and Power that is back of all I call God. I care not what term you may use, be it Kindly Light, Providence, the Over-Soul, Omnipotence, or whatever term may be most convenient." "The great central fact in human life . . . is the coming into a conscious vital realization of our oneness with the Infinite Life, and the opening of ourselves fully to this divine inflow."²⁶

The author's development of this theme shows that, in thus

²⁴ P. 15.

²⁵ Mrs. Eddy, in the chapter entitled "Science, Theology, Medicine," in *Science and Health*, undertook to distinguish her teaching from pantheism. This she did because she considered pantheism to be more or less tainted with the idea of "matter"; the non-existence of which it was her gospel to affirm. But her basic conception that the Divine Spirit is the one universal substance, and the impersonal character and rôle which this Spirit has in her thought, show that her teaching is one form of pantheism.

²⁶ Cf. pp. 11, 12, 16.

PANTHEISM

interpreting God as an infinite reservoir of life surrounding us, to which we need simply to open the gates, he is wishing primarily to stress the importance of optimism, cheer, the feeling of vigor, and similar mental states as the sufficient means for producing health and the harmonious functioning of life.

A similar theme is prominent in the writing of Horatio W. Dresser. It is true that this writer's conception of God is not uniformly pantheistic but, like Emerson's, hovers between the pantheistic and the personal form. But his more characteristic thought takes the form of optimistic pantheism. In his little book, *Living by the Spirit*, he writes:

"Half our aches and pains are due to our opposition to Nature's remedial power. The other half are due to excess, fear, and nervousness." "What profits all this despondence, fear, anxiety, condemnation, and complaint? Ask what Nature is trying to do, how she is setting about to accomplish it, and what she is likely to encounter ere her ideal is realized. Settle yourself into an easy, peaceful adjustment to the creative rhythm, the march of events, the flow of time." "Life is just this passing experience, as we awaken each day, look out at the trees and sky, and earn our daily bread. Never mind now the fact that it is difficult for many to earn their daily bread. Life is a passing panorama which sweeps by us whether we are rich or poor. In the general sense in which we are considering it, it is independent of particular struggles, of either favorable or unfavorable conditions." "From the practical point of view the Spirit should therefore be regarded as we consider the air we breathe; that is, as immediately surrounding the soul and, like the atmosphere, adequate to meet all our demands." "He may not concern himself with our thoughts or know them as we regard them; but they are, in reality, activities within his total life, in the same way that the least and the greatest manifestations of physical force are encompassed by the Spirit."²⁷

In the foregoing examples we can see not only how

²⁷ Cf. pp. 3, 43, 71, 72.

BELIEF IN GOD

pantheism is adapted to give sustenance to certain forms of æsthetic and mystical experience, but also how it may be employed as a gospel of salvation—salvation, that is, from states of over-strain, anxiety, depression, and fear. Its way of salvation is the way of realization—of accepting the truth that we are one in nature with the Infinite Life of the universe and that our great need is to make this oneness real to ourselves in conscious experience.

But we are concerned now, not so much with the functions of pantheism in religious experience, as with its claim to metaphysical validity. Does the theocentric view of things which pantheism presents afford us the needed philosophical synthesis between ideal values and cosmic reality which naturalism is unable to achieve?

Pantheism suffers from the serious limitation that it effects a synthesis between ideal values and cosmic reality by the means of identifying them. The consequences of this method of identification are either that ideal values are subordinated to a worshipful attitude toward the processes of existence as a whole, or that portions of the existent facts and processes are ignored in the interest of finding the entire scheme of things good and worshipful. The latter consequence is illustrated by the ignoring of palpable physical ills and of the science of medicine by Christian Science; the former consequence appears in some of the utterances of lovers of nature like Burroughs.²⁸ In either case the tendency is for the pantheistic doctrine of unity to blur ethical distinctions. The normal effect of pantheism is either the ignoring of evil or the treatment of it as somehow good.

Another limitation of pantheism, closely linked with the foregoing one, is that it discounts human freedom, merges human personality in the All-One, as a wave must be conceived as merging in the ocean, and in general deprives individuality of genuinely metaphysical significance. "Indi-

²⁸ *Accepting the Universe*, Chap. I.

PANTHEISM

vidual things," says Spinoza, "are nothing but modifications of the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a fixed and definite manner"²⁹ Moreover, "nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and to operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature."³⁰ From this point of view human personality in its individual character is a transient phase of the infinite time process. "The mind," says Spinoza, "can only imagine anything, or remember what is past, while the body endures."³¹ Whereas, if the human mind be considered *sub specie æternitatis*, it is like a single word in the book of God's thought: "Our mind, in so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to infinity; so that all taken together at once constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God."³²

Thus pantheism is dominated by a sense of the unity of all things which is so strong that it merges finite individuality completely into the system of things as a whole. This all-engulfing monism is assumed *a priori* by pantheistic thinkers, or taken to be the necessary verdict of science, rather than something established by reasoning from experience. With the monism which is its controlling principle pantheism blends religious feeling of the mystical type, so that its result for human living, when it is consistent with itself, is the disinterested love of nature, which Spinoza calls the "intellectual love of God." The graver evils of nature are met, in part, by the conception that the Cosmic Divine Life is impersonal, which renders it unnecessary to regard these evils as designed in some inscrutable way for man's good, as theism so often has taught; and in part they are inwardly transcended because for pantheism the moral

²⁹ *Ethics*, Pt. I, Prop. xxv.

³¹ *Ibid.*, Pt. V, Prop. xxi.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Pt. I, Prop. xxix.

³² *Ibid.*, Pt. V, Prop. xl, Note.

BELIEF IN GOD

passion for the development of personality is subordinated to the mystical satisfaction of absorption in God.

But a monism which overrides the facts of individuality, denying them any genuine metaphysical significance, and which assumes the principle of universal necessity—thereby ruling out human freedom in advance—cannot be regarded as a true synthesis of the world of our experience. And the more we find ourselves bound to think of man as in some real sense a part of nature—the truth for which naturalism stands—the more we find that a disinterested love of nature is incompatible with a disinterested love of man. For if man is a part of nature, human injustice is also in some sense a part of nature. And then the disinterested love of nature becomes acquiescence in human injustice—as being involved in the universal necessity of things.

Pantheism, then, while it arrives at the objective reality of a Cosmic Divine Life, which naturalism with its personifications cannot reach, does not present us with a true synthesis between cosmic reality and ideal values. Accordingly we must go on to consider whether such a synthesis can be achieved through the theistic form of belief in God. It is theism which has proven to be the form of thought and belief most congenial to ethical religion. And ethical religion, as we have seen, has been characterized by its union of communion with Divine Reality and the creation and conservation of the values of life. But how is theism to be regarded from the standpoint of metaphysical validity?

The Meaning of Theism. As a preliminary to our inquiry into the metaphysical validity of theism we need some consideration of its meaning. Broadly speaking, theism may be defined by its contrast with pantheism, which we have just been examining, and with deism. Hence a definition of deism will help us in defining theism.

✓ Deism is one of the products of the period of the Enlight-

THE MEANING OF THEISM

enment. As an historical movement it contained widely varying views, which, however, tended to converge toward a characteristic philosophical position. The mechanical conception of the astronomical universe had been established by Newton's *Principia*, published in 1687. The effect of this conception on religious thought was greatly to exalt the idea of the majesty of God as the author of a universe so vast and orderly. But the notions of miracles and of special providences seemed incompatible with the universal mechanism; and, in general, God came to seem much less accessible to man. At the same time the conception of "natural religion" began to rival revealed religion, just as the doctrine of "natural rights" had been set over against the notion of the divine right of kings and governments. Among other things the advocates of natural religion criticized the supernatural features of traditional religion and the elements of earlier and inadequate ethics which had survived in it. Deism thus held that God was the creator of the universe and its laws and the upholder of pure morality through his divine sanctions, and that the chief worship of him was through moral living. In contrast to pantheism, then, deism conceives of God as personal and transcendent and exalts ethical distinctions to the highest place. But it tends to make religion as such a mere appendix to morality, and it is too rationalistic to make room for mysticism. Moreover, its conception of God removes him so far from the life of men that he becomes what has been called "an absentee deity."

Theism shares with the cosmic form of pantheism the conception of the immanence of God in physical nature and in humanity, and the conviction that human life and the Divine Life stand in intimate relation to each other. Thus theism gives worship a much more significant and vital place in religion than was true of deism. But at the same time theism finds a need for conceiving God as transcendent as well as immanent. It cannot identify God with Nature, be-

BELIEF IN GOD

cause it conceives God to be characterized by a will and a purpose which transcend the phenomena of Nature and are supremely good. It reacts against the tendency of pantheism to subordinate ethical distinctions and values, and shares with deism the conviction that they should be central in our interpretation of Divine Reality and of human destiny. Hence personality is for theism a controlling conception. Human personality is not thought of by theism as destined to be completely merged in God, but as reaching fulfilment through becoming a significant participator in the life and work of God. And it is from the idea of personality that the theist gains his most adequate conception of God, because he conceives personality to be the necessary bearer of wisdom, purpose, and love.

The development of theism in the modern period has been aided by the great growth in the nineteenth century of the historical point of view and method, and of the conception of biological evolution. These movements of thought have tended to make the conceptions of organism and of continuity in growth seem more adequate than the conceptions of mechanism and of quantitative mechanical change. In the last two or three decades, however, mechanical conceptions have been again reinforced by the successes of mechanical invention and by the fact that the machine bulks so large in our civilization. Hence tension between the concept of mechanism and the concept of organism furnishes one of the underlying intellectual problems of our time, and one which has an important bearing on the problem of theism.

On the religious side the development of theism has been nourished by a renewed realization of the place of ethical values in essential Christianity. It is being increasingly appreciated that the uniqueness of Jesus and of the Gospels consists largely in a vital union of the religious and the ethical aspects of life. And as between theism and pantheism, those who are acutely alive to the great social questions of

THE MEANING OF THEISM

our day are apt to find an incongruity between devotion to social causes and the pantheistic way of thinking.

Many shades of meaning, however, are bound to occur in any conception which finds expression in different periods and through different thinkers; and sometimes these shades of meaning have much importance from the standpoint of spiritual adequacy or intellectual convincingness. To avoid oversimplifying the meaning of theism it may be well to indicate certain of its types.

In the *Platonic type* of theism God is conceived of as transcendent, and as perfect, and as the cause of the whole existing cosmos. In this type mechanism in the cosmos is everywhere subordinate to teleology, because the Good is the supreme principle in God and is determining in all his activity. The significance of human personality in this type is expressed by the belief in the kinship of man in his spiritual nature to God, and by the belief in immortality. The distinguishing characteristic of the Platonic type of theism is the doctrine of Ideas, Forms, or patterns of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, which belong to a super-temporal realm of being and are the objects of contemplation for God in all his creative activity. Modern realists, so far as they are also theists, are likely to hold the Platonic doctrine of Ideas. They maintain that the ultimate norms of truth and value are "subsistents," however little or much they may have found expression among the "existents" of the world of time.

The *Neo-Platonic type* of theism is more monistic than the Platonic type. The Ideas of the Platonic doctrine—the "subsistents" of the modern realists—have being for this type solely as thoughts in the mind of God. Thus God is conceived to be the ground not only of all actuality but of ✓ all possibility. God is the One, identical with goodness, from whom all being flows. Although this type of thought is so strongly monistic, it does not reduce the cosmos to unreality,

BELIEF IN GOD

as is the case with acosmic pantheism. Instead, the cosmos has reality because it expresses in varying degrees the nature of the One. And while God is so transcendent that he cannot be said to be in the world, the being of the world is included in the being of God. This teaching is represented in the modern period by Krause's panentheism (not "God in all" but "all in God"). The transcendence of the One and its identification with goodness place the Neo-Platonic type of thought in the sphere of theism. But its extreme monism tends to subordinate some of theism's characteristic ideas. The significance of human personality is ambiguous in this type, and mystical experience is given a supremacy which often obscures ethical values. This was true of Plotinus, the fountain-head of Neo-Platonism. Later representatives of this way of thinking preserve more fully the traits of theism.

✓ In America Jonathan Edwards developed a Neo-Platonism, in that he thought of the universe as an emanation of the infinite fulness of God, without subordinating personal and ethical values.⁸⁸ A similar intent animates the contemporary expression of Neo-Platonism to be found in the thought of Dean Inge.

✓ *Ethical theism*, broadly speaking, is the under-current of religious thinking from the ethical monotheism of the Hebrew prophets to present-day Christianity. But as a special type it dates from Kant and received its most characteristic development from the Ritschlians. Kant limited the theoretical reason—by which we gain our scientific knowledge of Nature—to the phenomenal aspect of reality, and gave the

✓ primacy to the practical reason. The effect of this teaching on religion was to subordinate the cosmical interest to the ethical interest. Kant set aside the traditional arguments for

✓ the existence of God as inconclusive; and he treated reasoning from the natural cosmos to God as irrelevant, because

⁸⁸ Cf. A. C. McGiffert, art. "Immanence" in Hastings, *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

THE MEANING OF THEISM

the natural cosmos belongs to the realm of phenomena and God does not. Ethical theism, to be sure, has its world-view. The cosmos as a whole is affirmed to have its origin in God and to be subject to his will; and freedom and a spiritual destiny are affirmed for man. But these affirmations have their basis precisely in the primacy of the practical reason. It is on the unconditional authoritativeness of the moral law that Kant bases his postulates of God, Freedom, and Immortality. The Ritschlians added to the Kantian teaching a spiritual interpretation of history. But this in turn was based exclusively on the religious experience which comes from the revelation of God in Christ. The early Ritschlians, at least, were not interested in the conception of evolution as having a constructive meaning for religious thought, nor in the idea of divine immanence. Their main teaching in this regard was that the Christian experience of God enables one to realize moral freedom and "mastery over nature." This fact should not be taken to mean that the ideas of evolution and of divine immanence are incompatible with ethical theism. It only means that the Ritschlians did not make use of them, because their interests were predominantly ethical, and because they had reacted from the Hegelian philosophy and taken as their watch-word, "back to Kant." In ethical theism the dominant traits of theism are clearly maintained. God is conceived as personal; ethical values are supreme; human personality has unique worth and an eternal destiny; and the theory of physical nature is definitely subordinated to these teachings.

We also should take account of *pluralistic theism* as a special type. This type shares with the foregoing the personal conception of God and the uniqueness of ethical values. Human personality, too, is unique and truly individual, and not merely the product of physical or biological processes. But some of its representatives are uncertain in their affirmation of human immortality. The most specific point of con-

BELIEF IN GOD

trast between this and the foregoing type has to do with the extent to which pluralism is carried. Ethical theism maintains that degree of monism implied in ethical monotheism. It accords to finite persons real individuality and capacity for freedom, but it finds God to be the ultimate ground of all things. Pluralism accepts an indefinite variety of forms of ultimate reality. But pluralistic theism also finds in the totality of things "a Power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness." William James is doubtless the best representative of this position. His view was that God "has an environment," as man has, which he is seeking to subdue to his thought and will. The pluralistic theist, accordingly, stresses the idea that God is finite and tends to conceive him as struggling and growing. The problem for this type of theism arises from the indefiniteness of its pluralism. For God may be conceived as being finite to such an extent that purely physical forces become the paramount reality, or that his ethical nature becomes impaired.⁸⁴

In general, theism may be defined as the view that God, whose being is inherently characterized by Goodness, Truth, and Beauty, is the ultimate ground of all things and is expressing his nature through bringing finite spirits into being and through bringing them into vital fellowship with each other and with himself. As we have seen, however, different types of theism tend to stress some of the implications of this conception and to subordinate, or even to sacrifice, other implications. This comes about because theism is an effort to synthesize fundamental aspects of experience which often present themselves in sharply contrasted fashion. But its dominant tendency will be stressed if we understand theism as centring in the belief in God as a Cosmic Moral Will. Thus theism stands in contrast to naturalism, which would

⁸⁴ Some of the foregoing types are more fully characterized in A. E. Taylor's valuable article, "Theism," in Hastings, *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

THE MEANING OF THEISM

replace the idea of God with the idea of Nature, or would retain the idea of God only as a personification of such natural tendencies as result in good. And it stands in contrast also to pantheism, which finds the basic reality to be an all-pervading impersonal Divine Life. For from this point of view the significance of human personality and the idea of purpose in man and God become submerged, and ethical distinctions become blurred.

We must now go on to consider whether or not theism can achieve a more adequate synthesis of experience than can be attained by either naturalism or pantheism, and whether, accordingly, the belief in God which is vital to ethical religion rests upon rational grounds.

A. BELIEF IN GOD

(continued)

XI

THE NEW COSMOLOGY AND THEISM

WE are living in an era when a new cosmology is taking shape. This is a fact which is bound to have a far-reaching effect upon the belief in God. For many of the problems concerning belief in God have had their origin in the older cosmology. Hence, as this is replaced by a new cosmology, the problems concerning belief in God will be altered correspondingly. Any great conception of God must find expression in relation to the chief areas of human experience. The thought of God which is to have significance for vital religious experience must have to do with such themes as God and Man, God and the Ideal Order, God and Human Destiny; and with these is inevitably interwoven the theme, God and the World.

It is, indeed, often objected that belief in God should not be concerned with theories of the universe. Such theories, it is urged, involve difficult matters of scientific learning and speculative thought; whereas belief in God should be something to live by, and should be available for all, whatever their intellectual training, or lack of it, may be.

✓ So far as this objection means that vital practical religion has a rightful primacy over intellectual interpretations, and that the urgent spiritual needs of men cannot always wait for the elaboration of intellectual theories about the cosmos, it should be assented to at once. But if the objection means that religion in its full development, and in its effort to minister to all the basic needs of men, can still dispense with

GOD A COSMIC BEING

an interpretation of the cosmos in which we live, it should be resisted for the sake of religion itself. Religion in its higher developments always contains, at least implicitly, a view of the cosmos as an essential part of its meaning. This is certainly true of ethical religion. The ethical monotheism of Second Isaiah holds God to be "the creator of the ends of the earth." Jesus' interpretation of human life is that of a filial relation to a Heavenly Father, whose nature is one of infinite wisdom and love, and in whose hands are all things. Paul's thought of God, expressed in such language as "Of him, and through him, and unto him, are all things," is plainly cosmic in its scope. And all down through the centuries Christianity has interpreted the cosmos in the light of its conception of God. Similarly all great religions contain, in some form or other, a view of the world. Even the acosmism of certain forms of Indian religion is one of religion's answers to the cosmic question.

But it may still be urged that, although God should be believed to be supreme in the cosmos, yet faith in him should be *grounded* simply in moral and religious experience. Such, as we have noted, has been the procedure of the form of ethical theism developed by Kant and the Ritschlians. Likewise Doctor A. C. McGiffert, writing upon "Immanence,"¹ speaks of the "two disparate interests"—the cosmical interest and the ethical and religious interest—thereby suggesting that cosmology need not be a vital concern of theology nor of the philosophy of religion.

There are, however, two considerations that should be weighed at this point. First, the idea that theism could be based on moral and religious experience alone was bound up with the Kantian doctrine of phenomenalism. If all our scientific knowledge of things in space and time is to be regarded as giving us phenomena only, rather than things as they are in themselves, then ethics and religion are left free

¹ In Hastings, *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

THE NEW COSMOLOGY

to make such postulates about the metaphysical realm as their principles may require. But as science has extended its analyses and its system of laws, and its power to predict and control events, it has become increasingly difficult to think that it is dealing with phenomena only, and realism has tended to replace phenomenalism. But if scientific cosmology is giving us an account of things as they are—an account that is true as far as it goes, even though it be a partial account—then we are bound to consider in what relation this cosmology stands to our idea of God, if we are to conceive God as a cosmic being at all.

The second consideration is that the dilemma in modern life to which attention was drawn in the preceding chapter is concerned with the question whether the natural order of which we are a part is not alien to the higher spiritual life and ideals of man. From this point of view our theories of the cosmos do have a vital bearing upon theism, and upon the practical meaning of religion. And, on the other hand, if we find religious significance in the thought of God as immanent in the cosmos, we should expect to discover some positive relation between that thought and cosmological theory.

It is, then, of much moment for theism that we have come to a turn in the road in the scientific view of the universe, and that a new cosmology is arising. But before seeking to ascertain some of the significant traits of the new cosmology, we shall do well to recall the general character of the cosmology which has been dominant since the breakdown of scholasticism.

Professor E. A. Burtt, in *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science*,² writes:

The claim of absolute and irrefutable demonstration in Newton's name had swept over Europe, and almost everybody had succumbed to its authoritative sway. Wherever was

² See p. 299.

MECHANISTIC VIEW CRITICIZED

taught as truth the universal formula of gravitation, there was also insinuated as a nimbus of surrounding belief that man is but the puny and local spectator, nay irrelevant product of an infinite self-moving engine, which existed eternally before him and will be eternally after him, enshrining the rigor of mathematical relationships while banishing into impotence all ideal imaginations; an engine which consisted of raw masses wandering to no purpose in an undiscoverable time and space, and is in general wholly devoid of any qualities that might spell satisfaction for the major interests of human nature, save solely the central aim of the mathematical physicist.³

A similar characterization of the older cosmology is given by Professor Whitehead. Writing of the period in which modern science has been developing he says:

There persists throughout the whole period the fixed scientific cosmology which presupposes the ultimate fact of an irreducible brute matter, or material, spread throughout space in a flux of configurations. In itself such material is senseless, valueless, purposeless. It just does what it does do, following a fixed routine imposed by external relations which do not spring from the nature of its being. It is this assumption that I call "scientific materialism." Also it is an assumption which I shall challenge as being entirely unsuited to the scientific situation at which we have now arrived.⁴

The authority which this mechanical view of existence has had until very recent times is indicated by the fact that Professor Santayana could write in 1905: "Any one who can at all catch the drift of experience—moral no less than physical—must feel that mechanism rules the whole world."⁵ Hence it is not strange that the mechanistic doctrine has spread its influence throughout all the fields of science, and that it tends to persist today in many of these fields even though it is

³ Professor Burt's whole study undertakes to show that this world-picture, and the claim that it is demonstrated, are untenable.

⁴ Cf. *Science and the Modern World*, pp. 24-25.

⁵ *Reason in Science*, p. 76.

THE NEW COSMOLOGY

being rejected in physics and astronomy. It is in the interest of the sciences themselves, as well as of philosophy, that they should be freed from the mechanistic dogma. Professor Whitehead has remarked: "The progress of biology and psychology has probably been checked by the uncritical acceptance of half-truths." Hence he insists that science "must become philosophical and must enter upon a thorough criticism of its own foundations."

But why has the older cosmology proved insufficient? The fact of its insufficiency is freely affirmed by the foremost interpreters of physical theory. Thus R. A. Millikan tells us that "the childish mechanical conceptions of the nineteenth century are now grotesquely inadequate."⁶ And Whitehead describes the situation as follows:

The progress of science has now reached a turning point. The stable foundations of physics have broken up: also for the first time physiology is asserting itself as an effective body of knowledge, as distinct from a scrap-heap. The old foundations of scientific thought are becoming unintelligible. Time, space, matter, material, ether, electricity, mechanism, organism, configuration, structure, pattern, function, all require reinterpretation. What is the sense of talking about a mechanical explanation when you do not know what you mean by mechanics?⁷

As to the reason for the insufficiency of the older cosmology, Millikan, Whitehead, and Eddington point to relativity and the quantum theory as the really revolutionary theories, and of these it is the quantum theory which is much more far-reaching in its effects.

Let us first consider the theory of relativity in its bearing on our subject.

⁶ *Evolution in Science and Religion*, p. 27.

⁷ *Science and the Modern World*, p. 23. Millikan mentions eight steps, beginning with the discovery of X-rays in 1895, and including the theory of electrons, the discovery of radio-activity, and the finding of the principle of the conservation of matter to be invalid. But these earlier discoveries did not definitely overthrow the older conceptions of physics. (*Op. cit.*, Chap. I.)

MECHANISTIC VIEW CRITICIZED

Of this theory in its mathematical intricacy no layman in such matters can undertake to speak, and its effects upon cosmology will be long in working themselves out. Nevertheless, if we take note of some of the points where the theory breaks with the old world-picture, we may be able to discern some of the features of the new world-picture which is taking shape. One of the points where the older cosmology has proved to be insufficient has to do with the ideas of space and time. Newtonian mechanics presupposed the ideas of absolute space and absolute time. The theory of relativity finds these ideas untenable, and substitutes for them the idea of space-time. One meaning of this idea is that time is a fourth dimension of all objects of the physical world, which is as essential to their being what they are as the three dimensions of space are supposed to be.

From the older point of view one should be able to conceive the processes of the universe stopped, as one might stop a clock, at a given moment of time. There would then be a perfectly definite distribution of all the elements of the universe, just as there would be a perfectly definite arrangement of the works of the clock. And if one could know this arrangement of elements adequately, one could foretell infallibly all that would take place in the universe at the next moment of time. But the theory of relativity rejects this way of conceiving the physical world and teaches us that the ultimate units of the world, whatever they may be, must be thought of as "events" and not as tiny particles whose most essential characteristic is their location in absolute space, like dots on a map. Likewise, say the relativists, when we are dealing with things from the spatial point of view, we are asked to remember that our "frames of space" are relative to our situation on this planet, and that an observer on one of the stars would inevitably have another frame of space. As to which frame of space is the right one there is no way of deciding. In fact, the notion of the "right" frame of space

THE NEW COSMOLOGY

should be discarded altogether.⁸ Hence motion and rest are relative only.

The empirical evidence on which the theory of relativity rests consists chiefly of three sets of experimental and observational data. First, the theory is in harmony with the results of the famous Michelson-Morley experiment, which were inexplicable on the basis of the Newtonian mechanics. That experiment was designed to detect the motion of the earth through the ether, and it was accurate and delicate enough to show such motion if there were any, but it showed none. On Newtonian principles such a motion must exist, but according to Einstein's theory the idea of such a motion stands for no reality. Second, Einstein's theory enabled him to make a prediction which subsequent observation verified. Einstein predicted that rays of light passing through a strong gravitational field would be deflected from their course a certain amount by gravitation. This should not happen according to Newtonian principles. Nevertheless it was found to take place in the case of rays of light passing close to the sun from certain stars, the fact being shown by photographs of those stars taken at times of the sun's total eclipse. Third, the theory of relativity explains certain irregularities in the orbit of Mercury which previously had been inexplicable.

Perhaps the most important consequence of the theory of relativity for our cosmology is that it extends the sway of mathematics in physics further than ever before, and that by so doing it transforms the conceptions which formerly were ultimate for physics into mathematical symbols. Eddington gives an example of this transformation in the following passage:

In the old textbooks mass was defined as "quantity of matter"; but when it came to the actual determination of mass, an experimental method was prescribed which had no bearing on this definition. The belief that the quantity determined

⁸ Cf. A. S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, pp. 20 ff.

MECHANISTIC VIEW CRITICIZED

by the accepted method of measurement represented the quantity of matter in the object was merely a pious opinion. At the present day there is no sense in which the quantity of matter in a pound of lead can be said to be equal to the quantity in a pound of sugar. Einstein's theory makes a clean sweep of these pious opinions, and insists that each physical quantity should be defined as the result of certain operations of measurement and calculation⁹

This transformation of the older physical concepts into mathematical symbols does not mean that physics is becoming pure mathematics and losing all contact with reality. One might, indeed, be tempted to ask why, if physics is dissolving its earlier concepts of mass, force, and the like, it is not becoming like a game of chess, played with rigorous adherence to its own rules but whose rules are arbitrarily established. But the answer is, according to Professor Eddington, that physics is getting closer than ever to reality in *its metrical aspect*, while it is discarding its former conceptions as to that to which its measurements are applied and refraining from forming any new ones. The new physics, then, requires us to abandon the familiar conceptions of the workshop, and the notions which are simply refinements of those conceptions, and to put in their place the "pointer-readings" of the measuring process, which give us a merely symbolic aspect of reality.

Eddington illustrates this characteristic of the new physics by supposing an examination paper to contain the following problem: "An elephant slides down a grassy hillside. . . . The mass of the elephant is two tons. . . . The slope of the hill is 60° ." The friction of the turf and other data are also given, and one is to find the time of descent of the elephant. Now as the student gets down to business with the problem he will have to forget the interesting picture, and he will find himself dealing only with pointer-readings—the reading of the pointer on the machine on which the elephant is

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 254, 255.

THE NEW COSMOLOGY

weighed, the reading of a plumbline against the divisions of a protractor, and a certain coefficient of friction—and he will give his answer in terms of the reading of a pointer on a watch. Hence Eddington says :

The whole subject matter of exact science consists of pointer readings and similar indications. . . . The essential point is that, although we seem to have very definite conceptions of objects in the external world, those conceptions do not enter into exact science and are not in any way confirmed by it. Before exact science can begin to handle the problem they must be replaced by quantities representing the results of physical measurement.¹⁰

The more, then, that mathematics triumphs in physics through the relativity theory, the more it renders the world as described by physics a world of symbols. This means that the mechanistic view of the universe is displaced. "We have travelled far," says Eddington, "from the old standpoint which demanded mechanical models for everything in Nature, seeing that we do not now admit even a definite unique distance between two points."¹¹ The mathematical symbols are, indeed, real knowledge of the universe in its metrical aspect. And by aid of them we can learn something about "the grain of the universe." But as to the intrinsic nature of the realities to which the symbols apply physics cannot inform us. The question of the intrinsic nature of these realities must be raised if the knowledge gained through physics is genuine but symbolical only. What is it, we are bound to ask, to which the symbols apply? But for answer we must turn to a philosophy which draws upon other sides of experience than those with which physical science is adapted to deal.

The theory of relativity thus breaks with the mechanistic view of the world by reducing to a system of mathematical symbols the conceptions on which that view was based. By

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 252, 253; cf. also the whole of Chap. XII and p. 275.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

MECHANISTIC VIEW CRITICIZED

this very fact the theory has set in motion tendencies of thought which are moving in the direction of a new cosmology. But it is the quantum theory which physicists affirm to be the more revolutionary in its effects upon the understanding of physical nature. It is important, then, to try to ascertain in some measure what these revolutionary effects are.

Stated in general terms the quantum theory stands for the experimentally established fact, first discovered by Planck in 1900, that the radiation of light or any other form of energy is not continuous, as the accepted wave-theory required it to be, but is discontinuous and is accomplished through the emission by the energy-source of an infinite number of infinitesimal units or "bullets" of radiation. Formerly radiation was thought of somewhat after the manner of the sound waves sent forth by a vibrating tuning-fork, but this way of conceiving it has had to be abandoned, and the consequences have been most upsetting to the classical physical theories. Professor Pupin says of the quantum theory: "It has received splendid experimental verification and it represents *radiation as composed of tiny energy granules*. In order to construct an atom which will radiate that way, it is necessary to assign to the orbital electrons of the atom an activity which cannot be represented by any dynamical structure within human experience."¹²

✓ "Atomicity or discontinuity," then, characterizes radiation as well as matter. Professor Bridgman writes:

✓ "The light which we receive from the sun is atomic in structure, like an almost inconceivably fine rain composed of indivisible individual drops, rather than like the continuous flood of infinitely subdivisible radiation that we had supposed."¹³ As Professor Montague, in reviewing Eddington, has expressed it: "An atom receiving and emitting light-

¹² *The New Reformation*, p. 163.

¹³ "The New Vision of Science," *Harper's Magazine*, March, 1929.

THE NEW COSMOLOGY

waves is like a man who refuses to receive or spend any money except dimes or integral multiples of dimes."

The physicist's definition of this new unit of radiation, the quantum, is summarized by Montague as follows:

Curiously enough, it turns out that while the different kinds of atom give out different amounts of energy, the *product* of the energy emitted and the *frequency* or vibration period of that energy is the same for all atoms. This constant quantity which comes from multiplying energy by time, is the "*quantum of action*." Its symbol is h and its value is .00,-000,000,000,000,000,000,000,655, or 6.55 times 10^{-27} which we can pronounce in American terminology "six hundred and fifty-five nonillionths of an erg second," where an "erg" is the amount of energy possessed by a mass of only one gram moving at the velocity of only one centimeter a second.

Professor Montague goes on to say:

This Lilliputian absolute is the smallest thing in the world and it has made the biggest trouble in all history. For it has not only defied the laws of classical physics and shattered to bits the seemingly satisfactory conception of the atom as a minute solar system composed of units of positive and negative electricity, which was invented by Bohr in the first quarter of the twentieth century, but, what is much worse, in its later developments it has brought science face to face with the astounding possibility of abandoning the very principle of causality itself and admitting that the ultimate realities of the physical world are unimaginable "somewhats" which do what they do without rhyme or reason. *In short, at the heart of nature, in the innermost recesses of the tiny spaces once occupied by atoms, there are indeterminate happenings, events that have no cause.*¹⁴

The revolutionary effects of the quantum theory as here described are well authenticated. Bridgman writes: "When we get down to fine-scale phenomena the detailed results of

¹⁴ Article "Beyond Physics," in *The Saturday Review*, March 23, 1929.

MECHANISTIC VIEW CRITICIZED

interaction between the individual elements of which our physical world is composed are essentially unpredictable." The stress in this statement falls on the word "essentially." We are not to suppose that predictability is theoretically possible, and might become actual if the physicist could refine his instruments further. On the contrary Eddington affirms: "It is a consequence of the advent of the quantum theory that *physics is no longer pledged to a scheme of deterministic law.* . . . The future is a combination of the causal influences of the past together with unpredictable elements—unpredictable not merely because it is impracticable to obtain the data of prediction, but because no data connected causally with our experience exist."¹⁵

If, then, the "downfall of the classical physics," on which the mechanistic view of the universe was based, has been proclaimed by the physicists themselves, what new conceptions are emerging which bid fair to become permanent traits of a new cosmology? First may be set down the conception that the classical laws of physics are to be regarded as statistical averages rather than as the final account of the nature of things. This is a position which has been maintained in philosophy by able thinkers for some time. Notably in the philosophy of James Ward this view that physical laws are statistical averages has been clearly set forth and is an integral part of the system. Concerning the physicist's results Ward wrote: "The constants and uniformities with which his analysis ends are regarded as simply statistical results, such as frequently hide the diversity and spontaneity of animated beings when they and their actions are taken *en masse.*"¹⁶

This view is now receiving increasingly wide acceptance among the authoritative interpreters of the new physics. Thus

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 294, 295.

¹⁶ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 433; see also pp. 65 ff. The same position was taken in the author's much earlier work, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, cf. Vol. I, p. 111; Vol. II, pp. 280-83.

THE NEW COSMOLOGY

Bertrand Russell says: "The course of nature is not so definitely determined by the physical laws at present known as it was formerly thought to be. We cannot predict when a discontinuous change will take place in a given atom, though we can predict statistical averages."¹⁷ Likewise Whitehead writes: "The characteristic laws of inorganic matter are mainly the statistical averages resulting from confused aggregates."¹⁸ And Eddington presents the same view. "It now seems clear," he tells us, that we have not yet got hold of *any* primary law—that all those laws at one time supposed to be primary are in reality statistical."¹⁹

A second conception which characterizes the new cosmology is the "Principle of Indeterminacy." This principle, according to Eddington, "seems to rank in importance with the principle of relativity." "The gist of it," he says, can be stated as follows: "*A particle may have position or it may have velocity but it cannot in any exact sense have both.*"²⁰ As thus stated the principle gives succinctly the reason for the revolutionary effect of the quantum theory in physics itself which we already have noted. But this principle has broad consequences for philosophy and even for religion. It alters the status of the law of cause and effect. Eddington brings out this fact explicitly:

✧ Strict causality is abandoned in the material world. Our ideas of the controlling laws are in process of reconstruction and it is not possible to predict what kind of form they will ultimately take; but all the indications are that strict causality has dropped out permanently. This relieves the former necessity of supposing that mind is subject to deterministic law or alternatively that it can suspend deterministic law in the material world.²¹

It has been, in truth, the conception of a completely determined physical universe, of which man in his bodily life was

¹⁷ *Philosophy*, p. 294.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 156.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 98.

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 220.

²¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 332. See also Bridgman's article, *op. cit.*, pp. 445, 446, and *The Quest of Certainty*, by John Dewey, pp. 201 ff.

an integral part, which has brought confusion into our thought of man's moral and religious life. This conception has meant that consciousness was non-efficacious, and consequently that the aims and values which we cherish in our conscious life are futile. But now this conception turns out to be, not the well-grounded implication of the world of science, but a dogma which has imposed itself upon our imagination. As Montague puts it: "The quantum leads us to the brink of a baffling mystery within which we can dimly descry an indeterminate spontaneity congruent with that freedom of the will demanded by conscience and attested by inner experience."

A natural consequence of the rejection of the conception of mechanism as the structural principle of the cosmos is the tendency to restore the conception of organism to a constitutive place in cosmology. A good definition of the distinction between a mechanism and an organism has been given by Hobhouse. He points out that in a mechanism the parts are mutually indifferent to each other, while in an organism the parts form a sympathetic whole. For example, the parts of an engine, in case of maladjustment, go pounding on to the destruction of the whole machine, or else entirely cease to act; while in an organism the parts act concertedly to remove the maladjustment and maintain the whole. The organism, then, accomplishes a purposive action which mechanism is not adapted to explain.²²

Among philosophers who are building on the new physics it is Whitehead who is making the most extensive application of the conception of organism. Whitehead finds the new developments in physical science leading to "a thorough-going organic view of nature," or to what he calls "organic mechanism." He writes:

The doctrine that I am maintaining is that the whole concept of materialism only applies to very abstract entities, the

²² L. T. Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose*, Part II, Chaps. VI, VII.

THE NEW COSMOLOGY

products of logical discernment. The concrete enduring entities are organisms, so that the plan of the *whole* influences the very characters of the various subordinate organisms which enter into it. In the case of an animal, the mental states enter into the plan of the total organism and thus modify the plans of the successive subordinate organisms until the ultimate smallest organisms, such as electrons, are reached. Thus an electron within a living body is different from an electron outside it, by reason of the plan of the body.²³

One result of the adoption of this point of view is that Whitehead vigorously attacks the current physiological doctrine which holds that everything concerning living organisms is to be explained in terms of chemistry and physics. He rejects this doctrine because it entirely eliminates final causation as being applicable to living organisms. As a methodological principle it is, to be sure, quite justifiable to explain all you can about living organisms by the laws of physics and chemistry. The mischief begins when final causation is denied. "We have here a colossal example of anti-empirical dogmatism arising from a successful methodology. Evidence which lies outside the method simply does not count."²⁴

The neglected evidence Whitehead finds partly in our daily human experience. "The conduct of human affairs is entirely dominated by our recognition of foresight determining purpose, and purpose issuing in conduct."²⁴ But he finds further evidence of the same sort in the general evolution of reason. "In the course of evolution why should the trend have arrived at mankind, if his activities of reason remain without influence upon his bodily actions? It is well to be quite clear on the point that reason is inexplicable if purpose be ineffective." Hence Whitehead holds that "a satisfactory cosmology must explain the interweaving of efficient and final causation."²⁵

This interweaving of efficient and final causation White-

²³ *Science and the Modern World*, p. III.

²⁴ *The Function of Reason*, pp. 9-11

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 22.

WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY

head accomplishes through the conception of organism, which he applies to the whole cosmos. His *Process and Reality* he terms "an essay in cosmology," and in it he presents "a philosophy of organism." This philosophy of organism appears to be a doctrine of microcosm and macrocosm so worked out as to give a genuine rôle to process, creativity, and freedom. Thus Whitehead writes :

The notion of "organism" is combined with that of "process" in a twofold manner. The community of actual things is an organism; but it is not a static organism. It is an incompleteness in process of production. Thus the expansion of the universe in respect to actual things is the first meaning of "process"; and the universe in any stage of its expansion is the first meaning of "organism." . . . Secondly, each actual entity is itself only describable as an organic process. It repeats in microcosm what the universe is in macrocosm.²⁶

But Whitehead wishes to make sure that his philosophy makes room not only for process but also for creativity and freedom :

The doctrine of the philosophy of organism is that, however far the sphere of efficient causation be pushed in the determination of the components of a concrescence—its data, its emotions, its appreciations, its purposes, its phases of subjective aim—beyond the determination of these components there always remains the final reaction of the self-creative unity of the universe. This final reaction completes the self-creative act by putting the decisive stamp of creative emphasis upon the determinations of efficient cause. Each occasion exhibits its measure of creative emphasis in proportion to its measure of subjective intensity. The absolute standard of such intensity is that of the primordial nature of God, which is neither great nor small because it arises out of no actual world. . . . The doctrine is that each concrescence is to be referred to a definite free initiation and a definite free conclusion. The initial fact is macrocosmic, in the sense of

²⁶ *Process and Reality*, p. 327.

THE NEW COSMOLOGY

having equal relevance to all occasions; the final fact is microcosmic, in the sense of being peculiar to that occasion.²⁷

What then, let us ask, are the features of this philosophy of organism by which Whitehead seeks to make it inclusive of process, creativity, and freedom? We find them given in outline in his *Religion in the Making*. There he says:

The temporal world and its formative elements constitute for us the all-inclusive universe. These formative elements are: (1) The Creativity whereby the actual world has its character of temporal passage to novelty. (2) The realm of ideal entities, or forms, which are in themselves not actual, but are such that they are exemplified in everything that is actual, according to some proportion of relevance. (3) The actual but non-temporal entity whereby the indetermination of mere creativity is transmuted into a determinate freedom. This non-temporal actual entity is what men call God—the supreme God of rationalized religion.²⁸

The organic character of this view of the world is expressed in the same connection: "Each unit has in its nature a reference to every other member of the community, so that each unit is a microcosm representing in itself the entire all-inclusive universe."²⁹

It is evident that for Whitehead the conception of God is essential to the working out of a cosmology. He does not claim that this cosmological conception of God, taken by itself, is sufficient for religion. At the same time he does hold that such a conception is necessary to give full validity to religious experience. With respect to the problems of cosmology Whitehead says: "In the place of Aristotle's God as Prime Mover, we require God as the Principle of Concretion."³⁰ The necessity of this idea of God arises from the fact that without it we should have, on the one hand, formless creativity or blind urgency, and on the other, eternal forms

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 75, 76.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

²⁸ *Religion in the Making*, p. 90.

³⁰ *Science and the Modern World*, p. 243.

WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY

quite empty of concrete content and powerless to embody themselves. Thus God is thought of as "the ground for concrete actuality."

It is important to note that Whitehead is not conceiving God "as the foundation of the metaphysical situation with its ultimate activity." Such a view he rejects, saying:

If this conception be adhered to there can be no alternative except to discern in Him the origin of all evil as well as of all good. He is then the supreme author of the play, and to Him must therefore be ascribed its short-comings, as well as its success. If He be conceived as the supreme ground of limitation, it stands in His very nature to divide the Good from the Evil, and to establish Reason "within her dominions supreme."⁸¹

In developing his thought of God Whitehead distinguishes between his "primordial nature" and his "consequent nature." It is in his primordial nature that God is the principle of concretion. In this aspect of himself God possesses the complete envisagement of all eternal forms. But "the nature of God is dipolar. . . . The consequent nature of God is conscious; and it is the realization of the actual world in the unity of his nature, and through the transformation of his wisdom." The consequent nature of God has direct religious meaning: "He saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of his own life. It is the judgment of a tenderness which loses nothing that can be saved. It is also the judgment of a wisdom which uses what in the temporal world is mere wreckage." From this point of view "God's nature is ever enlarging itself." "It is in this way that the immediacy of sorrow and pain is transformed into an element of triumph. This is the notion of redemption through suffering which haunts the world."⁸²

But in its other aspect God's nature is unchanging.

The theme of Cosmology, which is the basis of all reli-

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 250, 251.

⁸² *Process and Reality*, pp. 523-525; 530-531.

THE NEW COSMOLOGY

gions, is the story of the dynamic effort of the World passing into everlasting unity, and of the static majesty of God's vision, accomplishing its purpose of completion by absorption of the World's multiplicity of effort.⁸³

It is one of the most significant aspects of Whitehead's philosophy that he thus sees the need of religion for a basis in cosmology, and that he also regards it as the task of cosmology to include in its syntheses the experience and insights of religion. The function of religion in his metaphysics is well indicated in the following passage:

The best rendering of integral experience, expressing its general form divested of irrelevant details, is often to be found in the utterances of religious aspiration. One of the reasons of the thinness of so much modern metaphysics is its neglect of this wealth of expression of ultimate feeling. Accordingly we find in the first two lines of a famous hymn a full expression of the union of the two notions (*i.e.*, permanence and flux) in one integral experience:

"Abide with me;
Fast falls the eventide."

Here the first line expresses the permanences, "abide," "me," and the "Being" addressed; and the second line sets these permanences amid the inescapable flux. Here at length we find formulated the complete problem of metaphysics.⁸⁴

Whitehead also finds a needed insight for philosophy in the thought of Jesus. Of this insight he says:

It does not emphasize the ruling Cæsar, or the ruthless moralist, or the unmoved mover. It dwells upon the tender elements in the world, which slowly and in quietness operate by love; and it finds purpose in the present immediacy of a kingdom not of this world. Love neither rules nor is it unmoved; also it is a little oblivious as to morals. It does not

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 529, 530.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 318.

look to the future; for it finds its own reward in the immediate present.⁸⁵

The first two features of the new cosmology that is emerging, which we have set down, seem already to have established themselves. The view that the laws of physics are statistical averages, and the principle of indeterminacy, are more adequate to the facts than the doctrines of the older cosmology which preceded them. What, then, shall be said of the tendency to restore the conception of organism to a constitutive place in cosmology, which, as manifested in Whitehead, becomes a complete "philosophy of organism"?

This philosophy, with its wealth of novel categories and its tireless speculation, is a subject for years of study. Nevertheless certain judgments concerning it may be ventured upon here. It is a valuable achievement to have established for the conception of organism a constitutive place in the cosmic scheme, as Whitehead, in company with a whole group of thinkers, has done. The position that wholes can determine parts as well as parts wholes, and that for the understanding of living organisms efficient causation and final causation must be interwoven, makes a fuller synthesis of the facts of experience than the position that the laws of physical and chemical combination are our sufficient and sole sources for the explanation of living bodies. The argument that otherwise the evolution of mind is inexplicable is alone sufficiently decisive on this point. And this is a position which it is important to establish because the mechanistic view of the universe, which has been so long dominant, required its denial.

Further, the application of the conception of organism to the totality of existence is illuminating, if made with certain reservations. It is clear that organization in certain respects characterizes the whole universe. Otherwise there would be

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 520-521.

no statistical laws for science to discover. Moreover, this organization of the universe supplies the basis without which there could have been no evolution of true organism. It may even be that when Whitehead speaks of "the shift from materialism to organism as the basic idea of physical science,"⁸⁶ he is describing the course that scientific thought will follow. Certainly materialistic mechanism has broken down and must be discarded; and perhaps physicists will come to conceive atoms and electrons as organisms, as Whitehead does.⁸⁷ But it is too much to affirm that everything in the universe is implicated in everything else. The civilizations in Europe and in Yucatan which were contemporary with each other were not mutually implicated, even though the races involved may have sprung from a common stock in the immemorial past. It seems a *tour de force* to convert the absence of organic relation into an organic relation of a negative sort, as one phase of Whitehead's thought appears to do.⁸⁸

Some of the results which follow when the conception of organism is made all-inclusive appear in Whitehead's treatment of the idea of God. As we have seen, Whitehead presents his thought of God by means of distinguishing between his "primordial nature" and his "consequent nature." And as he develops the meaning of these terms he comes very close to the Hegelian conception that God comes to consciousness through the world-process. Of God's primordial nature he says:

When we make a distinction of reason, and consider God in

⁸⁶ *Process and Reality*, p. 471.

⁸⁷ *Science and the Modern World*, pp. 111, 145.

⁸⁸ Whitehead holds that "an actual entity has a perfectly definite bond with each item in the universe." (See *Process and Reality*, p. 66.) These bonds he terms "prehensions" and they may be either positive or negative. Both positive and negative prehensions are bonds between a given entity and all the other items in the universe. In this doctrine the notion of "negative prehension" is made to carry an enormous load. What appears to be a negative logical relation is transformed into a constitutive bond. And negative logical relations are well-nigh numberless.

WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY

the abstraction of a primordial actuality, we must ascribe to him neither fulness of feeling, nor consciousness. He is the unconditioned actuality of conceptual feeling at the base of things; so that, by reason of this primordial actuality, there is an order in the relevance of eternal objects to the process of creation.³⁹

It is to God's consequent nature that consciousness is ascribed:

The nature of God is dipolar. He has a primordial nature and a consequent nature. His consequent nature is conscious; and it is the realization of the actual world in the unity of his nature and through the transformation of his wisdom.

Then Whitehead goes on to a more explicit comparison of the two natures. Speaking first of the primordial nature he writes:

This side of his nature is free, complete, primordial, eternal, actually deficient, and unconscious. The other side originates with physical experience derived from the temporal world, and then acquires integration with the primordial side. It is determined, incomplete, consequent, "everlasting," fully actual, and conscious.⁴⁰

Now although the primordial nature of God is spoken of as an abstraction, the consequent nature which supplements it and brings God's nature to full actuality is described as incomplete, and as originating with physical experience derived from the temporal world; and it is for this side of the divine nature that the quality of consciousness is reserved. But this conception of God becoming conscious in the world-process is metaphysically barren and ethically baffling. It is barren metaphysically because it simply points us to the world-process when we seek to apprehend the meaning of God—at least so far as his "consequent nature" is concerned. Thus it does not aid us in the explanation or interpretation

³⁹ *Process and Reality*, pp. 521, 522.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 524.

THE NEW COSMOLOGY

of the world-process.⁴¹ It is baffling ethically because it does not permit us to conceive God as having a conscious purpose which transcends the world-process.⁴²

In general, that which cannot be subsumed under the head of organism is purposefulness. To a very large extent the purposefulness in human life manifests much less unity than is implied by the term organism, and yet it is capable of a far higher and richer unity. And when one views the cosmos as a whole from the standpoint of ethical values one sees in it the potentiality of a Realm of Ends; but by the same token one must recognize much that resists the attainment of that super-organic unity and harmony which a Realm of Ends implies.

But if it be clearly recognized that the purposeful is super-organic, one may see in the tendency to accord the conception of organism a constitutive place in cosmical theory one of the significant gains of the new cosmology. Living organisms cannot be reduced to chemical and physical processes to the exclusion of final causation. The conception of organism gives promise of fitting the facts in the physical realm more closely than the conception of mechanism. And the totality of physical existence appears to have a degree of unity which may be deemed organic. Astronomers, it is true, speak of the nebulae as "island universes"; nevertheless, they evidently all belong to one electro-magnetic system. And this system, where we know it intensively, engenders an evolutionary process that issues in profoundly significant values. With this aspect of our problem we shall be occupied in the fol-

⁴¹ It is true that God's primordial nature, according to Whitehead, possesses "envisagement" of all eternal objects, and as such transcends the world-process. But what this "envisagement" means, and how it bears on the world-process, in view of the assertion that God's primordial nature is unconscious, is difficult to see. For a discussion of the term "envisagement" by Whitehead see *Process and Reality*, p. 50.

⁴² In certain connections Whitehead speaks of the purpose of God in such a way as apparently to mean a conscious purpose transcending the world-process. See his discussion of "Value and the Purpose of God," in *Religion in the Making*, pp. 100 ff. One questions whether the wealth of thought which is so stimulating in Whitehead's writings has been given the degree of consistency required by a "philosophy of organism."

PANPSYCHISM

lowing chapters. But a unified physical system which manifests orientation toward values may justly be said to have an organic character. This organic character is not belied by the demonstrated mechanical aspects of the system, any more than a particular living organism ceases to be an organism because it demonstrably has mechanical aspects. The organic character, however, is transcended wherever definite purposefulness appears; and at the level of purposefulness there may be either less unity than the term organism denotes, or a fuller and richer unity.

One further characteristic of the new cosmology has special significance for our inquiry. In addition to the conception of physical laws as statistical averages, to the principle of indeterminacy, and to the disposition to accord the idea of organism a constitutive place in cosmical theory, there is in the new cosmology a notable tendency toward adopting the doctrine of panpsychism.

As to the central idea of this doctrine, James Ward states it as follows: "The panpsychist, holding fast to the principle of continuity, maintains . . . that at all events there are no things wholly inert, devoid of all internal springs of action, and only mechanically related to each other."⁴³ In other words, spontaneity is an ultimate and universal category, and there are no things which do not possess it to some degree. This same doctrine has been expressed by Durant Drake in a recent work, in which he says that the substance of reality is always characterized by some degree of sentience. "What is necessary to remember," he writes, "is merely that in any case physics is telling us nothing about the nature of the *substance* of its units, whatever it calls them. We are therefore free to believe that the *stuff* that is deployed in this or that order throughout the universe is the same sort of stuff that composes *us*, sentient beings that we are."⁴⁴

⁴³ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 62. ⁴⁴ *Mind and Its Place in Nature*, p. 100.

THE NEW COSMOLOGY

But it is important to recognize explicitly that the spontaneity of which the panpsychist speaks connotes appetency as well as sentience. The panpsychic conception involves a certain polarity from the beginning. It means that matter is never wholly inert but always possesses some minimum degree of inner agency; and also that matter always is sentient in some rudimentary fashion. It leads us to think of a primitive inherent sentience and appetency as characterizing each individual particle of the so-called inorganic world. These primitive attributes panpsychism holds to be continuous with those which appear on higher levels in the selective responses of plants to their environments, in the sensation and conation of animals, and in the cognition and volition of man.

Toward this doctrine of panpsychism the new cosmology is manifesting a significant tendency. As Professor Montague has said, if you approach religion from the standpoint of the new physics,

There is one high road over which you will be likely to travel. It is the high road of what is technically called Panpsychism *As our physical brains are to the conscious minds that throb within them so is any material structure or particle to the "mind-stuff" that must constitute its real and inner nature.*⁴⁵

"Mind-stuff" is the name that Eddington gives to the reality of which physics gives us only symbolical knowledge. In a chapter entitled "Reality" he writes:

I will try to be as definite as I can as to the glimpse of reality which we seem to have reached. . . . The recent tendencies of science do, I believe, take us to an eminence from which we can look down into the deep waters of philosophy. . . . To put the conclusion crudely—the stuff of the world is mind-stuff. As is often the way with crude statements, I shall have to explain that by "mind" I do not here exactly mean mind and by "stuff" I do not at all mean stuff. Still this is about as near as we can get to the idea in a simple phrase.

⁴⁵ *Saturday Review* (Mar. 23, 1929), p. 801.

PANPSYCHISM

The mind-stuff of the world is, of course, something more general than our individual conscious minds; but we may think of its nature as not altogether foreign to the feelings in our consciousness.⁴⁶

Eddington makes it plain that he is not postulating complete identity of mind-stuff and consciousness:

But we know that in the mind there are memories not in consciousness at the moment but capable of being summoned into consciousness. We are vaguely aware that things we cannot recall are lying somewhere about and may come into the mind at any moment. Consciousness is not sharply defined, but fades into subconsciousness; and beyond that we must postulate something indefinite but continuous with our mental nature. This I take to be the world-stuff. We liken it to our conscious feelings because, now that we are convinced of the formal and symbolic character of the entities of physics, there is nothing else to liken it to.⁴⁷

Eddington's exposition of his conception of mind-stuff makes clear how the doctrine of panpsychism satisfies the principle of continuity. The great discontinuity between purely inert matter and thinking and purposing mind having broken down, because the scientific knowledge of matter is recognized to be symbolical, the continuity in reality to which experience bears witness can be expressed in terms of mind, rudimentary and developed, of which we have some immediate knowledge.

Whitehead's cosmology also involves a panpsychic conception of things. "Blind prehensions, physical and mental," he writes, "are the ultimate bricks of the physical universe."⁴⁸ These "blind prehensions," we should remember, are a kind of apprehension in which consciousness does not play a part. The term "prehension" itself Whitehead has defined by saying: "I will use the word '*prehension*' for *un-cognitive apprehension*: by this I mean *apprehension* which

⁴⁶ *The Nature of the Physical World*, pp. 276.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 279.

⁴⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 470.

may or may not be cognitive."⁴⁹ Moreover, all "positive prehensions" are termed "feelings."⁵⁰

But with this notion of uncognitive apprehension or feeling goes the notion of "appetition" as characterizing every actual entity. "Appetition," says Whitehead, "is immediate matter of fact including in itself a principle of unrest."⁵¹ As an example of his meaning he cites "thirst." This example brings out admirably the panpsychic character of Whitehead's thought. For, appearing midway between the qualities of fully developed conscious life and the qualities of the ultimate physical units, it points to the continuity which he finds between the lowest and the highest levels of existence in the cosmos. Of thirst he says: "This is an example at a low level which shows the germ of a free imagination."⁵² But appetite also is present at levels of existence far below that of animal thirst, in fact it is present at every level even the lowest. This is evident because one of Whitehead's ultimate metaphysical concepts, conditioning and characterizing all that exists, is "Creativity." Thus he writes: "'Creativity' is another rendering of the Aristotelian 'matter,' and of the modern 'neutral stuff.' But it is divested of the notion of passivity, either of 'form,' or of external relations."⁵³

Starting from primitive physical feelings and primitive appetite, Whitehead reckons always with a conceptual factor, by which definiteness and order are introduced, from the realm of "eternal objects," into the formless creativity. Thus in the course of emergent evolution arise "physical purposes." These physical purposes are unconscious as are the physical feelings and the appetite, but they are continuous with these on the one hand, and with conscious purposes on the other. "The physical purpose," says Whitehead,

⁴⁹ *Science and the Modern World*, p. 97.

⁵⁰ *Process and Reality*, p. 35

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 48

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 46. The notion of "appetition" and that of "feeling" are connected with each other in the following passage: "Appetition is at once the conceptual valuation of an immediate physical feeling, combined with the urge toward realization of the datum conceptually apprehended." P. 47.

PANPSYCHISM

"provides the creativity with a complex character."⁵⁴ And out of the physical purpose, through more and more complication with conceptual factors, arises fully conscious purpose.⁵⁵

The foregoing traits of Whitehead's thought are sufficient to bring out its panpsychism. For him every actual entity has both a physical pole and a mental pole. And of the latter he says: "The mental pole is the link whereby the creativity is endowed with the double character of final causation, and efficient causation."⁵⁶ Those who are seeking to interpret Whitehead as naturalistically as possible, and who are reluctant to acknowledge the panpsychism in his teaching, should ponder such sentences as the following: "According to the philosophy of organism, physical and mental operations are inextricably intertwined"; and "The whole doctrine of mentality—from the case of God downward—is that it is a modifying agency."⁵⁷ They also should reflect upon his meaning of "æsthetic" when he says:

The metaphysical doctrine here expounded finds the foundations of the world in the æsthetic experience, rather than—as with Kant—in the cognitive and conceptive experience. All order is therefore æsthetic order, and the moral order is merely certain aspects of æsthetic order. The actual world is the outcome of the æsthetic order, and the æsthetic order is derived from the immanence of God.⁵⁸

Evidently for Whitehead "æsthetic" stands not only for harmony and artistic feeling, but also for feeling in the most rudimentary sense of the term. "There is nothing in the world," he writes, "which is merely an inert fact. Every reality is there for feeling: it promotes feeling, and it is felt."⁵⁹

We have noted four characteristics of the new cosmology

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 426.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 420–428.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 423.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 496.

⁵⁸ *Religion in the Making*, pp. 104, 105.

⁵⁹ *Process and Reality*, p. 472.

THE NEW COSMOLOGY

which is emerging. This cosmology regards physical laws as statistical averages; it acknowledges the principle of indeterminacy; it accords the conception of organism a constitutive place in its understanding of the cosmos—though the all-inclusiveness of this conception does not follow from the recognition of its validity; and it tends to interpret the ultimate stuff of reality in panpsychic terms. Of these characteristics the last is obviously the most speculative, and it cannot be assumed that the other thinkers who may participate in developing the new cosmology will necessarily join the group who already have embraced the panpsychic doctrine. But the growing hospitality toward this doctrine is noteworthy, and one may affirm in behalf of it that it answers certain questions concerning the ultimate stuff of things which, in view of the acknowledged abstractness of the physical sciences, seem capable of being answered in no other way.

This new cosmology, as we noted at the outset of the present chapter, cannot but have a most significant bearing upon the belief in God. For many of the intellectual difficulties concerning belief in God have sprung from the older cosmology, which we now see to be invalid. The attempt to construct a view of the world on the basis of mechanistic materialism and the doctrine that mind and its values are mere epiphenomena have completely broken down. But much more than this. The new cosmology gives powerful intellectual support to belief in God. For it portrays to us a universe which has order, and organization, and organic character on such a scale as can be understood only by recognizing a Cosmic Creative Spirit everywhere at work. Mechanism no longer suffices to explain the physical order. There is too much indeterminacy and—let us admit it—inherent spontaneity even in the physical order for that. But still less will a mindless Creativity explain this order, and the extent to which it either embodies values or makes them pos-

A NEW THEISM

sible Either, then, we must simply beg the order and unity of our world—saying so much order and unity are here, we know not how or why—or we must be willing to acknowledge these characteristics of our world as having their source in a Creative Intelligence.

The weakness, from the intellectual point of view, of merely begging the world's order is that at any other point in the past history of the cosmos—for example, prior to the appearance of life upon this planet—an observer could have begged only the order which the world showed then. Whereas we now know that potencies of a far richer and more complex order were present at that point of time. Such a helpless form of empiricism, which refuses to seek deeper meanings and trends in the world, would not be tolerated in the several natural sciences, where theory plays an increasingly important part. Many of us would also find such sheer empiricism unacceptable in the field of human society. In this field a constructive spirit requires the seeking out of basic principles and meanings on which to build. Why then should one regard sheer empiricism as the last word in philosophy? Rather, philosophy is bound to seek for the correlation between the potentialities of the cosmos and its knowable structure and meanings.

There are three conceptions by which cosmologies have been built. They are Mechanism, Organism, and Purpose. The new cosmology is showing us that the concept of mechanism, while it is likely always to remain pragmatically valuable, is inapplicable to the ultimate data of physics. Hence the notion of mechanism has been replaced by that of mathematical symbolism. For building our cosmologies, then, there remain the leading concepts of Organism and of Purpose. We have seen that the concept of organism has a significant application to the cosmos. Whitehead is showing us that there is a correlation in the universe between microcosm and macrocosm which is organic in character. But we also

THE NEW COSMOLOGY

have seen that the concept of organism is not all-sufficient for cosmology. Particularly in the human realm there is such an absence of harmony, and such a measure of positive discord, as to make the concept of organism unilluminating in respect to great bodies of fact. At the same time we have pointed out that there are ranges of fact and event which are super-organic, namely those ranges where purposefulness appears. Now the concept of purpose implies three things—a basic existing order, the apprehension of values *not* embodied in the existing order, and activity directed toward bringing those values into existence. Purpose brings into significant correlation our experience of order, and of potentiality, and of ideal value. Thus a fuller synthesis of the aspects and meanings of the cosmos is attainable through the idea of a Cosmic Creative Purpose than through the idea of mechanism or the idea of organism. The new cosmology points to theism, and may derive from theism the ultimate concepts for its synthetic task.

But the theism which may hope to complete the new cosmology will be in many respects a new theism. It will be a theism which will include the fact that, although mechanism is not the ultimate truth for science, and still less for philosophy, it has its relative truth. That is, the universe has such a character that many of its phenomena can be expressed with a high degree of accuracy in terms of mechanism—or in other and more suitable words, the universe has its metrical aspect. This universe with its metrical aspect, the new theism, like the old, will find to be illuminated by our vision and present possession of eternal values. But the new theism will bring mathematical order and eternal values into more significant and effective unity through the recognition of Creativity as basic to the universe and as being omnipresent, in varying degrees, in its processes. Thus, as compared with the ethical theism of the recent past, the new theism will be able to show for the eternal values a more significant rele-

A NEW THEISM

vance to the existing world, because it will not merely postulate that relevance, but will disclose it in actuality by showing how both the existing order and the potentiality of a far richer and higher order are grounded in the working of a Cosmic Creative Spirit.

In the preceding chapter we defined theism as the view "that God, whose being is inherently characterized by Goodness, Truth, and Beauty, is the ultimate ground of all things and is expressing his nature through bringing finite spirits into being and through bringing them into vital fellowship with each other and with himself." The new theism will lay stress upon the insight that God works through "creating creators," and thus will deepen the ethical earnestness, as well as increase the interpretive power, of the theistic philosophy.

Oh, brother men, if you have eyes at all,
Look at a branch, a bird, a child, a rose,
Or anything God ever made that grows,—
Nor let the smallest vision of it slip,
Till you may read, as on Belshazzar's wall,
The glory of eternal partnership.⁶⁰

The new theism will find in courageous attack upon our urgent human problems, in the applying of creative social intelligence to their solution, and in personal devotion to the building of the Beloved Community on earth, the living expression of the deepest reality of the cosmos. And it will find the fullest realization of God, the present experience of life eternal, in whatever increases the wisdom, good will, and joy of the world.

⁶⁰ Edwin Arlington Robinson, "Sonnet," *Children of the Night*.

A. BELIEF IN GOD

(continued)

XII

REINTERPRETATIONS OF EVOLUTION AND THEISM

OF the three conceptions according to which men have built their cosmologies, Mechanism, Organism, and Purpose, the first has its primary application to inanimate nature, the second to the biological realm, and the third to human life and history. When thinkers have sought for the simplification of complex phenomena they not unnaturally have tried to reduce the sphere of purpose to organic terms, and to reduce the sphere of organism to mechanical terms. Such simplification is, of course, a gain if it really explains the phenomena in question. But the charm of simplification may betray us by making us content with inadequate explanations. As we have seen, the claims of mechanism can be sufficiently recognized if we keep in mind that all the objects which we perceive in nature have a mechanical *aspect*—all, for example, being subject to gravitation. But we need also to recognize that many objects have an organic character, which calls for other principles of explanation. Indeed, the universe as a whole is more adequately conceived as an organism than as a mechanism. But again, this organic character is an aspect of things, and other aspects fall outside of it. In particular, the relevance of value to existence, the continuous processes by which values find increasing embodiment in existence, and the processes by which dis-values are resisted, neutralized, and overcome, point to the conception of purpose as being needful for explanation, not only in the

MECHANISM *VERSUS* ORGANISM

human realm, but also in regard to the comprehensive character of the cosmos.

Prior to the rise of the new physics and the consequent beginnings of the new cosmology, however, the authority of the principle of mechanism in natural science was so great that biologists prevailing regarded it as the only fully scientific means for explaining the phenomena of life. Kant, to be sure, held that the Newton of a blade of grass—one who should explain even a blade of grass according to mechanical principles—would never arise. And he held that purposiveness would always be an indispensable means of scientific discovery in organic nature. Still he assigned a degree of subjectivity to the idea of purposiveness which he did not to that of mechanism. In this respect he anticipated the dominant philosophy of biology.

The conception of organism, it is true, gained a certain preponderance in the last century when the idea of evolution became the comprehensive principle for thought in the realms of biology and history. For the idea of evolution tended to link the phenomena to which it was applied into a co-ordinated, actively self-maintaining and unfolding whole, such as the term organism denotes. Darwin used organic conceptions in solving the problem of the origin of species, and thus gave massive empirical verification to the theory of evolution and to the organic way of conceiving evolution. The conception of organism thus became immensely fruitful throughout the range of the new science of biology, and was appropriated—often far beyond its real usefulness—by the sciences of society.

Nevertheless, the tendency to a mechanical conception of evolution persisted and gained ground. Spencer, before the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species* in 1859, had begun to elaborate a philosophy of evolution on mechanical principles. And the formulation of the doctrine of the conservation of energy by Robert Mayer in 1845 gave a power-

REINTERPRETATIONS OF EVOLUTION

ful impetus to the view that mechanical principles are all-sufficient in the natural sciences. The authority which the mechanical conception of evolution ultimately came to possess is well exemplified by James Sully's definition of evolution in the ninth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, which was that evolution is "a natural history of the cosmos, including organic beings, expressed in physical terms as a mechanical process."

Many contemporary biologists hold essentially the same conception, as is shown by the following citation. Professor H. H. Newman, editor of *The Nature of the World and of Man*, writes in his section of that volume:

There are two opposed biologic philosophies: one known as the vitalistic view, or vitalism, the other as the mechanistic view. The vitalist is more or less of a mystic in that he believes that life involves "some all-controlling, unknown and unknowable, mystical, hyper-mechanical force." . . . This conception is tantamount to a denial that the laws of energy and of matter are sufficient to account for biological phenomena. . . . The mechanistic point of view is one that assumes as a working hypothesis that life is an expression of the transformations of energy and of matter in a large group of materials, differing in detail, but alike in certain fundamental respects—materials known technically as protoplasmic and which constitute what Huxley termed "the physical basis of life." Life has never been observed except in some kind of protoplasm, and, therefore, must be due to the physical, chemical, and organizational properties of these substances. When used as a working hypothesis the mechanistic principle has amply justified itself.¹

One cannot but see in the definition of Sully and in the position represented by Newman today the persistence of the influence of the older cosmology on evolutionary theory and biological science. It is true that the treatment of mechanism as a working hypothesis in biology is an important

¹ Pp. 164, 165.

MECHANISM *VERSUS* ORGANISM

modification of the mechanistic view, as compared with the doctrine that life is "nothing but" mechanism of a very intricate sort. But the implication of the foregoing statements is still that if one employs any other than mechanistic ideas in the field of biological evolution one has passed beyond the bounds of science. Such a position, however, becomes anomalous in view of the fact that the new physics finds mechanism insufficient in its own field. Moreover, there is a serious ambiguity in Newman's phrase "organizational properties." Such a phrase may easily become a question-begging one. If one is to give any positive theory of such properties, it is fair to ask whether one can do so without introducing teleological considerations. One of the most careful and thorough of the recent writers on the philosophy of evolution has pointed out the fallacy into which the mechanistic biologist is apt to fall, in that "he takes for granted as much organization as may be needed for his mechanistic explanations."²

But the claim that the mechanistic hypothesis is the only fruitful one for the biologist is significantly challenged by a number of leading scientists in this field. One of the foremost of this number is J. S. Haldane, the physiologist. Haldane does not wish to be identified with those who adopt "vitalism" in the sense of belief in a "mystical" force, acting but not acted upon, "unknown and unknowable."³ His position, rather, consists in making the conception of organism, conceived "as an active autonomous whole," the fundamental conception for biology, instead of the idea of "a mechanism made up of separable parts and actuated by external causes."⁴ He recognizes the great contributions made to biology under the guidance of the mechanistic hypothesis, but still finds that it has only limited application. And—so far from admitting that mechanism is the only principle for discovery in

² Seba Eldridge, *The Organization of Life*, p. 389.

³ *Mechanism, Life and Personality*, Chap. I.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 81, 82.

REINTERPRETATIONS OF EVOLUTION

biology—he says: “As a physiologist I can see no use for the hypothesis that life, as a whole, is a mechanical process. This theory does not help me in my work: and indeed I think it now hinders very seriously the progress of physiology.”⁵

As one of the reasons for his position Haldane brings up the problem of heredity:

The real difficulty for the mechanistic theory is that we are forced, on the one hand, to postulate that the germ-plasm is a mechanism of enormous complexity and definiteness, and, on the other, that this mechanism, in spite of its absolute definiteness and complexity, can divide and combine with other similar mechanisms, and can do so to an absolutely indefinite extent without alteration of its structure. On the one hand we have to postulate absolute definiteness of structure, and on the other absolute indefiniteness. . . . The mechanistic theory of heredity is not merely unproven, it is impossible. It involves such absurdities that no intelligent person who has thoroughly realized its meaning and implications can continue to hold it.⁶

In general, the characteristics of life for which physico-chemical conceptions seem unable to account are “organic structure, the processes of reproduction, heredity and development, the genesis of hereditary variations, the regeneration of lost or mutilated parts, the organization and regulation of the more common physiological processes, and the adaptive behavior of the organism as a whole.”⁷

The foregoing considerations are enough to show that reinterpretations of the prevailing conception of biological evolution, as exemplified by Sully's definition, are in order. We see that, while the mechanistic hypothesis has proven useful in biology and will continue to do so, it can no longer be regarded as the all-sufficient hypothesis. Its prestige has been due to the dominance of the older cosmology. If mechanistic

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 60. Cf. also *The Sciences and Philosophy*, by the same author, Chaps. I-V.

⁷ S. Eldridge, *op. cit.*, p. 389.

MECHANISM *VERSUS* ORGANISM

conceptions are no longer adequate for physics, why should they be supposed to be adequate for biology? And since many of the basic conceptions of organic life seem incapable of being handled from the standpoint of mechanism, there is need that this principle be supplemented by others, if the conception of evolution is to be made adequate to the phenomena. The effort to discover *mechanisms*, in the plural, cannot but advance our knowledge, but the mechanistic theory of life as a whole must be replaced by something more adequate.

But reinterpretations of evolution have been forthcoming in recent years. To some of the most notable of these we now should turn, with a view to seeing how far they may supplement principles that we already have found in the new cosmology, and what may be their bearing on theism.

At the outset let us take note of the conception of the aim of science held by a biologist who appreciates the need of correlation between science, philosophy, and religion. J. Arthur Thomson, in his *System of Animate Nature*, writes :

After a long period during which science consisted of numerous discrete bodies of knowledge . . . there began to be concentration into a system, a sort of cosmology. Science entered upon a new and purely theoretical rôle of giving man a composite picture of the world and its processes. After a long ascent we get a new view, æsthetically magnificent, intellectually a revelation of connectedness. But, fine as it is, the scientific picture has satisfied very few thinkers of distinction, the chief reason being that the contributions which each science makes are always *partial* views, reached by processes of abstraction, by focussing attention on certain aspects of things.⁸

We need, then, to keep in mind the limitations of our natural knowledge. "The chief end of science is descriptive

⁸ Pp. 7, 8.

REINTERPRETATIONS OF EVOLUTION

formulation," but as we extend description to make a comprehensive genetic account of things we have to combine laws of nature which simply sum up certain uniformities, like gravitation, with theories which are the work of imaginative construction. This combination is legitimate if made with a due appreciation of what is being done, and success depends upon the extent to which science and philosophy co-operate. Philosophy needs science to supply it with data and with particular formulations of law which are as exact as possible. Science needs philosophy to criticize its presuppositions, to relate the sciences in a way that is not merely additive but genuinely synthetic, to secure recognition of feeling as a true way of apprehending meaning in Nature, and also to secure recognition of mystical intuition as a way of knowing reality that is unseen and yet intimately bound up with the seen.⁹ "What must be worked toward," says Thomson, "is a philosophical co-ordination of the essential results of biology and the other sciences with the results of intellectual inquiry in other fields, allowing at the same time for those glimpses of reality that feeling alone affords."¹⁰

For such a philosophical co-ordination the idea of evolution is indispensable. *But what should we mean by evolution?* In the first place, this idea cannot serve as our ultimate philosophical conception. Even if we extend the term beyond the biological realm and speak of "cosmic evolution," as we legitimately may, we shall need to conceive for this cosmic evolution a metaphysical ground, just as the evolution of living organisms implies an environment. And if we apply the term to the human realm, we cannot carry its application through without recourse to conceptions of value, which must have other than evolutionary grounding.¹¹

In the opening chapter we distinguished between the terms

⁹ Cf. J. A. Thomson, *System of Animate Nature*, Chap. I.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

¹¹ Cf. A. E. Taylor, in *Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge*, Chap. XII.

MEANING OF EVOLUTION

"evolution," "development," "growth," "creative evolution," and "progress."¹² There we said: "The term evolution is applicable wherever a specific structure or state of things comes about by a fairly continuous process of change." Obviously evolution so defined *may* denote processes to which each of the other terms applies, but also may denote processes to which none of the other terms applies. Doubtless we should make little or no use of the term evolution if there were only processes of degeneration, dissolution, and decay to apply it to; but such processes are often so closely interwoven with those which show development, growth, and progress that evolution should be defined in such a way as to be inclusive of the former type of process as well as the latter.

In view of these distinctions the interpreter of evolution will be interested to consider how far evolutionary processes manifest development, growth, creative action, progress, and their opposites. He will also have in mind that a single formula may not suffice to cover all the aspects of evolution and will consider what range of concepts is needed for their understanding. And he will reflect upon the relation of evolutionary processes to metaphysical grounds and ultimate values. In all these respects reinterpretations of evolution are being actively undertaken by contemporary thought.

Evolution has its most significant application in the biological realm, because it stands, first of all, for a continuity of history in the case of all the forms of animal life. The idea of evolution is reasonably established, whatever problems concerning it remain, in the sense that we must recognize what Thomson calls "a flesh-and-blood linkage" between the forms of life which we find on earth and certain very primitive, simple beginnings of life in the remote past. But, in the second place, the idea of continuity must not be so understood as to exclude radical changes. "Birds are continuous with reptiles but not continuations of them." Thomson has

¹² See pp. 5, 6.

REINTERPRETATIONS OF EVOLUTION

given a definition of organic evolution which we may well note here, since it makes room for radical changes and does not prejudice the factors to which evolutionary processes are due (as did Sully's *Encyclopædia Britannica* definition): "Organic evolution is a continuous natural process of racial change in a definite direction whereby distinctively new individualities arise, take root, and flourish, sometimes alongside of, and sometimes, sooner or later, in place of the origi-native stock."

Passing to the question as to whether or not evolution is progressive Thomson points out that "there is a discernible standard with objectively verifiable features—increasing differentiation and integration—in a word *organization*." From the standpoint of this standard three admissions, he says, should be made: (1) Evolution may be down as well as up—*e.g.*, parasites. (2) In many corners organisms have developed luxuriantly without leading to anything beyond themselves. (3) There are lost races, which attained notable development but became extinct. But he adds:

These admissions notwithstanding, the large fact is certain, that on the whole there has been for many millions of years progressive differentiation and integration along diverse lines, and increasingly complex and masterly behavior, a growing emancipation of mind and an approximation to personality. This is the largest fact to be borne in mind in our interpretation of evolution.¹⁸

In order to get an "objectively verifiable" standard of progress Thomson has cited those aspects of evolution which we have called "development," namely, aspects showing increasing articulateness and complexity of structure. If we are to find "progress" as we have defined the term, there must be advance toward an end which has value, and the value itself should have objectivity. But the two definitions have a real

¹⁸ *System of Animate Nature*, pp. 360, 373-77.

CREATIVE EVOLUTION

connection to this extent: that, while organization is not to be identified with value, and may result in dis-value, yet a high degree of organization is indispensable for the greater values.

We must next ask, what are the general factors in the evolutionary process which best help us to understand it in its more comprehensive character? We have already emphasized the fact that, notwithstanding the criticism of the principle of mechanism by the new physics, the discovery of mechanisms—the plural being emphasized—in the realm of biology always renders the phenomena more intelligible. But the mechanistic dogma, which holds that mechanism alone explains, must be avoided. But as a matter of fact, prior to the recognition that a new physics had arrived, evolutionary thought was taking on new forms in the doctrines of creative evolution and emergent evolution.

Bergson's doctrine of creative evolution is based on a radical criticism of mechanism as the sole principle for science and therefore as authoritative for biology. At the same time he brings forward other principles of much importance for the understanding of the evolutionary process. In evolution mechanistically conceived, he insists, nothing really new comes to pass. The elements of things were all present from the beginning, and all changes which take place consist of nothing but external rearrangements of these elements. The world as a whole, in fact, as it is at any one moment, could be completely understood if we knew completely its state the moment before, and so on backward *ad infinitum*. According to the mechanistic theory there is nothing new under the sun, nor among all the suns. Bergson compares mechanistic analysis to cinematographic reproductions of events, which portray motion by a series of static pictures. The film taken of a runner doing the hundred-yard dash really presents a series of postures which closely succeeded each other. The bond between the postures escapes such an

REINTERPRETATIONS OF EVOLUTION

analysis. Mechanistic analysis, he holds, merely fragmentizes objects into minute parts which are as much the product of evolution as the objects themselves.¹⁴

How, then, does Bergson conceive evolution so as to recognize the full reality of becoming, of generation, of the production of the *new*? It is through adopting as a first principle for his thought the conception that there is inherent creativity wherever there is individuality. In the inorganic realm objects have, according to his view, no true individuality. But every organic body is a genuine individual. Each is a unique whole existing in *active* relation to the environing world. Each is the kind of object from which can come an increment of being by which the sum of things is qualitatively enriched. An immanent principle of creativity characterizes to some degree every living thing.

Bergson's name for this principle is *élan vital* or vital impulse. But this is a one-sided name for the principle itself. The principle stands for both conservation and creation, and for each as being necessary to the other. Organic bodies enregister past experience as well as push forward in novel ways. In other words, living things manifest both organic memory and spontaneity, and the correlation of these two traits indicates that they have a single inner spring. In Bergson's thought creative evolution is also historical evolution. The involution of the past and the evolution of the future are interrelated.

We look in vain for this immanent creative principle in living things if we consider only their successive states. Instead it is manifest in their *tendencies*. The *élan vital* is the wellspring both of variation and of organization—only, the latter must be conceived as active organizing and not simply as passive arrangement.

But the idea of an immanent principle of creativity in living things is for Bergson not simply a postulate made in

¹⁴ *Creative Evolution*, pp. 385 ff.

CREATIVE EVOLUTION

order that the coming to pass of the genuinely new in evolution may not be denied, and that the correlation of spontaneity and organization may be recognized. Man himself is a product of evolution and the *élan vital* is pre-eminently present in him. And in man this principle can be known intimately and profoundly. What characters, when it is thus known, is it found to possess? The truly primary character, Bergson points out, can be apprehended only if we turn our thought from ourselves as already made to ourselves in the making and to our own active participation in the shaping of ourselves. We must go beyond the unchangeable self of the past to the changing self as it enters on its own future. In other words, it is the self in the act of volition—such volition as shows freedom and choice—that the essential nature of the vital impulse is to be found.¹⁵

But at the same time Bergson emphasizes the fact that in volition the past is being carried forward into the future and conserved in a new form. Otherwise volition would not constitute any increment of being. To know the vital impulse we must grasp it as a past prolonging itself into a future. Now it is in memory that the past becomes a present force able to bud forth into a new volition. Thus in the human self the vital impulse has the characteristics of memory, fusing with a present awareness of significant aspects of the environing world, and issuing in a volition which inserts itself creatively into that environing world. The vital impulse thus reveals itself as a reality of the psychological order, and such it is, in some form, and to some degree, throughout the realm of life. Wherever there are organic bodies, wherever there are true individuals, there an immanent creative principle of a psychological order is to be recognized.

In accordance with this understanding of the individual organism Bergson develops his view of evolution as a whole.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 236.

REINTERPRETATIONS OF EVOLUTION

He sees a universal creative life pushing forth inventively along many lines of a fan-like evolution. Three great experimental achievements of the evolutionary process he especially dwells upon. First, there is vegetism, in which the chlorophyll function controls—seen in the whole plant world. The Sequoias, of which individual trees have been known to exist for several thousand years, impressively exemplify what this form of evolution can achieve. Second, there is instinctive life—seen, for example, in the arthropods; the honeybee is a familiar instance. In human bodies the autonomic nervous system is an example. Third, there is intelligence, which appears when the cerebro-spinal system is sufficiently developed. But in order to understand the fundamental reality we must integrate these three great manifestations of life by means of the combined efforts of intuition and reflective thought. Thus we may gain something like an adequate conception of the processes of creative evolution.

Since creative evolution as a whole has obviously, for Bergson, a psychological character—life being inherently psychological—the question arises whether in the last analysis it is to be subsumed under the head of purpose. Bergson is at pains to show that, in rejecting “radical mechanism,” he does not go over to “radical finalism.” That is, he does not believe that the ends realized in nature are all laid down in detail as necessary parts of one comprehensive end or purpose. Radical finalism, to his view, involves to a considerable extent the inadequacies of radical mechanism. For it does not admit of there being anything really new in the universe. To Bergson the ultimate reality is a freely creative energy, working experimentally, and not only realizing ends but generating new ends. At the same time Bergson makes plain that his thought is nearer to finalism than to mechanism. This is because evolutionary processes follow continuous lines of direction. And these lines of direction are not due simply to the vital impulses resident in particular

CREATIVE EVOLUTION

organisms. They imply a cosmic vital impulse as well. One of his instances, by which he would establish this view, is the development of the eye in a mollusk and in a vertebrate. These two lines of evolution do not influence each other. Yet they have a common significance and result in the generation of organs of sight which, though not wholly alike in structure, have a like function. This is but a single instance. Bergson points out that there is a mass of evidence of like purport furnished by embryology. Nature often brings forth identical results, sometimes in different species by quite different embryological processes. Other evidence is afforded by the facts of the regeneration of mutilated parts. Such parts may be regenerated by tissues different from those which originally produced them.¹⁶

Such processes, in which life arrives by different routes at certain ends, betoken for Bergson's thought a kind of finalism, but not a finalism according to which ends completely preordain the processes. The processes cannot be defined as being irrelevant to the ends, as in radical mechanism. Nor can they be defined as the inevitable series of steps for the realization of predetermined ends. Rather, they betoken a basic tendency in life to develop instruments for the fuller expression of life and its fuller mastery over material conditions. But this basic principle in life is also for Bergson the most basic principle in the universe as a whole. The ma-

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 66ff. Professor Cohen, in *Reason and Nature*, p. 278, has criticized Bergson's argument from the resemblance of the eye of that mollusk described—that of the scallop—to the vertebrate eye as being mistaken as to the resemblance. But though the resemblance of structure be negligible, the resemblance of function remains. He also objects that Bergson's appeal to a unitary *Élan Vital* to account for the realization on a wide scale of similar results by different processes is not a biologic explanation. But may not a philosophy of evolution go beyond the special science of biology in seeking explanations of evolutionary phenomena?

It may be noted here that in an earlier chapter (Chap. VII, pp. 171 f.) we have taken the position which Cohen takes as against Bergson's restriction of the idea of individuality to organic bodies, namely, that the idea has genuine application in the inorganic realm. But we would connect this position with the doctrine of panpsychism. (See the preceding chapter, pp. 279 ff.)

REINTERPRETATIONS OF EVOLUTION

terial conditions derive, in the last analysis, from the same principle, according to Bergson's doctrine of "the ideal genesis of matter."¹⁷ Thus for him the ultimate reality is a Cosmic *Élan Vital*, a universal Creative Energy.

Thus Bergson's principle of explanation might be called *creative finalism*. On the one hand the processes of evolution are not subsumed under the head of an all-determining purpose. But on the other hand, reality is everywhere characterized by psychic tendency, purposiveness, which in man becomes conscious purpose and freedom.

But an important question arises in regard to the bearing of this creative finalism on theism. Does the Cosmic *Élan Vital* as a whole possess conscious purpose, such that æsthetic and ethical values and normative principles of reason characterize its activity? When affirming that a single principle of Creativity is the ultimate source of both inanimate and animate nature, Bergson develops his thought by adding: "God, thus defined, has nothing of the already made; he is incessant life, action, liberty." In such a statement, taken by itself, there is no recognition of basic principles of reason and value which hold for God as well as for human thought and action. But Bergson goes on to say: "Creation, thus conceived, is not a mystery; we know it experimentally in ourselves when we act freely."¹⁸ And in ourselves conscious purpose and reason play a significant, even though too limited, part. Why, then, should not these attributes belong, in a far greater degree, to God? Perhaps all we can say in regard to this question is that at this point Bergson's thought remains ambiguous, and that this ambiguity is connected with an insufficiency in what we have called his creative finalism.

Nevertheless, this creative finalism of Bergson has made an important contribution to the new cosmology, as Whitehead has developed it. Whitehead finds Bergson to be the

¹⁷ *Creative Evolution*, pp. 249 ff.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

CREATIVE FINALISM

most characteristic philosopher of his epoch, as Locke was of his. "Bergson introduced into philosophy the organic conceptions of physiological science. He has most completely moved away from the static materialism of the seventeenth century."¹⁹ The creative finalism of Bergson reappears in Whitehead's doctrine that creativity is a metaphysical ultimate,²⁰ and in his insistence that for a full understanding of the field of physiology final causation is indispensable. Whitehead, in fact, holds that apart from final causation one cannot answer the question why the trend of evolution has been upward; and in general he maintains that "a satisfactory cosmology must explain the interweaving of efficient and final causation."²¹ Moreover, "appetition," which in Whitehead's thought belongs in some degree to every actual entity in the universe, is essentially a Bergsonian conception.²² It seems clear that the new cosmology, when viewed in its meaning for living things, involves the principle of creative evolution, in which creativity and finalism are combined.

But the fact that evolution in its larger aspects means also development, that is, results in increasing complexity of organization, calls for something more than the Bergsonian idea of creative evolution for its explanation. For on the whole the criticism of Professor R. B. Perry seems justified, when he says :

There is in Bergson no . . . clear recognition of a scale of life, of "higher and ever higher forms of organization." There is direction, yes; but not ordered progression. Such direction as there is, is rather the effect of the original centrifugal movement of life prolonged by its own momentum. The inspiration of such a view is not the hope of mounting higher, but the sense of participating with all the life of the

¹⁹ *Science and the Modern World*, pp. 205, 206.

²⁰ *Process and Reality*, p. 11 *et passim*.

²¹ *The Function of Reason*, p. 22.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 25-28; *Process and Reality*, p. 47 *et passim*.

REINTERPRETATIONS OF EVOLUTION

world in an irresistible rush which shall sweep away every obstruction.²³

There is need, then, that the philosophy of evolution unite the recognition of genuine becoming and newness with an equal recognition of the organic structures which evolutionary processes achieve. These structures are instrumental in conserving the results of creative energies and thus contribute to the expansion of those energies in still further new forms. This twofold character of evolutionary development is the theme of *the doctrine of emergent evolution*.

Of this doctrine Lloyd Morgan, its chief author, writes: "Under what I here call emergent evolution stress is laid on this incoming of the new. Salient examples are afforded in the advent of life, in the advent of mind, and in the advent of effective thought." There is, moreover, emergence in the inorganic world. "Emergence is no less exemplified in the advent of each new kind of atom, and of each new kind of molecule. It is beyond the wit of man to number the instances of emergence." But while in Morgan's doctrine the appearance of the new is stressed, an equal stress is laid upon the coming to pass of successive levels of physical and organic existence which serve as the basis for further advance. From the most comprehensive point of view there are to be recognized the level of matter, the level of life, and the level of mind; but there are many intervening levels, and each level furnishes a basis for the succeeding ones.²⁴

Each emergent level presents a new kind of "relatedness" to which belong new qualities. That which distinguishes each kind of relatedness as new is the fact that its specific nature could not be predicted before it appeared.²⁵ Moreover, when the emergents occur they become effective in helping to determine the course of things. "When some new kind of relatedness is supervenient (say at the level of life), the way

²³ *The Present Conflict of Ideals*, p. 363.

²⁴ *Emergent Evolution*, Chap. I.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

EMERGENT EVOLUTION

in which the physical events involved run their course is different in virtue of their presence—different from what it would have been if life had been absent.”²⁶ Hence Lloyd Morgan urges, “as against radical behaviourists, that mental guidance of events counts for progress and betokens a kind of relatedness that is effective.”²⁷ Thus the doctrine of emergent evolution stands in definite contrast to the mechanical conception and links the idea of evolution with the ideas of development and progress.²⁸

At the same time retrogression and degeneration are not ignored in Morgan's theory. He writes: “This reversal of order, this downward passage in state or in status is a feature of the world in which we live, seen alike in disintegrating molecules and atoms, in degenerate organisms, in degraded minds, in debased institutions.” But he adds:

“Falls to lower status there are; but rise to higher status has won through.” “The world as it now is affords irrefutable evidence that evolution has prevailed over dissolution.” “And with this progressive advance we ourselves have been caught up as active and open-eyed participators. That is where mind in evolution comes at last into the picture.”

Mind brings into the process “enjoyment,” *i.e.*, feeling (of pleasure and its opposite, pain); “objective reference,” *i.e.*, cognition; and “guidance.” This factor of guidance, says Morgan,

“means nothing less than the dawn of freedom which we cherish above all things. It is the very turning point in the evolutionary history of events. In that history it is of all events the greatest in promise. In human life it marks us as what we verily are—makers of a new, and, we hope, a better world.” “It is guidance toward personal joy in right conduct. More than that; it is guidance toward the sympathetic

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

²⁸ “The whole doctrine of emergence is a continued protest against mechanical interpretation, and the very antithesis to one that is mechanistic. It does not interpret life in terms of physics and chemistry.” *Op. cit.*, pp. 7, 8.

REINTERPRETATIONS OF EVOLUTION

rejoicing in the joy of others which characterizes love and good will. Above all, it is guidance in so acting as to promote evolution and combat dissolution. For regress there is. Our aim should be to fight it in all its forms. Here we have mind at its highest and best in social life."²⁹

When Lloyd Morgan goes on to ask, "What makes emergents emerge?" he finds that the question leads beyond biological science into the field of philosophy. But if the question is to be answered at all, he holds that it must be done through the "acknowledgment" of a cosmic Purposeful Activity. For a constructive philosophy, in his view, emergent evolution "leads upwards towards God, as directive Activity within the scheme which aims at constructive consistency."³⁰

The doctrine of emergent evolution, then, as Lloyd Morgan has formulated it, evidently contains that recognition of advance along salient lines to higher and higher structures which is insufficiently present in Bergson's doctrine of creative evolution. Likewise the conception of God which completes Morgan's interpretation has more significance for understanding the processes of advancing organization than has Bergson's conception, inasmuch as for Morgan, God is definitely Purposeful Activity. Is not, then, the idea of emergent evolution the needed supplement for the idea of creative evolution, whereby Bergson's creative finalism may be rendered more adequate to the facts?

Such, indeed, the idea of emergent evolution will prove to be, but only if Morgan's interpretation of it is in turn subjected to criticism. Morgan is at great pains to exclude the idea of an immanent creative principle, or *élan vital*, in organisms as a causal factor in biological evolution. While he recognizes mental "correlates," on different levels, wherever there is life, in animal or plant; and while on lower levels he attributes mental "correlates" to all the things of the inorganic world,³¹ yet he insists that these mental correlates

²⁹ See *Creation by Evolution*, edited by Frances Mason, pp. 347-351.

³⁰ *Emergent Evolution*, pp. 32, 33

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 26, 27.

EMERGENT EVOLUTION

stand in no causal relation to any of the structures and functions which they accompany.³² This position renders highly ambiguous his assertion, cited above, that in the higher ranges of evolution mind brings into the process not only "enjoyment" and "objective reference," but also "guidance." Thus we find him affirming that mental guidance of events "counts for progress," and then hastening to add, "and betokens a kind of relatedness that is effective." And we see the meaning of this addition when he explains that he uses the word "relatedness" in order to "exclude the concept of 'agency,' or 'activity,' from any place in scientific interpretation." The same meaning is brought out by Morgan's explicit distinction between physical or physiological *influence* and mental *reference*, as belonging to parallel, causally unrelated series.³³ It certainly is difficult to see how the mental reference can supply "guidance" if all "influence" has to be of the physical or physiological order. In view of this position it seems clear that Morgan's thought is open to the charge, made by McDougall, of being "crypto-mechanistic."³⁴

But why should the idea of emergence be bound up with the position that mind is non-efficacious in the biological realm? The opposite view—that whatever emerges functions in some new and effective way—is what "emergent evolution" naturally suggests. Professor Lovejoy has given the following definition of the term in question:

"Emergence," then (or "epigenesis," which would be a much more appropriate word) may be taken loosely to signify any augmentative or transmutative event, any process in which there appear effects that, in some one or more of several ways yet to be specified, fail to conform to the maxim that "there cannot be in the consequent anything more than, or different in nature from, that which is in the antecedent."

³² *Ibid.*, p. 28. See also Morgan's chapter in *Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge*, pp. 115 f., 127 f., 137 f. See, further, Morgan, *Life, Mind and Spirit*, pp. 282 ff.

³³ Cf. *Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge*, p. 130.

³⁴ Cf. *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution*, esp. pp. 144 ff.

REINTERPRETATIONS OF EVOLUTION

This maxim Lovejoy shows to have no *a priori* basis in reason, and then he goes on to point out that, in psychical events and psychical objects, we have instances of existential emergence of a "trans-physical" sort. Between these psychical entities and bodily processes he holds that interaction should be recognized, since no reason to the contrary can be given except the "arbitrary pseudo-axiom" cited above. Lovejoy concludes: "We have, therefore, abundant reason to believe that in the history of our planet there have occurred genuine new births of time, a sheer increase and diversification and enrichment of the sum of things here."⁸⁵

It seems clear that there is no reason for rejecting mental influence on physiological processes for the sake of upholding the principle of causation, if one accepts the reality of emergence at all. If the principle of causation can be invoked against any recognition of teleology by science it can be invoked against the recognition of emergence. If, however, as Lloyd Morgan finds, emergence should be acknowledged, out of loyalty to the facts, in biology and even in chemistry and physics, the reality of teleology or final causation should be acknowledged wherever it is able to afford a fuller explanation of the facts. What we should seek in our explanations, as Whitehead has said, is such a view of things "that everything determinable by efficient causation is thereby determined, and that everything determinable by final causation is thereby determined. The two spheres of operation should be interwoven and required, each by the other. But neither sphere should arbitrarily limit the scope of the alternative mode."⁸⁶

Emergent evolution, then, does not in principle exclude the

⁸⁵ See "The Meanings of 'Emergence' and its Modes," in *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, 1926. Professor Lovejoy's discussion of trans-physical emergence includes a rejection of panpsychism; but he admits that the panpsychic doctrine and the doctrine of emergence may be combined.

⁸⁶ *The Function of Reason*, p. 22

CREATIVE FINALISM

recognition in organisms of immanent creative agency and purposiveness which are of the psychological order. Thus it is not incompatible with the idea of creative evolution, but on the other hand supplements that idea through its fuller recognition of advance in complexity of structure and function along salient lines of evolutionary process. The conception of emergence enables us to carry forward the doctrine of creative finalism beyond the point at which Bergson left it.³⁷

The meaning of creative finalism as an immanent principle is well illustrated by J. Arthur Thomson's description of four grades of psychical life which are operative, at different

³⁷ Other recent interpretations of evolution join in rejecting mechanistic views, but endeavor to find in the conception of organism itself a principle of explanation that suffices. J. Smuts writes, in his *Holism and Evolution*: "The creation of wholes, and ever more highly organized wholes, and of wholeness generally as a characteristic of existence, is an inherent characteristic of the universe. There is not a vague indefinite creative energy or tendency at work in the world. This energy has specific characters, the most fundamental of which is whole-making." (P. 99) "We thus arrive at the conception of a universe which is not a collection of accidents externally put together like an artificial patchwork, but which is synthetic, structural, active, vital, and creative in increasing measure all through, the progressive development of which is shaped by one unique holistic activity operative from the humblest inorganic beginnings to the most exalted creations of the human and of the universal Spirit." (P. 107.)

Somewhat similarly, E. Noble, in his *Purposive Evolution*, finds need for recognizing "organic causation" in addition to "inorganic causation" In instances of the former type "we observe implications of interdependence and reciprocity which are utterly lacking in inorganic causation." (P. 336.) "The driving and directing power seen in life is thus the organism as a whole." (P. 340) "Under inorganic causation . . . the molecules have a merely inorganic relation to each other: they act as molecules of carbon, oxygen, nitrogen, phosphorus, sulphur and what not, and the configurations they will assume can be described in purely chemical terms. But when favored by organic conditions a new relation between them begins. What each of the molecules shall do is henceforth determined by what all of them must do; the single properties of the units, in a word, are transmuted, or merged, into a collective property, the property of life." (P. 339.) This organic causation, according to Noble, is a manifestation of what he calls "dynamic" intelligence—something not essentially psychical—and which he describes as "the self-striving of Nature towards enduring shapes of beauty and strength." (P. 344.) The effort, however, to conceive intelligence in detachment from the psychical or conscious seems artificial and without clear meaning. Psychic life is a known source of the co-ordinating of diverse processes toward a common end and should be recognized as present in some form where such co-ordinating takes place.

REINTERPRETATIONS OF EVOLUTION

levels, in adapting organisms to their environment. (a) There is conceptual purposefulness such as we see in man when he pursues an end, perhaps against obstacles, even through a single day. (b) There is perceptual purposefulness such as is seen in the big-brained higher animals, where we may reasonably think that a present perception or a remembered image is at work. (c) There is the instinctive purposiveness of the little-brained animals such as ants and bees, where psychic factors seem to be at work although we cannot assume that the end is in view. (d) And there is the organic purposiveness of animals such as the star-fish, which have no central ganglia but only scattered neurones, but which are capable of active and rather complicated endeavor.⁸⁸

Immanent creative purposiveness, then, should be recognized wherever there are living organisms, and may be postulated wherever there are individual entities in the inorganic realm which possess a characteristic internal organization. On the inorganic levels this immanent creative purposiveness is, of course, of the most rudimentary sort, such as the panpsychic doctrine conceives. On these levels it can be nothing more than the blind appetite and the physical purposes of which Whitehead speaks.⁸⁹ But up through the successive levels of animal life it becomes increasingly developed and efficient until it appears in the capacity for inference and persistent purpose of the orang-utan and chim-

⁸⁸ *The System of Animate Nature*, pp. 335-341. Similar points, stated in reverse order, are made by President J. R. Angell, in an article on "Modern Movements in Psychology." (1) The study of micro-organisms, he says, shows that their behavior "gives evidence of preferential actions indicative of rudimentary intelligence." (2) Animals of higher organization "give clear evidence of effective memory for many kinds of experience and of the existence of persistent purpose." (3) "Recent observations on anthropoid apes . . . reveal the presence in unmistakable form of the beginnings of the human process of inference, of the connecting of cause and effect in a practical way, the use of implements, the existence of excellent memory, and the presence of persistent and definite purpose." (See *Amherst Graduates' Quarterly*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 80, 82-83).

⁸⁹ See the preceding chapter, pp. 282 ff.

CREATIVE FINALISM

panzee, and in the intellectual, social, æsthetic, and ethical capacities of man.

But the principle of creative finalism also has its indispensable meaning for the cosmos as a whole. Only its meaning for the cosmos must be held in harmony both with its meaning for finite individuals, and with the doctrine of levels. It leads, when thus understood, to the conception of God as a Cosmic Creative Spirit, to whose nature the ultimate principles of reason and of value are intrinsic, and to whose nature belongs also an infinite capacity for the origination of particular entities and processes. God so conceived is more than Bergson's Cosmic Élan Vital, because he eternally possesses perfections which are determinative in all his creative action. But also, God as so conceived is, as I think, more than Morgan's omnipresent Divine Purposeful Causality, inasmuch as in this conception Divine Purpose is timeless. Morgan affirms "that what in naturalistic regard is 'epigenetic' emergence is from first to last the temporal unfolding of Divine Purpose in which there is no first nor last since it Is."⁴⁰ This means that, when one comes to the metaphysical view of things, one should abandon epigenesis or emergence for preformationism. But if all that ever has or ever will come to pass in the time process is prefigured down to the last detail in the Divine Purpose, human life and the cosmos are twice-told tales. Is repetition then the last word about existence? Is not, in contrast to such a view, the conception of God as metaphysically creative, and as bringing into being finite centres of creativity, a higher and richer one?

Here is a question of fundamental philosophy on which modern philosophies of evolution divide. Hobhouse in his *Development and Purpose*, "An Essay towards a Philosophy of Evolution," writes:

Thus the growth of harmony involves the evolution of in-
⁴⁰ *Life, Mind and Spirit*, p. 308; cf. also p. x.

REINTERPRETATIONS OF EVOLUTION

dividual minds, which constantly enter into deeper and wider relations with one another. But beyond this our account appears to imply a permanent activity of a Mind that is not limited to a single physical organism. For at least so far as our experience and our powers of conception extend, the existence of a Purpose implies a Mind commensurate with that purpose. Mind is the permanent—we may venture to say the substantive—basis of purposive conception or activity. Where we trace germs or filaments of purpose we infer the rudiments of mind. Where a purpose of a given scope is plain there is to be inferred a mind of not less scope. If, as we now conclude, a purpose runs through the world-whole, there is a Mind of which the world-purpose is the object. Such a Mind must be a permanent and central factor in the process of Reality.⁴¹

This Central Mind, according to Hobhouse's thought, since it is the permanent ground of all development, cannot be *in toto* the product of development, but at the same time it is in a real sense evolving. "If we persevere with the organic conception," he says, "we must regard the central mind as itself undergoing development." To this he adds: "It follows—in opposition to a more mechanical teleology—that the Purpose operating in evolution is itself not fully defined from the beginning, but susceptible of development."⁴² Hobhouse's theory, thus, is a thorough-going theory of epigenesis, according to which a Central Mind, "the core of the world-process," working in the midst of limiting conditions of the mechanical type, is bringing forth successively higher stages or levels of organizations and harmony in fulfilment of a purpose which is itself developing.

In contrast to this theory of cosmic epigenesis stands Boodin's theory of "cosmic interaction." In this theory there is no evolution of new levels in the cosmos. "Is there," Boodin asks, "evolution in the whole?" And he answers, "There obviously cannot be the evolution of new levels, for

⁴¹ Pp. 364f.

⁴² *Op. cit.*, p. 370, and f.n.

COSMIC EVOLUTION

then we should have the whole problem of something coming from nothing."⁴³ Instead he holds that there must be an eternal hierarchy of levels in the universe. In fact, not only the levels of matter, life and mind, but "all possible levels," eternally coexist. Evolution, however, and emergence can take place in any given part of the cosmos—for example, on the earth—through the interaction of the co-existing levels. In this interaction the higher levels supply "energy patterns," including thought patterns, which stimulate the objects of the lower levels to respond with whatever unique capacity they may have.

According to this theory of cosmic interaction "God is the highest level of the cosmos."⁴⁴ As such he pervades nature in some degree throughout all its levels. "Somehow the energy of God radiates throughout, and energy radiates back from nature to God. There is continual interaction and interchange."⁴⁵ Thus matter and God are co-eternal, as are all the possible levels of the universe, and each supplies energy and energy-patterns to all the others. "There is preformation in the whole in relation to the history of any part of the cosmos."⁴⁶

In respect to the issue defined by these contrasting philosophies of evolution it is clear that Hobhouse has more truly effected the synthesis between creativity and finalism which we have found to be necessary. Boodin, to be sure, holds that God can bring forth new "patterns." He rejects the notion "that cosmic genius has a storehouse of an indefinite number of patterns from which it draws." And he argues:

If the form of cosmic activity which we know as human art does not require the pre-existence of particular patterns, but rather consists in creating new pattern controls according to general cosmic laws, how absurd to suppose that the creativeness of cosmic genius is limited by pre-existing patterns.⁴⁷

⁴³ *Cosmic Evolution*, p. 44.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 244, 245.

REINTERPRETATIONS OF EVOLUTION

It is hard to see how this absolute creativity of patterns is consistent with Boodin's denial of any evolution of new levels. And *per contra*, if God can be creative of new patterns, why can he not be creative of new levels of being? Why must electricity and matter and all other possible levels be co-eternal with him?

At all events we have seen reason to hold to a thoroughgoing application of creative finalism as being the principle to which the reinterpretation of the philosophy of evolution leads. Both creativity and general principles of reason and value must be taken as metaphysical ultimates. On this basis God's purpose must be conceived to be eternally defined by ultimate principles of reason and value, so that he is always creative of order and beauty and goodness; and yet his purpose must not be conceived as completely defined from the beginning but as originating new patterns and achieving new levels of being. As Whitehead has said:

The immanence of God gives reason for the belief that pure chaos is intrinsically impossible. At the other end of the scale, the immensity of the world negatives the belief that any state of order can be so established that beyond it there can be no progress.⁴⁸

Let us gather up some of the results of this and the preceding chapters in their bearing on theism. We saw, in our study of the new cosmology, how ideas of organic unity, of the determination of parts by wholes, of creative co-ordination, and of gradations of organization have proven to be necessary for understanding the physical order and lead to the recognition of values, purpose, and intelligent creativeness as being operative in physical processes; so that the whole of physical nature is most rationally conceived as being grounded in the activity of a World-Spirit.

And now, in our study of reinterpretations of biological

⁴⁸ *Process and Reality*, p. 169.

A PURPOSEFUL WORLD-SPIRIT

evolution, we have seen how mechanical conceptions are taking a provisional place as being applicable to parts and aspects of the evolutionary process, rather than as being adequate for evolution as a whole. In other words, mechanism is to be subordinated to ideas of emergence, purposiveness, and creativity. Life itself is a new emergence in the physical order. In the unfolding of life psychic factors are increasingly identifiable. Feeling makes possible purposive action and higher organization. Then conscious mind and purpose emerge as guiding agencies and the human and moral level is reached. On this basis "the direction of human evolution" is such as to call for struggle and effort, for the discovery and appreciation of values, and for creative intelligence and co-operation.⁴⁹ So vast a process of cosmic evolution requires the conception of a creative purposeful World-Spirit as its ground. As Boodin has expressed it: "Nature is what it is, it has determinate order and law, it evolves towards truth and beauty because it is under the creative control of God. Else were there no creative advance in nature."⁵⁰

The dominant characteristics of evolution, then, are such as to enable us to think of God as being truly immanent in the evolutionary process. In all that makes for the emergence and establishment of ever higher organic unities and for the co-ordination of these unities into an increasingly comprehensive harmony we may see the working of God. But for the right understanding of this working of God we need to think of his all-embracing purpose toward the supreme values as interacting with finite centres of activity throughout the scale of emergent evolution. The principle of creative finalism finds application in some degree wherever there is individuality, as well as in the cosmos as a whole. These finite centres of activity, indeed, condition the working of God; and they do so in two opposite ways. When brought

⁴⁹ Cf. E. G. Conklin, *The Direction of Human Evolution*, Chap. X.

⁵⁰ *Cosmic Evolution*, p. 265.

REINTERPRETATIONS OF EVOLUTION

into organized unity they become constituents of a richer harmony than would have been possible without them; but so far as they remain unco-ordinated they may become sources of discord and evil. Hence suffering and, on the human level, moral evil are bound to appear in the cosmic evolutionary process. God is not immanent in these processes of discord and dissolution as such, for they are contrary to his working. His immanence is to be found, in relation to these processes, in the healing, recuperative work of nature and in reconciling and redemptive spiritual working, by which suffering and evil are triumphed over and transmuted into good.

Finding God immanent in the evolutionary process does not mean that we should not think of him as also transcendent. The mind of a man is immanent in his body, but it also transcends his body. So God should be thought of as transcending the evolutionary process at the same time that he is immanent in it. For he possesses the ultimate values which we do not find in the world but toward which we aspire. He also is creative both of new patterns and of new levels of being. And his creative love engenders the creativeness of our finite minds. We may, indeed, take the three "voices of Nature" of which Thomson speaks⁵¹—voices which say, "Endeavor, Enjoy, Enquire"—as the summons to us of the transcendent-immanent God.

⁵¹ Cf. *The System of Animate Nature*, pp. 646-648

A. BELIEF IN GOD

(continued)

XIII.

THEISM AND HUMAN HISTORY

MAN is part of the cosmos; which means both that natural laws have application to man, and also that the nature and history of man must be considered in interpreting the cosmos. More particularly, man is a part of biological evolution, and at the same time a new emergence in evolution. Our view of evolution, then, cannot be completed without taking account of the principles and meanings which characterize the level of human life, and the new emergences which take place there. Accordingly, we turn next to human history, in order to see how far a philosophy of history is attainable and what its bearing may be upon theism.

The historical method and its results form a no less vital part of modern thought than do the methods and results of the natural sciences. The writing of history as an art begins, it is true, with the Greeks, as do also the natural sciences. But it was not until, with the coming of the modern period, the secular view of life had freed itself from the control over thought which authority and revelation exercised in the mediæval period that the historical method could be fully realized and freely employed. Indeed, if we mean by the historical method the first-hand study of sources under the guidance of the principle of development we have to wait for its full emergence till the latter part of the eighteenth, and the beginning of the nineteenth, centuries.

Under the influence of the new historical spirit new philosophies of history have taken shape. Formal philosophy,

THEISM AND HUMAN HISTORY

it is true, has become in recent decades exceedingly shy of the subject of the philosophy of history. The enormous mass of material which historical study has accumulated, the complexity of the problems involved in the attempt to interpret the actual processes of history, and the, at least partial, failure of the most ambitious modern attempts at the subject have largely deterred philosophers from the field of the philosophy of history. And yet, if philosophies of evolution in general are needed and have value, why should not the problems of the philosophy of history be grappled with, even though, after the most hopeful successes, the problems will have to be returned to again and again?

At all events few teachings in the field of philosophy have been more potent in the life of the modern world than certain outstanding philosophies of history which have gained wide acceptance, explicit or tacit. There are five such philosophies of history which we must take up for brief consideration. They are: Hegel's idealistic monistic conception of history; Karl Marx's materialistic monistic conception; pluralistic views of history, seen in nationalism and racialism and in various philosophic guises; the philosophy of progress; and Spengler's cycle theory of history.

History as the expression of the Absolute Spirit. Hegel's philosophy of history did much toward bringing the historical method to its full meaning and influence. This may be seen in the matter of the higher criticism of the Bible. Though the higher criticism had begun long before, with Spinoza, Richard Simon, and Semler, it gained a new conception of the relation of history to the sacred literature through the work of Ferdinand Christian Baur and his school, who in turn derived their inspiration and general principles from Hegel. The theologians at Tübingen were studying Hegel while the department of philosophy was still indifferent to him. David Friedrich Strauss's first lectures at Tübingen were upon Hegel's logic—lectures which Zeller, the great

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

historian of Greek philosophy, heard and by which he was profoundly impressed.

"We may," says A. K. Rogers, "sum up Hegel's main thought most readily, by saying that it is the philosophical expression of that new *historical sense*' which came in with the nineteenth century. What Hegel contributed to the problems of history was a thorough-going application of the concept of *development*. He held that all human life and institutions, and indeed all reality, should be viewed as a developmental process. "Reality exists, and that reality reveals itself in history."¹

But Hegel also had a characteristic conception of the nature of historical development. To quote from his *Philosophy of History*: "The only thought which philosophy brings with it to the contemplation of history is the simple conception of *Reason*; that Reason is the sovereign of the world; that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process"² For Hegel the real was the rational and the rational was the real. This combination of Reason and the principle of development gives us Hegel's philosophy of history. From this point of view the development of reason and the development of things exemplify one and the same law. Hegel thought that he could describe the essence of the logical process as consisting, first in the positing of a thesis, then the recognition of an antithesis, and finally the discovery of the unity of the two in a higher synthesis. This law of thought applies to things. "That which at first we take as immediate and complete in itself, presently, by reason of the fact that it is not such a complete whole, but only a part of the entire reality, shows its incompleteness by passing into its opposite; and then follows the process of reconciliation, through which both sides get their rights."³

¹ *A Student's History of Philosophy*, pp. 457-463. Cf. also Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, pp. 612ff.

² *Hegel's Philosophy of History* (Bohn's Library), p. 9.

³ Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 460.

THEISM AND HUMAN HISTORY

"Philosophy," wrote Hegel, "shows that the Idea advances to an infinite antithesis; that (antithesis), viz. between the Idea in its free, universal form—in which it exists for itself—and the contrasted form of abstract introversion, reflection on itself, which is formal existence-for-self, personality, formal freedom, such as belongs to Spirit only. The universal Idea exists thus as the substantial totality of things on the one side, and as the abstract essence of free volition on the other side. This reflection of the mind on itself is individual self-consciousness—the polar opposite of the Idea in its general form, and therefore existing in absolute Limitation. This polar opposite is consequently limitation, particularization, for the universal absolute being; it is the side of its *definite existence*; the sphere of its formal reality, the sphere of reverence paid to God.—To comprehend the absolute connection of this antithesis, is the profound task of metaphysics."⁴

We might illustrate the application of this dialectical process to history by pointing to the dominance in the Middle Ages of unquestioned authority. This was followed by the growth of abstract ideas of freedom culminating in the Enlightenment, and leading to an excessive individualism. And these ideas must of necessity give way to a more socialized conception of freedom, which to Hegel's mind must be realized through a highly centralized political state. "The State is the Divine Idea as it exists on Earth."⁵

There is no higher embodiment of the Divine Idea at any given time than the national political state. Hegel did not look forward to any super-state, or federation of the world. But beyond any given state there is the succession of states, through which the Divine Idea gains ever fuller expression. "The particular form of Spirit not merely passes away in the world by natural causes in Time, but is annulled in the automatic self-mirroring activity of consciousness. Because this annulling is an activity of Thought, it is at the same time conservative and elevating in its operation." Just as an

⁴ Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁵ Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

individual, while maintaining a unity, advances through various stages of development, so does a people. Each particular stage of the people's life makes some contribution as the immanent Spirit presses on toward universality. "In this point lies the fundamental, the Ideal necessity of transition. This is the soul—the essential consideration—of the philosophical comprehension of History."⁶

The consequence of these principles is that history becomes the expression of the Absolute Spirit.

That the History of the World, with all the changing scenes which its annals present, is this process of development and the realization of Spirit—this is the true *Theodicy*, the justification of God in History. Only *this* can reconcile Spirit with the History of the World—viz., that what has happened, and is happening every day, is not only not "without God," but is essentially His Work.⁷

This philosophy of history was the most essential aspect of Hegel's thought, and it is the aspect which has had the most far-reaching effects upon human life.

But while Hegel did much to help men to conceive human history in developmental fashion, his system as a whole broke down. His rigorous monism gave too little scope to individuality and personality. His stress upon Reason as the essence of all reality was followed, as if in illustration of his own dialectic, by Schopenhauer's doctrine of the essential irrationality of all things; and, in the schools of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, by insistence upon the claims of intuition and faith alongside of those of reason. Furthermore, while Hegel's thought was often illuminative when applied to the human spirit, it was arbitrary and barren of meaning when extended to the philosophy of physical nature.

In the actual writing of history, too, the influence of Hegel's thought often led to *a priori* theories as to the course

⁶ Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

⁷ Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. 477.

THEISM, AND HUMAN HISTORY

of events which resulted in violence being done to the facts. This can be illustrated by the theories of the school of Baur concerning the New Testament writings. Holding that these writings represented in various ways the conflicts of parties in the early church, this school regarded Matthew as the earliest gospel, the Judaistic thesis of early Christianity; which was followed by Luke, embodying the antithesis of Gentile Christianity; while Mark was regarded as the latest of the three gospels, the synthesis of the other two. But by more objective historical study Mark has been proven to be the earliest of the three gospels, and a source for the other two.

Finally, Hegel's philosophy of history was gravely limited by its ultra-conservative social temper. Hegel was, in fact, "the philosopher of the Restoration," who opposed all the tendencies of thought which found expression in the American and French Revolutions. Concerning this aspect of his philosophy Rogers says:

There was a new social spirit coming to birth, which Hegel failed . . . to satisfy. For him, the task of philosophy was simply to interpret the movement of the Universal Spirit as it had already embodied itself in social institutions; it was not in any sense to prophesy, or to construct ideals. To the new temper which was beginning to demand social justice, and a reconstitution of society that should give something for the mass of men to hope for, and relieve the sufferings of those with whom the Idea had not seen fit to concern itself, Hegel seemed to have nothing to say. Indeed, to men of such a temper, he appeared even a reactionary.⁸

Clearly, the notion that philosophy might play some creative part in human history was precluded by Hegel's thought. He assigned to philosophy a very different function. "The insight then," he wrote, "to which . . . philosophy leads us is that the real world is as it ought to be. . . . Philosophy,

⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 482-485.

MARXIAN PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

wishes to discover the substantial purport, the real side of the divine idea, and to justify the so much despised Reality of things."⁹

History as a process of economic determinism. Though Hegel was the philosopher of social conservatism, a Hegelian left wing developed which gave radical application to the master's ideas in several directions. Among this group was Karl Marx, the founder of German socialism. Of the relation of Marx to Hegel, Max Eastman writes:

Marx retained the principal assumptions of this philosophy: namely, that history is one thing or process; . . . that this process has some one cause, other than the conscious purposes of men, which explains it all; and that this cause has the property of being logical in its development, and of advancing by contradiction, and the negation of the negation. . . . But he turned that philosophy other side up. He found the ultimate one cause, not in the evolving Idea . . . but in the evolving forces of production.¹⁰

For Marx the Hegelian thesis is exemplified by the "productive forces," the labor of men; the antithesis by the "production-relations," or industrial system; and the synthesis by the social revolution, establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat, and ultimately the class-free society.

A compact statement of the essentials of Marx's view of history is to be found in his early work, *The Poverty of Philosophy*:

The social relations are intimately attached to the productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production, and in changing their mode of production, their manner of gaining a living, they change all their social relations. The windmill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist.

The same men who establish social relations conformably with their material productivity, produce also the principles,

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 38.

¹⁰ *Marx and Lenin*, p. 47.

THEISM AND HUMAN HISTORY

the ideas, the categories, conformably with their social relations.

Thus these ideas, these categories, are not more eternal than the relations which they express. They are *historical and transitory products*.

There is a continual movement of growth in the productive forces, of destruction in the social relations, of formation in ideas; there is nothing immutable but the abstraction of the movement—*mors immortalis*.¹¹

This work criticized the Hegelian philosophy because of its abstract idealistic character. In an essay entitled "A Criticism of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right"¹² Marx opposed the alliance which that philosophy effected in principle between religion and the Prussian State. It is in this essay that he said of religion: "It is the opium of the people." "The criticism of religion ends," declared Marx, "with the doctrine that man is the supreme being for mankind, and therefore with the categorical imperative to overthrow all conditions in which man is a degraded, servile, neglected, contemptible being."¹³ The union of religion and speculative jurisprudence by which Hegel gave support to the Prussian state Marx attacked by means of the Hegelian dialectic itself, and by means of the Hegelian philosophy of history materialistically interpreted. By the same laws according to which capitalism has followed feudalism, socialism must follow capitalism.¹⁴ "When the proletariat desires the nega-

¹¹ See p. 119.

¹² In *Selected Essays by Karl Marx*.

¹³ Marx may well have been influenced toward his position on religion by Feuerbach and the other "Young Hegelians." "Just at the time when Marx was still at the university the Young Hegelians took up the fight against the conservative section of Hegel's disciples and the Christian Romanticism of Prussia." See *The Life and Teachings of Karl Marx*, by M. Beer.

¹⁴ Those political economists who hold that capitalism is founded on natural law really hold that, "There has been history but there is no longer any. There has been history, since there have been feudal institutions, and in these feudal institutions were found conditions of production entirely different to those of bourgeois society, which the economists wish to have accepted as being natural and therefore eternal." Cf. *The Poverty of Philosophy*, p. 131.

MARXIAN PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

tion of private property, it is merely elevating to a general principle of society what it already involuntarily embodies in itself as the negative product of society."¹⁵ Here the Hegelian principle of "the negation of the negation" is clearly at work.

In estimating the Marxian view of history it is of interest to note that for a present-day radical socialist like Max Eastman the Marxian theory breaks down, partly because it is too deterministic. Eastman complains that Marx "interchanges the verbs *condition* and *determine* as though they were approximately equivalent." "The control exercised by the economic factor turns out in the nature of the case to be merely negative. And the followers of Marx, without exactly noticing this, have been content if they could show in the case of any particular historic development that economic factors *had something essential to do with it.*"¹⁶

It seems evident that a thoroughly monistic materialism can be no more adequate, to say the least, as an interpreta-

¹⁵ Marx, *Selected Essays*, p. 38. Cf. the following: "The emancipation of Germans is the emancipation of mankind. The head of this emancipation is philosophy; its heart is the proletariat. Philosophy cannot be realized without the abolition of the proletariat, the proletariat cannot abolish itself without realizing philosophy.

When all the inner conditions are fulfilled, the German day of resurrection will be announced by the crowing of the Gallic Cock." *Op. cit.*, p. 39.

"The Hegelian dialectic appears most strikingly in the famous twenty-fourth chapter (sec 7) of the first volume of *Capital*, where the evolution of capitalism from small middle-class ownership through all phases up to the Socialist revolution is comprehensively outlined in bold strokes: 'The capitalist method of appropriation, which springs from the capitalist method of production, and therefore capitalist private property, is the first negation of individual private property based on one's own labor. But capitalist production begets with the inevitableness of a natural process its own negation. It is the negation of the negation.'" M. Beer, *op. cit.*, p. xxx.

¹⁶ *Marx and Lenin*, p. 50. In the place of economic determinism Eastman would adopt "a thoroughly experimental procedure. The aim will be defined at first very loosely and 'abstractly,' and held subject to redefinition in the light of the developing facts." "This definition does not pretend to determine in advance the concrete forms to be assumed by a class-free society, the degree and kind of co-operation and competition which may prove possible or desirable there. . . . 'The declaration of a permanent revolution' implies this. It preserves the extremeness and inflexibility of the purpose, but it leaves open the field of experiment and political invention." Pp. 214, 215.

THEISM AND HUMAN HISTORY

tion of the manifold phenomena of history than a thoroughly monistic idealism. Spontaneity, we have seen reason to believe, is rooted even in the seemingly inanimate world; wherefore we are compelled to regard its vast uniformities as statistical averages rather than as absolutely changeless laws. Variation and selective action are increasingly manifest throughout the ascending scale of emergent evolution, although the ascent is no less dependent upon the building up of stable organizations than upon the presence of increasing spontaneity. In human history the vast uniformities of physical nature are omnipresent, as are also the enormous continuities of the biological world; moreover, in addition to biological heredity, human habit, custom, and tradition form tenaciously stable complexes, and "social heredity" becomes a most potent force. Nevertheless, the capacities for intelligence, purpose, and the appreciation of value which have emerged play a growingly significant part. The level has been reached where moral freedom is possible, at least for some men, when recorded history begins. And here both the glory and the tragedy of the human story begin to appear. For the development of moral freedom and spiritual creativity requires the elaboration of social structures, and yet these same structures often block the way to an extension and a deepening of man's moral action and of his spiritual vision and achievement.

A view of history which seeks to hold in some kind of perspective these various complexes of forces will need to retain a large measure of pluralism while seeking to discern principles and laws. The determining power and inertia of economic organization, which Marx stressed so exclusively, cannot be ignored. Moreover, there is a class conflict, even though it be not grounded in a metaphysical dialectic. And as against the doctrine that the capitalistic system is grounded in natural law, Marx's historical view of social institutions has the greater truth. But potent as material and economic

PLURALISTIC VIEWS OF HISTORY

forces in human history may be, one who tries to understand the Greeks without recognizing the causal significance of their science and their art, or the Hebrew people apart from the historical efficacy of their religious vision and faith, misses the factors to which the place of these peoples in history is chiefly due. Thus determination and contingency, and the interplay of physical, economic, and idealistic forces demand such recognition in our view of history that the doctrine which treats history as solely a matter of economic determinism must be set aside.

Pluralistic views of history. But not only have rigidly monistic theories of history, whether idealistic or materialistic, broken down because the facts cannot be fitted into them. The reaction against monistic interpretations has gone so far that the very ideal of human unity has been undermined in wide circles. This tendency to reject the unity of humanity as an ideal is to a large extent the result of the *influence of nationalism and racialism on the philosophy of history*. Following upon the unity of social life achieved in the Middle Ages, and stimulated by the corruptions which had developed in the ecclesiastical system, there arose the Machiavellian doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of the political state, which has been dominant down to the present time. This doctrine has been reinforced, in the case of the stronger nations, by the doctrine of superior and inferior races—this latter doctrine being supposedly grounded in biology and anthropology. The result has been a philosophy of history which has set aside the idea of the unity of humanity as being either desirable or possible.

A good example of this view of history is to be found in H. S. Chamberlain's *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*. Chamberlain said of the modern period and its culture:

"If we wish to judge rightly the history of the growth of this new world, we must never lose sight of the fact of its specifically Teutonic character. For as soon as we speak of

humanity in general, as soon as we fancy that we see in history a development, a progress, an education, etc., of 'humanity,' we leave the sure ground of facts and float in airy abstractions. For this humanity, about which men have philosophized to such an extent, suffers from the serious defect that it does not exist at all. Nature and history reveal to us a great number of various human beings, but no such thing as humanity." "This humanity . . . we shall never take as a starting-point in judging what is human. . . . Nor shall we ever take it as our goal, for individual limitation precludes the possibility of a universally valid generalization."¹⁷

Hence Chamberlain held that peoples of different races are essentially unintelligible to each other, and that progress in the modern world depends upon the purity of the Teutonic stock from which modern culture springs, and upon the dominance of that stock.

Chamberlain included under "Teuton" the Anglo-Saxons and the Franks as well as the Germans; and unfortunately for his theory there ensued the World War between different branches of the Teutonic race. Such an event shows how much more significant may be a historical unity, such as a nation is, than a unity of stock, which always remains a somewhat doubtful matter. And on the other hand, such an event shows how unities of the national type may prove to be self-destructive because of the pluralistic character of the values which they cherish. Hence the need is clearly demonstrated that ethical ideals which are far more universal than those based on either nationality or race should come into control.

Furthermore, an important school of anthropologists has so successfully challenged the doctrine of superior and inferior races that such a doctrine cannot be put forward as the verdict of science. Professor F. Boas has shown that, whereas the Negro race is popularly supposed to stand nearer to the anthropoid apes than the white race, as a matter of

¹⁷ Vol. II, pp. 200, 207.

PLURALISTIC VIEWS OF HISTORY

fact in respect to a number of biological traits the white race stand nearer. As for the argument that some races are inferior because they not only have not produced a high culture, but also have failed to assimilate such a culture when they have come into contact with it, Professor Boas points out that the facts in question are sufficiently accounted for by historical and geographical conditions. Where the disparity in actual culture is not too great, and where the contacts are gradually made, as they were around the Mediterranean basin, assimilation does take place. Where assimilation has failed to take place, as in the case of the contact of Europeans with the original peoples of America, either the disparity of culture was too great, or the contact of races was too abrupt, or both. Nor is the existence of cultural disparity between races at a given point in chronology a sufficient basis for establishing an inherent difference of capacity between races. For in the long story of human evolution these disparities are not so great as they seem to us, and too many circumstances, favorable or unfavorable, have played their part in accelerating or retarding cultural development in different regions of the earth.¹⁸

As a matter of fact race distinctions as they actually function in human life are, as Arnold Toynbee has pointed out, very largely psychological matters, that is, matters of race-feeling, instead of being based on profound biological differences.¹⁹ Hence they do not introduce the element of physical necessity into the development of culture, as is often supposed; but, on the contrary, are controllable by ethical ideals. Finally, so far is race from being decisive in the development of culture, as Chamberlain maintained, that our Western culture has its roots in social systems which were the antithesis of race—the Hellenistic world and Christianity.

But a thoroughly pluralistic view of history is often held

¹⁸ Cf. F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*.

¹⁹ See art. "Race" in Hastings, *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

THEISM AND HUMAN HISTORY

by thinkers in whose interpretations nationalism and racialism play no significant part. Having rejected all monisms, whether idealistic or materialistic, and being unable to discern any purpose or dominant trend in history, many feel that pluralism must be the last word in the historical realm. These thinkers hold that, if one is to speak of purpose in history, one must mean always the purpose of the historian. The writer of history selects a process which has had a result that he thinks interesting and important, and he traces the steps which led up to that result. There are as many histories, therefore, as there are processes selected by man for understanding. But absolutely considered, all histories are of equal importance or unimportance. Purpose in history is wholly relative to the student of history.

Thus Professor Woodbridge affirms that "history is pluralistic and implies a pluralistic philosophy." And hence he writes :

Absolutely considered the cosmos is impartial to its many histories. But even that is not well said, for it implies that the cosmos might be partial if it chose. We should rather say that there is no considering of history absolutely at all. For history is just the denial of absolute considerations. It is the affirmation of relative considerations, of considerations which are relative to a selected career.²⁰

This pluralistic, relativistic view of history Woodbridge places in the general framework of his naturalism. "The continuity of history," he says, "is the continuity of matter. It comprises in sum the structure to which every movement in time is subject. It makes up what we call the laws of nature conformably to which whatever is done must be done." But this naturalism remains pluralistic. The continuity of matter in itself "is inert and impotent. Activity of some sort must penetrate it, if there is to be anything effected."²¹ Hence Woodbridge holds that man's history "can never be ade-

²⁰ *The Purpose of History*, pp. 4, 52.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

PLURALISTIC VIEWS OF HISTORY

quately written solely in terms of physics or chemistry, or even of biology; it must be written also in terms of aspiration."²² Thus man's purposes and ideals have an irreducible rôle to play in his history. But these purposes and ideals are in turn to be naturalistically conceived. We should admit that "man makes moral judgments as naturally as the sun shines." And the purpose of his history is "so to use the materials of the world that they will be permanently used in the light of the ideal perfection they naturally suggest."²³

But when one thus combines pluralism and naturalism it is difficult to see why one is not logically without defense against the nationalism and racialism which we have just been discussing. Why may not each form of fascism, and each form of democracy based on race, make an equally logical claim to represent the ideal that "the materials of the world" "naturally suggest"?

If, on the other hand, one insists upon a pluralistic view of history apart from any general philosophical framework, one may ground the ideal of the unity of humanity in an autonomous ethics; but then the question returns as to whether that ideal has no other relevance to the course of events than what is supplied by the conscious purposings and strivings of men toward that ideal. Is there nothing in the deeper nature of reality and of human life which supports the hope that the ideal is achievable?

Sheer philosophical pluralism can no more be the last word for us today, as we face the problems of history, than can nationalism and racialism. In the case of the latter positions, we see too plainly the ethical limitations of the doctrine of national sovereignty, and we cannot but feel the arrogance involved in assuming the sufficiency of a given racial culture—even for the people who possess it. And as over against sheer philosophical pluralism we must recognize that the degree of organic unity in the cosmos which the new cos-

²² *Ibid.*, p. 57.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

THEISM AND HUMAN HISTORY

mology exhibits, and the creative finalism discoverable in the dominant trend of organic evolution, furnish a basis for the discernment of a unifying process in human history which has spiritual and metaphysical meaning.

As a matter of fact, after the rather long prevalence of thoroughly pluralistic views of history, certain *recent tendencies toward synthesis* are to be noted. As Troeltsch has said: "In all moments of crisis, and in periods of greater maturity a conscious and constructive synthesis . . . becomes necessary. This kind of synthesis is the something for which today we are searching unceasingly in our modern world."²⁴ This suggests that neither monism nor pluralism is the final word about history, but that unity is partly present and partly to be achieved. If it is in this fashion that synthesis is to be sought, one of the ideas which we shall need to examine and reinterpret will be the idea of progress.

The Philosophy of Progress. J. B. Bury has shown that the idea of Progress is a modern achievement. The doctrine of world cycles dominated Greek thought, and other-worldly conceptions dominated mediæval thought. But with the modern period there arose, first, the idea of an indefinite progress of human enlightenment, and then the idea of the general progress of man. The French Revolution gave new impetus to this idea, and the science of sociology arose. Then Darwin's *Origin of Species* carried the idea to a new stage by ranging behind human history a vast process of biological development.²⁵

But the idea of progress requires some principle by which progress is to be measured. For the idea relates not only to the past but also to the future. "It is from its bearings on the future that Progress derives its value, its interest, and its power. You may conceive civilization as having gradually advanced in the past, but you have not got the idea of Prog-

²⁴ *Christian Thought*, p. 95.

²⁵ *The Idea of Progress*, Introduction and Chap. XIX.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROGRESS

ress until you go on to conceive that it is destined to advance indefinitely in the future"²⁸ One cannot consistently hold that whatever the evolutionary process brings forth must be progress, if for no other reason, because the future may bring forth results quite contradictory to those of the past in meaning and value. It is to ethical ideals whose validity is independent of the evolutionary process that we must look for the norm by which progress is to be measured. In our previous discussions of ethical values we have undertaken to set forth the autonomy of ethics, and have formulated the supreme ethical principle as being "the fullest development of every human personality through the co-operative creation of a world-wide community of persons." With this principle in mind we may sketch, following L. T. Hobhouse, certain lines of development which support the idea of a progress in human history.

Hobhouse, after pointing out that the word "humanity" has a double meaning—that is, "a certain quality that is in each man," and also "the whole race of men"—sums up the whole process traced in his inductive study of *Morals in Evolution* by saying that "it is in this double sense to realise humanity." This realizing of humanity, both intensively and extensively, he has traced along several main lines of development. Starting with the primitive society resting on ties of blood-kinship, he points out the transition through military power and the principle of force, on to the principle of authority together with the recognition of paternalistic obligation, until there is reached the principle of the good will of the citizens and the social nature of man as the basis of society—which is then ordered so as to secure the maximum of social co-operation and individual freedom.

Similarly there is the development from the self-redress of wrongs by individuals or kindred, toward a more and more impartial tribunal—established first under external au-

²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 7.

THEISM AND HUMAN HISTORY

thority, but later resting on a democratic basis and aiming at reforming the criminal and cutting off the sources of crime. Again there is the change in the position of woman from that in a relatively loose natural family to more defined and stable relations secured through a subordination of the wife, followed by the developments which seek to reconcile the intimacy of union with equal freedom for both parties—the governing ideal being the realization of full, well-rounded personality for both woman and man.

Likewise in the instance of property there is the beginning in the quasi-communism of primitive peoples, then the control of property by feudal methods, then the system of free contract, and then the movement toward social control of production and distribution. And finally—without seeking to summarize all even of these major lines of development—we may cite the process which begins in group-morality, then becomes inter-tribal morality, and later enters the field of international relations. The various steps toward the organization of international law involve, in the judgment of Hobhouse, “a fuller recognition of a common humanity,” and point ultimately toward “a society of nations to which each independent state owes allegiance.”²⁷

Unmistakably there has been progress *within* human history. Just as an age-long process of biological development made possible human personality—a process which, if human personality has intrinsic worth, must be called progress—so there has been, within the general stream of human evolution a development of morals which has meant a growth of individual personality and a growth of society in such a way that, in varying degrees, they have mutually furthered each other. So far as this is true, or is in process of becoming

²⁷ See *Morals in Evolution*, pp. 354-364. Cf. Shailer Mathews, *The Spiritual Interpretation of History*; Harry Emerson Fosdick, *Christianity and Progress*; and my chapter, “How Shall We Think of Progress?” in *Religious Foundations*, ed by Rufus Jones. Cf. also the chapter, “Progress in Human History,” in E. G. Conklin, *The Direction of Human Evolution*.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROGRESS

true, we are bound to acknowledge the reality of progress in human history.

But if in biological evolution we have also to face the facts of stagnation and degeneration, still more do we have to face such facts in human history. And what we call physical evil in the biological realm takes on the form of moral evil in the human realm. The conception of progress in human history has often led to the ignoring or minimizing of the facts of evil and resulted in a very superficial optimism. This result has also been due to the assumption that progress in history would go on simply by a process of unconscious growth, instead of being something for which definitely rational, moral, and religious forces are indispensable. Bury, in the passage cited above, affirms that the very idea of progress carries with it the conception "that it is destined to advance indefinitely in the future." But the word "destined," although expressing the thought of many, restricts the idea of progress in arbitrary fashion. Since we find much evolution that is not progress, and also much that is, the *possibility* of indefinite future advance is all that is required to make the idea of progress meaningful and important.

Such, however, has been the prevalence of superficial evolutionary optimism, at least prior to the World War, as to evoke a strong reaction against the idea of progress as being valid in history. Thus we find Dean Inge speaking scornfully of "the superstition of progress," while upholding for men the ideals of Hope through the resources of religion.

Since our object is to enter into the realm of unchanging perfection, finite and relative progress cannot be our ultimate aim, and such progress, like everything else most worth having, must not be aimed at too directly. Our ultimate aim is to live in the knowledge and enjoyment of the absolute values, Truth, Goodness, and Beauty. If the Platonists are right, we shall shape our surroundings more effectively by this kind of idealism than by adopting the creeds and ideals

THEISM AND HUMAN HISTORY

of secularism. . . . For individuals, then, the path of progress is always open; but, as Hesiod told us long before the Sermon on the Mount, it is a narrow path, steep and difficult, especially at first. There will never be a crowd gathered round this gate; "few be they that find it."²⁸

Such a reminder that human values and human destiny need a metaphysical interpretation is most important. But should it not lead to a deepening of our conception of the conditions and nature of human progress, rather than to a return to the Greek idea of world-cycles, which Dean Inge seems to favor?²⁹

The cycle theory of history. It is the World War which has stimulated the revival of the cycle theory, of which Oswald Spengler's *The Decline of the West* is the most influential exposition. Spengler holds that there is no world history, but he defines eight world cultures, each divergent from the others. These cultures are organisms, and each rounds out a cycle of growth and decay, passing through the stages of spring, summer, autumn, and winter. In the spring-time of a culture we find the growth of myths, as in Homer, in the Gospels, and in the Roman Catholic myths of the ninth century. In the summer period there are reformations of the earlier material, such as we see in Orphic religion among the Greeks, and in the work of Augustine and of Luther. Autumn in a culture is the time of over-ripeness, which expresses itself in the notion of the almightiness of reason and in systems of philosophy, as seen in the systems of the Greeks, in late Mohammedan philosophy, and in German idealism. The winter period is a time characterized by a materialistic outlook; by the cult of science; by the emphasis on ethical and social ideals as a substitute for spontaneous spiritual energies; by religion without a God. General skepticism comes in and is a sign of decay. There is

²⁸ *Outspoken Essays*, 2d series, pp. 182, 183.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

THE CYCLE THEORY OF HISTORY

a loss of interest in the perpetuation of the distinctive cultural type, and in the family; and the physical basis of life becomes undermined. In this winter period the culture, which is the development of an inner spirit, is dead, but it continues as civilization, which is occupied with the conquest of nature—as seen in the Roman road-builder and in the modern technician.

The divergence of cultures is strongly emphasized by Spengler. Classical culture is one organism and modern culture is another, and the modern man really gained nothing from the classical man. In between, however, comes what Spengler calls "Arabian culture," which is dualistic, making a sharp antithesis between soul and body, and is thoroughly other-worldly—so that it is spoiled if it is made over into socialized forms. This Arabian culture has its early bloom in the first three centuries of the Christian era, but in its full span it extends to 900 A.D. It is manifested in a group of religions, to which Christianity, Gnosticism, and Islam belong. In order to present the Arabian culture as being thoroughly divergent in character from others, especially from the classical, Spengler introduces the conception of "pseudomorphosis." This phenomenon occurs where a new culture spreads in regions already possessed by an older culture, to which the new is alien and which in many ways cramps the new culture into its older forms. In this way Spengler would explain the relations between Greek culture, Roman civilization, and Christianity. But the inner soul of each culture he holds to be quite distinct. Spengler discerns in classical culture the "Apollinian" soul, in the Arabian culture the "Magian" soul, and in modern Western culture the "Faustian" soul. And he is very severe in condemning the customary division of history into the ancient, mediæval, and modern periods, on the ground that it obscures the true morphology of history.

THEISM AND HUMAN HISTORY

But the actual application to history of the three types of culture, classical, Arabian, and modern, results in forced constructions. The review of the second English edition of Spengler's book by Professor F. J. Teggart may be cited at this point. In reference to the concept of "Arabian Culture" he writes:

Do facts and theory coincide? Now so little correspondence is there between them that the author has been driven to formulate a new conception, that of "pseudomorphosis," to cover the facts in this conspicuous case. . . . What the facts adduced by Spengler show is that the "Arabian culture" was the product of a "native" culture subjected to a succession of intrusive cultural influences. Had he examined the facts with the intention of finding an hypothesis, instead of imposing upon them his own "intuitive" explanation, he would have discovered that human advancement has been due to "contact," not to "development"—but then *The Decline of the West* would never have been written.⁸⁰

In truth Spengler's whole theory turns upon the notion of Arabian culture, which is a highly artificial and arbitrary conception. He has ignored, as Troeltsch points out, the historical mediation between classical and modern culture through the Church. "Instead of this he has inserted a third quite alien body of culture, the sum-total of an Arabian-magian culture, which should embrace Jesus, Paul, Mohammed, Augustine, and Justinian, and he has exaggerated the difference between the classical and the modern man in quite unmeasured fashion."⁸¹

Spengler's revival of the cycle theory of history has the merit of insisting that the problem of decadence in civilization be faced. And his pointing out of the signs of decadence in our present age is often impressive, as when he says: "Here, then, I lay it down that *Imperialism* . . . is to be taken as the typical symbol of the passing away," because it

⁸⁰ *The Saturday Review of Literature*, Jan. 19, 1929.

⁸¹ E. Troeltsch, *Der Historismus und seine Probleme*, p. 718, f.n.

HISTORY AND CREATIVE PERSONALITY

stands for unlimited external expansiveness instead of the inward development of a cultural soul.³²

But Spengler's morphological theory of history is too much dominated by the biological conception of "organism," and his scheme of a spring, summer, autumn, and winter for every culture is far too simple. The result is that Spengler brings out many fanciful or loose correspondences between the stages of different cultures—as can be quickly seen from his tables of "contemporary" spiritual and cultural epochs at the end of his first volume—whereby the individuality and uniqueness of cultural epochs is obscured. Spengler's thought, moreover, is too utterly deterministic to be the true interpretation of history—where the importance of personality, the reality of spontaneity and freedom, and the efficacy of spiritual forces must, in the end, be recognized.³³

History and Creative Personality. If we remember the place which we found it needful to give to purposiveness in biological evolution, and to the influence of organic wholes upon physical processes, it seems reasonable to think that, as personality emerges and develops, it will play an increasingly important rôle in the processes of which it is a part. What

³² *The Decline of the West*, Vol. I, p. 36. In this connection Spengler writes: "And thus I see in Cecil Rhodes the first man of a new age. He stands for the political style of a far-ranging, Western, Teutonic and especially German future, and his phrase 'expansion is everything' is the Napoleonic re-assertion of the indwelling tendency of *every* Civilization that has fully ripened—Roman, Arab or Chinese. It is not a matter of choice—it is not the conscious will of individuals, or even that of whole classes or peoples that decides. The expansive tendency is a doom, something demonic and immense, which grips, forces into service, and uses up the late mankind of the world-city stage, willy-nilly, aware or unaware."

³³ Speaking of the triumph and inner decay of imperialism, "with which the history of West-European mankind will be definitely closed," Spengler says: "He who does not understand that this outcome is obligatory and insusceptible of modification, that our choice is between willing *this* and willing nothing at all, between cleaving to *this* destiny or despairing of the future and of life itself; he who cannot feel that there is grandeur also in the realizations of powerful intelligences, in the energy and discipline of metal-hard natures, in battles fought with the coldest and most abstract means; he who is obsessed with the idealism of a provincial and would pursue the ways of life of past ages—must forego all desire to comprehend history, to live through history or to make history." *Op cit.*, Vol. I, p. 38.

THEISM AND HUMAN HISTORY

we need, in order to understand the deeper meaning of human history, is to realize that, through an increasing functioning of creative personality, history may be made truly progressive. From this point of view we may hope to escape the fallacies which have crept into men's conception of history under the cover of the idea of progress without resigning ourselves to the disillusionment of our post-war period. If we can recognize "the difference between a *belief in progress* and a *belief in the possibility of progress*,"⁸⁴ we may avoid both a supine optimism and a no less supine pessimism, and may bring the understanding of history and the making of history into vital relation to each other through seeking to discern the conditions on which the development and the functioning of creative personality depend.

Professor Dewey has made an important contribution to this problem by his conception of creative intelligence. He writes:

Progress is not automatic; it depends upon human intent and aim and upon acceptance of responsibility for its production. . . . I doubt if the whole history of mankind shows any more vicious and demoralizing ethic than the recent widespread belief that each of us, as individuals and as classes, might safely and complacently devote ourselves to increasing our own possessions, material, intellectual, and artistic, because progress was inevitable anyhow. In dwelling upon the need of conceiving progress as a responsibility and not as an endowment, I put primary emphasis upon responsibility for intelligence, for the power which foresees, plans and constructs in advance.⁸⁵

But to creative intelligence we must add creativity in religion, if we would take account of all the forces in history upon which progress depends. We have maintained from the beginning of our study that religion in its highest and deepest manifestations is creative, that it makes for the creation

⁸⁴ F. J. Teggart, *Theory of History*, p. 222.

⁸⁵ *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, ed. by J. Ratner.

HISTORY AND CREATIVE PERSONALITY

and conservation of value. This character of religion, however, is not to be understood from the point of view of mere instrumentalism. Religion has this creative character because it consists in communion with Divine Reality, because it unfolds itself as an imaginative achievement of the human spirit, and because of its power to effect an integration of thought and experience. The outstanding evidence of this creativity of religion is always the prophet, who is, as Hocking has expressed it, "the mystic in historic action." And the great prophets are always the beginners of new epochs in history, the originators of new centres for the unification of human life. To quote Hocking further: The prophet "must find in the current of history a unity corresponding to the unity of the physical universe, or else he must create it. And what I want to point out is that it is just such a conscious unification of history, that the religious will spontaneously tends to bring about."⁸⁶

Let us recognize, then, that history is not through and through a unity, but that, while there is much to build on, there remains a great task in unifying history. And let us not fail to see that religion at its best is a great constructive force—"creating men, conferring on them the power to create." Religion's most significant contributions are its prophets, and the communities which spring from them and leaven the world with their spirit. And when creative religion and creative intelligence unite we have the forces of progress at their maximum. It is such a union of spiritual forces that H. G. Wells means when he says:

The over-riding forces that hitherto in the individual soul and in the community have struggled and prevailed against the ferocious, base, and individual impulses that divide us from one another, have been the powers of religion and education. . . . Religion and education, those closely inter-

⁸⁶ *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, pp. 484, 518. See also Part VI entire, especially the chapter on "The Unifying of History." Cf. my book, *The Experience of God in Modern Life*, Chaps. I, II.

woven influences, have made possible the greater human societies whose growth we have traced (*i.e.*, in *The Outline of History*). . . . They have been the chief synthetic forces throughout this great story of enlarging human co-operations.³⁷

It is Ernst Troeltsch whose philosophy of history most fully and consistently recognizes the creative rôle which belongs to religion in history. In his great historical work, *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*, he maintains throughout the conception of religion as an originative force, interacting with other social forces to shape the course of history.³⁸ And in his volume on the philosophy of history his entire thought leads up to the conception of a present synthesis of culture as the task which the World War has set us, a task in the fulfilment of which religion should have a place of central importance.³⁹ Thus he is led to express his conception of the creative function of religion in the form of a challenge to Christianity: "A new era in the world's history is beginning for it (Christianity) at this moment. It has to ally itself anew to a new conception of nature, a new social order, and a profound interior transformation of the spiritual outlook, and has to bring the suffering world a new peace and a new brotherhood." The steps in this process, he says, remain to be discovered, but he adds: "I have come more and more to regard the specific kernel of religion as a unique and independent source of life and power."⁴⁰

Our previous study of the new cosmology and of the newer interpretations of evolution would not lead us to look

³⁷ *Op cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 581-583.

³⁸ See also his *Protestantism and Progress*.

³⁹ See my article on "Ernst Troeltsch's Philosophy of History" in *The Philosophical Review* (1932).

⁴⁰ Certain aspects of Troeltsch's thought, it is true, prevent him from setting forth with full clarity the creative function of religion. While he distinguishes the interpretation of history from all naturalism and psychologism, and insists upon the discovery of norms which shall be valid both for the interpretation of history and for the task of a present cultural synthesis, he would derive his norms from the history of the culture

A COSMIC MORAL WILL

for any automatic progress in history nor to conceive progress to be something to be easily achieved. As we have seen, the new cosmology admits a principle of indeterminacy at the foundation of things, and the idea of creative evolution stresses spontaneity and variation, but at the same time recognizes a comprehensive process of creative co-ordination and increasing organization. And we have seen the need of combining the idea of creative evolution with the idea of emergent evolution—and thus of recognizing advancing levels and the reality of guidance—in the principle of creative finalism. It is but the application of kindred principles on the level of human relations when we discern in history an actual progress toward the development of creative moral personality and toward a genuine community of moral and spiritual life—but a progress which is necessarily conditioned on creative intelligence and creative faith and love. With progress so conceived effort and struggle are bound up, and from it defeat and evil cannot be excluded by predestination. But the cosmic trend upward has been manifest also in human history, and in this aspect human history also bears witness to the reality of God, conceived as a Cosmic Moral Will; and from this point of view the intuitions of the mystic and the courageous faith of the prophet become a veritable sharing in the life of God.

The conception of God to which the foregoing interpretation of history leads is that of a God who is both transcendent and immanent. Such a conception appears to be that toward which Troeltsch points when he says: "The absolute in the relative, yet not fully and finally in it, but always pressing forward towards fresh forms of self-expression,

to which they are to be applied. And because he holds that each culture is a unique "individual totality," he cannot discover universal principles which can guide us toward world-unity, whether in logic or ethics or religion. Thus Troeltsch does not escape from the historical relativism against which he struggles, and the conception of religion is unduly subordinated to the conception of a plurality of cultures.

and so effecting the mutual criticism of its relative individualizations—such is the last word of the philosophy of history.”⁴¹ One aspect of the need for the union of these two ways of conceiving God is expressed by Pringle-Pattison thus:

The eternal contrast between the actual and the ideal seems to me to furnish the natural key to the problem of immanence and transcendence. Transcendence does not mean remoteness or aloofness. The distinction it points to is that between the perfect and the imperfect; and by perfection we do not understand the possession of innumerable unknown attributes, but the perfect realization of those values which we recognize as the glory and crown of our human nature. This idea of perfection disclosing itself gradually, as men become able to apprehend the vision, is the immanent God, the inspiring Spirit to whom all progress is due. But the immanent God is thus always transcendent. The two aspects imply one another.⁴²

But the foregoing statement is inadequate in certain important respects. Imperfection in the world and in the life of man is not the only reason why we need to think of God as transcendent. Evil in human history is too positive and too tragic to be called simply imperfection. As Professor Reinhold Niebuhr says, “Too much emphasis upon the harmonies of the universe may make evil seem unreal.” But Niebuhr holds that “the moral and spiritual values in which religion is interested have their basis in concrete actuality.” Hence he has welcomed the thought of Hobhouse and of Whitehead as promising a new metaphysical validation for “the faith of religion in both the transcendence and immanence of God.” Still, above metaphysical syntheses Niebuhr ranks the vital synthesis in prophetic religious experience:

⁴¹ See Troeltsch's article, “Historiography,” in Hastings, *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

⁴² See Pringle-Pattison's chapter, “Immanence and Transcendence,” in *The Spirit*, ed. by B. H. Streeter. See also Pringle-Pattison's Gifford Lectures, *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy*, pp. 252ff.

A COSMIC MORAL WILL

There is no way of guaranteeing the reality of God if someone does not make him real in experience, and there is no way of declaring the victory of the ideal if someone does not defeat reality in the name of the ideal in history. Religion validates itself in spiritual experience and moral triumph.⁴³

To this last we should freely assent, if at the same time it be recognized that religion also requires for its validation a reasoned interpretation of the universe in which spiritual experience and moral triumph are shown to have metaphysical meaning.

How, then, shall we express the idea that God is both transcendent and immanent in human history? We can find God immanent in the creative energies of men so far as they make for unified personality and for real community in the life of mankind; and we also can find him immanent in the organizing processes of human life so far as they do not suppress, but instead further, the release of new creative energies. In other words, God is Creative Love and is manifested in those cosmic and historic processes which embody such love. But God transcends the world process in that he consistently embodies creative love in his own nature and envisions far higher expressions of it than the world manifests. Moreover, in those processes which make for stagnation and degeneration God cannot be immanent, for they resist the realization of his purpose. At the same time he is not aloof from those processes but is actively resisting them. Hence Divine Love cannot be conceived to be free from suffering, any more than the highest human love. But in this relation God's immanence appears again in a new aspect, that is, in redemptive love. In other words, while evil cannot be excluded from a world in which there is a real measure of contingency, spontaneity, and freedom, there is a profound sense in which evil may be transmuted into good through the healing power of inexhaustible love. Hence in a real

⁴³ *Does Civilization Need Religion?* pp. 209-217.

THEISM AND HUMAN HISTORY

sense God is immanent in the tragedies of human experience; and as men find him there and embody in themselves his redemptive love, they bear their part in the ultimate triumph of his Spirit.

B. MAN AND HIS IDEALS

XIV

THE HUMAN SOUL, ITS FREEDOM AND IMMORTALITY

THERE is no problem with which the thought of our time, whether religious or philosophical, is more deeply engaged than that of human nature. In the sphere of religious thought two sharply contrasted views of human nature appear. The naturalistic humanists lay all their emphasis on faith in man. They hold, not only that man is a part of nature, but also that it is not rational to conceive him as being akin to a superhuman spiritual reality or a member of a higher spiritual order. But they cherish an optimistic view of human nature, and maintain a faith in the progress of mankind, and even in human perfectibility, on the basis of man's capacity for mastering nature, physical and human, by intelligence, by moral effort, and by social co-operation. They continue, in general, the spirit and point of view of Positivism, and the words of the positivist Guyau are not inapplicable to their conception of human nature: Man "perceives with astonishment the extent of the power of his will and intelligence." "The substitution of a human providence for the omnipresent influence of a divine providence might be given as being, from this point of view, the formula of progress."¹

In contrast to this optimistic view of human nature stands the view taken by the radical supernaturalism of our time. This supernaturalism is exemplified by American Fundamentalism and, in a still more vigorous and clear-cut fashion, by

¹ J. M. Guyau, *The Non-Religion of the Future*, pp. 449-450.

For an effective criticism of the present-day tendency to equate religion with ethics see W. P. Montague, *Belief Unbound*.

THE HUMAN SOUL

the Theology of Crisis now so influential in Europe. From this point of view faith in human nature is deplored. It is an instance of that pride of reason which is the gravest form of sin.² Here is where liberal Christianity is held to be hardly less gravely in error than naturalistic humanism. For even though liberal Christianity has laid much emphasis upon the immanence of a Divine Spirit in the cosmos and in man, this doctrine of divine immanence is to be regarded as only a disguised or unwitting form of naturalism. The basis of any true faith must be the humble acknowledgment of God's sovereignty and grace. Only the transformation of human nature through the crisis of such an acknowledgment, and the accompanying complete surrender of the will to God, can effect the salvation either of the individual or of mankind. Human nature apart from an essentially miraculous transformation by the grace of God, mediated through his incarnation in Christ, is inherently weak and corrupt, by reason of a Fall which has involved all mankind, or by reason of *Das radicale Böse* which has its mysterious basis in the metaphysics of human nature.³ Our previous study has brought us to some of these problems. In what sense and to what extent is man to be understood as a part of nature? What is the ultimate meaning of his selfhood as a unique emergent in the evolutionary process? Can we face squarely the tragedies of human existence and the realities of moral and social evil and maintain a vital faith in human progress or human salvation; and if so, upon what philosophical and spiritual basis? How shall we think of the question of human freedom in view of the presence of both law and contingency in the world? How are man's biological nature, his social nature, his psychical individuality, and his ideals interrelated, and what is the relation of his ultimate ideals and values to ultimate reality? Is faith in human immortality rational?

² H. E. Brunner, *The Theology of Crisis*, p. 43.

³ For an examination of the conception of God on which radical supernaturalism is based see Chap. XVII.

PROBLEMS OF HUMAN NATURE

These are questions to which our study of religious experience and religious knowledge, and our interpretations of cosmology and history lead up; and the views that we take of these questions have much to do with our understanding of the meaning of religion for the solving of the social and spiritual problems of our time.

But not only do many of the problems concerning human nature grow out of our previous study. Certain results that we already have gained have positive significance for the attacking of these problems. Our study of the philosophy of history has shown the weakness of a philosophy of progress based on evolutionary optimism; and also the inadequacy of such a philosophy when it relies solely on the exercise of intelligence and moral effort. The evils of society are too deeply seated in human nature and social institutions to be overcome except as also all the resources of religion for personal and social redemption be drawn upon. On the other hand, a supernaturalism that does not set before men the task of creative synthesis in human history and give religious meaning to that task is bound to fail both in meeting the crucial problems of our time and in metaphysical insight.

Furthermore, our examination of the philosophy of evolution has shown us the reality of final causation in the evolutionary process. Emergents make a difference when they have emerged. Mind is a true emergent in the course of evolution and contributes guidance. And this is intelligible only if the emergent mind, in its mental character, is efficacious amidst physiological and physical processes. Such a recognition of final causation makes meaningful the conception that man, given sufficiently favorable conditions, may be intellectually and spiritually creative, a conception which in turn has far-reaching religious significance. And if it be further recognized that wherever there are organic bodies an immanent creative principle of the psychological order is at work, then man has to be understood as a member of a

THE HUMAN SOUL

cosmic process of vast extent in time—the process of biological evolution—in which creative finalism plays an omnipresent and increasing rôle.

Similarly the new cosmology tends to bring human nature and physical nature into intelligible relation to each other, not by treating man as “nothing but” a very complicated form of purely physical forces, but by recognizing that the cosmos manifests an organic character due to the operation within it of structural principles of reason. And we have found it necessary both to limit and to supplement this conception of the organic character of the cosmos by the conception of a Cosmic Creative Purpose which the present world order partly expresses and partly resists. In such a universe, as we shall have occasion to develop more fully, man’s aspirations, sufferings, struggles, and spiritual achievements need not be regarded merely as a pathetic episode. And further, if we have come to realize that a panpsychic view of the ultimate stuff of things is the view to which we are led by the abstractness of purely physical knowledge, by the principle of indeterminacy and the need of correlating facts of discontinuity and facts of continuity, and by the extent to which the mental and the physical stand in organic relation to each other, then the distinctive traits of human nature cease to be an anomaly when viewed in their actual cosmic setting.

The general purport of these results of our foregoing study is that man should indeed be regarded, according to the current generalization, as a part of nature, and that at the same time man, with his ideals, spiritual struggles, and religious experiences, illuminates the nature of which he is a part. But we need now, in the light of these generalized results, to go forward to a more special inquiry into the interpretation of human selfhood and its destiny, and of human ideals in respect to their relation to ultimate reality and their fate in human history.

THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

The mind-body problem confronts us as soon as we begin to consider the implications, for the interpretation of human selfhood, of the doctrine that man is a part of nature. As we turn to this problem there are three general facts to be borne in mind. First, man in his bodily aspects is a member of the same space-time system to which other physical objects belong. Second, mind—that is, the intellectual, appreciative, purposeful part of man—is the most significant part. It is within this aspect of man that the whole question of truth, including scientific truth, appears, and in consequence, the question of the guiding of life by truth. And third, mind and body are known to form a functional unity. From these three facts arise several questions: Is man as mind to be entirely explained on the basis of his body and its relationships? Or can the bodily aspect of man be treated as simply a manifestation of mind, individual or cosmic? Or is mind in man, while conditioned upon its bodily aspect and its total physical environment, yet super-physical in its essential character? That is, is its relation to the body one of correlation instead of subordination? In other words, does mind in man reveal an order of reality which is above nature as a space-time system, but which, nevertheless, is necessary for the understanding of nature and its relation to meanings and values?

One answer to these questions is represented by the behaviorism of John B. Watson. This answer regards the physiological organism as the real man and treats every other aspect of man as a case of bodily behavior only. Watson says that the behaviorist throws out the concepts both of mind and of consciousness.⁴ "Thought then is a form of general bodily activity just as simple (or just as complex) as tennis playing. The only difference is that we use the muscles of the throat, larynx, and chest instead of the muscles of our arms, legs, and trunk." "It might be better to give up the

⁴ *Ways of Behaviorism*, p. 7.

THE HUMAN SOUL

term thinking and use the term *implicit behavior* in its place."⁵ On this basis Watson holds that behaviorism can displace philosophy entirely.

This treatment of behaviorism as an adequate philosophy goes far beyond the limits of behavioristic psychology. Behaviorism in psychology is only a method, and an evidently fruitful one, for the study of man and of other animal organisms. This method has great merit because the behavior of an organism can be observed and registered with much accuracy. Moreover, it makes possible a more unified treatment of man, provided the conscious aspects of behavior are fully recognized. But one should not seek unity at the expense of failing to discriminate the different kinds of facts that need to be unified. Introspection—the method which Watson would discard entirely—gives additional facts, namely, the facts of consciousness or inner experience. Hence it cannot legitimately be set aside for the sake of making behaviorism the sole psychological method. In reality neither the study of behavior nor the method of introspection can be carried through without the other. Hence most psychologists who appreciate the value of behaviorism recognize that the method of introspection is no less necessary. Professor Judd writes upon this point as follows:

In the sphere of feelings, where we experience likes and dislikes, in the world of dreams, and in the play of fancy, we find that introspection is the only method which we can employ to reveal the inner happenings of the individual life. . . . Introspection gives us an indispensable body of data which are necessary for the complete study and understanding of human life.

Accordingly he affirms the need for "experimentation combined with introspection"; and he goes on to say:

In every normal human being there is an inner world of ideas and of recognitions of values, for which inner world

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 84-85.

THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

there is no counterpart in the world studied by the physicists or in life below the human level.⁶

One of Watson's chief teachings, in his effort to make behaviorism the all-sufficient psychological doctrine, is that thought can be adequately treated in terms of speech, actual or implicit. To this teaching Professor Woodworth has replied effectively, giving the reasons why he does not accept "the equation, thought = speech":

One is that I often have difficulty in finding the word required to express a meaning which I certainly have "in mind." I get stuck, not infrequently, for even a familiar word. Another reason is that you certainly cannot turn the equation around and say that speech = thought. You can recite a familiar passage with no sense of its meaning, and while thinking about something entirely different. Finally, thinking certainly seems as much akin to seeing as to manipulating. It seems to consist in seeing the point, in observing relationships. . . . My chief objection to behaviorism . . . is that it soft-pedals so insistently on "seeing."

The first important point, then, in regard to the mind-body problem is that the attempt of Watsonian behaviorism to identify the mind with certain forms of observable physical behavior of the body breaks down entirely from the standpoint of psychology itself.

There are, however, forms of naturalistic philosophy which, while recognizing consciousness to be real and unique, treat it as simply a function of the brain or of the body as a whole. From such a point of view the self is a body so organized that upon occasion it does intelligent and purposeful actions. Consciousness is always involved in such actions, and consciousness is something that emerges when a certain type of bodily organization, including especially a

⁶ Cf. *The Nature of the World and of Man*, by H. H. Newman and others, pp. 541, 542, 543.

⁷ *Contemporary Schools of Psychology*, by R. S. Woodworth, p. 72.

THE HUMAN SOUL

nervous system, is present. But there arises immediately the question, if consciousness is a function of the brain or of the body as a whole, are these in turn functions of consciousness in such a sense that consciousness is efficacious in bodily action? Obviously if consciousness is real but non-efficacious in respect to the body, its relation to bodily processes must be either that of parallelism or of epiphenomenalism. Parallelism is affirmed when the members of two series correspond to each other but do not interact with each other. A cinema and a phonograph may so operate that the pictures and the speeches will correspond, but there is no interaction between the pictures and the speeches as such. Epiphenomenalism is a name for a one-way causal relation. The shadows which accompany our bodies everywhere on a sunny day have our bodies as a cause but they do not in turn affect our bodies. The shadows are mere by-products or epiphenomena.

Now the naturalistic view of the self seems bound to treat consciousness either in parallelistic or epiphenomenalistic fashion for the reason that it is unwilling to grant to consciousness genuine efficaciousness. Professor Sellars, it is true, in discussing the mind-body problem seeks to revise naturalism so as to give to consciousness a significant rôle in the bodily life. Indeed he goes so far as to say that "consciousness literally assists the brain to meet new situations." In fact, however, he does not get beyond the conception of a correlation between what belongs to the mind and what belongs to the brain.

"Corresponding to association," he says, "is the connection of the neuron groups; corresponding to the compresence of sense-data and images in perception is the co-functioning of various sub-systems. Corresponding to meanings is some sort of summation."

This is simply the language of parallelism. Moreover, beyond the fluctuating phenomenon of consciousness, Sellars identi-

THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

fies the mind with the brain. "The mind," he declares, "is the brain as known in its functioning. . . . It is the brain in its integrative capacities."⁸ Thus Sellars's effort to treat consciousness as being effective in man's bodily life proves unsuccessful. Man's cerebral and bodily processes are not in any real sense functions of consciousness, if the mind as a whole is identified with the brain and if consciousness, when it appears, simply corresponds to arrangements of brain cells without having a causal relation to them.

Professor Dewey holds that for naturalism the mind-body problem disappears if only the idea of causality "in the old, non-historical sense" be abandoned and for it there be substituted the notion of growth as a continuity of historical change. In the case of the passage from childhood to adulthood, for example, "the reality is the growth process itself." "The real existence is the history in its entirety, the history as just what it is."⁹ On this basis he holds that consciousness and the physical processes of the body can be regarded as equally real and significant, and at the same time consciousness can be treated as essentially a qualitative function of the bodily organism.

But it must be pointed out that in the case of psychophysical organisms the conception of causality in the "older" sense cannot be abandoned if one is to understand the historical process itself. The moon would cause the tides in precisely the same manner if it were clothed with life as it does now. The emergence of life on the moon would be entirely irrelevant to its gravitational influence. Professor Dewey speaks of mind in human beings as an emergent, as a new level of existence as compared with the physical and biological levels of existence. The question then is: does this new level of mind make any difference with the physical and biological levels, or is it irrelevant so far as those levels

⁸ Cf. *Evolutionary Naturalism*, pp. 300, 301, 308, 313.

⁹ *Experience and Nature*, p. 275.

THE HUMAN SOUL

are concerned? If it is causally irrelevant mind is an epiphenomenon of the bodily life. If on the other hand mind bears a causal relation to the physical and biological processes of the body, then the question arises whether this fact does not inevitably carry our thought beyond the bounds of naturalism.

Professor Dewey's theory of the instrumental nature of ideas, and his stress upon intelligent control of nature in general and of human behavior in particular, would seem to imply that mind and consciousness were efficacious with respect to the physical and biological levels. But his abandonment of what he calls the old non-historical conception of causality looks in the opposite direction, for in the end what he provides for is a merely descriptive account of historical processes. His last word seems to be that a given history is "just what it is." In other words, it is only by a thorough-going phenomenalism that he escapes treating conscious processes as epiphenomena of the human body.

It is a question, however, whether Professor Dewey really has succeeded in making this escape. The following passage is important for understanding his full thought:

Empirically speaking, the most obvious difference between living and non-living things is that the activities of the former are characterized by needs, by efforts which are active demands to satisfy needs, and by satisfactions. In making this statement, the terms need, effort, and satisfaction are primarily employed in a biological sense. By need is meant a condition of tensional distribution of energies such that the body is in a condition of uneasy or unstable equilibrium. By demand or effort is meant the fact that this state is manifested in movements which modify environing bodies in ways which react upon the body, so that its characteristic pattern of active equilibrium is restored. By satisfaction is meant this recovery of equilibrium pattern, consequent upon the changes of environment due to interactions with the active demands of the organism.¹⁰

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 252, 253.

THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

In this passage the terms "need," "effort," "satisfaction," which are primarily psychological or biological in their meaning, are translated into purely physical language and made to denote changes in the distribution of energy, and it is on this level that Professor Dewey conceives the action of organisms, whether plant, animal, or human, to be determined. The inference to be drawn is that mental processes do not bear a part in determining events on the physical and biological levels.

So far, then, as Professor Dewey's thought goes beyond a merely descriptive account of things and takes up the question as to what determines bodily action, it leaves mental processes in the status of epiphenomena with respect to the body. And where this consequence is avoided it is done in terms of a complete phenomenalism which gives a merely descriptive account of things. But neither a merely descriptive account nor a doctrine of levels which leaves mental processes in the status of epiphenomena can do justice to the data involved in the mind-body problem. The red and green lights of an automatic signal system on a railroad system are of course just as "real" from the descriptive point of view as are the locomotives and the rails. Nevertheless they are mere epiphenomena from the point of view of how and where the trains will run unless some alert consciousness, which apprehends the meanings of the signals, is a co-determinant with the locomotives and the rails in the running of the train. Similarly, any real solution of the mind-body problem requires the recognition that mental processes are efficacious on the physical and biological levels of human existence.

Professor Dewey's great reproach against those who insist that there is a mind-body problem to be solved is that they really presuppose that the universe is split into two separate and disconnected realms of existence, one psychical and the other physical; hence the bringing of these two

THE HUMAN SOUL

realms into some kind of relation again is a matter of great difficulty. But there is no such splitting of the universe into two separate parts in the philosophy of organism of Professor Whitehead, who insists upon the interweaving of physical and final causation, nor in the doctrines of emergent evolution and of creative finalism espoused in the preceding chapter. On the contrary, from these points of view, psychic processes are operative to an increasing degree throughout the ranges of animal evolution, and without them that evolution would be unintelligible.

The true way, then, to carry through the doctrine that man is a part of nature is frankly to accept *interactionism* in respect to the mind and the body. The difficulty with the thought of interaction between mind and body has been created largely by the notion of matter as inherently inert, and hence as continuing in a given state of rest or motion except as it is affected by other matter acting mechanically upon it from without. But as we have seen this conception of matter no longer dominates the physical sciences themselves. There thus is no reason for regarding the human bodily organism as utterly different from mind. Especially is this true if we interpret the physical cosmos as a whole from the standpoint of panpsychism.

But also, if interaction is to be recognized as an explanatory principle, man's mental life must not be thought of as being wholly detached from the physical processes which go on in the organism. Experience leads us to think of mental life as first appearing in the infant in an incipient and unorganized form, in comparison with which the body is relatively more highly organized. But the organization of the body is far from being complete at birth, and in the completion of its organization the rapidly growing unity of psychic processes plays an increasingly important part. As time goes on the unity of psychic life proves able to take the preponderance and man begins to act for distant and

THE PSYCHICAL SELF

ideal goals. In some aspects of our experience, then, the bodily organism has the initiative. In other aspects the initiative is with the unity of psychic life. The relation between the two might be compared to the relation between an individual and the social group on which he depends. At first the group may almost completely determine the individual. Still he acts with some spontaneity upon the group. In the end he may become the most potent member of the group.

On the basis, then, of emergent evolution and creative finalism we are led to recognize the emergence, in connection with the human type of bodily organism, of *a psychical self possessing unity and uniqueness*. The uniqueness of selfhood can be best expressed in terms of the direct attributes of mental life. As I have written elsewhere:

"The fundamentally unique thing about selves, which distinguishes them from all the objects of physics, is that they can bring both the past and the future to bear upon the present. In physics what is past acts no longer, and what is future cannot yet begin to act." "This power of selves which appears in memory and anticipation, in retrospect and forecast, is essentially superphysical."¹¹

Awareness of the present, then, coupled with memory and anticipation, define the uniqueness of the self. And it is upon these super-physical and super-biological traits that the creativity of the self depends, and likewise its capacity to share in the life of the Cosmic Creative Spirit.¹²

Concerning the creativity which is inherent in the very nature of selfhood Bergson has been our great teacher. His theory is that the brain is to be understood as an instrument for action, and that the mind renders action creative because

¹¹ See my book, *The Meaning of Selfhood and Faith in Immortality*, pp. I-30.

¹² Professor Hocking has defined the uniqueness of the self as consisting in its being "space-free" and "time-free," as the body is not; and he adds "that the body is a set of *facts* and the mind is a set of *meanings*." Cf. *The Self: Its Body and Freedom*, pp. 28-49.

THE HUMAN SOUL

it "overflows" the cerebral processes with a wider range of functions and meanings.

Besides the body which is confined to the present moment in time, and limited to the place it occupies in space, which behaves automatically, and reacts mechanically to external influences, we apprehend something which is much more extended than the body in space, and which endures through time, something which requires from, or imposes on, the body movements no longer automatic and foreseen, but unforeseeable and free. This thing, which overflows the body on all sides, and which creates acts by new-creating itself, is the "I," "soul," "mind." [This is a reality] "whose main purpose appears to be a ceaseless bringing of something new into the world."¹⁸

Creativity, indeed, is present to some degree throughout the whole scale of evolution wherever psychic life is to be found. But when the level of self-conscious mind has emerged creativity in a quite new sense is made possible because of the new and more far-reaching system of relationships which can be brought into play.

The type of creativity, however, which belongs to the self cannot be understood apart from recognizing that the self from the beginning possesses an inherent and growing unity. Unless, for example, there is an inner unity and coherence in the self it would be impossible to discover any coherence or system of laws in the outer world. This inner unity should not be thought of as a fixed unchanging thing. It is, on the contrary, something that increases in the normally developing life. But the rudiments of it are present from the beginning of our experience in infancy. The Gestalt psychology is showing us that all our experience tends to take on some configuration or pattern, and that this must be assumed to be true from the beginning. Koffka says that when a child first perceives a candle flame, the flame cannot be thought

¹⁸ *Mind-Energy*, p. 39.

INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIETY

of as an isolated stimulus, but is perceived against an undifferentiated background. As experience grows the differentiation of the background increases, and all new experience occurs in relation to it.¹⁴

In general, all our experience is *owned*. Knowledge is always somebody's knowledge, mine or yours. Sentiments are always personal, belonging to a given individual. Purpose is also a personal affair; it is the purpose of some definite individual self. When, in pathological cases, personal identity is lost, we are obliged to speak of multiple personalities. Thus experience is intelligible only on the basis of an inner psychical personal unity.

Individuality and Society. A philosophy of human nature must include not only a recognition of the unity and uniqueness of the psychical self, which develops in interaction with a growing physiological organism. It must include also a recognition of the social aspects of all human nature. Professor Coe has pointed out that, as we emerge in the midst of physical nature, the acts which individualize us are "inter-individual."

"The emergence of each self is conditioned upon interplay with selves or with selves-in-the-process-of-becoming." "There is no getting behind this mutuality to anything that is independently self-subsisting in particular selves. . . . The whole meaning of my world, myself included, develops in this self-and-socius way. This does not, and cannot, imply that each of us is a mere echo of others, for a 'mere-echo' theory would not provide for the rise and development of anything that could be echoed. Society is more than a complex of reciprocal imitations; rather, it is a mutuality in which precedence and the unprecedented are everywhere present and interfused."¹⁵

An interesting phase of the way in which the self gains further definition, refinement, and organization through so-

¹⁴ *The Growth of the Mind*, pp. 131 ff.

¹⁵ *What Is Christian Education?* pp. 98-99.

THE HUMAN SOUL

cial contact is described in Cooley's account of what he calls "the looking-glass self." Just as a child occasionally performs before the looking-glass in order to observe what manner of being he is, so the thought of the judgment of others concerning ourselves often serves as a means of developing our own self-idea.

A self-idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: The imagination of our appearance to the other person, imagination of his judgment of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification.

This social interpretation of the self, as Cooley has shown, is important for any framing of the ethical ideal of personality.

"Self-feeling may be regarded as . . . the complement of that disinterested and contemplative love that tends to obliterate the sense of divergent individuality." "The sickness of either is to lack the support of the other." "A healthy self must be both vigorous and plastic, a nucleus of solid well-knit private purpose and feeling, guided and nourished by sympathy."¹⁶

This emphasis on the social conditionedness of the self should not be thought of as negating its individuality and creativity, any more than does the physiological conditionedness of the self. If interaction holds between the psychological self and the bodily organism, still more does it hold between the individual man and the social group. In general, that which emerges should be recognized as having as much ontological status as what it emerges from. So the individual which emerges in society becomes an active factor that in some measure remolds society. But the degree to which this takes place depends in part upon the interest which society has in fostering creative individuals. The relation between individuality and society is a reciprocal one, as Professor

¹⁶ Cf. *Human Nature and the Social Order*, pp. 69, 91, 92, 152, 155-157.

INTEGRAL VIEW OF THE SELF

Dewey has so fully shown. In his work, *Democracy and Education*, he presents a social view of the self, and at the same time he stresses initiative and creative thinking as qualities which society should evoke in the individual. "The essence of the demand for freedom," he says, "is the need of conditions which enable an individual to make his own special contribution to a group interest." The development of personality, and of society as well, according to Dewey, demands a vital synthesis of freedom and social control. "A progressive society counts individual variations as precious since it finds in them the means of its own growth."¹⁷

The view of the self to which our thinking has led us may be summarized as follows: A self is a subject of experience, an active purposive experiencer. But how does its experiencing unfold and what is involved in it? The immature human organism at birth, which is the bearer of heredity, must be credited with psychic potencies, because of its manifestation of awareness and impulsiveness, in configural patterns, in a process which has from the start an essential unity. This process, moreover, is able to bring to bear upon the present that which exists no longer (the past) and that which does not yet exist (the future) and to act as a whole; it is therefore a non-mechanical originaive whole. Still further, this whole, which is sensitive, conative, and originaive, becomes aware of itself in relation to other similar wholes and to its general environment. In other words, it becomes a conscious self in relation to other selves and to objects in general. Each of these conscious selves develops rapidly through the inter-play of hereditary traits and environment and its own originaive power—especially through combining with present stimuli awareness of the past, anticipation of the future, and social awareness. But effective development depends upon the control of the growing com-

¹⁷ Pp. 352, 357.

THE HUMAN SOUL

plexity by the native unity, *i.e.*, upon the maintenance of an integrated self. This non-mechanical, developing, originative self constantly conditions the maturing bodily organism and is conditioned by it. It comes to have in the body an equipment of conditioned reflexes and habit systems on which the adjustment of the self to the environment and its control over the environment depend. But how the conditioning shapes up and what ends shall control depend in part upon the intelligent learning which the psychic functions described make possible. Moreover, when the integration has taken place poorly, the way to make it better is to bring the situation into clear consciousness. Thus on the basis of a highly developed biological unity there emerges a new type of unity, the self, capable of creative synthesis and creative activity.

This conception of the self may properly be called a doctrine of the human soul. For from the point of view here presented the self is not a mere system of relations and qualities arising among more enduring entities and entirely subject to the general cosmic stream of change. Rather, the self is an entity having duration by reason of its own inherent psychical character and structure and is itself an initiator of change. Nothing has a more truly ontological status than a self. So far as the self is a part of a larger whole, as it unquestionably is, it is an integral, constitutive and meaningful part of that whole. So far as the self has conditions and constituents, these in turn are modifiable by reason of their relation to the peculiar kind of whole which we call a self. The fact that the self is an emergent under given conditions, and that the emergence is not completed with the occurrence of a physical human birth, does not make it any the less truly a soul, having its unique ontological character. For so far as we can see, all the entities of the existential world are emergents, which, while unique, have their pre-conditions. And in becoming an agent capable of

THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM

creative synthesis through laying hold of principles of order and value and embodying them in the world, the self reveals that fundamental character of reality to which the existence of a meaningful cosmos is due.¹⁸

The Problem of Freedom. Our discussion thus far has led us to emphasize the reality of the inner psychic life of man as an active force in the midst of the enviroing world. From this point of view our purposes may have a decisive part to play in the course of natural events. We also have conceived this activity of the self as creative. The mind is a principle of creative synthesis through its powers of experience, foresight, appreciation, constructive thought, and purposeful action. It is thus a source of new departures in the cosmos. And these new departures may lead to constructions of higher and higher value. In culture and civilization life may become organized in such a way that ideal values have increasing control and that evils—both natural evils and those due to blind or willful action—may be overcome.

This part which thought, purpose, and creative action play in human life would seem to be well expressed through the doctrine of human freedom. But there are certain problems involved in the conception of freedom which require further examination. These problems have to do with the question whether the moral freedom of which, as we have seen, man is capable, and which society should seek to foster, implies metaphysical freedom; and with the question whether metaphysical freedom is compatible with the reli-

¹⁸ The present-day philosophy of personalism is doing much toward the re-establishment of the doctrine of the reality of the soul. See *The Philosophy of Personalism*, by A. C. Knudson, and the writings of E. S. Brightman. But a more realistic cosmology than is to be found in the writings of our American personalists is required for the adequate working out of a philosophy of the self. Moreover, so far as personalism holds to the phenomenality of time (*cf.* Knudson, *op. cit.*, pp. 235 ff.) it embodies a fundamental inconsistency, since time is the universal form of our inner experience.

THE HUMAN SOUL

gious experience of dependence upon God or of oneness with God.

Let us first define our terms. Moral freedom applies to our conduct when our choices are guided by principles which have the approval of our moral judgment—principles of duty or of rational good. We speak of a person who lives in accordance with such principles as morally free because he is not at the mercy of impulse or a slave of habit, but is rationally unified within, and so is more wisely related to his world and able to shape a more consistent and significant course in the world.

Metaphysical freedom means that at least at times selves confront real alternatives for action either of which is literally possible even when all existing factors—those within the self as well as those without—are taken into account, and even from the most metaphysical point of view. The heart of the problem involved is the question as to whether the self is always so constituted that it must act in a given situation in an absolutely predetermined way. Does the self, in view of its own nature as well as of its environment, ever face real alternatives in the sense that either one of the alternatives is genuinely possible?

From the standpoint of this question the determinist affirms that, when we consider the nature of the self and of the situation fully, we must acknowledge that only one action can ensue. In the last analysis the determinist holds that, the universe being what it is at any given time, our actions are its necessary result. True, we play a part in determining this result, but what we are is in turn determined by the universe as a whole. Thus the determinist denies metaphysical freedom.

The indeterminist on the other hand maintains that genuine alternatives are possible, and that our choices, although influenced by external conditions and our own antecedents, need not be completely determined by them, but may be

THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM

instances of original action. He holds that to trace action completely to heredity and environment is to deny the possibility of anything new originating in the universe, and to fail to see the full significance of thought, appreciation, and purposeful action.

Both the determinist and the indeterminist hold that the metaphysical question has much importance for the understanding of moral freedom. The determinist maintains that character depends upon the principle that our present choices are the fruits of our past living, and that if we are to be dependable in moral and social relationships it must be because the kind of self that we have become can be counted upon to act consistently with itself. The indeterminist maintains that if our bad conduct is necessitated as well as our good conduct, the moral situation is unreal. We are no more morally responsible than the animals.

Some of the arguments on which the denial of metaphysical freedom has been based we already have seen to be invalid, namely, those which involve the insistence that man is a part of a physical order governed by absolutely necessary laws and that hence no overt human action can be otherwise than absolutely determined. Arguments like these are no longer tenable in view of the principle of indeterminacy which, as we have seen, has become a part of the new physics.¹⁹ And even if the principle of indeterminacy be regarded as too new to be securely established, we already have shown, further, that on the basis both of philosophy and of physics the laws of the physical world must be regarded as statistical averages rather than as laws possessing absolute metaphysical necessity.²⁰ Moreover, the doctrine of emergent evolution, when consistently thought out, is not compatible with an absolute determinism of physical law.²¹

¹⁹ See pp. 268 ff.

²⁰ See pp. 267 ff.

²¹ See pp. 305-309.

We may sum up our position in regard to these points and their bearing on moral freedom by a citation from Professor Dewey:

"Upon an empirical view, uncertainty, doubt, hesitation, contingency and

THE HUMAN SOUL

Other arguments against metaphysical freedom, namely, those based on a deterministic psychology, are really incompatible with the place which we have found it necessary to accord to spontaneity and creativity in the life of man. We may bring out the implications of our previous thought upon this matter by a brief summary of a part of Bergson's reasoning concerning free will.

Bergson argues that the deterministic view of our inner life rests upon a survival of the influence of the associationist psychology after that psychology has been abandoned in principle. By this he means that determinism of the inner life implies that the mind can be analyzed into elementary constituents, and that the interplay of these constituents determines whatever we do. But if we really abandon the associationist theory we shall recognize that the self as a unity is more than the passive interplay of the elementary processes which are found in it. "It is the whole soul, in fact, which gives rise to the free decision."²² Bergson also examines the argument that if we knew *all* the antecedents of an act we should be able to predict the act with certainty. He points out first that we must distinguish "between those who think that the knowledge of antecedents would enable us to state a *probable* conclusion and those who speak of an

novelty, genuine change which is not disguised repetition, are facts. Only deductive reasoning from certain fixed premises creates a bias in favor of complete determination and finality." "Variability, initiative, innovation, departure from routine, experimentation, are empirically the manifestation of a genuine *nisus* in things. At all events it is these things that are precious to us under the name of freedom. It is their elimination from the life of a slave which makes his life servile, intolerable to the freeman who has once been on his own, no matter what his animal comfort and security. A free man would rather take his chance in an open world than be guaranteed in a closed world." *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 310-311.

In *The Quest for Certainty* Dewey builds his argument explicitly upon the principle of indeterminacy as it has been developed by the new physics. See pp. 201-205.

²² Cf. *Time and Free Will*, pp. 149-67.

"Scholars now agree," writes Professor Palmer, "that no detachable piece of us—the will—is free, but either nothing or the whole of us." *The Problem of Freedom*, pp. 21-22.

THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM

infallible foresight." The probable conclusion, he rightly affirms, is all that is admissible. The reason is that "to know *completely* the antecedents and conditions of an action is to be actually performing it." If a philosopher Paul were to know fully the conditions entering into the action of a fellow-citizen Peter, he would have to become Peter. In other words a full knowledge of the conditions of an action, apart from a dynamic living through of the action, is unthinkable.²³

We are, then, justified in affirming that no conception of natural law, whether physical or psychological, can rightly forbid the acceptance of metaphysical freedom.

But we must go farther and must recognize that morality postulates metaphysical freedom. We must take our stand with the Kantian doctrine that "ought" means "can," that conduct which is absolutely necessitated does not have full moral meaning. This means that there is a measure of indeterminism in man's moral life—the more so if we reject Kant's phenomenalism with respect to both outer and inner experience and conceive of both in realistic fashion.

James brought out effectively the ethical claims of indeterminism through his discussion of our "judgments of regret," in which he showed that determinism brings us into a dilemma between pessimism and subjectivism. If all that we morally regret and condemn, down to the most heinous

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 183-89.

Professor Hocking has made an interesting contribution to the understanding of freedom by his conception of "cycles of causation" in the activity of the person. He bases his theory upon the study of the effect of glandular secretions upon emotion and conduct as observed by Doctors Cannon and Britton. The normal development of an emotion is described as follows: (1) The exciting idea in the mind. (2) Visceral disturbance and increased adrenal flow. (3) The mind becomes aware of these changes. (4) The mind consents, or does not consent, to the further development of the expressive changes. (5) If consent is given, increased expression and adrenal secretion follow. If consent is not given, these are checked. (6) With increased expression comes mental awareness of the further changes. (7) Then follows development and exhaustion of the emotion. "The mind's initiative," says Hocking, "appears at two points, at (1) and at (4)." *The Self: Its Body and Freedom*, pp. 53-75.

THE HUMAN SOUL

crimes, really had to happen, then we are thrown into pessimism. The world is so made that men have been compelled to commit all their sins. The only escape from pessimism is to say that evil is only seeming. And the only way to maintain that view is to hold that "our performances and our violations of duty exist for a common purpose, the attainment of subjective knowledge and feeling."²⁴ But this subjectivism is open to the gravest practical dangers. It fosters the fatalistic mood, making men either too inert or too reckless. The minister who in the pulpit expressed his "willingness to sin like David, if only he might repent like David" illustrates the point. Now the only way to avoid this dilemma is through the belief in metaphysical freedom, that is, that often real alternatives are open to our choice, each of which is metaphysically possible.²⁵

If, then, no conception of physical or psychological law can rightfully forbid the idea of metaphysical freedom, but rather, the indeterminacy in these realms and the creativity which inheres in psychic life call for this idea; and if the idea is postulated by the fundamental principles of the moral life; the question which most concerns us here is the one already stated, namely, the question whether metaphysical freedom is compatible with the religious experience of dependence upon God or of oneness with God.

It is often said in theological circles that on moral grounds we must believe in freedom in the full sense, and that on religious grounds we must hold to a conception of God's absoluteness or sovereignty which means determinism or predestination; and that, as for the reconciliation of the two points of view, it must remain an insoluble mystery, but that neither point of view should be abandoned for that reason. It would be a superficial philosophy or theology which did not recognize that its themes involved profound mysteries.

²⁴ See *The Will to Believe*, p. 171.

²⁵ Cf. *Ibid.*, Chap. "The Dilemma of Determinism."

FREEDOM AND RELIGIOUS DEPENDENCE

But a mystery and a contradiction are two different things. It is wrong, upon arriving at a contradiction, to take refuge in terming it a mystery.

No one has made a more persistent attempt to reconcile the ethical conception of freedom with the religious and philosophical conception of God as the Absolute than did Royce in his "Supplementary Essay" in *The Conception of God*, written by himself and others, and his reasoning is very persuasive. Let us give it brief consideration.

Royce held that moral freedom implies metaphysical freedom; in other words, if we are to have moral personality it cannot be completely determined by the empirical contents of its experience, nor by any system of laws or rational relations, nor by any will outside its own. That such freedom of moral personality is real he established by showing that no form of individuality, least of all moral individuality, is intelligible in terms either of the immediate data of experience or of general ideas, but that individuality is always conditioned on the presence of will, which includes among other traits exclusive interest and selective attention. The moral individual becomes such through acquiring a plan of life and an ideal to which only he can attend and which only he can fulfil. We are moral selves in so far as we choose, by our interest and attention, some ideal out of a number of genuine possibilities, and there is no complete predetermination of these choices. According to this aspect of Royce's doctrine, wherever there is true individuality in the world there is an element of contingency, and the moral individual possesses metaphysical freedom.

But prior to this doctrine of the moral individual, and more basic than it for Royce's thought, is his monistic idealism, his doctrine of God as the Absolute, according to which the world must be viewed "in the unity of the Eternal Moment—the absolute Now." "All temporal sequences," said Royce, "given in finite experience are fragmentary facts

THE HUMAN SOUL

from the midst of the unity of the One Moment."²⁶ Thus not only is God supertemporal, but the finite individual must ultimately be conceived from the supertemporal point of view. All its processes, both in their plan and in their complete fulfilment, are eternally present to the Absolute Experience. God, then, is not only a being "to whom all hearts are open, all desires known, and from whom no secrets are hid," but he is a being for whom all the issues that can ever proceed from the heart of man are given in fully actualized form, for whom all finite desires are eternally fulfilled or frustrated, to whom both the secrets of our past lives and the unknown events of our future lives stand forth in completed reality. Although we can never place ourselves at the supertemporal point of view, we can affirm certain things about it. One of these things is that it has necessary validity and that through it alone does the world have full reality. And from this it follows that, from the most adequate point of view, all things—those of the future as well as those of the present and past, are fully determined.

Royce's way of reconciling the doctrine of the moral individual with the doctrine of the Absolute was to conceive the Divine Will as an organism which is constituted in part by our finite human wills. Thus he wrote:

If a certain kind of moral independence amongst these various interests or wills which constitute the Divine Organism is the morally highest conceivable form of life; if, in order that the Divine Will should be the best, it must be differentiated into many forms of will, which do not wholly predetermine the one the other, but which freely unite to constitute the whole: then this variety will exist, precisely because it is the best; but the unity of the world of knowledge, by virtue of which we obtain our rational assurance that the best is realized, will not be sacrificed for the sake of obtaining room for the exercise of this free variety of will.²⁷

Moreover, Royce held that finite wills stand in a constitutive

²⁶ *The Conception of God*, p. 318.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 270-71.

FREEDOM AND RELIGIOUS DEPENDENCE

relation to the Divine Will for the reason that they are *identical parts* of that Will:

I assert: (1) That this individual experience is identically a part of God's experience, *i. e.* not similar to a portion of God's experience, but identically the same as such portion; and (2) that this individual's plan is identically a part of God's own attentively selected and universal plan.

Hence Royce quoted as expressing his thought the words of Meister Eckhart: "Were I not, God himself could not be."²⁸ It is on the basis of this conception that finite wills are identical parts of the Divine Will that Royce felt able to say to the moral individual: "No will besides your own, no Divine choice beyond yourself, determines what, in the most individual aspect of your being, you are."²⁹ Hence he declared in conclusion: "The moral individual can say, 'I am free,' and 'I am part of the Divine Will.' The antinomy is solved."³⁰

But persuasive as is Royce's reasoning by which he has sought to develop his doctrine of the Absolute Experience through a conception of the Divine Will which should give logical grounding for a conception of finite individuality possessing metaphysical freedom, it cannot be admitted that the antinomy is solved in this way. For as we have seen, the will in the Absolute Experience is an Absolute Will which in its ultimate supertemporal character is completely determined. Metaphysically speaking, the whole career of every finite individual is as completely spread out in realized form as is that of a character in a play of Shakespeare. Thus the idea of a metaphysical freedom for the finite individual is extinguished by Royce's monistic idealism.

But does there exist so sharp an antinomy between moral individuality and religious dependence as Royce's thought developed? We must deny that this is so. The chief reason

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 291-92

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 319.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

for this denial is that all our thought throughout our study leads to the conception that time is metaphysically real. It is on the supertemporal character of the Absolute Experience and Will that the determinism of Royce's thought rests. But the Cosmic Creative Spirit must be conceived as eternally creating, which necessarily involves activity in time. The emergence of new levels in evolution we have thought of as real increments of being, which implies the reality of time. Moreover, time is the necessary form of all inner, psychic life, and in a universe panpsychically conceived time must be fully real. Finally, time is the indispensable form of moral living, with its discovery of ideals and its purposeful activity for their realization. If, indeed, the Divine purpose involves the creating of creators, how can it be otherwise than that time has metaphysical reality for both man and God?

This view of time as metaphysically real does not impair the conception of the Divine as eternal, in the vital religious meaning of the word. For we are conceiving God to be the eternal ground of the world process, without whose activity time would have no meaning. We further must recognize eternal truths which God possesses rather than brings into being; otherwise God's nature would basically be one of mere formless creativity. And what is most important of all, our highest religious insight discerns through all the vicissitudes of time the supreme reality of a changeless Divine Love.

It is only from the standpoint of the metaphysical reality of time that the unchanging Divine Love has its full religious and moral meaning. Royce, it is true, equated the Divine Will with the Divine Love. But in so doing he interpreted Divine Love as the exclusive interest of the Divine Will in this world in its totality as a possessed goal. "Whatever is, is so far, then, an object of the one Divine Will, and helps to fulfil that Will."⁸¹ In such a view there is too much

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 303.

IMMORTALITY

acceptance of all that is and happens as fulfilling a divine purpose of wisdom and love. "This world," wrote Royce, "has a value from the absolute point of view such as no other world, conceived as an abstract possibility, would have."³² But the unchanging Divine Love in its highest expression is inherently creative and redemptive. It goes forth to transform the evil in the world into good, and the good into the better, and it seeks to elicit a like love in the sons of men that they may participate in redemptive work and in creative living.

Moral freedom, then, in the full metaphysical sense, and the religious experience of dependence on God and union with God are compatible if the relation between them be understood, not in terms of the identity of finite wills with parts of the Divine Will, but in terms of a process in which, on the basis of an inherent kinship, finite wills grow into oneness with the Divine Will through learning love—a process in which Divine grace and human faith are deeply fused and in which, as men enter into sonship to God they become builders of a spiritual community.

In the conclusion of this chapter we need to turn our thought to the problem of man's ultimate destiny. *Is faith in immortality rational?* Is there an eternal destiny for human personality and for the spiritual community which man, when he responds to his highest ideals, seeks to build?

One ground, partial but important, for an affirmative answer to these questions is furnished by the matrix-theory of the relation between man's bodily organism and his psychological life which was developed earlier in this chapter. We have seen that the individual self which emerges in connection with each human bodily organism is essentially super-physical in its powers of awareness, memory, thought, appreciation, and purpose. And such is the integral and creative

³² *Ibid*, p. 215.

THE HUMAN SOUL

character of each emergent self that it should be conceived of as a soul in a genuine ontological sense of the term—a unique originative agent in the world-process. The relation of the unique self or soul to the bodily organism is best conceived after the analogy of the relation between any unique living individual and the matrix in which it takes shape. The rind or shell of a seed in the plant world is necessary as a condition for the formation and protection of the seed, but in the end the matrix is sloughed off by the growing seed. The womb is the matrix for the development of the embryo in mammals, but it is left behind by the growth of the new individual. Since the body can represent neither the whole self nor the essential self, it is better regarded as bearing an instrumental relation to the growing psychical life, which as it grows gains an increasing dominance over its instrument. Thus the self not only cannot be identified with the bodily organism and its functions, but it has a type of reality which makes its separability from the bodily organism quite conceivable.

On the basis of the extent to which the philosophy of personality shows the self to be transcendent, as well as immanent, in its relation to the body, Bergson holds that we may regard the self's survival of the body as not only possible but probable.

"If," writes Bergson, "as I have tried to show, the mental life overflows the cerebral life, if the brain does but translate into movements a small part of what takes place in consciousness, then survival becomes so probable that the onus of proof falls on him who denies it rather than on him who affirms it; for the only reason we can have for believing in the extinction of consciousness at death is that we can see the body become disorganized, that this is a fact of experience, and this reason loses its force if the independence of almost the whole of consciousness with regard to the body has been shown to be also a fact of experience."⁸⁸

⁸⁸ *Op cit.*, pp. 72-73.

IMMORTALITY

In general we must hold with Bergson that, whereas the body belongs to the space-time order, the mind belongs to a temporal but non-spatial order, and hence it is not subject to the same limitations as are entities which are inherently spatial in their character. It would, indeed, not suffice to base belief in immortality solely on the foregoing considerations from the philosophy of personality. The rationality of this belief must be considered in the light of our most comprehensive synthesis of experience. But it may be justly said that the belief has a real though partial basis in what already has been brought out concerning the inherent nature of personality or selfhood.

A further consideration which contributes to the grounding of faith in immortality is the capacity of the self for participating in timeless truth and value. As the self, an originative agent in the temporal order, becomes immanent in the order of space-time² through molding its bodily organism, so it transcends the temporal order itself by laying hold of eternal truth and value—truth and value which no change can make untrue and evil. Indeed, without this transcending of the temporal order by selves they could not remold the things of time and space in significant ways. All selves have this capacity for the supertemporal so far as they possess what we call childlike sincerity and develop that quality into integrity of mind and character. Through these qualities eternal truths and values may become constitutive of the self, and a self thus constituted need not lose its identity or its agency with the disintegration of the body.

Professor Bixler, in his recent discussion of immortality, has made much of the capacity of the human soul to apprehend timeless truths and values, but concludes with the suggestion that this aspect of experience should be substituted for faith in immortality in the sense of an endless life.

"Perhaps," he writes, "immortality should stand not for an unending existence but for the realization in mortal life

THE HUMAN SOUL

of that by which mortality itself is transcended. In the place of endless quantity we may have to put belief in a quality which temporal limits cannot confine."⁸⁴

But are not some of the implications of man's capacity for laying hold of eternal truth and value missed here? If the self be conceived naturalistically, one cannot go beyond the suggestion quoted. But if eternal truths and values enter into the very constitution of the self, and if at the same time the dynamic character of the self as an originaive agent be kept in mind, the self is not simply a bodily organism having certain spiritual functions, but is a soul whose destiny the fate of the body cannot determine. At least one can say with Professor Perry:

If any life can be said to consist of interests that are independent of the spacial and temporal juxtaposition of things, if its interests can be said to be capable of realization under other circumstances and through other means, then there is ground for saying that such an individual life is non-physical, and not *necessarily* bound up with the fortunes of the body.⁸⁵

But the final answer to the question, Is faith in immortality rational? must come from our total synthesis of experience, and this, as we have seen, is most adequately achieved by theism. "With one creative Spirit over all we may well believe in a unity of the many created spirits,"⁸⁶ and in their immortality. The conception that the ultimate ground of the universe is a Cosmic Creative Spirit who is creating creators carries with it the conception that the finite creative spirits have intrinsic and abiding significance for the universe and that they, and the spiritual community which they labor with God to achieve, will be immortal."⁸⁷

⁸⁴ *Immortality and the Present Mood*, p. 54.

⁸⁵ *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 343

⁸⁶ Cf. James Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, p. 422.

⁸⁷ It is a serious limitation of the treatment of immortality by Professor Bixler already referred to that it was not placed in definite relation to a conception of God.

IMMORTALITY

Such a grounding of immortality cannot possibly be thought of as emphasizing quantity of life instead of quality. Our highest religious experience, which must have its place in philosophical synthesis, does not permit of that. Immortality, for ethical religion, does not mean mere prolongation of existence. It means first of all the attainment of a quality of life which may rightly be understood as a real union with God. The childlike possess this union in germ. It is possessed fully by those who attain to a life that is Christ-like in quality, a life controlled by the spirit of love. This view means that the eternal life may be lived in the midst of time. It means that we may have the kind of union with God now which can give true meaning to an immortal life. This religious experience is the climax which the Christian religion reaches in the Fourth Gospel, where it is taught that he who is at one with the spirit of Christ has eternal life as a present possession. This present possession of eternal life is itself a true earnest of immortality.

B. MAN AND HIS IDEALS
(continued)

XV

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ULTIMATE VALUES AND ULTIMATE REALITY

A PHILOSOPHY of human nature must recognize that man is a part of a physical order, in which the statistical laws of physics and chemistry hold sway; that he is a member of a social order, because his selfhood, which is a new emergent in the physical order, develops its inherent individuality through inter-individual relations; and that he is capable of becoming a member of a spiritual order. Actual participation in a spiritual order is experienced by man as he lays hold of values that are intrinsic and ultimate and creatively embodies them in the social and physical orders, and as he enters into the relationship of communion and co-working with the Cosmic Creative Spirit.

According to the principles at which we have arrived in the foregoing chapters the physical, social, and spiritual orders should not be regarded as detached from each other. In the physical order nothing is totally inert and inanimate; at least a minimum of sensitivity and spontaneity is present throughout. In the social order individual selves act efficaciously in the midst of physical processes, and this they do most significantly through participating in the truths and relationships of the spiritual order. And the spiritual order, in turn, would remain abstract and uncreative did it not find embodiment in the processes, spatial and temporal, of the existential world.

But a basic problem arises in regard to the spiritual order which requires discussion if we are not to become confused

ARE VALUES NATURAL POSSIBILITIES?

as to the meaning of that order for man's moral and spiritual life. This is the problem of the relation in the spiritual order between ultimate values and ultimate reality. Are the meaning and validity of values conditioned on the existence of God? Or if values are autonomous in their meaning and validity, does their recognition suffice for sustaining man's spiritual experience and creative living?

The importance of clarity upon these questions can be illustrated from the essay of Professor Wieman entitled "God and Value."¹ In this essay Professor Wieman defines God in terms both of reality and of value. He writes:

God is that structure which sustains, promotes, and constitutes supreme value. . . . In so far as this structure of supreme value enters into existence, we can speak of God as a process. But it extends far beyond existence, into the realm of possibility.

In this definition "supreme value" is evidently normative for our thought of God. As to the meaning of supreme value Wieman, without defining value in its elementary form, goes on to say: "Supreme value must be some system or structure which brings lesser values into relations of maximum mutual support and mutual enhancement." And lest we should be led to suppose that any kind of progressive integration or organization has the kind of value which can be regarded as the work of God, Wieman further defines supreme value so as to make it a principle of selection among integrative processes:

It would be a great mistake to think that any sort of increasing organization produces the kind of system we have described as constituting greatest value. On the contrary it would seem that only that kind of organized interaction between individuals can yield greatest value which elicits the most complete self-expression on the part of each individual member and promotes the greatest mutual understanding.

¹ Cf. *Religious Realism*, by D. C. Macintosh and others, pp. 155-176.

ULTIMATE VALUES AND REALITY

In this last definition, then, we find presented a kind of value which is so far autonomous that it is a valid principle for determining the worth of social and cosmic processes and for recognizing the working of God.

But there is another strain in Wieman's thought, as expressed in this essay, which has a quite different purport. According to this strain of thinking the processes of existence are what make values possible, and unless values are possible they are not values. Wieman writes, stating hypothetically what is evidently his own position: "If the value be a value because it is a possibility of existence, it cannot be a possibility and hence cannot be a value apart from some process." To his thought it would seem, then, that the processes of the existential world make its possibilities, and that all values must come under the head of these possibilities. As he also says:

When we cut off the possibility from the process which makes it a possibility, and prize the possibility as more important than the process that carries it, we are assuming a self-defeating and self-contradictory attitude. The possibility of highest value is not a possibility except by virtue of the process which makes it such.

In general, throughout the essay values are subsumed under the possibilities of existence, and these possibilities have to be "carried" by the processes of existence in order to be possibilities. Thus a naturalistic way of thinking in the end submerges the autonomy of values.

For the question is bound to arise: Do the processes of the existential world make possible a society in which there shall be the most complete self-expression on the part of each individual member and the fullest mutuality? Our natural and social sciences would have difficulty in establishing an affirmative answer to this question—whence arises much of the tension and tragedy of our modern life. But if the possibility of such a society is in doubt, according to Wie-

ARE VALUES NATURAL POSSIBILITIES?

man's reasoning its value is in doubt. How then shall we judge between the different processes of integration? Wieman at one point recognizes this difficulty, but he meets it only with a sophism. He imagines an objector saying: "Suppose the highest possibilities of value that ever can be attained are already attained and there is nothing higher that can ever be reached." To this objection he gives the answer that "we do not know that this which we already have is the best that ever can be." In other words, a possibility which is merely the expression of our ignorance is substituted for a possibility grounded in the processes of existence.

If, indeed, one is assured of the reality of God as a Cosmic Creative Spirit one has ample ground for denying that the highest possibilities of value have already been attained. But Wieman does not accept such a conception of God. He does not conceive God in terms of personality, or of purpose, or of moral will. Instead, he defines God in terms of naturalistic thinking, as he has made particularly plain in his essays in *Conversations about God*. In one of these essays he says that his main purpose is "so to formulate the idea of God that the question of God's existence becomes a dead issue, like the question of other inescapable forms of natural existence."² By thus bringing the idea of God within the range of naturalistic thinking, while God ceases to be Spirit in the sense of possessing intelligence, will, and moral goodness, Wieman feels that he gains more than he loses, because God can now be termed "an observable fact" and consequently a "basic and indubitable certainty." He holds, in fact, that no other way of conceiving of God is tenable. "Either God exists beyond dispute, like nature," he says, "or else God is a fabrication of the mind and a piece of wishful thinking."³ Wieman always speaks as though "nature" were a matter of indubitable certainty, whereas there are few concepts that are more complex, fuller of theory and specula-

² Cf. *The Christian Century*, Vol. XLIX, p. 883. ³ *Op cit.*, p. 885.

tion, and more subject to change than the concept of nature.

But what especially needs pointing out here is that the idea of God cannot have the kind of certainty that Wieman means—a certainty, let us say, of the same sort as the dependence of all plant and animal life upon the sun—unless the values which God must be thought of as sustaining are also conceived naturalistically. Wieman gives as his definition of God which is to have the same sort of certainty as “other inescapable forms of natural existence” the following: “God is that actuality which sustains, promotes and constitutes the supreme good.” Now if the supreme good be defined in terms of autonomous values, as is done by Wieman himself when he says that it involves the most complete development of each individual member of society and the most complete mutuality between the members,⁴ it is clearly not a matter of simple observable fact that the supreme good is sustained by a unitary actuality or power.⁵ To assert the contrary is not to give sufficient credit to honest doubt nor to the pessimism concerning human progress which is so widespread today. Only when the supreme good is defined naturalistically—as whatever integration of life the processes of natural existence make possible—can it be affirmed as a simple observable fact that this good is supported by actuality; for then the affirmation could stand even though mankind can go no higher than it has gone.

Certainty about God, which by no means need be less than certainty about nature in any unified meaning of that term—which indeed may be much greater than the latter—is nevertheless a matter of intuition, of faith, of religious experience, and of a spiritualistic, rather than a naturalistic, philosophy. And very central in this certainty must be the recognition of the autonomous character of moral and spiritual values—the values of goodness, beauty, and truth. When

⁴ Cf. *Religious Realism*, pp. 156, 163.

⁵ For the term “unitary” as applied to God by Wieman, see *The Christian Century*, Vol. XLIX, p. 884.

VALUE AND GOD

values are recognized in their autonomous character, and God is spiritualistically conceived, a religious experience is opened to man which can work creatively in his personal and social living. To illustrate: since there is abundant nitrogen in the atmosphere the soil when exhausted may be replenished with nitrogen by those organisms which are capable of extracting nitrogen from the atmosphere. So it is the presence of a spiritual order of value and Creative Purpose which makes it possible for man to work creatively in the natural and social orders. Few have written more eloquently and persuasively of creativity in and through religion than has Professor Wieman. But the logic of this creativity inevitably bursts the framework of naturalistic thinking.⁶

We must hold, then, that value-judgments are autonomous in that they do not derive their validity nor their entire meaning from the existential world. They do, indeed, have meaning *for* the world of existence. That world becomes meaningful in proportion as it embodies values. But we do not have to confine ourselves to its processes and possibilities in order to determine the meaning of values and their claim to our allegiance. A world-wide community in which love prevails is a supreme good, however little it may be grounded in Sovietism or in the capitalistic West, and if human nature renders such a community forever impossible, human nature must be judged so far forth to be evil. And in the realm of beauty we must not deny the validity of the poet's dream even though it be of

A light that never was on sea or land.

But if ultimate values do not derive their meaning and validity from naturalistic processes and their possibilities—or from some portion of these which may be designated as God by a thinker who, like Wieman, feels that theism can

⁶ See the valuable chapter on "The Creativity of Religion" in W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*.

ULTIMATE VALUES AND REALITY

be brought within the framework of naturalism—are ultimate values conditioned for their meaning and validity upon the existence of God spiritualistically conceived?

In examining this question we shall do well to consider Professor Baillie's discussion of "the witness of our values to the structure of reality."⁷ For Baillie clearly holds that ultimate values—at least, moral values—are autonomous in respect to their validity. He affirms that "*there is nothing of which man is more certain than of his primary moral values,*" and sets forth the vital importance of recognizing "this character of self-sufficiency attaching to our moral knowledge." And at the same time he declares: "*No obligation can be absolute which does not derive from the Absolute.*"⁸

Shall we understand this last affirmation to mean that unless one believes in the reality of God as a moral Being it is illogical to be loyal to moral values because then those values lose their validity and meaning? Not precisely that, but Professor Baillie comes very close to such a position, because of his insistence that one who recognizes the intrinsic worth of ultimate moral values logically must believe in God. He writes:

The consciousness of the moral claim, though it comes to us with an independent and underivative certainty of its own, yet leads us on to the affirmation of some kind of ground and source of it in the real order. But we may now ask, What is the nature of this "leading on"? Its ground, of course, can be nothing else than a logical implication, and the mental process concerned is undoubtedly of the nature of inference.⁹

And in summary he says:

We have now set down . . . in something approaching a rigorous deductive form what we believe to be the logic

⁷ Cf. John Baillie, *The Interpretation of Religion*, Part II, Chap. VII.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 342, 343, 350.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 348.

VALUE AND GOD

of faith. We have formulated what we hold to be the one valid argument for the truth of religion.¹⁰

Now one feels bound to raise the question whether this treatment of the relation between ultimate values and ultimate reality does not overstrain the logical consequences of the values, with the accompanying result of a serious narrowing of the grounds for the truth of religion. The *logical* meaning of moral values when they are viewed as autonomous is more accurately stated by Baillie in another passage. After describing the corrosive effect of the naturalistic picture of the universe, when taken to heart, upon zeal for moral ends, he writes:

No doubt we *ought* to be able to say to ourselves, as Robertson of Brighton still said to himself when the night of his doubt was at its darkest: "If there be no God and no future state, yet even then it is better to be generous than to be selfish, better to be chaste than licentious, better to be true than false, better to be brave than a coward."¹¹

But with the view that moral values are authoritative, whatever the nature of ultimate reality, the following passage does not seem compatible:

It is not indeed as a sanction, or a reward, or even primarily as a support, that our values "need reality to climb on," but rather *as an assurance of their own reality*.¹²

We should in truth hold with Baillie that "The ultimate reality must . . . be One Who loves the Good."¹³ But the proper meaning of this "must" is that it expresses a moral postulate in the Kantian sense. It cannot rightly be translated into the "must" of a deductive logical inference—nor would Kant have allowed such a translation.

But Professor Baillie does in fact broaden the basis for the truth of religion beyond his "one valid argument," and

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 358.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 357. (*Italics mine.*)

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 354.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 352.

here we find ourselves in hearty agreement with him. After all it is the "logic of faith" that he desires to set forth, and he shows effectively how moral faithfulness is a pathway to knowledge.¹⁴ As we have seen in an earlier chapter,¹⁵ moral faithfulness places one at a point of vantage for objective discernment such as one cannot gain apart from this faithfulness. The cumulative evidence of experience too is different according to whether experience is animated by moral faithfulness or not. Not that a given spiritual truth will inevitably be gained when moral faithfulness is present—this is also made clear by Baillie's discussion. But faith, in the form of moral faithfulness, constitutes one of the great conditions for knowing ultimate reality.

The basis for the truth of religion is broadened further by Baillie through the place which he gives to intuition as a source of truth about ultimate reality. "In that which leads to *religious* discovery," he says, "the element of intuition is almost everything."¹⁶ We must not with him, however, derive the evidential value of the religious intuition solely from the moral postulate and its logical implications. An experience of beauty, or an apprehension of the order and creative energy of the world, may enter more potently into a given moment of religious intuition than the consciousness of duty or of moral goodness. And whatever the ratio between its constituents, the religious intuition, as a perception of kinship between the soul of man, the deepest reality in the universe, and ultimate value, has an autonomy of its own. We may indeed speak of the autonomy which belongs to the religious intuition, to moral values, to æsthetic perceptions, and to scientific and philosophical judgments concerning reality, as being in each case a relative autonomy, in the sense that these aspects of experience and the truths which they yield should not be kept separate from each other. In fact we have argued for the interpenetration of these

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 363-370.

¹⁵ See Chap. VII.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 359.

VALUE AND GOD

aspects of experience as being essential to the higher levels of religion. But the autonomy is real in the sense that none of these aspects of experience derives its principle of validity and its right to be a source of truth solely from the others.

We may not say, then, that ultimate values derive their meaning and validity from the existence of God. But neither can we think that the recognition of ultimate values in their autonomous character is sufficient for sustaining man's spiritual experience and creative living. Values do indeed "need reality to climb on." Moral values require to be carried into the objective world, into the social order, and even into the physical order. They call upon men to give them effective embodiment in social life and to be creative of new patterns and standards as the conditions of social life change. And they summon men so to co-ordinate the physical order, to which as psycho-physical organisms men also belong, as to further the spiritualization of social life. Likewise æsthetic values impel men to give them sensuous embodiment, and this is an indispensable part of the spiritualization of the world.

In view of this need that values be given embodiment in the existential world man cannot avoid being motivated by his view of the ultimate nature of existence as well as by his conceptions of ideal value. Though he cannot logically pare down his ideal values to what the existential world permits, psychologically the existential world will wean him from loyalty to ideal values, or foster such loyalty, according to his basic understanding of the nature of that world. Though men ought to be, and have been, utterly courageous and loyal to each other when they find themselves isolated on the glaciers of Greenland, no civilization will be undertaken and maintained there till perchance the glaciers have disappeared. So in the long run the question whether mankind is seeking values singlehanded and alone, in the face of an aimless universe, or whether there is a God to whom values are

ULTIMATE VALUES AND REALITY

precious and with whom man can have communion and co-operation, is of the utmost importance for the maintaining of loyalty to values and creative energy in the pursuit of them.

It is sometimes asserted today that a neutral view of the universe expresses the ultimate truth and that an adequate philosophy of life can be based on this view. Nature, say those who take this view, is neither hostile to man nor is it friendly; it is just neutral. Man should make use of Nature, for it is partly plastic to his efforts; and where Nature sets him definite limits he should be resigned and seek nothing more. For Nature—man being recognized to be a part of Nature—is the last word concerning existence. There is no purpose in the universe higher than man's. There is no achieving of values except as man achieves them. Nature, says this doctrine, is utterly unconcerned for man, and there is no reality beyond Nature. But Nature is not hostile to man, "or we should not be here." Hence pessimism is unjustified, and man may cherish a measure of hope, even though the faith which lays hold of Divine Reality is not permitted him.

This doctrine has been finding expression recently in poetry and literary criticism. It stands, says one writer, "for the full and hearty affirmation of the universe, in its human as well as its unhuman manifestations." It holds up for us as the ideal: "To live, to live enough, to live long enough, but certainly to cease."¹⁷

One finds this doctrine signally expressed by the Californian poet, Robinson Jeffers. In his poem, "The Tower Beyond Tragedy," he depicts the earth when the final ice age has come:

At last, the cold uninhabitable earth:
O clean, clean,
White and most clean, colorless whiteness,

¹⁷ *The Saturday Review of Literature* (Sept. 5, 1931), pp. 98, 99.

IS THE UNIVERSE NEUTRAL?

Without trace, without trail, without stain in the garment,
drawn down
From the poles to the girdle.

But though this means universal death, he finds it possible to say:

. . . I and my people, we are willing to love the fourscore
years
Heartily; but as a sailor loves the sea, when the helm is for
harbor.¹⁸

And here is the teaching that is to bring us, according to the poet's intent, to the tower beyond tragedy. As the critic says, the final wisdom

depends on loving the fourscore years heartily and in all their variety, on perceiving that the strain in humanity is an eagerness in matter, like the expectancy of the lover, or that of the runner on his course.¹⁹

The name for this final wisdom "is, in the loftiest sense, comedy." Thus the critic concludes: "The poetry of the neutral universe will be comic." This philosophy of life based on the neutral view of the universe is intended, I think we may say, to supersede both the pagan tragic view of existence ruled by blind Fate, and also the religious faith in a Divine Purpose working in the universe to create and conserve value. The universe being neutral, one is to love the fourscore years heartily and pass on.

But one aspect of this neutral view of the universe requires special attention. As both poet and critic present this conception it involves a neutral view of society as well. Jeffers writes:

So I believe if we were strong enough to listen without
Divisions of desire and terror

¹⁸ *Roan Stallion, Tamar, and Other Poems*, pp. 56, 85.

¹⁹ *Saturday Review*, as cited above, p. 99.

ULTIMATE VALUES AND REALITY

To the storm of the sick nations, the rage of the hunger-smitten cities,
Those voices also will be found
Clean as a child's. . . .²⁰

And the critic adds:

"The Tower Beyond Tragedy" brings the human and the natural worlds harmoniously under one rule of conduct, for it sanctions and purifies every passion by making each legitimate in its place and hour and for its subject.

Here is where the neutral view of the universe meets its crucial test. When it includes, as it naturally does, the neutral view of society, and calls upon us to accept the storm of the sick nations and the rage of the hunger-smitten cities as parts of the natural order, how can we regard this view as in some lofty sense comedy? Can it be to us anything but the grimmest tragedy? And when this philosophy goes on to sanction every passion as being legitimate in its place and hour and for its subject, its tower beyond tragedy becomes only painted scenery. If one tries to bring the human and the natural worlds into harmony by treating the storms of human passion and the havoc they work in society as being like the dashing of waves against cliffs one reveals how slight is the difference between the neutral view of the universe and the doctrine of blind Fate.

The neutral view of the universe, instead of being an alternative to the pagan view of existence, is really at one with the pagan view and should face the tragic consequences inherent in the latter view. It is true that the pagan philosophy of life is often presented as being simply one of natural joyousness. We are reminded of the Greeks, with their love of athletics, and of the sunshine, with their cultivation of the arts, with their less serious views of sin, and with their worship of the gods of nature. And we are told

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 232.

IS THE UNIVERSE NEUTRAL?

that natural joyousness was the distinctive thing about the Greek attitude toward life. In contrast we have been pointed to the supernaturalism of St. Paul, St. Augustine, and Luther, with its preoccupation with sin and redemption—especially as this supernaturalism was developed in the bleaker climate of the north, under overcast skies and amidst the gloom of forests. Taking the Greek view of life as representing the best in paganism, we may be disposed to think of paganism's dominant mood as being bright, spontaneous, and joyful.

But this is an erroneous conception of paganism as represented by the Greeks. When we adopt it we forget how capricious was nature to the thought of the average Greek, how matter and the flesh came to be regarded by him as inherently evil, and how much his mind was dominated by fear. We forget how the world's greatest tragedies were produced by the Greeks, and how, even after their great philosophers had done their work, the Greek attitude toward life ended in what Gilbert Murray has called "a failure of nerve." As William James once wrote:

There was indeed much joyousness among the Greeks. . . . But . . . the moment they grew systematically pensive and thought of ultimates, they became unmitigated pessimists. The jealousy of the gods, the nemesis that follows too much happiness, the all-encompassing death, fate's dark opacity, the ultimate and unintelligible cruelty, were the fixed background for their imagination. The beautiful joyousness of their polytheism is only a modern poetic fiction.²¹

The reason why the pagan philosophy of life is at bottom one of gloom is that it is dominated by the idea of Fate. Man is a part of a system of forces which has no purpose or meaning and which is sure to frustrate him in the end. No matter what his prowess or virtue may be, blind Fate will checkmate him. Take, for example, one of the choruses from Æschylus's

²¹ Cf. *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 142. See also p. 85.

ULTIMATE VALUES AND REALITY

Agamemnon as Gilbert Murray has translated it. Agamemnon has returned to Mycenæ victorious over Troy, but he is destined to be murdered in his own house. The chorus sings:

If it is writ, he too shall go
Through blood for blood spilt long ago;
If he too, dying for the dead,
Should crown the deaths of alien years,
What mortal afar off, who hears,
Shall boast him Fortune's Child, and led
Above the eternal tide of tears.

As voiced in the great Greek tragedies the pagan philosophy of life is one that sees mankind overwhelmed by an eternal tide of tears by reason of the workings of blind Fate.

This pagan philosophy of life is being set forth in our time by artists who perceive its tragic meaning more clearly than the exponents of the doctrine of the neutral universe appear to have done. It is given expression in the dramas of Eugene O'Neill. In explaining the origin of his masterpiece, *Mourning Becomes Electra*, the dramatist said that he asked himself: Can I make the modern intellectual American, who has no belief in gods, feel the tragic inevitableness of man's frustration by the forces within him and about him? He undertook to portray the psychology of strong natures and to show how their conflicting passions bring about their own downfall. He has made skilful use both of psychoanalysis and of the logic of events to this end—seeking to make us realize how certainly the frustration will come to pass, and to leave us "purged by pity and terror."

Essentially the same was the philosophy of Thomas Hardy. A blind fate brings frustration to most of his leading characters. In *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* the letter which Tess slips under the door of her lover's room, which was to tell him her story, slips under the carpet and is hidden, and so the chain of fatal circumstance remains unbroken. And when Tess, so much more sinned against than sinning,

IS THE UNIVERSE NEUTRAL?

swings from the gibbet, Hardy closes his tale with the mournfully ironic words: " 'Justice' was done, and the President of the Immortals, in Æschylean phrase, had ended his sport with Tess." Hardy was indeed very wistful for the Christian faith and attitude. He longed even for the child-like beliefs of the peasant:

If someone said on Christmas Eve,
"Come; see the oxen kneel,
In the lonely barton by yonder coomb
Our childhood used to know,"
I should go with him in the gloom,
Hoping it might be so.²²

But all he really could believe in was an order of nature which works fatally for man's frustration.

This philosophy of the inevitable frustration of man and his values is finding expression also in music. It is to be observed in the extensive use of dissonance instead of harmony. In one of the orchestral works presented for the first time recently at Carnegie Hall the composer purposely exploits the possibilities of dissonance and atonality. Instead of subordinating dissonance to harmony, the diatonic harmonies are used in the lesser parts to represent transient wish-fulfilment. It is dissonance which prevails, "leaving no doubt," the composer explained, "as to the dominant mood of the work—that of hopeless protest."

There is no question that the pagan philosophy of life, which sees all man's highest aspirations and endeavors checkmated by a blind Fate, has again seized the imaginations of gifted men, and that they see this philosophy borne out by the facts of human existence. Hence, just because they are lovers of ideal values, their interpretation of life takes the form of hopeless protest.

In *Mourning Becomes Electra* Lavinia, after the murder

²² "The Oxen," *Collected Poems*, Vol. I, p. 439.

ULTIMATE VALUES AND REALITY

of her father and the suicides of her mother and brother, closes the doors and shutters of the house, never to open them again. Thus she acquiesces in the downfall of her family and the frustration of her own life, and symbolizes the philosophy of Fate. In "The Tower Beyond Tragedy," the hero who wills to love the fourscore years heartily, and for whom every passion is legitimate in its place and hour, finally leaves humanity behind and goes away to the forest, thus identifying himself with the neutral universe. These two interpretations of life, which are so close together in their ultimate purport, cannot but bring home to us the need that values have, not only for reality to climb on, but for positive support from a Cosmic Divine Purpose. Values, to be sure, as we have seen, do not lose their authoritative claim upon us even when the ultimate nature of reality is found to be indifferent to them. Otherwise the tragedy which ensues when man is frustrated in the pursuit of values would be largely unreal. Tragedy in its full meaning does not arise through the frustration of human desires as such, but only through the frustration of human purposes which have intrinsic worth and nobility. But just because values in their ultimate nature possess intrinsic worth and nobility, one can hardly be loyal to them and be indifferent to the question whether or not they have support in ultimate reality. Indeed the hope that values have such support has the strongest moral sanction.

The Kantian postulate of the existence of God, then, holds good in the sense that, unless God exists, there is fundamental irrationality in the universe, and a tragic destiny for men in proportion as they are lovers of the ultimate values. To hold as a necessity of thought that the world must be rational through and through is more than loyalty to our highest values permits. There is too much of tragedy and evil in the actual experience of men for that. As we shall see in the next chapter, the problem of evil cannot be dealt

A MORAL UNIVERSE

with by rationalizing evil in all its forms and in its totality. But the faith that God exists has strong *moral* sanction. It is saying both too much and too little to call the moral postulate the one valid argument for religion. But the moral postulate of the existence of God must be given full weight by all who are seeking to find coherence and rationality in the universe and the maximum attainable support for the spiritual creativities of men.

Thus moral values afford one of the ways of apprehending the validity of religion and one of the ways of finding God. But to moral values we should add æsthetic values, the intuitions and experiences of kinship and communion with the Divine which belong to the mystical side of religion, and the spiritualistic philosophy to which the philosophy of nature and history leads, if we would fully apprehend the sources of religion's validity and the ways of finding God. As A. E. Taylor has said: "If we are to reach God in this life, so far as is permitted, we need to integrate the 'religious experience' with the suggestions conveyed to us by the knowledge of Nature and of our own being." Hence he reasons "from Nature to God," "from Man to God," and "from God to God" (that is, from religious experience), holding "that the suggestions of an eternal above and behind the temporal are derived from three independent sources, and that the agreement of the three in their common suggestion gives it a force which ought to be invincible."²⁸ We may say also with Taylor:

In principle this work of integrating our experience has been already accomplished for us by Christianity, with its double inheritance from the Jewish prophets and the Greek philosophers who freed their "reasonable worship" from en-

²⁸ Cf. the essay, "The Vindication of Religion," in *Essays Catholic and Critical*, edited by E. G. Selwyn, pp 79, 80.

In *The Faith of a Moralist*, Vol. I, Taylor has elaborated "The Theological Implications of Morality." The attitude there presented, which "avowedly involves a 'venture of faith,'" appears still to call for the integration of morals and religion with a spiritualistic philosophy of Nature.

ULTIMATE VALUES AND REALITY

tanglement in the follies and foulnesses of the old "nature-religions."

Nevertheless, "we cannot enter into the highest religious experience available to us except by a perpetual fresh interpretation of the given for ourselves."²⁴ It is such a fresh interpretation, which shall aid us in realizing anew the Divine meaning and power of creative and redemptive love, that we have been seeking here.

We conclude, then, that ultimate values are autonomous, being derived in their authority neither from naturalistic processes and possibilities nor from being willed or thought by the Absolute. We conclude, in the second place, that just because of the authority and preciousness of ultimate values, loyalty to them cannot be combined with the doctrine of a neutral universe, and that either that doctrine becomes one with the doctrine of blind Fate and with a completely tragic view of human existence, or the loyalty to values is diluted by too great an acceptance of the natural and social orders. Hence faith in God is a moral postulate. We conclude, in the third place, that since the integration of our experience validates faith in God as a Cosmic Creative Spirit whose very nature is characterized by Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, man need neither conform his ideal values to the natural and social orders, nor cherish them in tragic defiance against an indifferent universe, but may so truly become a member of a spiritual order of ultimate value and Creative Purpose that he will increasingly transcend and transform the natural and social orders.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 80.

B. MAN AND HIS IDEALS
(continued)

XVI

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

ACCORDING to the course of thought developed in this third part of our study it is theism which most adequately interprets our total experience. This is because it brings the philosophy of ultimate values, the philosophy of man, and the philosophy of physical nature into the most coherent and vital relations with each other. Theism finds the ground of both nature and man to be Active Purposeful Spirit working creatively to achieve the highest values, and to bring into being a spiritual universe. For theism man's freedom and creative action are metaphysically real, and necessary for the attainment of a universe which is genuinely spiritual. And for theism the sub-structure for man's creative living in the pursuit of the highest values appears in nature as a whole by reason of its orderly processes, and by reason of its age-long upward trend. But at the same time theism, in consequence of its loyalty to the highest values, cannot take the world-accepting attitude which characterizes pantheism. Nor can it acquiesce in the relativity of values which results from naturalism. Instead, it recognizes in values of intrinsic and ultimate worth the clue to the nature of God and the destiny of man.

Thus theism affords a solution of what Professor Montague has significantly called "the Problem of the Good." He states the problem in the following terms: "How can the amount of goodness and purposefulness in the world be compatible with the non-existence of a God?" And he in-

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

sists that the Problem of Evil and the Problem of the Good need to be considered together.¹ We have seen how theism makes intelligible the presence of goodness and purposefulness on a cosmic scale, and at the same time opens to man a life of transcending and transforming the world, by the conception of God as a Cosmic Purposeful Spirit who is creating and conserving value. And at the same time we have pointed out, as we concluded our discussions of evolution, of history, and of ultimate values, how this very solution of the problem of the good opens the way to a constructive treatment of the problem of evil. But as the problem of evil is the characteristic difficulty for theism, just as the problem of the good is for naturalism and pantheism, we should now go on to a fuller examination of it.

Let us undertake to face the problem comprehensively in its most salient aspects. It may be considered under the three aspects of suffering, frustration, and sin. We must be sure, however, that these aspects are viewed in their full range of meaning and in their inter-relatedness.

The problem of suffering is the problem of Job.

Wherefore is light given to him that is in misery,
And life unto the bitter in soul?²

In contrast to moral evil, suffering may be called physical evil, but it is an evil none the less. Suffering is something that we cannot directly will. At the most we can accept it if it is found to be accessory to the attainment of a good—as when one undergoes a surgical operation for the sake of fuller health. But the suffering of the world appears to be far in excess of what can be understood as means to the end of good. Moreover, it is one of the highest objectives of man to relieve suffering and to eliminate its causes. Why then, we must ask with Job, should there be so much suffering in a world which owes its existence to a good God?

¹ Cf. *Belief Unbound*, pp. 67, 68.

² Job 3:20.

SUFFERING, FRUSTRATION, AND SIN

But the drama of the book of Job includes also the problem of frustration.

Why is light given to a man whose way is hid,
And whom God hath hedged in?³

The defeat of our purposes, if they are themselves intrinsically worthy, is an evil even though no physical suffering be involved. Calamities which frustrate high enterprises bring mental suffering. Bereavement brings the pain of sorrow and brings the added evil of frustration. Thus the inter-relatedness of suffering and frustration must be appreciated if we would realize some of the more grievous forms of the problem of evil.

On the other hand, as the problem is presented in the book of Job, the absence of sin on the part of Job determines the acuteness of the problem. Suffering which is the plain consequence of sin, as when one falls into the pit that one has digged for another, or suffering which is a brief chastisement for transgression in order that one may learn the way of righteousness—these are not the forms of suffering which baffle the understanding and create moral confusion. The integrity of Job is real—else his accusers have solved the problem of the book. It is the absence of sin in Job, and the positive presence of moral integrity instead, which makes the problem of his suffering and frustration so acute. Sin, however, enters in to aggravate the problem in the form of the sins of others on whom no calamities fall. Hence Job complains accusingly of God:

The earth is given into the hands of the wicked;
He covereth the faces of the judges thereof:
If it be not he, who then is it?⁴

Injustice goes unpunished while calamity falls upon the righteous. So far as this is true, are we not driven to say

³ Job 3:23.

⁴ JOB 9:24.

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

that God is unjust? Or else, that aimless forces are in control?

The problem of frustration, however, is peculiarly the problem of the prophet, and is illustrated most clearly in the experience of other characters than Job. Jeremiah, like Job, curses the day of his birth:

Cursed be the day wherein I was born: let not the day wherein my mother bare me be blessed. Cursed be the man who brought tidings to my father, saying, A man-child is born unto thee, making him very glad.⁵

The frustrations of the prophet come to him because he is more sensitive than others to the social injustices of the world and more determined to "make righteousness and the will of God prevail." The prophet is keenly aware of the cruelty, ruthlessness, and oppression which result from man's greed and wanton use of power, and he cannot but pronounce woe upon them. He seeks to win men from devotion to power and privilege and to bring in the reign of justice and love, but the devotees of power and privilege overwhelm him. The frustration of the prophet finds its ultimate expression in the cry of Jesus on the cross, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"

Thus we see that the evil of frustration in its most tragic form springs from the third aspect of the problem of evil—the problem of sin. The core of this problem consists of moral evil. There are tendencies within us, in the realm where personal insight and control are possible, which defeat the higher good and work injury to our fellows. Objective wrong springs out of dispositions and sentiments which might have been controlled for objective good and which therefore must be judged to be morally evil. Not that any natural disposition taken by itself is evil. On the contrary all natural dispositions are potencies for good as well as for evil. But when natural dispositions become waywardness,

⁵ Jer. 20:14, 15.

SUFFERING, FRUSTRATION, AND SIN

willfulness, callousness, when these qualities get expressed in overt action and become parts of our "second nature," the moral factor is unmistakably present and the result is moral evil, deeply rooted in the self. Here we face evil in its gravest form—moral evil in men's hearts and wills. For this form of evil corrupts that which has intrinsic worth—personality—and is the chief source of the defeat of the highest good—a universal community of creative personalities.

We have called moral evil the core of the problem of sin. But we must use the term sin as the most far-reaching and searching designation of moral evil. Sin is moral evil viewed in the relationships which religious faith apprehends. From the standpoint of religious faith on its highest levels man is not only a denizen of earth and a citizen of society, but a being possessing kinship with the Unseen and Eternal. The individual man and all his fellowmen possess the capacity to become co-workers with God in achieving a spiritual universe. Moreover, in ethical religion there is an interpenetration between the religious relationships and those which are specifically ethical. Sin is moral evil seen as transgression against the total system of spiritual relationships to which man belongs or into which he may enter—against men as sons of God and against God as the Eternal Good Will. Hence it is that, while moral evil is most characteristically defined in terms of the doer's responsibility and his knowledge of what his action will involve, sin denotes the rupture of moral and spiritual relationships even when it is largely unwitting. Doctor Adler has pointed out this aspect of sin by saying: "It is characteristic of sin that the fuller knowledge that the harmful deed is sinful *comes after the act.*"⁶ And Royce was expressing the same thought with another shade of meaning when he said that in sinning "we consciously choose to forget."

If, then, we would face the problem of evil in its acute

⁶ *An Ethical Philosophy of Life*, p. 172.

forms and in its comprehensive meaning, we must have in view the problem of Job, or the problem of suffering; the problem of the prophets and of the creative spirits in any realm—the problem of frustration; and the problem of sin, that is, of moral evil and of the injury which it works, far beyond the doer's ken, in the doer's soul, in society, and in the entire realm of man's religious relationships.

And again we must emphasize that these forms of evil are intricately interrelated. The frustration of the prophets is chiefly due to the sinfulness of those who are ready to stone them. The worst and most widespread human suffering springs from causes which lie in the human realm, and which are controllable or which may be brought under control by sufficient co-operative endeavor. And the sin of one inevitably means some measure of suffering and frustration for others. On the other hand, suffering, or physical and social handicaps, often enfeeble the moral resources of men. Thus physical evil, and the external evil of practical situations, often condition individuals heavily in the direction of moral evil.

The most serious form of this interrelatedness of the different aspects of evil appears when the causes of suffering, frustration, and sin become established in the institutions of society. War, economic injustice, governmental corruption, oppressive social customs, racial antipathies, senseless methods of education, persist and work their havoc very largely because of the sheer momentum of institutions. It is here that "the sins of good people" can be most clearly discerned. For we acquiesce in injustices and cruelties done by institutions which we would not tolerate for a moment if done by individuals, although we are implicated in varying degrees in those same institutions; and personal goodness in those who guide these institutions, plus amiable intentions on our own part, assist us to this acquiescence. At least partly through the sins of good people, as well as through sheer

SOLUTION BY INTERPRETIVE REASON

human greed and the ruthless use of power, injustices and oppressions may become so entrenched in social institutions as to constitute something like what Rauschenbusch called "a kingdom of evil"—the very opposite of the kingdom of God.

Having thus sought to face fully the problem of evil in its most salient aspects, we must now go on to consider what contributions toward the solution of the problem reason and faith may afford. In so doing we must maintain the position already adopted that the Problem of Evil and the Problem of the Good must be taken together. And since theism alone can reach a solution of the Problem of the Good, we must ask, to what attitude toward the Problem of Evil the type of ethical theism developed by our previous thought leads, and whether this attitude can be accepted as a working solution of the problem. If ethical theism does not make possible such a working solution, it is seriously challenged, if not invalidated. But if ethical theism be found to contain a working solution of this supreme problem, its meaning will be further unfolded.

We have spoken of the solution to be sought as "a working solution." It would be contrary to the spirit of ethical theism if we sought for a full intellectual solution of the problem of evil. We have been concerned already in this chapter to face the reality of evil and not to tone it down in the interests of a theological or metaphysical view. Evil is inherently irrational. How then can a reason be given for all the evils of the world? It is the most serious defect of thorough-going monism that it has to make evil a permanent constituent of the Whole. Hence idealistic monism tends to treat evil as simply imperfection or incompleteness. Or if an idealistic monist is bent, like Royce, upon not minimizing the gravity of evil, he still must treat it, because of his doctrine of the Absolute, as something that, though bad in itself, is indispensable to the good—like the bad characters in

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

a good play. Thus when one persists in solving the problem of evil solely by interpretation, an æsthetic view of evil tends to take the place of a fully moral view.

But the possibility of evil may be recognized as inevitable along with the denial of the inevitableness of the actual evils of the world. The possibility of evil is inevitable because of the limitations inherent in the process of the creating of good. A spiritual order which is to have love as its supreme principle cannot be established by coercion; hence from the process of achieving such an order evil cannot be simply banished. An order in which man's initiative and freedom are to bear a part cannot be pre-determined against all evil. An order that is to be achieved through voluntary co-operation of its members cannot be made immune from all injustice.

Evil, then, springs from the reality of freedom in the human realm, and from the reality of contingency in the orders of existence below man. And this contingency we see to be present, not only by reason of the spontaneity evident in the realms of life, but also by reason of the principle of indeterminacy with respect to the ultimate units of nature, which as we have seen has become a part of the new physics. Contingency and freedom cannot be looked upon as themselves evil, for they are conditions of growth and of the achievement of the good. But they are also inevitably the source of the possibility of evil.

The problem of evil, accordingly, is susceptible of this much of intellectual interpretation: if evil is due to the presence of contingency and freedom in the world, then the actual evils of the world spring from finite centres of origination and not from God. The God in whom we find it rational to believe is a God who by his very nature grounds the enterprise of achieving the good and the endeavor for the conquest of evil.

But the good, so far as we empirically see, must be

SOLUTION BY INTERPRETIVE REASON

achieved by a growing process. This means that earlier and more primitive stages tend to hold the field against more ideal stages, which can be reached only by persistent effort. The phenomenon of inertia thus becomes a condition from which evils spring. Sins of sloth will be in large measure responsible for the final judgment, "Inasmuch as ye did it not."

More specifically, the realization of the purpose of God, according to all our experience, involves an educational process. This means that the presence of ignorance in the human realm becomes a source of evil, which can be overcome only by the growth of knowledge and its application to life. How great are the evils which mankind suffers today through ignorance of what those who have had the benefits of scientific medicine have already learned!

Furthermore, it is inherent in the purpose of God that it must be achieved through a social process. This means that the interaction of lives which are only partially socialized and ethicized will be a source of evil. The founder of a school may have a wholly good purpose, and may work wisely and persistently for its accomplishment; but he can eliminate wrongs done by members of the school to each other only as he evokes in the members appreciation of the values he has in view and co-operation toward their attainment.

Too often men have assumed that God creates by fiat, and then have said: "Why have we not a universal harmony now?" Or they have assumed that God really moves his creatures about as the chess-player moves his chessmen, and they have said: "Why the mistakes in the way in which the game is being played?" This is the conception which produces the pessimism of Omar Khayyam:

Impotent pieces of the Game He plays
Upon this Checker-board of Nights and Days;
Hither and thither moves, and checks, and slays,
And one by one back in the Closet lays.

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

But the Cosmic Creative Spirit is not a chess player, moving impotent pieces about. He is building a Cosmos, but the Cosmos is not complete, for there is much that is chaotic still, at least in human life. He brings into being organic life, abounding in centres of spontaneous growth; and through this process there come to pass forms of loveliness such as the universe could, not otherwise show. But there remain other forms of beauty to be realized which no eye has yet seen and no ear has yet heard. He achieves finite spirits to whom he can impart a creativity in some degree, however slight, like his own; and then he summons them to work with him in building a social order in which force and selfish competition shall be replaced by reason and love.

In such a universe there will be collisions between the finite spirits and the basic cosmic order already established. There will be error and pain. These could be prevented only by fiat. But God does not work by fiat; he works, rather, by the silent forces which spring from impartial love. "He maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust." God works not by the method of fiat but by the method of growth. And the method of growth, which for us means stimulating the creative within us, can achieve what the method of fiat cannot. The whole meaning of our existence is that we are called upon to be sharers with God in creative work. We cannot rightly relate theism either to the problem of evil or to the problem of the good unless we replace the conception of a cosmic chess-player, which has underlain too much of our theology and has lingered on in our popular-science philosophy, by the conception of a God of creative love who makes possible for men

The glory of eternal partnership.

We thus far have been taking the point of view of interpretive reason, although recognizing that interpretation alone

SOLUTION BY ACTIVE FAITH

cannot suffice for dealing with the problem of evil, since what is inherently irrational and evil cannot be made into good by interpretation. But when interpretive reason brings us to the conception of eternal partnership, it directs us beyond itself to the point of view of active faith. And we must go on to this point of view, because only through active faith can many of the gravest evils be dealt with.

Among the gravest evils are those of human oppression. It is such evils which often evoke the darkest pessimism. The Jewish sage from whom came the book, Ecclesiastes, was facing realities when he wrote:

Then I returned and saw all the oppressions that are done under the sun: and, behold, the tears of such as were oppressed, and they had no comforter; and on the side of the oppressors there was power; but they had no comforter. Wherefore I praised the dead that have been long dead more than the living that are yet alive.⁷

Here is a sensitiveness to injustice which condemns us if we do not respond to it. But we are still more condemned if we are callous to the oppressions of our own day—oppressions such as force so many textile workers and coal miners into revolt; oppressions such as leave their stamp upon the anemic faces of so many thousands of children in our large cities; oppressions such as are always before us in the lot of the negro race.

But a sensitiveness to injustice which ends in disillusionment and pessimism, as was the case with the sage of Ecclesiastes, serves simply the purpose of repudiating those interpretations of evil which subtly aggravate the evil. Only as moral sensitiveness issues in active faith can our fuller resources for solving the problem of evil be known. In other words, there must be no solution of the problem of evil which does not include the fight with evil. Faith in God is no less vital in this aspect of the solution of the problem of

⁷ Eccles. 4:1, 2.

evil than in any other; but it is the faith in God that strengthens for the conquest of evil and for its elimination which is called for, instead of a faith which acquiesces in evil as being inscrutably a part of God's will.⁸

Active faith is always the attitude of the prophets toward evil. A prophetic spirit of modern times may be cited as an example. The Earl of Shaftesbury, England's greatest social reformer in the last century, was a man of intense religious faith, and his faith was the mainspring of his work for reform. What his fight against injustice and oppression cost him may be seen from an entry in his journal at a time when the outcome of his efforts for factory legislation looked dark:

Twelve years of labor, anxiety, and responsibility! I have borrowed and spent in reference to my income enormous sums of money, and am shut out from every hope of emolument and path of honorable ambition. My own kinsfolk dislike my opinions and persecute me. I am excluded from my father's house because I have maintained the cause of the laborer. It has been toil by day and by night, fears and disappointments, prayers and tears, long journeys and unceasing letters.⁹

But Shaftesbury's pain and struggle bore their fruit, and at the time of his death it could be said that all the great social reforms of his generation were due more to his influence, character and perseverance than to any other single cause. There could be no clearer demonstration that active faith is an indispensable part of the solution of the problem of evil.

It is thus a source of the strength of ethical theism that it does not offer an interpretation of the actual evils of the

⁸Cf. Professor D. C. Macintosh's doctrine of "moral optimism," *Reasonableness of Christianity*, pp. 45 ff.

⁹Jennie M. Bingham, *The Life of the Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury*, K. G., pp. 43, 44.

THE RELIGIOUS SOLUTION

world by finding them to be necessary as a part of the good, but that instead it summons men to the fight with evil, in the faith that such a fight will be victorious. The will of an ethical God must be understood to be directed toward the conquest of evil; and men are co-workers with God, consciously or unconsciously, wherever they are striving courageously and intelligently for the elimination of evils and are changing the processes which produce evil into processes which produce good.

—In this fight with evil, science may bear a most indispensable part through its mastery of physical and social conditions. But for this very reason the enlistment of science in the service of the highest ends is of the utmost importance. For science may be used to entrench evils in society still more strongly, and to reinforce destructive agencies. Hence the conquest of evil is in the last analysis the responsibility of ethics and religion.⁹ The fight with evil becomes a matter of building a moral world and of evoking the fullest responsiveness to God in the depths of the human heart.

The final contribution to a working solution of the problem of evil springs from direct religious insight. It is the discovery, made by the supreme prophets of religion and capable of being made anew by each religious soul, that in the secret processes of the inner life evil may be transmuted into good, and that thereby active faith may be nourished and the vision of God rendered more profound. Beyond the interpretation of evil which carries us to the recognition that the possibility of evil cannot be precluded from a universe in which finite spirits must bear their part, and beyond the fight with evil which aims at its conquest and elimination, comes the principle of the transmutation of evil through the life with God.

The need of the principle of the transmutation of evil arises from the fact that life must be lived in the midst of many evils not yet eliminated. The fight with evil, in fact,

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

brings with it added evils of frustration. These evils we must not think of as sent from God, since the will of God is directed toward eradicating them from the world. But they may be met nobly instead of ignobly. Through strength from God we may transcend them instead of being overwhelmed by them. And a spiritual victory on our part may help others to their own spiritual victory. Thus experiences, which in and of themselves could be only experiences of evil, may become transmuted into experiences of good having a unique and lofty quality.

The author of the seventy-third Psalm exemplifies one form of the experience of which we are thinking when, in the midst of his own sufferings and of the prosperity of the wicked, he finds that the inward presence of God suffices for him:

Whom have I in heaven but thee?
And there is none upon earth that I desire besides thee.
My flesh and my heart faileth:
But God is the strength of my heart and my portion for ever.

The principle of the transmutation of evil in its application to physical suffering is impressively illustrated in the following instance. Katherine Mansfield, the gifted author who died in 1922 at the age of 34, after a long struggle with disease, wrote thus in her *Journal*:

I should like this to be accepted as my confession. There is no limit to human suffering. When one thinks: "Now I have touched the bottom of the sea—now I can go no deeper," one goes deeper. . . . I do not want to die without leaving a record of my belief that suffering can be overcome. For I do believe it. What must one do? . . . Do not resist. Take it. Be overwhelmed. Accept it fully. Make it *part of life*. Everything in life that we really accept undergoes a change. So suffering must become Love. This is the mystery. This is what I must do. I must pass from personal love to greater love.

THE RELIGIOUS SOLUTION

And a little later, pressing on through suffering to her work, she wrote: "May I be found worthy to do it! Lord, make me crystal clear for thy light to shine through."¹⁰

The principle of transmutation of evil is expressed in its profoundest meaning in the portrait of the Suffering Servant. "The chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed." This is the principle which Jesus found to be inseparable from sonship to God and which he incarnated when he accepted his Cross. His ultimate interpretation of his mission was that he came "to give his life a ransom for many." The conquest of evil involves the expression of self-sacrificing love on the part of those who have learned the meaning and power of love. It was Jesus' insight that such love is the outcome of the experience of sonship to God. Hence sonship to God means sharing in saviorhood. The deepest implication of this insight is that God himself is eternally expressing himself in redemptive work as well as in creative work, and that the evil of the world means suffering for Him. The suffering, self-giving love which we see in Jesus we may also discern at the heart of the universe.

The problem of evil is tragic enough so that all the resources of man's experience must be drawn upon for meeting it. Those upon whom the problem presses most heavily have a right to whatever intellectual interpretation is valid. And here it should be recognized that the faith in immortality is a part of ethical theism in the fullest sense of the term, and that without faith in immortality the evils of human frustration lead to the baffling view that numberless persons in this world are doomed, at best, merely to be means to ends in which they have no share. Such a view is repugnant to our conception of personality as possessing intrinsic worth and to the conception of God which ethical theism maintains.

¹⁰ *Journal of Katherine Mansfield*, ed. by J. Middleton Murry, pp 166, 167, 201.

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

But to any and all interpretations must be added active devotion to the conquest of evil as the cause which requires the co-operative endeavors of all those who would have a genuine experience of sonship to God. And to rational faith and self-giving endeavor should be added the insight that the life with God may transcend evil through the experience of communion with him and through the realization that there is no higher life than that of participating to some degree in his redemptive work. Thus the resources of ethical theism enable us to conceive our universe as having a spiritual goal, and as becoming spiritual in fact through the power of God's wisdom and love, in the expression of which we may bear a living part as his sons.

C. *A SPIRITUAL UNIVERSE*

XVII

GOD, IMMANENT AND TRANSCENDENT

WE have reached a point in our thought from which we can understand the universe as basically spiritual and at the same time as involving a vast process of spiritualization. The universe is basically spiritual because its order and organization, its upward trend through the æons of time, and its finite centres of creativity are grounded in a God whose being is inherently characterized by Goodness, Truth, and Beauty. The universe involves a process of spiritualization of indefinitely vast extent because of the enormously rich possibilities of value which are not yet realized in the world of existence, and because, through finite centres of creativity, evil as well as good enters into the processes of the world, and enters in a deeply tragic way. Against the evil God's redemptive will goes forth to conquer it and to win men to participation in the task of its conquest. Toward the possibilities of value God's creative will goes forth for their realization and to win men to a sharing in his creative work. We think, then, of the universe as being spiritual in its ground and its goal, and as involving in its time-process a supremely challenging task of spiritualization.

The relation of God to the universe as thus conceived may be best understood by thinking of him as both transcendent and immanent. God transcends the universe because he is its ground, because his nature is wholly characterized by Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, and because his purpose is far richer in content than the sum-total of actualized value in the universe. God is immanent in the universe because he is actively

GOD, IMMANENT AND TRANSCENDENT

present in the order, organization, and achieved values of the world as a conserver of value, and because he is purposefully at work throughout the historic process of the world as a creator of value.

But there are forms of dualism in religious thought today which result in the abandoning, or the serious limitation, of either the divine immanence or the divine transcendence. Two of these forms of dualism must be taken up for consideration here. The examination of them will enable us to test the conception of God as being both transcendent and immanent, and if this conception proves to be most adequate, as affording a synthesis of religious faith and experience with the philosophy of nature, of spirit, and of value, the meaning of this conception of God may receive fuller expression. The two forms of dualism referred to appear in the Theology of Crisis and in the doctrine of a finite God according to a recent presentation.

The Theology of Crisis, as set forth by Professor H. E. Brunner, exalts the doctrine of God's transcendence to a central and all-controlling position in theology and condemns the modern theology of the last two centuries for having been controlled by the doctrine of God's immanence. Hence the Crisis-Theology would restore "the Biblical dualistic concepts" with which it holds that Christianity stands or falls. Brunner maintains that all schools of modern theology share with modern thought in general an idea which is disastrous for Christianity, namely, the idea of continuity. Concerning this idea Brunner writes :

Over against it stands the thought of discontinuity which is basic to every primary doctrine of Christianity. A line of distinction is clearly drawn between God and the world by the concept of creation *ex nihilo*. This dualism is absolutely contradictory to modern monism. This line of separation between God and the world, which naturally applies to man also, stands out more boldly in the concept of sin, if it is

THE THEOLOGY OF CRISIS

understood in its terrific meaning which it has in the Christian dogma of "the fall" and "original sin."¹

(This dualism between man and God, which springs first from the event of creation and secondly from original sin, places a "contradiction" at the heart of all human life, which can be overcome only through the obliteration of man's guilt by divine forgiveness. Moreover the divine forgiveness, Brunner maintains, must be understood in terms of divine sovereignty. It is "a deed and word which God himself must do and speak, a sovereign act of God by which he places men in a new position with regard to himself because he so wills."² Brunner writes in summary as follows:

Man is separated from God through sin and guilt. The original union with God, in which he was created, has been destroyed; man is cut off from the tree of life. Therefore a contradiction beyond repair clings to our life. This contradiction is characteristic of the very essence of man because his relation to God is identical with his essence; and therefore there is no possibility of man's returning to God. All the ways of man are sinful ways. There is no road to innocence for the guilty, no road to peace for God's enemy. For wherever man goes, this contradiction goes with him. He is separated from God.

But it pleased God in his mercy to throw a bridge across the chasm between himself and man and to blaze a trail where man himself could not go. It pleased God to visit man who cannot come to God. This approach of God to man, this divine condescension, this entering into a world of sin and sinners burdened with their sense of contradiction to him, just this constitutes the mystery of divine revelation and reconciliation in the incarnate and crucified Christ.³

This fundamental dualism, then, between human nature and the Divine nature is for Brunner an indispensable presupposition for the Christian faith in Revelation, Incarnation, and Salvation; which faith, he holds, is undermined by

¹ *The Theology of Crisis*, p. 12. ² *Ibid.*, p. 59. ³ *Ibid.*, pp. 59, 60

GOD, IMMANENT AND TRANSCENDENT

the modern conception of divine immanence. Brunner, to be sure, will not have it that he lacks all perception for the immanence of God. "As if we too," he protests, "were not aware that God the Creator upholds all things by His power, that he has set the stamp of His divinity on the world and created man to be His own image!"⁴ And he says:

! When . . . we distinguish between the "transcendent" God of the Bible and the God-idea of the "religion of immanence," it is important to note that we are treating of an epistemological but not a cosmological transcendence. We hold, *i.e.*, that God cannot be known by his active presence in the world. His presence in nature and history is not denied, but it is regarded as hidden, so that what God is, is not revealed.⁵

But if this epistemological transcendence denies the immanence of God in all human faculties and in all human nature throughout history the cosmological immanence which remains is a matter of arbitrary affirmation and has little or no meaning for religious experience or philosophical interpretation.

Accordingly it is important to note that the dualism between human nature and the divine nature takes on its most acute form, for the Theology of Crisis, in a dualism between reason and faith. On the one side stands reason, which is the essence of our being and which at the same time is defined very broadly so as to cover all human knowledge, whether scientific, metaphysical, or religious. "I include in reason," says Brunner, "every faculty belonging to man as *humanus*."⁶ On the other side stands faith, which is always described as an "act of decision," and which is the one transcendent relationship open to man. Between these two—reason and faith—a deep gulf is placed, in order that the sovereignty of God and the absoluteness of his revelation, once-for-all, in the Incarnation and the Cross may not be impaired.

⁴ *The Word and the World*, p. 7.

⁵ *The Theology of Crisis*, p. 28 f.n.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

THE THEOLOGY OF CRISIS

But let us proceed to take account of some of the consequences of this form of dualism which is so essential to the Theology of Crisis. One of these consequences is that this theology is really built on philosophical scepticism. It is not as though this theology could be simply indifferent to the question whether or not philosophy logically lands us in scepticism. On the contrary it requires philosophical scepticism as a part of its foundation. The reason for this is that the Crisis-Theology rejects completely the Biblical world-view. Brunner declares: "The Biblical world-view, cosmological and historical, has gone for good."⁷ He would accept unreservedly the results both of natural science and of historical criticism. Reason in the form of science he holds to be one of the greatest gifts of God to man. Moreover, the results of natural science and of history may be legitimately summed up into a world-view which has sufficient validity to supersede that of the Bible. Still further, "critical reason" may be welcomed and is even important for faith. "Genuine faith," Brunner affirms, "and critical reason cannot be opposed to each other, for they are created for each other."⁸ But critical reason is allowed this rôle because it is expected to end in philosophical scepticism. It must set limits to knowledge, and it must not go on to any constructive philosophy or metaphysics which shall have positive meaning for faith. With reference to metaphysical issues Brunner says: "It seems to me to be characteristic of the human situation, that with an equal stringency of logic you can defend the one standpoint as well as the other."⁹

But how can natural science and history be synthesized into a world-view which has a right to overthrow the Biblical world-view and yet has no metaphysical or philosophical implications which extend into the realm of faith? If it be said that Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* has shown us how, we

⁷ *The Word and the World*, p. 98.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 15. See also Brunner, *Religionsphilosophie Protestantischer Theologie*.

GOD, IMMANENT AND TRANSCENDENT

must not forget that Kant himself went on to a doctrine of "the primacy of the Practical Reason." If one does not accept this latter doctrine—Brunner himself must disapprove of it as "rationalism"—and holds to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, one is either a naturalist or a philosophical sceptic.

Another consequence of the dualism in the Crisis-Theology is that it puts a decision of faith to accept a dogma about the historic Christ above the meaning and power of the historical content of Christ's teaching and life for revealing God and transforming men. The decision of faith is, indeed, finely described by Brunner as "the life-utterance of the total self in its unanalyzable unity."¹⁰ But that for which the decision is made is a dogma about Christ, in the interests of which his teachings and life are even disparaged. Brunner writes:

If Jesus is merely a teacher, example, genius, then it does not matter whether he lived or not, whether the world remembers or forgets him. Then we get no further with Jesus than without him.¹¹

Whether one holds that Jesus' meaning for mankind is of another order than that expressed by "teacher," and "genius," or not, one cannot but find painful this depreciation of Jesus' words and deeds and human life. On what other foundation than Jesus' teachings and life can any affirmation of his divinity rest, unless one subtly denies that the supremacy of Jesus depends precisely upon the revelation of God in history?

Indeed, one cannot but take as such a denial Brunner's insistence that the revelation of God in Jesus has no continuity with history as otherwise known, but is historical only in the sense that it "pierces" history.¹² All uniqueness in history, it is true, means some measure of discontinuity, especially discontinuity in respect to quality, and a prophet

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 72. ¹¹ *The Theology of Crisis*, p. 36. ¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 31 ff.

THE THEOLOGY OF CRISIS

shows such discontinuity in a high degree. Moreover, Jesus is unique among prophets inasmuch as he perfectly embodies the meaning of sonship to God—giving sonship a meaning far deeper and richer than our actual apprehension of it. But a revelation in history must have also a very real continuity with history as otherwise known; and a revelation, being an event which is essentially spiritual, must have continuity with man's thought and his ideals of value. Yet Brunner declares:

In the person of Jesus God tells us what no man can know, what is in no kind of continuity with our human ideas, no, not even with the best and highest that we possess.¹³

But on what ground shall we find God revealing himself in Jesus except on the ground of the historical content of Jesus' life, and on the ground of some kind of continuity between that content and our highest ideas and values? The Crisis-Theology answers: The inner witness of the Holy Spirit suffices.¹⁴ But to what is this witness made if not to the teachings and life of Jesus? The only alternative is to regard it as an inscrutable, arbitrary sanctioning of a dogma. It is indeed to this latter alternative that the epistemological dualism of the Theology of Crisis leads. Logically it is in a dogma about Jesus that we are asked to believe rather than in Jesus himself as a real person in history. We must conclude, then, that the only way in which we can be true to the historical character of the Christian revelation, if we reject the Biblical world-view, is through a conception of God's immanence which is both cosmological and epistemological.

A third and very momentous consequence of the dualistic thought in the Theology of Crisis is that it tends to shift dualism from the realm in which it has its most valid and important meaning into other realms—which has the effect

¹³ *The Word and the World*, p. 45.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Chap. III.

GOD, IMMANENT AND TRANSCENDENT

of confusing and weakening the valid meaning. The realm in which we must recognize that dualism has valid meaning is the realm of ethics. By ethical dualism we mean the dualism between good and bad, right and wrong, loyalty to truth and acceptance of untruth, love and its opposites of cruelty, callousness, greed, and hate. And we mean also the conflicts in men's souls and the cleavages in society which result from accepting and following, under whatever specious guise, the bad, the wrong, the untruthful, instead of the good, the right, the truthful, and the loving. All the subtleties of discrimination which we make, and in honesty must make, showing that personal characters, social institutions, and historical events are never either black or white but always of some shade of gray, do not do away with the sharpness of the alternatives which the ethical categories present to us when we face the future, nor with the grievous effects of the conflicts and cleavages in men's souls and in society when we face the past and the present.

The dualism, then, which we inevitably must acknowledge, if we are sensitive to ultimate values, is ethical dualism. But when this dualism is translated into other than ethical terms, the gravest dangers arise. Ethical dualism, for example, has often been translated into a dualism between matter and spirit, or between man's body and his soul, or between the finite and the infinite, or between mortality and immortality, or between the natural and the supernatural, or into an apocalyptic dualism between a wholly evil present world and a miraculously arriving ideal future world. But when evil is believed to consist in, or to be primarily caused by, matter, the bodily life, finiteness, mortality, the whole natural order, or the whole present world—and when the good is conceived as being reached through emancipation from these things and as consisting only in their opposites—then ethical issues lose their sharpness and intensity, and ethical values are placed in a perspective which dwarfs them.

THE THEOLOGY OF CRISIS

This sort of danger arises from the dualism between human nature and God which the Crisis-Theology places at the centre of its thought. The total nature of mankind and all human faculties are declared to be alienated from God, in spite of God's creation of man in his own image, by the inscrutable event of original sin. This event is the more inscrutable because in this theology the Biblical cosmology, with its story of man's creation and Fall, has been abandoned. Yet a Fall there has been, involving the whole human race, and this is the basic source of all our moral and social evil. The shift of meaning, which this thinking involves, away from ethical dualism to a theological dualism which is at once quasi-metaphysical and apocalyptic, is to be seen in Brunner's teaching that the heart of sin is "the pride of reason." To this source is to be traced a fatal enmity against faith. He writes :

The enmity does not come from reason as such ; but it is born of our claim that reason is a measure of all truth. The source of antagonism against faith is the *pride* of reason. This pride, this claim of reason to be the court of last appeal, the supreme judge of truth, constitutes sin ; it is the heart of sin. By this claim we assert our will to be like God and we refuse to acknowledge the majesty and sovereignty of God.¹⁵

Now pride is antithetical to reason as well as to faith ; its effect is to blind our vision as well as to pervert our wills. We have sought to show, in the second part of this study, that faith has an indispensable place in the gaining of religious knowledge and that religious intuitions are irreplaceable sources of truth. There are forms of rationalism which do not acknowledge these sources of truth, and which on that ground must be judged erroneous. But we also saw that the maximum synthesis of experience attainable by reason should be welcomed by faith as a source for its creativity, and that such a synthesis by reason has positive

¹⁵ *The Theology of Crisis*, p. 43.

GOD, IMMANENT AND TRANSCENDENT

religious value. Hence we cannot but see in the view that the heart of *sin* is in a pride of reason a form of theological dualism which obscures the valid ethical dualism. However much one-sided rationalism may have involved men in error, the heart of sin is lovelessness, or in the will to power which blinds men to the meaning and might of love.

Similarly, when in another connection Brunner says that "to repent means to recognize self-trust to be the heart of sin," theological dualism is obscuring ethical dualism. The self-trust of the modern man may be pathetic enough inasmuch as it has only made him into a Frankenstein, menaced by an industrial system which he has created but cannot master. Nevertheless, to place self-trust and trust in God in complete opposition is to lose sight of the Christian valuation of personality in its full significance. One of the chief things that Christian faith can do for all oppressed classes and submerged races is to awaken a normal self-trust; and a trust in God which does not do this may simply reinforce social subserviency. Again, one of the main sources of inner conflict in adolescence is self-distrust in the face of the demands of society and the complexities of the world. It is the province of ethical religion to remove such self-distrust through faith in God. So William James as a young man gained spiritual deliverance by aid of the prophetic saying he often quoted: "Son of man, stand upon thy feet, and I will speak to thee."

A self-trust which produces indifference to faith in God, instead of being limited to a courageous and intelligent facing of society and of physical nature, is indeed a source of spiritual danger. One reason for the danger is that self-trust is really always nourished by some alliance or kinship between the self and reality beyond the self; and too often the self-trust of the modern man has been founded on social privilege or the expansive powers of a nation. Even when self-trust has had the worthier foundation of the triumphs

of science and of a prosperously progressing civilization it has frequently involved a blindness to man's deeper needs and his more tragic situations.

Nevertheless, to hold self-trust to be the heart of sin is to lose sight of the central truth in ethical religion, namely, that the heart of sin is defect of love. As we saw in the preceding chapter, sin is moral evil viewed in the relationships which religious faith apprehends. It is moral evil seen as transgression against the total system of spiritual relationships to which man belongs or into which he may enter. Since ethical relationships and religious relationships should be recognized as interpenetrating, it is defect of love, and the dispositions, processes, and institutions that prevent and resist love, which bring the real alienation from God. And the faith in God which knows him to be a Cosmic Moral Will heightens the energy of love, and, banishing self-distrust and subserviency, produces toward society that higher form of self-trust which is a sense of divine mission in the world.

If, then, we are not to found faith upon philosophical scepticism, if Christian faith is to centre in faith in the Jesus of history and not in a dogma about him, if a theological dualism is not to obscure ultimate moral values and the real nature of moral issues, we cannot hold to a conception of the transcendence of God which involves the denial of his immanence. More particularly, we cannot accept that "epistemological transcendence" of which Brunner speaks and which calls for a denial of God's immanence in human nature and in human faculties. On the contrary, the recognition of God's immanence in the human realm is of first importance, for it carries with it the perception that God is immanent in man's moral judgment, in his sensitiveness to justice and injustice, and in his ideal of love and his effort to incarnate love in life. Since God is also transcendent, man's moral judgment and ideals can never be deemed infallible.

Yet because God works in and through them the most real dualisms of human experience will be found in the ethical realm. Professor Reinhold Niebuhr has convincingly shown that too much monism results in a dulling of ethical issues and is liable to foster a sentimental and complacent optimism.¹⁶ It needs to be no less clearly grasped that too much dualism results in a shifting of the centre of gravity in the issue between good and evil from the ethical realm to some other—be it metaphysical or theological. And then that which separates from God will be, not so much the defect of love in the human heart and participation in organized injustice in society, as it will be our human nature as such or, after the manner of apocalyptic thought, "this present age" which is found to be evil in its entirety.

The Theology of Crisis renders a real service when, on its part, it exposes the weaknesses of modern liberal theology where it has been too exclusively a religion of immanence, too monistic, too content with a merely evolutionary view of progress, and where for these reasons it has helped to foster a superficial optimism. But the extreme dualism which it professes belongs with the Biblical world-view which it rejects, and the untenability of this dualism but emphasizes the need for the union of the idea of the divine immanence with that of the divine transcendence in the interpretation of ethical religion at its highest.

The other form of dualism whose bearing on the conception of God as both immanent and transcendent we proposed to discuss is that contained in the doctrine of a finite God presented by Professor E. S. Brightman. This doctrine is developed by Brightman as a way of solving the problem of evil, and the dualism which it involves is obviously so far forth a limitation upon the idea of divine transcendence—as the dualism of the Crisis-Theology is a limitation upon the idea of divine immanence. The dualism which Bright-

¹⁶ Cf. *Does Civilization Need Religion?* Chap. VIII.

man finds it necessary to affirm is "a dualism of process" within the divine nature. On the one hand, for Brightman's thought,

God is a conscious Person of perfect good will. He is the source of all value and so is worthy of worship and devotion. He is the creator of all other persons and gives them the power of free choice. Therefore his purpose controls the outcome of the universe.

On the other hand there is something in God's nature to which the evils of life, so far as they do not come from human freedom, are due:

There is within him, in addition to his reason and his active creative will, a passive element which enters into every one of his conscious states, as sensation, instinct, and impulse enter into ours, and constitutes a problem for him.¹⁷

This passive element in the divine nature Brightman calls "The Given."

It is chiefly because of his doctrine of The Given that Brightman adopts his belief in a finite God. He says of this belief:

It holds that God is eternal reason and eternal will, dealing with what I have called The Given in his eternal experience. God's will is the creative aspect of the universe, but that will is limited by the laws of eternal reason and by the facts of The Eternally Given.¹⁸

The dualism which this belief involves, Brightman distinguishes from complete metaphysical dualism. He says:

The Given would take over many of the functions of matter, potentiality, the devil, and what the Germans call "the irrational." Yet there would be no dualism either of stuff or of ultimate principle in the universe; there would be only a dualism of process within the Supreme Person. There

¹⁷ Cf. *The Problem of God*, p. 113.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

would be no sacrifice of the unity of the divine personality and so no division of purpose within the divine will.¹⁹

Let us now note in what respects Brightman holds that the divine transcendence is maintained by this belief, and in what respects it is restricted or relinquished. God's transcendence is maintained in that he is the self-existent world-ground and is a personal spirit who is supremely creative and who is characterized by absolute rationality and absolute love. His transcendence is restricted in that he cannot be affirmed to be omnipotent, nor omniscient in the sense of having absolute foreknowledge; in that he is not impassible—*i.e.*, free from suffering; and in that his nature has its dark, passive, irrational side, to which all evil not resulting from human freedom is due.

This last respect in which the divine transcendence is relinquished cannot be other than peculiarly baffling to the religious consciousness. It means not only that God must struggle against an aspect of his own nature, but also that so far as we experience evil other than human sin we are experiencing an aspect of God's nature, and that when we resist and seek to overcome such evil we are resisting and seeking to overcome this aspect of God's nature. This transfer of the evils of human suffering and frustration from being something that God wills, to being the outcome of something irrational in his nature, brings relief from the necessity of regarding all these as being, in some inscrutable way, good; but it impairs the faith that God's nature is wholly creative of good and redemptive from evil.

Brightman appeals to the religious consciousness in support of his conception of the irrational in the divine nature, but he is able to do so only because of an ambiguity in the meaning of the "irrational." He says of religion:

It worships a God who is, on the one hand, reasonable and good, and, on the other, mysterious and above our com-

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

IS GOD FINITE?

prehension. His ways are not our ways. . . . It seems to be the voice of religion that there is something above and beyond reason in the reasonable God.²⁰

And he adds that the doctrine of The Given as being eternally in God would, "by providing for the mysterious and irrational along with the moral and the rational in his nature, make him a more worthy object of numinous worship."²¹ But the irrational which is above and beyond reason to the religious consciousness is quite different from the irrational which defeats or balks, perhaps only temporarily, reason and goodness. That which for religion is above and beyond reason is some value which surpasses the power of our thought to compass. When the prophet says that God's ways are not our ways, he is speaking of the divine mercy which transcends our thought. Let us quote the passage in its context:

Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts, and let him return unto the Lord, and he will have mercy upon him; and to our God, for he will abundantly pardon. For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts.²²

Similarly, the worship of the numinous, as interpreted by Otto, has two meanings. In primitive religion the numinous or the holy may mean the awe-inspiring or overpowering in a non-ethical sense; but at the level of prophetic religion the holy and the ethical have become fused. The mystery which belongs to God's nature as apprehended by prophetic religion is the mystery of his wisdom and his goodness. Hence the affirmation of an irrational element in God's nature in the sense of something that retards his goodness cannot rightly be said to make him "a more worthy object of numinous worship."

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 136, 137.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

²² Isaiah 55:7-9.

But beyond the consequences which follow from Brightman's doctrine of The Given for the religious consciousness and for worship, there is an effect of his "dualism of process" in the divine nature upon ethical dualism which we should note. Any dualism other than ethical dualism tends to put ethical issues and values in the wrong perspective. This tendency we have seen at work in a marked way in the Theology of Crisis. It appears in a subtler and less dangerous way in this conception of a dualism of process in God. Brightman writes:

The conception of a God limited by The Given within his own nature, yet wresting meaning from it by the achievements of his rational will, seems to account more adequately than other ideas of God for the paradoxical assertion of religious experience that its object is both a Mighty God and a Suffering Servant. It places the Cross in the eternal nature of God. (*Op. cit.*, p. 189.)

Now the meaning of the Cross for Christian thought and faith is that it expresses God's nature in relation to moral evil and sin. The extension of its meaning to express a redemptive participation of God in all human suffering and frustration also brings out something which seems essential to the Christian conception of God's love. This extension of meaning Brightman certainly holds to be an essential part of the significance of the Cross. But when one further extends the meaning of the Cross so that it denotes also suffering eternally present in God because of an eternal element in his nature, there is again danger that a theological, quasi-metaphysical dualism will dwarf the ethical dualism which the conflict between good and evil in the realm of human responsibility and control brings home to us.

But while we must reject this doctrine of a dualism of process in God's nature arising from an eternal passive element in him against which he struggles and against which we must struggle too, there are important kinships between

certain other aspects of Brightman's thought and positions at which we have arrived in our previous study. Let us take account of these and consider their bearing on the idea of divine transcendence.

We have maintained that an element of freedom in the metaphysical sense belongs to the life of man and this may be termed a limiting condition for God's action. It is, however, a condition inherent in the nature of the Good, if the Good is understood to include the creation of a moral order the members of which are themselves creative. We have maintained also that God is the ground of the presence of order and of value in the world and that reason is intrinsic to his nature. Thus, again, there may be said to be limiting conditions for God's action in that it will always be in accord with reason. But conditions which are essential to the realization of order and value in the world are not limitations in the same sense as is the irrational—meaning by the irrational the contradictory, the incoherent, the evil.

Furthermore, we have thought of time as being metaphysically real—as being real for God as well as for man. And the very notion of time involves limiting conditions for the beings to which time is applicable. To take an illustration from the higher ranges of experience, the revelation of God which we see in Christ, if it be truly historical, could not have come to pass without such a prior revelation of God as came in Hebrew prophetic religion. It could not have come to the cave man nor to the adherents of a merely animistic religion. We have rejected the doctrine of the Crisis-Theology that the revelation of God in Christ simply "pierces" history, and this means that God's action in history at any point of time is conditioned upon antecedent history.

But in general we should recognize that the idea of time is inseparable from that of the divine creativity. We have been led, as a basis for understanding both the physical and the spiritual orders, to think of God as a Cosmic Creative

GOD, IMMANENT AND TRANSCENDENT

Spirit. Now this conception means that God is not simply a being who once was a creator or who is a creator sporadically, but that creativity is essential to his nature and is being manifested ceaselessly. Moreover, some degree of creativity belongs to all finite spirits, and it is with and through finite spirits that we must believe God to be achieving a spiritual universe. Hence it belongs to the very nature of God to be working out his purposes under temporal conditions.

We must agree, then, with Brightman and other exponents of the doctrine of a finite God that omniscience in the sense of complete foreknowledge cannot be affirmed of God. The knowledge which can be ascribed to him as the Cosmic Mind and as the ultimate ground for value, actual and potential, in the world is the complete knowledge of the actual universe and of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness in their eternal nature. But the idea of absolute foreknowledge is contradictory to the idea of metaphysical freedom as belonging in some measure to finite spirits. Nor can we ascribe omnipotence to God, if we mean by omnipotence a sheer and absolute sovereignty of will from which everything else is derivative, even the divine reason and the divine love. From the standpoint of such a conception of omnipotence the whole time-process loses its meaning, and the creative action of God becomes creation by fiat instead of creation by purpose and for the realization of value.

Likewise the conception of God as the Eternal must mean, not that he himself is timeless and possesses eternally the fulfilment of all his thought and love, but that he grounds the time-process and through that process works for the fulfilment of his thought and love, since they are by their very nature eternally creative. The conception of God as being eternal in the timeless sense has been cherished chiefly because it has been believed to be implied by the conception of his perfection. If God is perfect, it has been thought, he can lack nothing and hence must be timeless. But instead of so

IS GOD FINITE?

concluding we should, as Pringle-Pattison has said, revise our idea of perfection.

But while we must think of God as realizing his purposes under temporal conditions and under the conditions inherent in the nature of reason and of love and of the process of creating creators, we must think of him also as transcending the world in which he is working because of his ceaseless creativity, his all-comprehending wisdom, and his inexhaustible love. Indeed we cannot rightly speak of God as immanent in the world-process unless we conceive him as also transcending it. For otherwise it is the world-process itself, or some aspect of it, concerning which we really are speaking, and the idea of the immanence of *God* is lost.

These conceptions of the divine transcendence and the divine immanence, together with the recognition of limiting conditions for the divine action which they involve, we can hold in common with Brightman. But why does he find it necessary to introduce the idea of a limitation of a quite different kind, namely, "the Eternally Given," which is a passive element in God and which grounds "a dualism of process" in his very nature? A partial answer, at least, may be found in Brightman's doctrine of the world. One may get an indication of what this doctrine is from the following passage:

There seems to be no reason for regarding physical nature as anything other than the conscious will of God in action. There is no ground, or very little ground, to suppose that physical nature has any inner life of its own apart from the God who controls it.²⁴

And what is affirmed of physical nature in general is affirmed also, more specifically, of physiological organisms, including the human body: "Human bodies being only the expression of divine will, the concrete form which that will assumes in

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 124.

acting on human persons."²⁵ From these passages it can be seen that Brightman's philosophical idealism includes not only a phenomenalist view of the physical world, but also the doctrine of causation known as "occasionalism." This doctrine is defined by Professor Knudson, who accepts it, as follows:

The occasionalistic theory reduces matter in its entirety to a phenomenal product of the divine energizing. Individual things have from this point of view no independent inner life; they are not *real* causes but simply *occasional* causes; that is, they furnish the occasions of the divine activity. The only real cause, so far as the material world is concerned, is God.²⁶

Thus one can see that, if God is the immediate and sole cause of all physical processes, one may feel compelled to introduce a ground for natural evil into the nature of God himself, unless one is to hold that all natural evil is not really evil, but good.

But such a necessity of thought does not arise on the basis of a more realistic view of the world, especially when that view is interpreted, as our discussion of cosmology led us to do, in terms of panpsychism. Professor Montague's formulation of the panpsychic view of the world will help us at this point:

The world consists of all finite existences, energies, particles, or what not. Each has its inner, or mental, potentialities, and its outer, or material actuality, and each has its measure of self-affirming spontaneity or primary causality, and also its inertia or passivity by which it figures as a term in the network of predominantly mechanistic interrelations.²⁷

This panpsychic view of the world makes more intelligible both the possibility of evil and the possibility of the good. It extends the notions of spontaneity and contingency

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 116.

²⁶ *The Philosophy of Personalism*, p. 232.

²⁷ *Belief Unbound*, p. 83.

A SPIRITUALISTIC PHILOSOPHY

throughout the universe and from these aspects of the universe disorder and evil arise. But these same aspects are the necessary conditions of creative finalism in evolution, of human freedom, and of the realization of new values in the universe.

In our discussion of the problem of evil in the preceding chapter we maintained that any intellectual solution of the problem of evil must be restricted to an explanation of the possibility of evil, and that beyond that the problem must be met solely by the moral fight with evil and the religious experience of the transmutation of evil. To carry the explanation of evil back into something dark and recalcitrant in the nature of God we cannot but regard as erroneous and as impairing the full force of the moral and religious solutions. We can sum up our thought in the terms employed by Montague when he speaks of "the finite will of an Infinite God," but we find the limiting conditions for the will of God to be solely in the contingency, spontaneity, and freedom in the world without which the creation of a spiritual universe is not possible.²⁸

Thus we have seen that a doctrine of a finite God resulting from an affirmation of a dualism of process in the divine nature is untenable. Limiting conditions there are for God's action, but they are such conditions as arise from the essential nature of reason, from creativity in time, and from the

²⁸ Montague, too, represents natural evil as being internal in God when he speaks of "that chaos of existence which God finds in himself and which is the world he would perfect." (*Belief Unbound*, p. 91.) And he carries this train of thought further in his most original, but difficult, article: "The Trinity. A Speculation" (See *Religious Realism*, by D. C. Macintosh and others, pp. 495 ff.) There he presents the first phase of the triune world-ground as being impersonal or prepersonal and as accounting for the multiplicity of entities; and then says: "Thus God does not consciously create the world with its disorder and evil, he creates himself and awakens to his own existence to find a world within him as an earlier product of that primordial ontological gestation of which his own conscious personality or Logos was the climactic phase."

If we understand this speculation rightly, it presents the conception of God as becoming conscious in the world-process, and it subsumes all the

GOD, IMMANENT AND TRANSCENDENT

purpose to achieve a community of finite creative spirits. There is no reason for limiting the divine transcendence in respect to those meanings of transcendence which are vital to ethical religion. For the fullest synthesis of experience and for the fullest justification of a dynamic faith we need the conception of God as transcending the world in that he is the world-ground, in that he is a spiritual personality whose nature is wholly characterized by Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, and in that the power which belongs to his Creative Reason and Love is inexhaustible.

And we likewise have found to be untenable, both from the standpoint of philosophy and from that of religious experience and Christian faith, a theological dualism which denies God's immanence, whether in nature and history or in human strivings for goodness and truth. God is immanent in the order and value of the world and in the processes by which a higher order and richer values are being attained; and where evil, whether natural or moral, is present, he is immanent in the work of conquering it and of recovering the souls of men from its sway and into the freedom and fellowship which he purposes for them as his sons.²⁹

The counterpart of the insight that God is both transcendent and immanent is the conception that the universe is spiritual in respect to its ground and at the same time presents to all finite spirits a great task of spiritualization.

facts of the world-process under the conception of organism. But as we saw at the conclusion of the chapter on cosmology (cf. pp. 286 f.) the cosmos as a whole must be thought of as super-organic. The conception of organism is more nearly adequate for the cosmos than the conception of mechanism; but only the conception of purpose is adequate for the higher levels of the world-process. From the standpoint of purpose there is more pluralism at these higher levels than the conception of organism implies. This is evident in the pluralism in history which must be acknowledged alongside of the process of unifying history, and in the ethical dualism which the moral judgment so often reveals in personal life and in society. But it is also true that at the super-organic level a far higher unity is attainable than at any lower level—the unity of a Realm of Ends, a truly spiritual community.

²⁹ D. C. Macintosh finds the synthesis of divine transcendence and divine immanence in the very conception of God as personal. See his *Theology as an Empirical Science*, pp. 187-190.

A SPIRITUALISTIC PHILOSOPHY

Thus the highest synthesis of our experience calls for a Spiritualistic Philosophy in which creative synthesis by finite spirits plays an indispensable part. The comprehensive goal for this creative synthesis we may best apprehend as the Building of the Beloved Community. The meaning of this goal for our faith and our effort must be the subject of our concluding thought.

C. A SPIRITUAL UNIVERSE

(continued)

XVIII

BUILDING THE BELOVED COMMUNITY

THE task of spiritualization which opens before men of vision can best be carried forward where there is the fullest rapport with those aspects of the universe which are actually spiritual now. It is for this reason that creative religion is of abiding importance to man, upon whatever spiritual interest the energies of an individual or an age may be chiefly concentrated. But most of all is there need for creative religion when the task of spiritualization involves grappling with a world-crisis such as the men of today are facing. There is a subtle kind of naturalism that is apt to infect religion, which renders it optimistic in times of prosperity and pessimistic in times of calamity. This kind of barometric response to historical and social conditions is not compatible with communion with God, if God is conceived to be a Cosmic Creative Spirit. But this subtle naturalism is hardly improved upon by the supernaturalism which develops the sharpest antithesis between the historic process and the idea of God, but which, because of its exaltation of God's sovereignty, sees no truth in the conception of man as God's co-worker. In contrast to both these attitudes creative religion will send men forth to the task of spiritualization, in times of calamity as well as in times of prosperity, through maintaining rapport with the eternal values and with the Cosmic Creative Spirit.

Nevertheless it must be acknowledged that it is very difficult for men to have the maximum of harmonious inter-

THE TASK OF SPIRITUALIZATION

action with the Deepest Reality of the universe, which we found to be the principle of religion,¹ in the midst of such spiritual and social disorder as prevails today. Here we find the spiritual dead centre from which it is so hard to escape. Our disordered time has peculiar need of men who have a fresh vision of values and persistent resourcefulness in achieving them; yet our vision of values and capacity for realizing them are very largely mediated by society, and a disordered society cannot mediate them with freshness and power.

The need for getting past this dead centre reveals the importance of the metaphysical aspect of religion and of the intuition, faith, and interpretive reason by which the truth concerning the metaphysical aspect of religion may be known. Except as men can transcend the world by coming into relation with a higher spiritual order and spiritual Power, they will hardly be able to work significantly in transforming the world.² But the counterpart of this truth is the further truth that where men most genuinely enter into relation with the higher order and spiritual Power they will direct their energies toward reconstructing the disordered system of life which so largely inhibits and smothers the spiritual capacities of men. Thus the fullest experience of the God whose nature is Creative Reason and Creative Love will be entered into by those who take as their supreme end the building of a world-wide community in which reason and love prevail—what Professor Royce called the Beloved Community.

The most obvious barrier obstructing the building of the Beloved Community is nationalism. The danger of nationalism to all the higher interests of man is demonstrated by the

¹ Chap. IV.

² Professor George Plimpton Adams writes: "One may be and will be fearless and radical in thinking through the task of social reconstruction and social justice, precisely because one cherishes and participates in significant structures, which are the sources of guidance and of loyalty." *Idealism and the Modern Age*, p 225.

THE BELOVED COMMUNITY

fact that it was the most comprehensive cause of the Great War. The subtlety of the danger consists largely in the capacity of nationalism to fuse into one indiscriminate whole the exploiting propensities and the moral sentiments of men. Nations proclaim themselves sovereign. They acknowledge no interests higher than their own national interests, and they claim the right to use all their power to enforce the national will. Hence they will acknowledge no allegiance, whether to God, or conscience, or reason, or to wider human relationships, which conflicts with national allegiance. This claim to supreme allegiance is bound to mold the moral sentiments of the great mass of a nation's citizens into conformity with itself. But upon the national will there is recognized by nationalism no check except the force which can be exercised by other nations. According to the philosophy of nationalism a nation is free to adopt a policy of exploitation toward weaker peoples if it will; and as a matter of fact before the Great War all the strong nations were engaged in maintaining or securing colonial dominions, and in these policies the control of raw materials and markets in the interest of the dominant nation was a powerful motive. Thus nationalism fuses policies of exploitation with the moral sentiments and highest loyalties of men.

The power of nationalism is signally shown by its success in subduing to itself forces and movements which are inherently international. Both Christianity and science are essentially international and universal in their ideals and motivations, and yet notoriously both were organized during the Great War in the service of nationalism. Labor has often recognized that its cause was an international one, but nationalism has always been able to break up the international trend in the ranks of labor. Philosophy spoke with its natural voice in the cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment and in Kant's essay on *Eternal Peace*, yet when modern philosophy reached its fullest systematic form, in Hegelianism, it be-

THE BARRIER OF NATIONALISM

came the sanctioner of the national state as the highest form of organized society. Since nationalism has been able so far to subordinate to itself forces which are essentially international, it is small wonder that it should have complete supremacy in the minds of the rank and file of men and women. Professor John Herman Randall, Jr., has made the following diagnosis of the contemporary mind in this respect:

Whatever its origin and ultimate value, patriotism is beyond doubt the most widespread social ideal of the day, it is the modern religion, far stronger than mere Christianity in any of its forms, and to its tribal gods men give supreme allegiance. Nationalism is almost the one idea for which the masses of men will still die.³

It is clear, then, that when men take as their supreme end the building of the Beloved Community they are thereby bound to seek to break the power which the ideals and policies of nationalism have over the modern mind and to bring to bear upon this task the creative energies of religion. No protest that religion is inward and spiritual whereas politics is secular, and no appeal to the doctrine of the separation of church and state, can justify an avoidance of this task. For nationalism on its part is intolerant of the attitude so essential to religion which is expressed in the words: "We must obey God rather than men." And if religion is not only to transcend but also to transform the world, it must penetrate all the great aspects of human life.

Nor can we justify the avoidance of this task on the ground that questions of politics and of international relations are intricate, require much experience and detailed knowledge and therefore must be left to the expert. The services of the expert are indispensable in determining and applying the means for political and international ends, but the choice of ends can never rightly be turned over to the

³ Cf. *The Making of the Modern Mind*, p. 630.

expert. For the choice of ends always involves fundamental ethical questions, basic and universal human relations, spiritual values, and the ultimate faiths of men. The evil of nationalism is that it prejudices and closes in advance very many of these questions when they bear upon national policy by insisting that the nation has absolute sovereignty, and on this basis commandeers the services of the experts. It is true that there can be no sharp separation between means and ends. The choice of means for ends is also in part an ethical question, and in the choice of ends the analyses of the expert should play an important part. But nationalism suborns the expert and disfranchises moral judgment and religious insight when it refuses to acknowledge any allegiance higher than that claimed by the nation.

The most crucial issue which nationalism presents to creative religion in its efforts for the building of the Beloved Community is the issue of war. We have reached a point in human evolution at which it is no longer rational to submit questions of international justice, according to the old high-sounding phrase, to "the arbitrament of war." Even though one may be convinced that it was well for civilization that the Greeks defeated the Persians at Marathon and Salamis, the last world-conflict has shown that war now devastates civilization, does not increase justice between the nations but terminates in new injustices in the peace-treaties, and commits the ultimate injustice against the tens of millions who are killed and the other tens of millions whose lives are permanently frustrated and broken. Not only so, but the inherent folly of war from the standpoint of national interest has been demonstrated. The world-wide depression has amply vindicated Sir Norman Angell's prophetic work, *The Great Illusion*, in which he showed that economically the victors in a modern war are bound to suffer a loss scarcely less than that of the vanquished. It is therefore difficult to see how war can be accepted any longer on the principle of

THE BARRIER OF NATIONALISM

being the lesser of two evils. Rather must one who would make the Beloved Community his supreme end persistently seek the abolition of war, whether by refusal to participate in it or support it, or by resisting military training and service, or by promoting organization for peace.

There are two ways in which those who have spiritual values at heart are tempted to accept war in principle, not simply as a deeply entrenched evil of which it is impossible to get rid, but as a necessary means to moral ends. The one is the way of the conservatives, who see spiritual values jeopardized by political inefficiency and social unrest, and who consequently are ready to swing to fascism and government by dictatorship. They are ready for a revolution, by military force or the show of military strength, provided it be a revolution to the right, because they have grown cynical about democracy and because they fear a revolution to the left. This readiness for fascism and dictatorship, and for the violent revolution which they involve, is so great a heresy from the standpoint of all the principles on which the cultural life of our western democracies has been built that one can understand it only on the basis of the psychology of fear. For the voice of reason speaks unequivocally against this heresy. History has repeatedly shown that dictators cannot be kept responsible even to the groups which put them in power—still less to the whole body politic which they are expected to serve with new efficiency. Dictators are of course always accountable to some forces besides themselves; they cannot work single-handed. But the accountability soon becomes hidden and devious and the back doors to conspiracy and corruption cannot be kept permanently closed. As for the successes which are credited to dictatorships today, it should not escape notice that they have come in countries where illiteracy is high; whereas in countries in which illiteracy is low and education is highly developed, as in Scandinavian lands, democracy is being extended. These facts raise a fun-

damental doubt as to whether Germany, since it is a country of high educational standards, could long tolerate a dictatorship, should one be resorted to in the midst of the present crisis.

But it should be acknowledged that the psychology of fear which underlies a readiness for fascism and a dictatorship cannot be met simply by analyzing what those methods involve or by an appeal to history. For the liabilities of our present democratic cultural systems, taken in their concrete actuality, are so heavy that the charge that they are approaching bankruptcy is difficult to refute. Consequently, we must be advancing constructively toward a new world order, or else the old forces of nationalism and war, which still hold the field though so obviously bankrupt themselves, will newly entrench themselves in the form of fascism and dictatorships. In this constructive work organization for peace must form one of the corner stones. As Sir Arthur Salter, in a chapter on "A New World Order," writes:

At the basis of any world order must be assured peace. . . . A solid foundation must be established if anything we are to build is to be more than fragmentary and unstable. Human history thus far has been a succession of brief achievements of high civilization destroyed each in turn by destructive wars with their attendant train of impoverishment and anarchy.⁴

It is, furthermore, difficult to see how one can intelligently believe and enlist in the work of laying this foundation without going on with Sir Arthur to envisage as an immediate concrete goal a co-ordination of the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact in which America should participate.⁵

In this work of building a new world order which shall have as a corner stone organization for peace there is imperative need for the energies of creative religion. For cre-

⁴ Cf. *Recovery, The Second Effort*, p. 342.

⁵ Such a co-ordination could be made effective, without sanctions by armaments, through economic sanctions.

THE PROBLEM OF CLASS STRUGGLE

ative religion not only can bring to this work its vision of the Beloved Community but can evoke the faith needed for sustained unwearied effort. Professor Randall writes:

Man has today a richer store of knowledge, and a more variegated pageantry of aims, than has ever been his possession before. What he will make of them depends upon the course of investigation, upon the working out of great social forces, and upon his own faith and intelligence. These two, Faith and Intelligence, so far as lies within the power of the human mind, will determine the future.⁶

No one can deny that the religious consciousness of co-working with a Cosmic Creative Spirit is a powerful sustainer of the faith needed for the task of building a new world order, concerning the possibility of which so many men are incredulous. The validity of the belief in a Cosmic Creative Spirit our previous study has shown. Hence against *Realpolitik* which accepts nationalism as the ultimate social philosophy and cynically discards the ideal of a new world order; and above and beyond a disillusioned ethical realism which, while giving full allegiance to that ideal, sees its fate determined wholly by the more massive social forces; may be set a religious realism which, by laying hold on Divine Reality, seeks to create new social forces to turn the scale for the new world order.

The second of the ways in which men who are seeking to make moral and spiritual values actually prevail in society are tempted to accept violent conflict as a means to their ends is the way of the radicals. Peace, many of the radicals say, is on the side of the *status quo*, which they find to be profoundly unjust. Must the victims of the injustice, who include the whole proletarian class—not to speak of other groups—wait upon peaceful means, parliamentary, educational, moral, and religious, for the securing of justice? This is a fatal procedure, the radical may say, because these means are now in

⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 637, 638.

THE BELOVED COMMUNITY

the hands of the privileged, whose privileges are the source of the injustice, and are used, whether consciously or unconsciously, to maintain the injustice. Moreover, the privileges are strongly entrenched in economic power, which is protected on its flanks by political power, and back of both stand ample reserves of military power. In the light of history, the radical may urge, have we any reason to expect that a privileged class, thus entrenched in power, will consent to relinquish its privileges on any very large scale for the sake of greater social justice? Must it not be confronted by sufficient power on the part of the oppressed groups to jeopardize its privileges, and in the gaining of this power may not violent revolution have to be accepted as a necessary means? After all, the revolutions by which the middle classes obtained their rights involved violence. And at least, violence on the part of a class struggling to rise cannot be called worse than the disguised coercive measures employed to keep them down.

Here we are faced by another great problem, perhaps not even second to that presented by nationalism, which makes difficult the task of constructing a world-wide community in which reason and love shall prevail—namely, the problem of class struggle. As a matter of fact these two issues, nationalism and the class struggle, cross each other at many points. The nationalism of today is becoming at a rapid rate an economic nationalism through a universal policy of constantly rising tariff barriers, and this economic nationalism sharpens the class struggle. Sir Arthur Salter, in pointing out how Government today is inadequate for its task, says:

Above all Government is failing because it has become immeshed in the task of giving discretionary, partial, preferential privileges to competitive industry, by methods which involve detailed examination and subject it to sectional pressure.⁷

A dealing in preferential privileges on the part of the government, even though it be carried on simply as between com-

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 341.

THE PROBLEM OF CLASS STRUGGLE

peting industries, is bound to confuse the issue of social justice and make the class struggle more acute. But it is not only when bestowing special privileges among competing industries and social groups that the government sharpens the economic struggle. Even when fulfilling its normal functions of maintaining law and order and administering justice, it may easily become an instrument by which the privileged classes resist the social changes necessary for the elimination of palpable economic injustice and establishing a greater degree of social justice. And such a result may come about not only through wresting laws and governmental processes from their intended functions so as to favor powerful groups—as when the “due process of law” clause in the constitutional amendment passed to give the negro his rights is turned into a most effective weapon in favor of organized capital and against organized labor. A like result may come to pass simply because in times of rapid economic development political and legal ideas may lag behind economic realities—as when the doctrine of freedom of contract is invoked against efforts to secure collective bargaining in regard to wages. In these and in many other ways the sovereign political power may both confuse the issues of social justice and render the class struggle more acute.

Americans have always been unwilling to believe that the class struggle was a reality in their own country. Hereditary classes having been done away with from the beginning, and the door of opportunity being held wide open, at least theoretically, for every one, Americans have been prone to assume that the groupings of men were determined either by free choice or by the competitive struggle of individuals, in which natural gifts and moral qualities were the decisive factors. But such a study of American life in the perspective of history as that contained in *The Epic of America*, by James Truslow Adams, shows that there always has been

THE BELOVED COMMUNITY

a class struggle in this country, but one that has been modified, and partly obscured, by that prepotent factor in American life—the existence of an open frontier. This open frontier has been partly a safety-valve, giving access to property and opportunity to the propertyless class; it has at times caused the class struggle to take the form chiefly of a sectional struggle; and it has made possible some important advances in the direction of democracy and social justice. But the open frontier exists no longer. Its closing, and the building up of vast aggregations of capital, and the development of mass production have come so closely together that, taken with the organization of labor and the growing class consciousness of the proletarians, there has resulted an intensification of the class struggle similar to what exists in Europe.

The class struggle in its present form has developed within an economic system based on capitalism, and we have reached a point at which our economic system determines our collective life more effectually than does our political system. Hence those who seek to be builders of the Beloved Community, and who see in the class struggle one of the gravest problems before them, are bound to undertake an examination of the moral and social aspects of capitalism. Some light upon this question can be gained from history, for capitalism has not always dominated economic life, and on the other hand there have been other eras in which capitalism has been a powerful determinant. The great German historian Mommsen has described the economic life of the Roman republic during the period 266–146 B.C. in the following terms:

The power of the capitalist was alike evinced in the speculative management of the land, in the increase of money-lenders, and in the enormous extent of all mercantile transactions; and, as in the end the gains from commercial enterprise flowed into Rome, the result was that Rome,

THE PROBLEM OF CLASS STRUGGLE

compared with the rest of the world, stood as a superior in point of wealth as in political and military power. In fact, the whole Roman nation became possessed with the mercantile spirit, and, while money served to create a new social barrier between rich and poor, that deep-rooted immorality, which is inherent in an economy of pure capital, ate into the heart of society and of the commonwealth, and substituted an absolute selfishness for humanity and patriotism.⁸

It can hardly be denied that there is a fundamental kinship between capitalism as it developed in the Roman republic and empire and that of today, even though the former arose in an agrarian and the latter in an industrial society.

What is "that deep-rooted immorality which is inherent in an economy of pure capital?" Is it not the doctrine of self-interest on which it is based together with the enormous power which it develops—a power, too, which is often quite irresponsible, and which at best is subject only to a very limited and one-sided responsibility? The controlling motive throughout the capitalistic system is acknowledged to be profits. When other motives, social and ethical, come in even in a subsidiary way, they tend to be driven out again because under the present system they cannot compete with the profit motive.⁹ But mass production and centralized control have proved to be most efficient in yielding profits. Thus there has arisen our present intricate, highly organized and highly centralized system, which deserves to be called a system of pure capital because profits for capital is its all-controlling principle. This system is responsible only to the owners and managers who have a claim on the profits, and yet it dominates completely the lives of great masses of men and tends to become dominant among all classes. Mr. Adams writes of America:

Steadily we are tending towards becoming a nation of

⁸ Mommsen's *History of Rome*, Abridged.

⁹ Cf. my article, "The Ethics of the Wages and Profit System," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XXXI, pp. 93 ff.

employees—whether a man gets five dollars a day or a hundred thousand a year. The “yes-men” are as new to our national life as to our vocabulary, but they are real. It is no longer merely the laborer or factory hand who is dependent on the whim of his employer, but men all the way up the economic and social scales. In the ante-bellum South the black slave knew better than to express his views as to the rights of man. Today the appalling growth of uniformity and timorousness of views as to the perfection of the present economic system held by most men “comfortably off” as corporation clerks or officials is not unrelated to the possible loss of a job.¹⁰

Can one fail to see that there is a deep-rooted immorality in such a system, having its seat not primarily in the individuals who at a given moment may be holding key positions, but in the system itself? For it belongs to the nature of the system to segregate itself from ethical and social responsibility by giving the central and decisive place to purely business considerations and to the purely economic motive and, while bowing to political authority when necessary, to seek to control that authority to its own ends. And at the same time this system, through the enormous power which it wields, makes itself really accountable for widespread social injustice and for the resultant class struggle.

In view of the reality of the class struggle and its deep-seated causes is there no such thing as working for the building of the Beloved Community? Are we shut up to a choice between a violent revolution springing from a passionate demand for greater social justice; a fascist revolution based on the threat of organized force, looking toward a dictatorship which shall safeguard existing values and privileges; and a blind trust that evolution rather than revolution may prevail and may issue in something that in the end we might call progress? Or can religion make a significant contribution toward solving our acute social problems and thus uphold the

¹⁰ *The Epic of America*, p. 409.

STANDARD AND METHOD

Beloved Community as an effectual ideal and a realizable goal?

Our previous study prepares us to see that religion can contribute toward the solving of the problems presented to us by the social struggle: *a standard, a method, a diagnosis, and a dynamic.*

Religion, so far as it is clearly and consistently ethical religion, brings to the social struggle *the standard* of the intrinsic and infinite worth of human personality, which when translated into social terms means that our ultimate standard must be a community of creative personalities which shall be world-wide. This standard is a searching principle of criticism with respect to our existing institutions. It forbids that property should be put above personality, whether in law, in economic policy, or in a particular situation of social strain. It condemns the grievous social inequality arising from the fact that the rights of property are amply protected but that the right of the workman to a standard of living has no place in law. It exposes the inherent injustice of a planless competitive system with its inevitable business cycles and the consequent periodic recurrence of unemployment and human misery. This standard is an indispensable principle for social reconstruction. It is often called romantically idealistic by the socially conservative and sometimes by the socially radical. But in truth unless it is employed, explicitly or tacitly, it is impossible to escape social blindness and an unrealistic view of the human situation. It is a principle for social reconstruction because it calls for an ethicizing of the economic motive and a socializing of economic power, such that not profit but service shall be the basic economic motive, and that responsibility, not to a limited group of owners, but to the commonwealth, shall control our vast production enterprises. Without this standard as an ultimate principle it is impossible to put consistent content into the conception of social justice or to have a

THE BELOVED COMMUNITY

rational and thorough-going distinction between mere social change and social progress.

Ethical religion summons us to *the method* of creative co-operation in industry, in contrast to the method of free competition according to which our present economic system has grown up, and in contrast to violent revolution, whether of the communist or the fascist type, as the only escape from economic ills.¹¹ The method of creative co-operation receives its negative proof from the fact that the competitive system turns out to be a self-refuting one. Under modern conditions competition inevitably gives way to combination, and when great combinations in industry have been made they are left without the only regulator which economic theory has held to be effective. As for competition, not between industries, but between capital and labor, that turns upon there being equality of bargaining power between the two groups, which the great combinations of industry seem to make almost hopeless of attainment. The positive proof of the method of creative co-operation is that it alone can permanently displace the class struggle and also do away with the suberviency of technical skill to the men who, because of their financial power, are at the top. And, granted that the non-co-operation and passive resistance of the strike and the organization of political power for social reconstruction are both necessary measures, these measures will be justified in proportion as they lead on toward the establishment of the method of creative co-operation in our economic life. This method which is exemplified in varying degrees in science, education, church-life, and certain well-integrated local communities must not only be greatly extended in these fields, but must penetrate our economic life as well. Our economic system so far conditions all the rest of life that it must not remain unethicized in its motive, unsocialized in its exercise of power, and purely secular.

¹¹ Cf. Harry F. Ward, *Our Economic Morality*. pp. 314 ff.

DIAGNOSIS AND DYNAMIC

The diagnosis which ethical religion contributes toward the solving of the problems presented by the social struggle is an ethical and spiritual one. It is a diagnosis in terms of man's disloyalty to the Commonwealth of God—in terms of sin. Diagnosis is often supposed to be a matter of science alone, and hence in the case of social problems to be solely in the hands of history, sociology, and psychology. Unquestionably the absence of scientific diagnosis of social ills may make the attempt to treat those ills criminally incompetent. But no diagnosis is complete when essential and vital relationships are left out of account, and a partial diagnosis may be a wrong diagnosis. Ethical religion adds to other indispensable diagnoses one made from the standpoint of man's ultimate spiritual relationships, and exposes the sinfulness in which social evils are rooted. Sin, as we came to think of it in a previous chapter,¹² is moral evil seen as transgression against the total system of spiritual relationships to which man belongs or into which he may enter—against men as sons of God and against God as the Eternal Good Will. When our social system functions so as to rob human beings of their divine possibilities it is sinful, and this sinfulness should burden the individual conscience of all those who either profit by such functions or acquiesce in them. In this time of economic depression one reads in the daily press that "more than twenty per cent of New York City's school children are suffering from malnutrition according to Health Department statistics." Any one who thinks of his own children as among the twenty per cent will be quick to feel how grievously these children are being sinned against. In this sinfulness of society we are all implicated, and these implications must be brought by ethical religion to the individual conscience till they become an intolerable burden driving men to unremitting effort, not only for immediate relief of such ills, but for such radical reconstruction of society as shall eliminate their causes.

¹² Chap. XVI.

THE BELOVED COMMUNITY

The dynamic which ethical religion brings to the problem of the social struggle is that of a living faith. In the decades immediately preceding the War, when to a short-range and superficial view mankind seemed to be going prosperously forward, realistic thinkers began to preach disillusionment as being a cathartic medicine which the times needed; and they received their vindication in the catastrophe which soon followed. But now that disillusionment has become so nearly universal we are in a position to know that it too can cut us off from reality, and that the fuller participation in reality is open, not to the disillusioned, but to the men of faith.

In contrast to so much contemporary disillusionment, which leaves men bewildered and impotent in the social struggle, one hears the clear note of faith in the following words of Mr. Charles A. Beard, historian, written in reply to the question, "What meaning has life for you, what keeps you going?"

For myself I may say that as I look over the grand drama of history, I find (or seem to find) amid the apparent chaos and tragedy, evidence of law and plan and immense achievement of the human spirit in spite of disasters. I am convinced that the world is not a mere bog in which men and women trample themselves in the mire and die. Something magnificent is taking place here amid the cruelties and tragedies, and the supreme challenge to intelligence is that of making the noblest and the best in our curious heritage prevail.¹⁸

Faith is in truth "that by which men live," and the greater our task, and the more complex the conditions in the midst of which it must be accomplished, the greater the significance of faith. Our study of the meaning and truth of religion has been an effort to make clearly articulate, and freshly to interpret, the living faith which a fully developed ethical religion embodies. And in this third part of our study we have seen that such a faith—which apprehends the souls of

¹⁸ Cf. Will Durant, *On the Meaning of Life*, p. 43.

CREATIVE FAITH

men and the structure and processes of the environing universe as being grounded in a Cosmic Spirit whose nature is creative and redemptive Love, and which finds in communion and co-working with this Divine Spirit the maximum release of human energy and the fulfilment of human destiny—such a faith yields the most valid and adequate interpretation of human experience. Belief in God, then, as a Cosmic Mind and an Eternal Creative Good Will, is not a mere leap in the dark, a venture into the unknown, a “betting of one’s life,” a working hypothesis. It receives rational justification from the synthesis of man’s total experience, when moral and religious experience are integrated with our experience of nature and of history.

But religion, in order to have its true place in such an integration, must be a growing, self-renewing, creative religion. So in the present crisis, as Professor Harry F. Ward insists, it must be achieving “a synthesis of the ethical, the mystical, and the metaphysical experience of God.” Ward finds that “a primary interest in the relation of God to the moral struggle leads directly into an interest in the cosmic problem”; but he also contends that the cosmic problem cannot be solved apart from a living consciousness of God as the Great Companion which bears fruit in moral creativity. With this contention we should heartily agree, provided the significance of a reasoned interpretation of the universe for moral creativity be also fully recognized.¹⁴ In other words, in a dynamic universe such as we find this to be the creative syntheses of ethical religion have the value of a metaphysical revelation.

¹⁴ Cf. *Which Way Religion?* pp. 36–42. Ward’s suggestion that “it is time for theology to put the cosmic problem on the table as unfinished business, to be taken up again when the state of civilization is less urgent,” depreciates the significance of interpretive reason for moral creativity. As he goes on to say: “The essential question about the cosmic energy is whether it is on the side of or indifferent to the achievement of a moral order.” This is a question in the answering of which intuition, interpretive reason, and creative action are alike indispensable.

THE BELOVED COMMUNITY

The dynamic of a living faith, then, needs to be brought into organic relation with the standard, the method, and the diagnosis on which the Building of the Beloved Community depends. Otherwise both the energy and the vision needed for grappling with so great a task will fail us. In the war story, *All Our Yesterdays*, a leading character who has lived through many battles revisits a battle-field with a friend and comrade after the war is over. And when his friend is dismayed at the throngs of sight-seers who know so little of what took place there, he draws from his pocket a book on the last page of which is written his own ultimate philosophy: "Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to dawn. The sun is but a morning star." In this portrayal the fullest realism and an unconquerable faith are united.

A faith which discovers that the transcendent God, who is the ultimate creative ground of the universe and whose inherent nature is Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, is also immanent in human aspirations and idealistic strivings and is most fully manifested in human personalities completely dedicated to the building of the Beloved Community, cannot be other than the supreme spiritual dynamic. It knows this work of building to be part of the achievement of a spiritual universe. It remains undismayed when the work of building is balked and baffled, for it knows the power of sacrificial, redemptive love. It responds eagerly when the constructive task expands into new areas of thought and action, for in exploring these new areas it is confident that the resources of creative love and wisdom are infinite. Such a faith can make religion both the supreme way to spiritual fulfilment and the supreme spring of spiritual power for mankind through the ages.

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INDEX

- Adams, G. P., 180, 221, 429 f.n.
 Adams, James Truslow, 447 f.
 Ames, E. S., 233-238
- Baillie, John, 386-389
 Barrie, Sir James, 17, 45
 Beard, Charles A., 454
 Beauty, idea of, 195-200; mystical experience of, 106
 Bergson, H., 297 ff., 359 f., 368, 369, 376
 Bernard of Clairvaux, 23
 Bixler, J. S., 377, 378
 Boas, F., 328, 329
 Boodin, J. E., 312 ff.
Book of the Dead, 63, 64
 Bridges, Robert, 195
 Brightman, E. S., 426 ff.
 Brunner, H. E., 416 ff.
 Buddha, 21
 Buddhism, the principle of non-resistance, 38, 39
 Burroughs, John, 244
 Burtt, E. A., 258
 Bury, J. B., 332
- Cabot, Richard, 121-123
 Capitalism, 449 ff.
 Chamberlain, H. S., 327-329
 Christian Science, 244
 Christianity, the higher synthesis of religion achieved in, 140-145
 Class struggle, problem of, 446 ff.
 Coe, G. A., 361
 Cohen, M. R., 301, f.n.
 Coleridge, 197
 Confucius, 4, 21, 22, 52
 Cooley, C. H., 362
 Cosmology, the new, its general characteristics, 284
 Courage, capacity of religion to produce, 16, 17
 Creative evolution defined, 6-7
 Crisis, theology of, *see* Theology of Crisis
 Cross, meaning of, 430
 Development defined, 6-7
- Dewey, John, 14, 15, 40 f.n., 175-181, 187-192, 233-236, 340, 355 ff., 363
 Diagnosis, religious, of social problems, 453
 Drake, D., 279
 Dresser, Horatio W., 245
 Dualism, ethical, 422 ff.; in theology of crisis, 416 ff.; within the divine nature, 427 ff.
 Durkheim, E., 55, 56
 Dynamic from ethical religion, 454 ff.
- Eastman, Max, 323, 325
 Eddington, A. S., 280-281
 Eldridge, Seba, 291, 292
 Ellis, Havelock, 102
 Emerson, R. W., 243
 * Ethics, characteristic function of, 89, 90; field of, 78-81; supreme principle of, 85, 86
 Evil, fight with, 410 ff.; transmutation of, 411 ff.
 Evolution, creative, 297-303; defined, 6-7, 294-296; emergent, 304-309
- Faith, 6, 46, 47; active, 410 ff.; creative, 454-456; living, 454 ff.; religious, its nature, 154-156; value for knowledge, 157-165
 Fascism, 443 f.
 Finalism, creative, 301, 302, 309-311
 Freedom, and religious dependence, 370-375; conditioning God's action, 431 ff.; problem of, 365-374
 Frustration, problem of, 402 ff.
- God, and value, Chap. XV; as a Cosmic Moral Will, 154-156, 345; as Cosmic Creative Spirit, 284-287, 311; as Eternal Creative Good Will, 33; as the Absolute, 371 ff.; attributes of, 432 ff.; belief in, Chaps. X-XIII, XV, XVII; doctrine of a finite, 426 ff.; immanence and transcendence, 42,

INDEX

- 43, 345, Chap. XVII, 436; postulate of the existence of, 396
 Golden Rule, 21
 Good, intuition of, 182 ff.; problem of, 399 ff., 405
- Haldane, J. S., 291, 292
 Hardy, Thomas, 394, 395
 Hegel, his philosophy of history, 318-323
 History, and creative personality, 339-342; cycle theory of, 336-339; pluralistic views of, 327-332
 Hobhouse, L. T., 223, 269, 311 ff., 333, 334
 Hocking, W. E., 18, 94, 170, 222, 341, 369 f.n.
 Hyde, Lawrence, 198
- Idealism, philosophical, 219-222
Imitation of Christ, 23
 Immortality, 375-379
 Indeterminacy, principle of, 268 ff.
 Individuality and society, 361, 362
 Inge, W. R., 335, 336
 Integration, of religion and social forces, 13, 52
 Intelligence, creative, 23, 340; creative social, 34
 Interactionism, 358
 Interpenetration, principle of, 94-98
 Intuition, creative, 215-219; defined, 205 f.; of personality, 211-214; of the Good, 180-194; perceptive type of, 212 ff.; synthetic, 208-210
- Jalal al-din Rumi, 22
 James, William, 6, 17, 157-158, 369, 370, 393
 Jeffers, Robinson, 390-392
 Jesus Christ, 3, 141 ff., 155, 229 f., 413, 420 f.
 Justice, social, 40-42
- Knudson, A. C., 170, 365 f.n., 434
- Laird, John, 167
 Laws of physics, as statistical averages, 267 f.
 Leuba, J. H., his estimate of religious mysticism, 124-125
 Love, 20-25; creative and redemptive, 345, 454 f.; mystical, 22-24
 Lovejoy, A. O., 307, 308
- Macintosh, D. C., 410 f.n., 436 f.n.
- Mansfield, Katherine, 412 f.
 Marx, Karl, his philosophy of history, 323-327
 McDougall, Wm., 307
 McGiffert, A. C., 38, 257
 Mechanism, conception of, defined, 269
 Mechanistic viewpoint criticized, 261 ff., 289-293
 Method, for this study, 225; of creative co-operation, 452
 Millikan, R. A., 260
 Milton, John, 36
 Mind-body problem, 351-357
 Mommsen, 448 ff.
 Monotheism, ethical, 127-130
 Montague, Margaret Prescott, her report of mystical experience, 106-107, 121-122
 Montague, W. P., 185, 223, 265, 266, 281, 399, 400, 434, 435; on the Trinity, 435 f.n.
 Moral evil, problem of, 402 ff.
 Morgan, Lloyd, 304 ff.
 Mozoomdar, P. C., 98
 Murray, Gilbert, quoted, 101, 394
 Mysticism, and the spirit of inquiry, 117-120; definition of, 110-112; aesthetic type, 106-107; its capacity for heightening personal energy, 120-124; philosophical type, 107-109; practical type, 104-106; producing social solidarity, 113-116; significance of, 101-112
- Nationalism, 327 ff., 439 ff.
 Naturalism, criticized, 233-241; the dilemma of, 175-178
 Newman, H. H., 290, 291
 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 344, 345, 426
 Noble, E., 309 f.n.
- O'Neill, Eugene, 394
 Organism, as a principle in the new cosmology, 269 ff.; conception of, defined, 269; *versus* mechanism, 289-293
 Otto, Rudolf, the idea of the holy, 73
- Panpsychism, 279-283, 434
 Pantheism, criticized, 242-248
 Pascal, 107-110, 118-119
 Perry, R. B., 187, 188, 193, 303, 304, 378
 Personalism, philosophy of, 365 f.n.

INDEX

- Personality, creative, and history, 339 ff.
 Phenomenalism, 165-173
 Philosophy, anthropocentric, 239; cosmocentric, 239-241; of religion, 13; spiritualistic, 435-437
 Pragmatism, and value theory, 181 ff.; critique of, 187-194
 Pringle-Pattison, A. S., 344
 Profit motive, 449 ff.
 Progress, 340; defined, 6-7; philosophy of, 332-336
 Psychical self possessing unity and uniqueness, 359-364
 Psychology, *Gestalt*, 360 f.
 Pupin, Michael, 265
 Purpose, as a principle in the new cosmology, 285 ff.
 *Quantum theory, 265 ff.
 Racialism, 327 ff.
 Randall, John Herman, Jr., 441, 445
 Realism, 153, 193, 223; and religion, 165-174; social, 168-170
 Reason, religion is capable of producing, 17-20
 Relativity, theory of, 260-265
 Religion, and the social struggle, 451 ff.; as a sense of present possession, 29; as an experience of insight, 60, 62; as an experience of inward power, 56; as an experience of kinship, 53; as an experience of securing spiritual integrity, 63; as an experience of wonder, 68; as an imaginative achievement, 136-138; as an integration of thought and experience, 138-140; as communion with Divine Reality, 131-136; as creative energy, 3-6, 340; as hope, 31; as the creation and conservation of values, 127-130; characteristic function of, 91-93; creative, 11-12, Chap. VI, *et passim*; defined, 74; ethical, 127 ff., 229 f., 132, 133, 134; its field, 82-84; its further development, 8-11; its historic memories, 30, 31; its paradoxes, 51, 52; redemptive, 11-12; supreme principle of, 86-88
 Republic, of Plato, 39
 Rogers, A. K., 319, 322
 Royce, J., 371-375; his doctrine of the Beloved Community, 439
 Russell, Bertrand, 72, 102,
 Salter, Sir Arthur, 444-446
 Salvation, four ways of, 65; the way of loyalty and obedience, 65; the way of realization, 66; the way of renunciation, 66; the way of transformation, 67
 Santayana, George, 19, 101, 176-178, 259
 Schuller, F. C. S., 158
 Schleiermacher, 57, 182
 Science, field of, 80, 150-152
 Sellars, R. W., 354 f.
 Shelley, 198-200
 Simkhovitch, 38
 Sin, 423, 425, 453; and society, 404, 409 ff.; problem of, 403 ff.
 Sinclair, May, 47
 Smith, Robertson, 54, 55
 Smuts, J., 309 f.n.
 Society and individuality, 361, 362
 Soul, human, 358-364
 Spengler, Oswald, 336 ff.
 Spinoza, 247
 Standard in the social struggle, 451
 Standards, new, 43-45
 Suffering, problem of, 400 ff.
 Synthesis, our present task, 145-148; the Christian, 141-145
 Tagore, 123
 Taylor, A. E., 397, 398
 Teggart, F. J., 338 ff.
 Theism, a new, 285-287; defined, 254, 255; ethical, 252 f.; meaning of, 248-255; Neo-Platonic type, 251 f.; Platonic type, 251; pluralistic, 253 f.
 Theology of Crisis, 42; criticized, 416 ff.
 Thomson, J. Arthur, 293-296, 309 ff.
 Time, as being metaphysically real, 431
 Trine, Ralph Waldo, 244
 Troeltsch, E., 332, 342, 343
 Tufts, J. H., 44 f.n.
 Universe, neutral view of, 390-398
 Upanishads, 131-135
 Value, and validity, Chap. VIII; in naturalistic theory, 175-181; problem of relativity of, 181 ff.
 Values, ultimate, Chap. XV.
 Vedic hymn, 68

INDEX

- , attitude of Christianity to-
ward, 38; problem of, 36-39, 442
ff.
- Ward, Harry F., 455
- Ward, James, 267
- Watson, J. B., 351 ff.
- Wells, H. G., 17, 28, 341 f.
- Whitehead, A. N., 259-283, 302, 303,
314
- Wieman, H. N., 381-385
- Will to believe, critical estimate of,
157-165
- Woodbridge, F. J. E., 330, 331
- Woodworth, R. S., 58, 353
- Woolman, John, Journal of, 104,
114-116
- Zoroastrian hymn, 69